I would like to deal with paragraph 4 of this report which contains the reprisal measures for the murder of General Krech and of three men of his escort detachment and 5 men who were severely wounded.
It says in this report which is, as I said, dated 30 April, that on the 1st of May, one day later, 200 hostages were to be shot. Furthermore, according to the report, 100 Communists have been shot by Greek volunteer units.
This incident is also mentioned in the following documents: in the same Document Book XVIII, in Exhibit 438, NOKW-654, on page 62 of the English text and of the German text: in Document Book XX, in Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 141 of the English and 102 of the German text; in Document Book XXI, Exhibit 490, NOKW-1554, on page 82 of the English text and page 72 of the German text; also in Document Book XXV, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 81 and 82 of the English and 63 and 64 of the German; finally in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804, on page 121 and 122 of the English and pages 92 and 93 of the German.
General, what are your comments on this incident?
A I certainly remember this incident because a divisional commander was killed in this attack. I learned of it in Salonika where I had been since the 21st of March as deputy for General Loehr. There I heard that the truck-convoy of General Krech had been attacked and that he had been shot during this attack; also 3 members of his escort were shot and 5 were wounded. The attack occurred along the highway between Moleioe, M o l e i o e, and Monemwassia, M o n e m w a s s i a. I will point it out on the map. That is the southeast corner of the Peleponnes. One company was stationed in Monemwassia. This was a naval base and it was stationed there to strengthen the naval forces and, apparently, General Krech was there to inspect that particular unit.
I was also informed that Colonel Papagondonas, through his Greek volunteers, had ordered as a reprisal measure for the losses incurred during that particular attack, to have 100 Communists or band suspects shot. Only here in the documents did I read that, apart from these, 200 other Communists were supposed to have been shot in Athens. I cannot make any statements about this. I don't know who could have ordered that shooting in Athens.
On the afternoon of the 30th of April I returned to Athens from Salonika and on the next day I took over again the leadership of the corps. Therefore, I could not even attend the funeral of General Krech whom I know from earlier days. Also I know his family. He had 6 or 7 children, to the best of my recollection.
Q General, I would like to ask you to clear up for us a difference in figures. In the war diary of the 68th Corps in Exhibit 480 in Document Book XX of the prosecution on page 141 of the English text and 102 of the German text, 335 Communists and band suspects are mentioned as having been shot. On the other hand, in the I-a report of the 68th Corps dated 2 May 1944, which is Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 82 of the English and 64 of the German, in Document Book XXV, only 325 Communists and band suspects are reported as having been shot, amongst them 200 in Athens and 125 on the Peleponnes.
How do you explain this discrepancy in figures?
A Inaccuracies occurred quite frequently in the reports. The liaison officer of the Corps Headquarters to Colonel Papagondonas, Colonel Papagondonas, Aptain Dietl, reported to me a number of 100 shot by the Greeks. I am very sure that I recollect that correctly. These were shot near Tripolis on the Peloponnes where the staff of Papagondonas was located. No shootings were carried out by the troops of the LXVIIIth Corps in Athens. I am in no position to clear up this discrepancy in figures authoritatively.
Q In your opinion, what caused Colonel Pagondonas to have 100 men shot for the Murder of General Krech and his escort?
A I said just now that Papagondonas' staff was located near Tripolis on the Peloponnes. In the same area there was also located the staff of the 41st Fortress Division which had, up to then, been led by General Krech. The close proximity in which the two staffs fund themselves had led to close military and tactical cooperation. A number of minor problems, such as equipment, training, etc., had to be discussed and considered. I can quite well imagine that Colonel Papagondonas had discussed these problems with General Krech. Furthermore, the Fortress Division had constantly occupied the coastal sectors, and these coastal sectors, or rather the rear strong points, were supported to a great extent by the volunteer units of Colonel Papagondonas. These units led each other and supported each other. I know of a number of fights which took place where parts of the Fortress Division used the volunteer units. Thus I can explain and can well imagine how Colonel Papagondonas and his staff felt about this attack against General Krech; they also realized that their own security of these units of the fortress which were so closely allied to the Fortress Division. There might also be some other human factors which played apart in this decision; I don't know.
