. Every dead or captured German soldier was sacked. The bands did not respect the Red Cross, I myself have seen attacks 5893-A on ambulances, dressing stations or ambulance planes.
The partisans established their positions in almost every case within the villages or on scattered farms. Their supply depots were usually hidden in the mountains or in well-concealed storehouses in a village under the harmless disguise of an honest trader whom we considered trustworthy.
Only once did we carry out measures of reprisal. A village was burned down when captured, after it had been clearly established that the entire buildings had served the partisans as hide-outs. Armed roberies were carried out from this village and German soldiers had been killed there. When captured the village was completely evacuated.
Reports of enemy casulties were usually issued as follows: dead: 3, estimated number of wounded: 10. However, there were frequent exceptions from this rule. A report of "killed partisan suspects" does by no means exclude the possibility that they were killed during or as a result of combat.
This brings me to the next document in this connection which is Leyser Document No. 29 contained in Document Book II of the Defense and it is on page 27. This is offered as Leyser Exhibit No. 40. This is an affidavit by the former Col. Hans Wolfgang Schoch and on 3 October 1947 this affidavit was sworn to before the commandant of the internment camp of Dachau.
In paragraph 1 he gives us his ranks and official positions. He says:
On 1 September 1943 as colonel and regimental commander I took over the command of the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment of the 114th Mountain Infantry Division in Croatia. While the 114th Mountain Infantry Division was under the SV Mountain Army Corps, I worked indirectly - under the command of General von Leyser.
In paragraph 2 the witness makes a few statements about General von Leyser's personality. He says that in check-ups and investigations that were carried out by him and General von Leyser, he could visit his regiment personally and insisted that he be informed very precisely.
I shall begin to quote from the next paragraph in paragraph 2:
I had the opportunity of reporting to General von Leyser on the measures which I had provided for the poverty-stricken population in the District of Sibenik in particular protection of communications with the rear zones, with the central authorities in Agram; the setting in motion of the economic processes, the assurance of food supplies, the adjustment of finances, the maintenance and repair of the railroads for military as well as for the economy and civilian transportation, the support of measures for charities and churches. In this connection I secured his full approval and recognized his deep understanding for the want and the needs of the Sibenik civilian population.
The sentiment of the population.......this is the first paragraph on page 2 of the document.
These demonstrations of gratitude were addressed spontaneously again and again by representatives of the Government and of the Churche to me personally, to my commanders, chiefs, officers, and units, as well as to the remaining troops of the 114th Mountain Division, in Sibenik, Primosten, Rokognica, Livno, and in very many other cities and communities, especially on the Dalmatian Islands.
The methods of warfare employed by the Guerrila bands, which mocked every usage of regular warfare were so utterly the rule, that I must restrict myself to mention one glaring example for the innumerable others: When Livno was taken in December 1943 the troops of the 114th Mountain Division were able to prevent in the last second the shooting of the wife of the bourgeous-Croat burgomaster of many years' service. The wife of this man who was very popular and respected among the entire population had remained in the city during the rule of the Guerrilla bands; she had been found innocent of the slightest wrong by a strict investigation and was now supposed to be executed by a liquidation-squad of the Communist bands.
The fact that ambulances and other medical installations of the regiment could travel only under powerful escort, and were under orders to do so was due solely to the frequent experience that they would be exposed to the treacherous and brutal raids of the Guerrilla bands when they traveled singly.
Constant acts of sabotage against the railroad, supplying the coastal region with food, were a matter of routine; likewise also, acts of sabotage against the port of Sibenik.
The affiant then describes a number of deeds perpetrated by the bands against the civilian population. He continues:
I did not witness any active racial or religious wars during the period of my assignment over there, although I did see their shocking traces in the form of relentless, senseless destruction and devastation of the country and of its settlements. As was reported over and over again by the population, these could not be ascribed to the war of 1941, which had blown rapidly over the country, nor to the subsequent measures of the German Wehrmacht, but to the racial and religious wars between the Serbs and the Croats.
In paragraph 4 he speaks about prisoners:
Prisoners of war were treated by the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment and, to the best of my knowledge, by all the other units of the 114th Light Infantry Division strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention, even though irregular guerrilla bands were involved. They were sent on to Division Ic as per regulations.
