Q. General, you are saying that the 1st Cossacks Division left the area of the corps, you also said before that the 1st Cossack Division had been in charge of protecting railway lines; did your corps, that is to say your division in the area no longer have to protect railway lines?
A. Yes, they did. The railway lines in the other part of the corps still had to be protected. These protection measures of other lines were quite a considerable part of the duties of the 373rd division. This included the railway line to Bihac-Banja Luka, which was mainly in the area of the 373rd Division. Also in the area there were elements of the Railway Protection Staff Croatia, which however was not subordinate to my corp, the 15th, but to the 69th.
Q. General, you mentioned just now the 373rd division, let me talk about the field of tasks of that division and once we have cleared that up, let us look at the reports of the area of that division. Let me ask you a preliminary question first. The documents mention that this division 373rd was a so-called Croatian division, and it might well be that the designation Croatian division might start a lot of confusion. We heard this morning and this afternoon quite a bit about the Croatian armed forces, that is the Domobranan the Ustashians, the Ustashinan battalions, and we had reference to the Croation defense and combat units. In the case of the 373rd Croatian division as it is called in the documents; was that an underground formation or why is it that it is called 373rd Croatian division?
A. The 373rd Croatian division as well as the 392nd were what we called Legion divisions, that is to say the officers and N.C.O,s were Germans. Among them there were a large number of Austrians who spoke Croatian. About 70% to 80% of the men were Croatians, the rest were German nationals, German citizens who had up to then lived in Croatia.
Q. May I interrupt you briefly, General, I was just told there was a mistake in the translation. If I understood you correctly, you said that the officers and N.C.O.s were Germans or Austrians who spoke Croatian?
A. Yes, they were not Croatians but were Germans who spoke Croatian., that was the reason why they were called Croatian divisions. They were not divisions who were part of the Croatian armed forces but they were division which were a part of the German Wehrmacht. They could be identified by wearing German uniforms and not Croatian uniforms.
Q. Can you tell us briefly, General, what area was held by the 373rd division?
A. I could perhaps explain that best on the basis of the map of Sketch 1. The 373rd division was in the left sector of the corps in the rear area. I could explain this best by saying that was along the Banja Luka-Bihac railway line and then from Bihac-Knin-Simie there was the main road to Knin, that is to say Bihac to the coast, that was the area which the 373rd Division held.
Q. What was the task of that division in that area, General?
A. The assignment which the division held was first to safeguard this railway line Banja-Luka-Bihac and the safeguarding of the supply road from Bihac to Knin and secondly to keep this divisional area in a state of peace.
Q. What main supply lines were there which had to be safeguarded?
A. As I said before, first the Banja Luka Bihac railway line and the very important road of supplies from Bihac to Knin and up to Knin was held by the 274th Division.
Q. How was the safeguarding of the supply lines to be carried out in actual fact?
A. The important thing was in this to prevent acts of sabotage which were frequent in that part of the world. This was done by having fortified points along that road and we had frequent patrols between these points.
Moreover, if and when necessary, the division could in this area carry out more or less small operations against the bands so that acts of sabotage would be less frequent.
Q. The field of tasks if that division is now quite clear to us, General. Let us now begin to discuss the various incidents which were reported from the area of the division and are contained in the prosecution documents. I shall again observe the chronological sequence. The first instance is contained in a report of 2 November 1943. It is a daily report by the 373rd division to the 15th Mountain Army Corps. It is contained in document book 14 on page 57 of the English version and 35 of the German. It is contained in document NOKW 720, which is exhibit 343, as I mentioned before it is on page 57 of the English book and 35 of the German. It is reported there that the passenger train Bilvac-Bosnia Novi hit a mine near Blatna and as a reprisal measure houses were burned down north of the Una.
The same incident is included in the daily report by the 15th Mountain Army to its superior agency, and that report is submitted in document book 15 on page 13 of both the German and English. That this case we are concerned with exhibit 367 and it is document NOKW 1331. May I add that the same incident has been mentioned in two different documents. Now could you, General, perhaps give us your comments on the basis of prosecution exhibit 361 from document book 14 and the exhibit 343, about what actually happened?
A. It becomes quite clear from exhibit 343 that a mine was released by a wire, across the Una. This wire came from houses north of the Una. Five soldiers and ten civilians were killed and in this instance four soldiers and four civilians were injured and three cars were completely destroyed. The attack was carried out against a perfectly normal passenger train of a civilian railway. The houses which were burned down were deserted. If under those conditions troops burned down houses from which the mine was released, they were destroyed thereby, as I see it, in a perfectly justifiable manner because here we had a definite and positive strong point of the bands.