Q This will bring me to Document Book XIX where, first of all, I would like to discuss Exhibit No. 449, on Page 37, ff. in the English and Page 35 ff.
in the German text, which is Document NOKW-755. Here we have Daily Reports by the Commander in Chief Southeast. I would like to deal with Page 55 of the English text, which is Page 68 of the German text. It states here in the report dated the 21st of July 1943 that "East of Amalias, Group IV, Fortress Infantry Battalion 999 fired on by band. As reprisal two hostages were shot. One locality was burned down."
General, do your remember that particular incident?
A In the material available to me this report is dated the 31st of July.
Q That is what I said, or did I make a mistake?
A I believe you said the 21st.
Q No, the 31st is correct.
A I remember that surprise attack very clearly, particularly so because it was the first clash between German troops and bands on the Peloponnes, in the middle of the summer 1943. The Regimental Commander Colonel Brueckner, whom I went to see sometime later, reported to me as follows: Already some days prior to the 31st of July his troops had been fired on near the same locality. This incident is also contained in the War Diaries which were sent from Washington. There under the 28th of July this incident is mentioned. As a consequence two hostages were arrested and a warning was announced to the population of the village of Geraki. On the 30th of July the attack occurred, which is mentioned in the document, and this, as I said, was the second surprise attack of this kind, and, as a consequence the Colonel fulfilled his threat and shot the two hostages and burned down the village. In his opinion a military necessity to carry out this measure existed. He could not allow any threat by bands in this rear of his position. The measure which he took was completely successful. In that particular sector there was peace for almost one year after that. I mentioned yesterday that, in my opinion, it is impossible to say now after four years what the actual situation was at the time and to reconstruct things as seen and evaluated at the time by the responsible commander.
Tension existed at the time because of the threat of a landing by the Allies in the Eles area, as there were plains there which were very well suited for landings on a large scale. The whole tendency as it was felt and realized at that time can no longer be reconstructed here in the courtroom today. At best one could compare the situation of the fights which take place today in Macedonia and Thrace, but still there is a big difference. The Greek troops fight only against the insurgents. They do not have to fear a landing in their rear which had to be expected at that time if we consider the German situation.
Q General, just before we discussed this incident you said that that was the first clash between German troops and bands in the middle of the summer of 1943. I would like to eliminate any misunderstanding right away. Do you mean it was the first clash with the bands?
A In my opinion it was altogether the first clash with the bands.
Q Altogether the first one?
A Yes, altogether the first clash between the German troops and the bands.
Q That brings me to Page 61 of the English text, which is Page 78 of the German text. Here we find a Daily Report of the Commander in Chief Southeast, addressed to the OKW, dated the 23rd of August 1943. According to this report, near Tripolis on the Peloponnes, band attacks occurred against German soldiers. In this connection two suspected localities where explosives and munitions were found were burned down. This incident is also dealt with in Document Book XX, Exhibit No. 472, NOKW-1246, on Page 87 of the English text and page 62 of the German text. Also in Document Book XXIV, Exhibit No. 544, Document No. NOKW-1761, on Page 207 of the English text and Page 158 of the German text.
General, do you remember that incident?
A No, I can't remember any details, nor can I explain that.
Q At this point I would like to draw attention to the following: In the photostat this Daily Report is contained as follows: "Area Nautia-Argos, two parachutists, presumably British arrested. Radio equipment and code material captured. Operation First Brandenburg Regiment in the Kyseiron Mountains concluded without any mentionable results. In the area south and southwest of the Parnas Mountains allegedly two medium strong bands. In mopping up, 1st Mountain Police Regiment 18, Southwest of Lamia, carried out several arrests, and captured weapons and munitions. Operation Combat Group 104 Light Infantry Division, in the area north of area Amphilokia, small enemy resistance was carried out according to plan. In the localities explosions and munitions were secured and the localities destroyed. Band suspected Monastery near Amphilokia was set on fire by airplanes."
General, what are your comments on this report?
A The two parachutists who were captured in the Argolis area turned out to be Creeks when they were interrogated later on by members of the Secret Field Police. I remember that incident very clearly because that was the first time we succeeded in apprehending such parachutists. After it had been established that they were Greek members of the Exile Government in Cairo they were taken to the Attilos prison in Athens, since the Military Commander was competent to judge Greek nationals. The operations of the First Brandenburg Regiment and of the 1st Police Regiment 18, near Lamia, were carried on outside the Peloponnes area. At that time, in August -- I believe the date is 23rd August -- only the LXVIIIth Corps and I were on the Peloponnes. I had nothing to do with either Boeotion or the Greek mainlands. The 104th Light Infantry Division, which is also mentioned, was not subordinated to me. Also the events in the area of Amphilokia near the Monastery took place outside the area of my Corps. At that time we were stationed on the Peloponnes.
Q In Exhibit No. 544, which I mentioned before and which deals with the same incident, it is said, by the way, that the place was not Tropea, but Doka. Are those two different localities?
A In Greek maps one can frequently find two names for one locality. One of the names is Greek and the other one is frequently of Albanian or Turkish origin. As Professor Stadtmueller explained to me -- at one time when we made a trip through the Peloponnes and encountered similar things -- M-E-T-A-X-A-S, Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister in 1935, had ordered that the Greek names were to he entered on the maps next to the old traditional names of Turkish and Albanian origin. So we experienced at one time, when we made a test, that old inhabitants of a village knew the old Turkish or Albanian name of their place, but they had no idea of the new Greek name which had been given to that particular place. That is my explanation for the two names.
Q On Page 64 in the English text and Page 82 in the German text it is said in the Daily Report of Army Group E, dated the 12th of September 1943, under the heading "Army Group Southern Greece," that, "During mopping-up operation of Levadia 200 band suspects were arrested. Ammunition was found; the locality was partly burned down. A reprisal measure for one murdered German soldier ten Greeks were hanged. What are your comments on this entry, General?
A During the morning of the 9th of September I had taken over Army Group Southern Greece, which had left the Peloponnes, and Levadia was from then on within the area of the Army Group. Since we were pretty busy with the transportation of the Italians and all other questions connected with the Italian capitulation, I can no longer remember this particular incident.
Q That brings me to Page 70 of the English text, which is Page 94 of the German text. Here we have a Daily Report of the Headquarters of Army Group E, addressed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, dated the 7th of November 1943. According to this, "In the area of the 68th Corps in Tripolis, 18 Communists were shot as a reprisal for railroad sabotage committed lately." The same incident is also dealt with in Document Book XX, Exhibit 470, NOKW-1355, on Page 65 of the English text and Page 48 of the German text. Also, in Exhibit 474, NOKW-1257, on Page 95 of the English and Page 66 of the German text. The shooting of these 18 Communists was a retaliation measure against a surprise attack on a train, on the 27th of October 1943 near Aighion.
Do you remember that incident, General?
AAighion is along the route Corinth-Agras, but I do not remember the incident itself, nor can I reconstruct the details of the incident. I have no indications on which I could base any such statement. I did not find anything in the War Diary.
Q From Felmy Document Book V I shall, in this connection, submit Document No. 108, on Page 76. This will be offered as Felmy Exhibit No. 46. It is a supplementary excerpt from this Prosecution document NOKW-755, in Document Book XIX. It says here, on Page 76, on the top, "LXVIIIth Corps: 18 Communists shot in Tripolis in reprisal for the recent act of railway sabotage." On Page 77 it says: "LXVIIIth Corps: Band attack"--behind the words band attack in brackets is '70.'"--on German freight train near Aighion; we had some losses and some missing. The shock unit brought into action has made no contact with the enemy. Reprisal measures begun. Eighteen Communists in Tripolis in reprisal."