Q. In the same document, General, there is another incident which occurred in the same locality. The report, which I mean is contained on page 62 of the English document book and page 38 of the German, it is the daily report by the 373rd Division of 6 November 1943. This is how it reads:
"Area Box/Drupa/Dopp during special operation to Ivanjska/ one man and four women arrested and 12 houses burned down as reprisal measures for railroad dynamiting. The population had fled."
Before you gave us your comment on that instance, General. That same incident is once more contained in three other prosecution documents. This report by the 373rd Division of 6 November is contained also in prosecution exhibit 352 in document book 14, document NOKW 807. The report there is contained on page 101 of the English and 75 of the German book. The same incident once more crops up in the daily report by the corps of 6 November and it crops up finally in document book 15 on page 15 of the English and 14 of the German as part of exhibit 367. It crops up again in prosecution document book 14, included in exhibit 358 on page 115 of the English and 89 of the German. This incident has been quoted in other words in four different exhibits.
Having made this clear, I would be grateful, witness, if you would now give us your comments on the contents of this report?
A This reprisal measure cannot be analyzed as an isolated incident.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, as the prosecution in Exhibit 358 have included only part of this incident, I have included further extracts from this report in my own document book, finally to clarify this incident, inasmuch as the incident is of interest to us here. It is contained in Leyser Book IV in Document 34 -- Book II, page 102 -- and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 29.
Q Let me hand you the exhibit, General, and ask you to clear up this incident with the help of our own exhibit.
A In the daily report by the Railroad Security Staff Croatia the reason for the reprisal measure is given. The report reads as follows:
"Locomotive derailed; train fired at and attacked with hand grenades; 36 people dead; 12 injured German soldiers and civilians" An attack of so grave a character seems to justify that houses were burned down which the population had already left and which would have been useful to the bands for further acts of sabotage -justifiable, that is, from a military point of view.
In my opinion, it was quite correct to destroy in reprisal the houses which made it possible for the bands to carry out attacks of this type.
Q General, may I ask you something in this connection. I seem to remember that the burning down of these 12 houses in reprisal was mentioned distinctly in the report by the Railway Security Staff. Is that correct?
A Yes, it is.
Q Now, let us discuss another incident which was also part of the Railway Security Service of the 373rd Division. This incident again is quoted repeatedly in the documents. It turns up in the daily report of the 15th Corps of 11 December 1943. This is contained in Document Book XV on page 7 of the English and page 7 of the German also. The exhibit number there is 365 and the document number is NOKW-1399.
The report is also contained in Document Book XV on page 20 this time of the English in Exhibit 367 which we have quoted before. It is a daily report by the 15th Corps of 11 December 1943. There again a pointer to the 373rd Division is contained.
Q General, may I ask you to make quite clear what this was about?
AAs the 373rd Division reports here, the line from Bihac to Bosnia Novi had been dynamited no less than three times. As reprisal for this, houses were burned down in this area which had been almost entirely evacuated by the population and was, therefore, used by the bands as bases.
Q This, I suppose, is all that can be said about this incident. Let us go on and discuss the next one. This is contained in the daily report by the 373rd Division of 17 December. This report is contained in Document Book 15 on page 10 of the English and page 9 of the German. It is part of prosecution Exhibit 366. It is Document NOKW-728. There the Division reports in its daily report two incidents which are separated from each other, the dynamiting of a line 6 kilometers south of Bosnia-Novi and the derailing of 400 meters of railway tracks near Jakodinja. In both cases 2 hostages were taken and houses burned down. The same incidents are contained also as usual in a number of documents, once again in prosecution exhibit 465, NOKW -1399 in Document Book XV on page 6 of both the English and the German and in the same volume in Exhibit 367 on page 23 of the English and 22 of the German.
General, what can you tell us about these incidents and the reprisal measures?
A These reports show how incidents in these parts increased. I am sure that the troops had announced their intentions of taking reprisal measures and, therefore, I think that as the sabotage acts increased it was necessary for them to take strong action.
Q Then finally in this context we shall discuss incidents which occurred on the 28th of January 1944. The prosecution document which I am referring to here is contained in Document Book XV on page 58 of the English and 85 of the German.
It is Exhibit 370. There the prosecution have only included one sentence. The Division says there in this entry: "Intention arrest of hostages on both sides of the lines southwest of Bosnia-Novi."