This brings me to page 71 of the English and 95 of the German Book. Here we have a daily report of Army Group E darted 13 November. According to this, in Geruthrey, 80 suspects were arrested and brought to labor assignment camp. General, can you tell us something about this incident?
A That band members were to be made available for labor assignment was in compliance with a directive from the O.K.W. dated from the summer 1943. I can no longer recall this particular incident.
Q Now, would you please turn to page 72 of the English Document Book XIX? Here, under 68th Corps, you find a report from the high Command of Army Group E addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 20 November. According to this, amongst others, near Makrokomi German trucks were attacked by band. This band was defeated by a shock unit committed for this operation, under heavy losses, and the village Makrokomi was burned down. The same incident is discussed in Document Book XX, in. Exhibit 472, NOKW 1246, on page 89 of the English text and page 63 of the German text, that is, War Diary, No. 3 of the 68th Corps Headquarters : the entry is dated 19 November 1943. General, did you know about that incident at the time?
A This incident also I can no longer recall. Makrokomi is located in the Sperchaios Valley. This was the communication route of the bands via Karpenision to the Epirus Mountains. I will show that on the map, (pointing) here is Makrokomi and here is Karpenision.
Q In order to deal with this also while we are discussing the subject, I would like to draw attention to Exhibit 470 in Document Book 20. The page in which I am interested is 70 of the English and 50 of the German text. In a teletype of the 68th Corps a certain village 30 kilometers west of Lamia is mentioned. General, is that the same incident which we discussed just now?
A The assumption can be easily made that the same locality is concerned in both reports because the statement "30 kilometers west of Lamia" allows this conclusion.
Q That brings me to page 77 of the English text and page 103 of the German text. Here we have a report dated 19 December. According to this report, in Sparta, a band attack on an air force liaison unit was repulsed by the 2nd Company of the Regiment 737 without own losses. The band leader was shot. Do you know this incident, general?
A No. On the 20th of December I flew home, on leave; therefore, this report would not have reached me. It shows, however, that the band leader was shot during a combat action, when he and his band carried out a surprise attack on the air force liaison unit. Therefore this can in no way represent a reprisal measure.
Q The last report of importance in this document is on page 78 of the English text and page 105 of the German text. It is a daily report of Army Group E, dated 30 December. According to this, during clashes between Greek volunteers and Communists, during raids in suburbs of Athens, 7 Communists were shot and 107 suspects were arrested. Would you please give us your opinion on this, General?
A On the 30th of December, which is the date under which this report is issued, I was on leave. The report shows, however that the volunteer units concerned were volunteers of the Evzones, which were organized in Athens by the Higher----SS and the Police Leader and which were subordinate to him. The Corps had no connection whatever with the Evzones and certainly had no jurisdiction over them. That this incident is reported under 68th Corps by the Army Group is only proof for the fact that the events which occurred in the Corps Area were frequently reported under the heading of the Corps.
Q That brings us to the end of Document Book XIX and I should now like to deal with document book XX. The first document in which I am interested in this book is NOKW 1551, Exhibit 458, on page 3 of the English text, which is page 2 of the German document book --the daily report West dated 22 March 1944; and on page 141 of the English text, which is page 102 of the German text, we have an entry from the War Diary of the 68th Corps under 20 March 1944.
In both reports a sabotage act on the railroad line Corinth-Athens is mentioned. The train hit a mine and was fired on by bands. Several cars with supplies were burned out. According to the report which I mentioned first, the reprisal measure taken was 50 hostages shot. Do you remember that incident, General?
A No, I do not remember that particular case. As I said just before, unfortunately that was an almost daily occurrence so that I cannot possibly distinguish between all the individual incidents which occurred.
Q The next report with which I would like to deal is one dated 3 April 1944, on page 4 of the English text and page 3 of the German Document Book. According to this report, as a reprisal measure for surprise attacks on our own trucks between Levadia and Delphi, 10 Communists were shot. The same incident can be found in Document Book 25, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 77 of the English text and page 60 of the German text. What can you tell us about this, General?