As the incident which explains this intention cannot be seen from this document, I myself have included in my document book Leyser II on page 103 further extracts from this prosecution document. I offer it is Leyser Exhibit No. 30. The entry to which I wish to have reference is on page 103 of my document book.
General, may I hand you the photostatic copy and ask you to give us your comments briefly about this matter?
A This daily report shows that the line to Prijedor-Novi had been dynamited at two points, near Kosara an armoured train hit a mine and that the oine near Omarsa had been blown up. It was reported that it was intended to arrest hostages on both sides of the railway line. That's all I can say about that; namely, the intention that hostages should be apprehended.
Q Would you please repeat the last sentence again?
A The daily report shows that the line had once again been dynamited twice, that an armored train had hit a mine, that the line near Omarsca had been blown up and, as intention, the report that hostages should be arrested on both sides of the line.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. May I have the document number again and page number? I take it you are referring to what you now term Leyser Exhibit 30. Will you give the information concerning it again, please?
DR. TIPP: Certainly, your Honors. If the Tribunal please, the report to which I have had reference -- or, rather, to which General von Leyser had reference -- is contained in Leyser Document Book II on page 105, on page 104 -- I beg your pardon. There is no page in the German document book. It is headed: "To Headquarters 2nd Panzer Army Daily Report 28 January 1944" and under "373rd Division," it is reported:
"At the action II 383 west of Prijedor strong partisan group thrown towards the North"; and then they quote enemy dead, their own dead, injured and so forth, and then comes the quotation which General von Leyser gave:
"The following night the railway line Prijedor-Novi has been blown up again at two points. In the area Kozara night attack on strong point repulsed. Armored train struck mine. I coach destroyed, railway line near Omarska blown up." and so forth. This is what General von Leyser just had reference to.
Q And if I understood you correctly, General, from the chronological sequence of these two reports from our own document book and the prosecution document you have drawn the conclusion that the arrest of hostages was done because of these incidents?
A Yes, indeed.
Q. May I draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that this incident is contained in a number of documents submitted by the prosecution. This includes, which becomes clear from the chronological sequence, the daily report by the Army of the 29th of January 1944, as the incident had taken place on the 28th of January, 1944. The report has been submitted twice in order to add to the clarity of matters; first, in Exhibit 370 in Document Book 15 on Page 59 of the English and 86 of the German. The report turns up again in the some wording in Document Book 25, where it is Exhibit 570. This is Prosecution Document NOKW 1772, page 59 English and 46 German. Would you, General, look at Document Book 25 and at Page 46 of the German and tell us what that shows us?
A. This daily report makes it clear that the Prijedor-Novi line again was dynamited, and that because of these many incidents twenty-nine hostages were arrested on both sides or the railway. This report, therefore, reports that the measure was carried out; namely, that the twenty-nine hostages had in fact been arrested. It was only a threat in the previous document. As these incidents increased to such an extent, the arrests of hostages, in order to safeguard this important line, seems to me utterly a military necessity. If things calm down the hostages will be released, of course, and in most cases it was shown that after hostages had been arrested, the sabotage actions discontinued.
Q. May I ask you something additionally in this connection? This brings us to the end of the problems concerning the 373rd Division. Have you found out whether in any of the documents submitted by the prosecution there is any indication that in the area of 373rd division there was, because of such sabotage acts, a reprisal measure which was actually carried out; that is to say, that hostages were shot or hanged.
A. I am afraid I haven't quite followed your question. Would you please repeat?
Q. What I asked you, General, was that---------we have found a number of documents that the 373rd Division has arrested hostages. Let me ask you, in addition thereto, have you found in any of the documents of the prosecu tion that actually hostages arrested were executed in the area of the 373rd Division?
A. No, the documents show beyond a doubt, although the 373rd Division reports frequently that hostages were arrested, but there is not a single case where they report that these hostages were killed afterwards. This, in my opinion, shows that the arrest of the hostages by itself was effective as a deterrent measure. As I said before, if things calmed down in that region, the hostages were released.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. Before we adjourn, I want to say that the adjournment will be until November 12, 1947, at 9:30. In making this announcement, I think we should further state that the Tribunal will be in session for the following Saturday, so that we can make up at least some of the time. The Tribunal with stand adjourned at this time until November 12th at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 November 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 12 November 1947, 0930-1630, Judge Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal 7 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the Courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, have you ascertained as to whether or not all the defendants are present in the Courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed with the examination.