A In the area which is mentioned here, namely Levadia and Delphi, the 18th Police Regiment was committed, which, as is known, was not subordinate to the Corps but, instead, to the Higher SS and Police Leader. There are several reports dated around the 25th of April about surprise attacks along that highway, I remember those later ones but I do not remember the first incident.
Q Do you mean the surprise attack on the column of the Commander of the Traffic Police?
A Yes, that is the one I mean. This again is a summary of reports which took place in the area of the 68th Corps; but no units subordinate to the Corps participated in these actions.
Q With such reports are you referring to the events in the area of the 18th Police Regiment which are, for instance, mentioned in Exhibit 437, on page 32 of the English text and 43 of the German text?
A Yes; that is the area where the 18th Police Regiment was committed at that time and that is the area where this regiment carried out band fights independently.
Q This incident is also mentioned in a number of other documents. They are in Document Book 18: Exhibit 438, NOKW-654, on page 62 in both the English and the German texts; in Exhibit 439, NOKW-647, on pages 84 and 86 of the English text and 82 and 84 of the German text; in Document Book 20 in Exhibit 479, NOKW-1356, on page 135 of the English text and page 97 of the German text; Exhibit 480, NOKW-1065, page 142 of the English text and page 103 of the German text: further, in Document Book 25, in Exhibit 571, NOKW-1667, on page 78 of the English text and page 61 of the German text; also on pages 79 and 80 of the English text and 62 of the German text; finally, in Exhibit 579, NOKW-1804), on pages 121 to 123 of the English text and pages 92 to 94 of the German text. General, are all these events connected with the surprise attack just mentioned?
A Yes, those are the events which are mentioned under the 25th of April. I would assume that reprisal measures in this case were carried out by the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q On page 6 of the same document, under the area of the 68th Corps, from the OKH., the following is reported: "During the night of the 24th of April, a British commando operation was carried out against Island Santorin. The Navy transmitter did not function. In Athens during large scale raids, altogether 126 persons were arrested. Weapons and ammunition were captured. 15 Communists were shot. Along the road Athens-Thebes, a train hit a mine and derailed. The main railroad line was interrupted for about 8 hours." What are your comments on this general?
A That is a typical example which I have pointed out on several occasions. In this case an incident is mentioned by the OKH which not only had no connection with any troop units in the area of the 68th Corps but did not even occur in the Corps area - but instead on an island in the Mediterranean, north of Crete. Only because the highest agencies had a situation map in the proportion of 1 to 1,000,000 where there was only a small space left for my special entries, everything which occurred in Southern Greece had to be reported under the common designation of 68th Corps. I would again like to point out the Island Santorin on the map.
(Indicates on map) This island is located north of Crete. The raids in Athens were not carried out by the 68th Corps. Such operations in Athens came within the sphere of the Higher SS and Police Leader who used for this purpose, Evzones, gendarmerie detachments and policemen. I do not remember this sabotage attack on a railroad line which a train hit a mine and was derailed.
Q This brings me to the next document in this Document Book, which is Exhibit 459. On page 11 of the English text, which is page 9 of the German text, it is reported in the War Diary of Army Group E, under 68th Corps, - "On the road Argos-Tripoli, motor convoys III 670th Artillery Regiment - 1 Officer and 95 men - attacked by bands. Our losses 25 dead 25 wounded, 6 missing. Pursuit of the bands by detachments of 737th regiment under way. The measures taken as a result of the Peleponnese being declared a combat zone are being reported currently." General, do you remember this particular report?
A I remember this incident very well indeed. The commander of the Artillery Regiment of the 117th Division had held a training course for mountain shooting and on the return march back to the garrison one of the columns was attacked. This surprise attack was the immediate cause to declare the Peleponnese a combat zone which had been intended for some time. Despite the heavy losses, no reprisal measures were taken because, with the declaration of the Peleponnese as a combat zone, a new road was taken towards the final elimination of these bands.
Q What were these special measures?
A When the Peleponnese was declared a combat zone, General von LeSuire received special rights. The area was no longer under the administration of the Military Commander and, with the executive powers, also territorial rights were transferred into General von Lesuire's hands. He himself could establish blocked-off zones; he could issue curfew hours; he could restrict the traffic along the roads, the traffic of the ships and of the railroads; and he could take similar measures along that line in order to eliminate the communications of the bands and also to prevent leading band members from entering the Peleponnese, there had been a fairly active exchange between leading band members along the Gulf of Corinth; we knew that.
Q What effect did the declaration of the Peleponnese as a combat zone have on the supply of Athens?
AAthens had two sources of supply; one was Attica, where Athens is actually located, and the second one was the Peleponnese. From the Peleponnese they received in Athens mainly fruit and vegetables. Through the blocking-off measures which became a military necessity, through the restriction of traffic, the supply of the capital seemed somewhat threatened Ignoring the military interests we loosened these restrictions on traffic. We did not want to harm the supply of the capital of the country and, instead, consciously exposed ourselves to the military disadvantages which we had.
Q Did the declaration of the Peleponnesse as a combat zone show any successful result whatsoever?
A Yes. It had a complete success, as a matter of fact. These effects did not become apparent immediately but quite soon during the course of time they were felt. Of surprise attacks on vehicle convoys -only two took place. One of these was the already mentioned surprise attack on Laternia, on the ambulance convoy in July 1944. And another one in July 1944 was on a corps supply column on which occasion the protestant Divisional Chaplain of the 117th Light Infantry Division was taken prisoner. He had been enroute to take care of the troops and he was going to go to Thyperressia.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: We will take our recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please take their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. General, just before the recess, you mentioned the loosening up of regulations concerning the declaration of the Peloponnes as a combat zone, so that the securing of supplies for Athens might not be endangered. Were any other measures taken over and beyond that to safeguard supplies of the capital?
A. There were a number of measures which we took. The most important one, I think, was that an official of the German legation in Athens was appointed as economic Plenipotentiary and was attached to the staff of General von Le Suire, so that the military and economic measures might be adjusted to each other. That, I think, was the happiest solution and the best way out.
Q. At this point, I should like to continue reading the report which I began before the recess on page 11 of the English version and page 9 of the German. It says there, under "68th Corps," in the second paragraph:
"Euboea near Kimi, bandits attacked a truck of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. Our losses ten dead, five seriously wounded. 50 band houses burned down as a first reprisal measure."
The same report is contained also in Volume 25 in Exhibit 573. It is Document NOKW-1640 on page 93 of the English and 73 of the German, and it is also contained in Exhibit 579 on page 124 of the English and page 94 of the German Book. In the Ic report of the 68th Army Corps, in the document which I mentioned just now it says further:
in reprisal for KVC, 20 hostages were shot so far in Kimi.
General, what can you tell us about that incident?
A. I cannot give you any details about that incident. I no longer remember it. I should now like to submit from Document Book Felmy III, Document 70 which is on page 14. It is offered as Exhibit 47. This document is an affidavit by Wilhelm Kohler, once a general, who was the commanding officer of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division. I should like to read this affidavit:
"In Kimi on Euboea, northeast of Chalkis, there are coal mines from which the electricity and water plants of Athens are getting supplied. During the spring of 1944 the supply to Athens of this coal was suddenly disrupted as Greek partisans through their attacks obstructed both the mining in Kimi itself, and the transport across Euboea to Chalkis. The supply of Athens seemed to be endangered. The Greek self-defense organization (Edes) under the command of the Greek General Papatanaaopoulos could not prevent these attacks, and asked through the Greek government for the allocation of German troops. Therefore a North-Caucasian (Russian) Battalion of volunteers - I no longer remember the number - was transferred to Chalkis for the protection of the supply line Kimi-Chalkis. Then this alone did not suffice, and the terror against the miners who were willing to work, increased, the North-Caucasian battalion was transferred to Kimi, and the replacement Training Battalion of the 11th Air Forces Field Division came to Chalkis, There were frequent engagements, and both sides suffered losses. In order to facilitate the protection of the mines around Kimi against attacks, and to make it more difficult for the partisans to approach the mines under cover, the local unit demolished, as far as I know, some houses and walls. This was a strictly military measure, which appeared to be necessary in the interest of the armed forces and of the civilian population which had to be protected.