ERNST VON LEYSER - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, before our recess we talked about the railway security service done by your division and the last thing we discussed was Exhibit 6570, which is in Document Book 25. The blowing up of railroads in the Area 373d Division has thus come to an end. Is there anything you want to say in conclusion about this problem?
A I should like to draw attention in this connection to the fact that it was, of course, strictly forbidden to all civilians to enter the neighborhood of the railway lines. This is the reason why all civilians who were found there, especially at night, were described as suspects and it was considered that they might be connected with the sabotage acts and they were, therefore, apprehended.
Q Could you, perhaps, say something more general about the relationship between blowing up of railway lines and reprisal measures carried out?
AAs a matter of principle I should state this: Reprisal measures were not carried out by the troop for every single case, as might be suspected from the documents submitted by the prosecution. Reprisal measures were carried out only if and when the sabotage acts became too excessive in spite of the fact that there were constant warnings to desist from these acts. In order to safeguard the troops it was entirely necessary to take stringent measures.
DR. TIPP: If the Tribunal please, I would like to offer a document in this connection which is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 108; it is Leyser Document 37. The prosecution have used NOKW 1772for brief extracts only and this might give the impression......May I repeat my sentence? The prosecution have included in their documents, daily reports, from which it might be concluded that there had been reprisal measures for every single act of sabotage. In order to correct that impression, I have taken from the Prosecution Document NOKW 1772, extracts, for the Leyser Document No. 37, which I have just mentioned. These are daily reports and they show that reprisal measures were not taken for every case of a railway line blown up. I should like to offer Leyser Document No. 37 as Exhibit 31. To illustrate what I have said just now, I would like to draw attention to a few points. On page 108 of Document Book 2, there is, first, a daily report of 8 February 1944. This is a report by the 373d Division, the last sentence of which says: "Line 11 kilometers SE Prijedor again practicable after temporary destruction by blasting." Neither the intention of a reprisal measure is mentioned here nor the fact that one was carried out. The next entry is a daily report of 9 February 1944, here again a report by the 373d Division. It says: "On the railroad line Banja-Luka-Prijedor, between Kozarac and Hadzimetric, 400 meters of rails torn up, bridge blasted. Line repaired, except bridge." Here again no intention is mentioned of carrying out a reprisal measure, nor that one was carried out. Then we have a daily report of the 23d of February 1944 and about the 1st Cossack Division it says:
"...Railroad line Sisak-Zagreb blasted between Odra and Gorica. Line again practicable." In the same report there is a notation about the 373rd Division which says: "Telephone lines between Suvaja and SRB interrupted by sawing off of 15 poles in the night of 20 to 21." Then it is reported what the troop intends to do, it says: "Reoccupation of Cazin." It seems to me that this is sufficient to clear up this point. I might draw attention, in this connection, to the fact that similar cases of sabotage occurred without reprisal measures, also mentioned in my Exhibit 30, which is Leyser Document No. 35, on page 103 of Document Book 2.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q Now, witness, please continue. You said that the Division, apart from their railway security service, had also the assignment of advancing on the bands who opposed law and order, and you called these "Operations." We also have a number of incidents concerning these operations, which we should discuss now. The first report about an operation of that type is contained in Document Book 15 of the Prosecution, on page 15 of the English and Page 14 of the German. The document is NOKW-1331 and the Exhibit number is 367. I am talking about a daily report by the Corps of 6 November 1943. According to that report, which I shall hand to you, Brecovac was taken in the teeth of enemy resistance and 26 civilians who were suspected of being members of bands, (Communist Committee), were arrested. Will you tell us something about that report, General?
A. The population of villages which we had taken were screened. As the members of the bands could not be ascertained wearing no insignia, those who were suspects were apprehended in order to safeguard the security of the troops. In this particular village the bands had established what was known as a local communist committee, which, of course, included the most active members of the bands. It was therefore absolutely necessary to apprehend those people in order to safeguard the security of our own troops. That is the purpose of this report.
Q. What happened to those people who were suspects?
A. They were arrested and they were screened. If nothing could be found against them they were released; otherwise they were kept in custody.
Q. Another operation by the 373rd Division is contained in a daily report by your Corps dated 8 November 1943. This report is contained in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, on page 63 of the English and 39 of the German. It is part of Exhibit 343 and the document number is NOKW-720. Would you please give us your comments about the report which I just handed you?
A. This report describes that a unit of the Division mopped up the Kamensco Area according to plan. The population had left and the area had been evacuated. Therefore all we could have there were band strong points or at least people who were suspect of being members of the bands. As I see it, it was militarily entirely correct and justifiable if the troops destroyed the barracks which they found in that area and also destroyed any supplies of the bands which they found there inasmuch as they could not carry them with them. The arrest of people there who were suspects was also a military necessity. As I see it, it would have been much simpler and less dangerous for our own troops to do the same thing which enemy pilots would do - namely to destroy these strong points by incendiary bombs and other bombs; but in that case, innocent women and children would be killed, whereas we simply arrested them and if we had nothing against them, released them again.
Q. The next report concerning an operation is contained in Document Book XV of the Prosecution, on page 15 of the English and also of the German. This is exhibit 367 and it is Document No. NO1331. Let me hand you this report, General, and I should like to quote briefly from it: "Combat Group Muenchhausen made a surprise thrust into the area 25 kilometers east of Banja Luka. By means of strategem, 2 band leaders taken care of." What would you like to say about that?
A. This document is self-explanatory. Here we have a mopping up, operation in the course of which, 2 band leaders were shot. To use a strategem is scarcely something which violates the customs of war. I cannot tell you more about it from my own knowledge because I don't remember it any more.
Q. Then we should touch upon a daily report by the same division of 19 November 1943, contained in Document Book 14, in Exhibit 353. The document number is NOKW-786. This is on page 103 of the English and 76 of the German Document Book. This report once again produces the expression "1 bandit shot." Can you tell us something about this when you look at the document? What is meant by this expression?
A. The document explains itself. When the troop was on a reconnaissance operation they encountered an enemy patrol and on that occasion one bandit was shot - in combat, in other words.
Q. There is something else we should clear up. Why does the troop, in their reports, use the term "member of a band shot" if it is so obvious that it was a combat action, although the expression really conveys, according to the German usage, that there was not a combat action involved?
A. The German soldier uses the term "to fall in battle" for every soldier who loses his life in open battle after having fought for his Fatherland.
That expression, however, is used only if the man killed has been a soldier; but in these fightings we were facing an enemy whom the troops did not regard as a soldierly opponent and in this connection they used the term "shot" and not the term "fallen in battle." This combination of words, I should like to say, is based on an emotional thing; but, as I see it, it is clear to anybody who knows how the German soldier expresses himself.
Q. The same term, that is to say, "shot", is contained in another daily report from the area of the same division. This is the daily report of 20 April 1944, contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution, on page 81 of the English and page 123 of the German. It is Prosecution Document NOKW - 1416, Exhibit 389. There the Division reports that south of Dolja, 1 bandit was shot and 3 of the suspects arrested. Will you please look at the report and give us your comments about that incident?
A. Here again we have a report about a combat action which becomes clear from the fact alone that in the report one man is reported as shot and three as arrested. Had the man been shot only after having been arrested, the Division would have reported four bandits arrested, one of whom was shot.
Q. Now, I would like to ask you, General, to look at the same document book. The report you just mentioned was contained on page 123 and on the next page you will find a daily report of 22 April. Here again the 373rd Division reports that one prisoner was brought in and one bandit was shot. I think you can be quite brief about this.
A. The same applies which I said before. Had the man concerned been shot after being arrested, the Division would have reported two people taken prisoner, one of whom was shot. In other words, this again was a combat action.
Q. General, then please look at page 125 in your document book. It is on page 85 of the English version. There we have a daily report by the Corps, of 24 April 1944.
This is a report by the 373rd Division about Operation Klettersteig. In the prosecution Document Book there is only a brief extract from this report. It says there "Operation Klettersteig. In the course of forward thrusts by the 3rd Battalion, 383rd Regt., into the Area Turovac-Jelovac, bandits repelled, 5 villages burned down." This brief extract did not seem comprehensible to us and I have therefore included the whole of the report into my document book. This document is contained in my Document Book 2, on page 113. It is Leyser Document 39, and it is offered as Leyser Exhibit 32. This is a daily report of 24 April 1944. I should like to read the contents of the document, inasfar as it is interesting here, into the record. Leyser Document Book 2, page 114: "Daily Report of 24 April 1944. 373rd Division: Operation 'Klettersteig': In the course of forward thrust by III/383 (3rd Battalion 383rd Regt) in the Turovac-Jelovac area, bandits dislodged, 5 villages burned down, 16 enemy dead, 3 prisoners, 1 of our own officers dead, 4 ammunition dumps blew up when villages were burnt down."