Row many houses were demolished, and the exact time I do not know. I cannot state, whether the "Edes" -units of General PAPATANASOPOULOS which took part in all these combats, did perhaps more than was necessary.
In addition I state the following:
The activities of the partisans on Euboea also spread to the northern part of the island, and from there also to the mainland, where the partisan units collaborated with those of northern Boeotia. Beginning approximately in June these partisans groups which had crossed over to the mainland, repeatedly May I interpolate here that we are talking about the year 1944? "interrupted also the traffic from Chalkis to Thebes, and the railway lines from Thebes to Athens through their raid."
"At such an occasion an ambulance which had to bring injured members of the North-Caucasian battalion to the surgical hospital in Thebes was attacked from ambush west of Chalkis, and all aboard this ambulance, including the Mohammedan priest, were killed.
The partisans were particularly cruel as far as their actions were directed against the civilian population and the Greek police. According to the statements of inhabitants, massacres and mutilations occurred often, as well as cutting off the hands and allowing people to bleed to death, These cruelties were intended to prevent a co-operation between the population and the German troops.
I have known Air Force General FELMY under whom I served as commander of a division from December 1943 until the beginning of September 1944 as a superior who cared very much for his troops; their well-being was his highest aim.
I cannot remember that the division had ever received orders from him, with regard to retaliatory measures during that time, neither orders of a general nature nor special orders in individual cases."
Q. General, would you please give us your comments on the next entry in the same document? The document concerned represents a prosecution excerpt from the War Diary of Army Group E of 26 May 1944. It is on page 12 of the English and 9 of the German; it is the report of 26 May 1944.
A In June and July 1944 several large scale band operations were carried out in the Peleponnes. The Police Regiment 18 also participated in these, as did units of Greek volunteers. The Police Regiment 18 was at that period of time withdrawn from Boeotia, and was serving in the Peleponnes. In Boeotia it was replaced by a Regiment of the 4th SS Division, which the Army Corps had transferred there. Such details as are mentioned in the War Diary of the Army Group are not really very firm in my memory. One of these band operations I participated in myself in Southern Argolis, but there again after a brief engagement the bands merely took evasive action.
Q This entry concerned quite obviously the same incident which was mentioned in the War Diary of 68th Army Corps, in the same document book, page 142 of the English and page 103 of the German. This is Exhibit 480, NOKW 1065; is that correct, General?
A Yes, these are the same operations in Southern Argolis.
Q As for the rest of the text of the entry in this document would you like to make any comments about that? The entry reads as follows: "Northwest of Athens and Euboea engaged with group of bands at mine near Alemerion and near Kimi, mines were secured by elements of 843rd Battalion respectively Field Replacement Regiment.
A General Kohler mentioned in his affidavit attacks on these mines in Euboea, and again we were concerned here with one of these attacks, and from that it becomes quite clear that we had to secure these coal mines, because only thus could we keep the Greek Colony going. The coal was a necessity for the power station and electricity work and a peaceful development of the economic life was endangered by the bands. That was the whole point. That was one of the methods by which they put pressure on the population. I mentioned yesterday that they disrupted the food supply transport to Athens, at least they tried to. These were measures not only directed against the German occupation, but much more against the Greek population.
Q This brings me to the next document in the same book, which is Exhibit 460 on page 15 of the English and page 11 of the German text, and it says under "68th Army Corps,"----and the same report also occurred in Volume XXI, on page 89 of the English and page 78 of the German.