Q. General, on the basis of the whole report, could you explain to us why the villages were burnt down?
A. This is what becomes clear from the report. These small villages in the mountains, and this is why we called the operation "Klettersteig", (Mountain Pass) were used by the bands as hiding places and strong points. No less than four ammunition dumps had been established by them there. The operation "Klettersteig" meant a forward thrust to the very center of the bands. To destroy these strong points of the bands was definitely a military necessity. In Croatia the term "village" by the way, particularly up in the mountains should not be compared to any village in Western Europe. These villages consisted as a rule of a few huts and if any ammunition blew up then, needless to say, nothing much would remain of a village of that type.
Q. The last report from the area of the 373rd Division is contained in the daily report of your Corps of 12 June 1944; it is contained in Prosecution Document Book XXV, on page 104 of the English and 81 of the German. This is Prosecution Exhibit 575. The document number is NOKW 1767. This report mentions that on the 10th of June in the course of the "Urwald" Operation (Jungle Operation), a strong point of the bands was encountered and medical huts were found there too. This strong point was destroyed. Can you explain this incident also?
A. Here again the same applies as I have said just now. This is an operation directed against the bands, a forward thrust into a center of band resistance. As mentioned before the bands would also select difficult mountain areas for their basis and that is where they usually kept the ammunition and supply dumps, huts for accommodation, etc. As the bands evaded our operations the troops had only the possibility to prevent the bands in their doings by making a thrust into their very center of resistance and take them away from them. It was in the course of an operation of that sort that the troop in the case of the Operation "Urwald", as reported here, encountered a strong point of that type and that strong point was destroyed.
It is obvious that the strong point had been deserted because no mention is made of prisoners wounded or killed. As I see it, it in no way is contradictory to the laws of war to destroy accommodations used by the enemy. It would have been much simpler to send up a squadron of bombers and to destroy the area by bombs, but we didn't have them.
Q. The 373rd Division needs no longer be discussed now, General, inasmuch as it concerns the XV Corps. I shall now discuss a few Prosecution Exhibits offered against you. These are the Exhibits 390, 391 and 392; all of them are contained in Document Book XVI. The first Exhibit 390 is on page 88 of the English and 128 of the German in Document Book XVI. It is Prosecution Document NOKW 788. The letter to which I have reference now is a teletype letter by the XV Army Corps to the 69th Corps of 20 May 1944. The Prosecution made a remark when they presented their evidence and it ran something like this: "This is a teletype letter by the XV Mountain Corps addressed to the 69th Reserve Corps, one of the units subordinate to it." This observation on the part of the Prosecution is contained in the record of 6 August on page 1514 of the German and 1516 of the English record. Let me ask you again, General, was the 69th Corps ever subordinate to you?
A. No, the 69th Corps was never subordinate to me. It was a Corps on the same level as the 15th Corps and subordinate to the Army.
Q. The three exhibit numbers which I have just mentioned, that is to say, 390, 391, and 392, all of them refer to the Operation "Schach", (Chess). General, what can you tell us quite generally about that operation? Was it an operation carried out by your Corps?
A. The Operation "Schach", was an operation ordered by the Army but the 69th Corps was to lead it.
I, myself, had nothing to do with it.
Q. The fact that this is not an operation by the XVth Corps but one by the 69th Corps becomes clear from a document which I have submitted. This is Leyser Document 28 and it was offered as Exhibit 28. It is the War Diary by the XVth Corps dated 1 January 1944 and it goes through until 13 June 1944. On page 85 of my Document Book II there is an entry of 19th of May 1944. I would like to quote:
"According to army field order, XV Mountain Corps with motor. Regiment 92, Mountain Artillery Battalion 54 and 1 regimental group of the 2nd Croat Mountain Brigade will participate in the operation of the LXIX Army Corps for the mopping-up of the Kordun and Banija."
Then there is an entry as to whom was to lead these units. General, under what division were these units otherwise?
A. These units were otherwise subordinate to the 373rd Division and for this particular operation they were put at the disposal of the 69th Corps and subordinated to them.
Q. You are saying, Witness, that this was an operation not by your Corps but one carried out by the 69th Corps which was not subordinate to you. But, as you said just now, you had 2 second units of the 373rd Division which usually was subordinate to you. Who issued orders to these units? How were matters reported during such operations, etc.?
A. The channels of Command and of reporting in the case of these operations were laid out very clearly. How it was handled was that the commanding unit which in this case was the 69th Corps would have the units usually subordinated to the 373rd Division and sent their orders to them which means that the newly subordinate units would receive their orders and assignments by the 69th Corps.
Q. If I have followed you correctly, General, the XV Corps in other words was not connected with this operation?