In connection with the 741st Mountain Infantry Regiment reprisal measures, retaliations, shootings of hostages, and burning down of houses were never carried out, nor did an order to that effect ever exist. Members of the guerrilla bands were at the most "shot in battle". The one possibility of doing away with the guerrilla raids and of paralyzing the activity of the bands for a time consisted in the removal of the guerrilla depots, and, in case this was rendered impossible by the impenetrability of the terrain, in their destruction.
These depots would most frequently he set up in forest hideouts.
This brings me to the next document. It is contained in Leyser Document Book II on page 91; it is Document No. 30 and I shall give it Exhibit No. 41. It is an affidavit by Capt. Siegfried Heidenreich, sworn to on 30 September before the notary in the parish of Wehmingen. Under paragraph 1, the witness says:
1.) From March 1943 to October 1943 I was assigned as supply officer to the 721st Mountain Regiment and from November 1943 to October 1944 as commander of a Mobile Mountain Infantry Column attached to Mountain Infantry Regiment 721, which was under the 114th Mountain Division, and thereby under the XV Mountain Army Corps until January 1944.
2.) With respect to the violation of International Law by the warfare of the guerrillas in Croatia, I can make the following statements: In connection with a surprise attack on the railroad line Zogre-Banja-Luka, between Bos. Novi and Prijedor, about middle of May 1943, a German soldier was roasted to death on a spit over an open fire and then sent to us in a box-car, allegedly to provide a deterrent example. The mutilation of about 15 to 20 additional German soldiers was horrifying. By orders of the regiment I was present at tho identification of the corpses in the field hospital in Prijedor.
In paragraph 3 he speaks about their methods of fighting:
3.) Fortified positions of the guerrilla bands practically never existed. There was sufficient natural cover and protection provided by rocks etc... and, moreover, houses and farms, indeed even entire larger localities like Cetingrad and Khiuc, were used as fortified positions.
The next document I offer Leyser Document 31 which is in Document Book II on page 93 and I offer it as Leyser Exhibit 42. It is an affidavit by Capt. Herbert Mueller-George of 7 October 1947, sworn to before a notary in Munich on the same day. Here again we find under paragraph 1 what positions the witness had held. He says that he was with the Mountain Regiment 721 where he was company commander and that that regiment was later on under the 114th Mountain Infantry Division and thereby under the XV Mountain Army Corps up to the time of its transfer to Italy.
2. The enemy whom I learned to know in the Croatian theater of war was no regular soldier. The Tito partisans were led by commanders, most of whom were proven Communists, teachers, artisans, laborers. Most of the time they were clothed as civilians, or fitted out with captured Croatian, Yugoslavian, Italian, or German pieces of uniform, and only on their heads wore a red very small, five-cornered star. However, not even this insignia was worn by all members. By daylight one could hardly recognize it within 100 meters and not at all at dusk or during hazy weather. It would be thrown away, together with the arms, whenever danger was imminent, and this was proven by the remains of the fabric of the star and the freshly pulled out threads on the cap. They would then disguise themselves as harmless civilians and would deny categorically having used fire-arms or having even heard anything whatsoever, although only shortly before the din of fighting had filled the whole area. Often it would occur when troops approached localities or houses, that quietly working civilians would suddenly seize firearms and open up fire from a distance of 200 to 400 meters. Regions which were hostile to the partisans were raided with a special preference in order to enable the latter to requisition food-stocks and implements which they needed. The civilian population reacted very bitterly to this. Later on enforced conscription was applied. From this category we gained the majority of deserters, who had something to tell about the life of the partisans. At the city entrance of Prijedor two partisans were once captured disguised as Moslem women. From then on the latter had to lift their veils during check-ups. Partisan orders and mail were found under the harness of an ass which was being led by two boys. Women were favorite go-betweens for the relegation of orders; they would hide the messages in the folds of their garments.
Usually the partisans would fire on the Wehrmacht from houses, defiles wooded mountain tops, and hedges. The partisans, being constantly on the move, would at the most dig fox-holes in tactically advantageous spots and fortify houses for defense positions. Depots were commonly set up deep in the woods.
3.) None of my corps, Divisional or Regimental commanders even gave me an order to arrest persons as hostages or to shoot them as such. Thus, no hostages were even taken by my unit, and to the best of my knowledge they were not taken by the other units of the 114th Mountain Infantry Division, either. Likewise my unit never burned down houses arbitrarily as a means of reprisal.
And now I shall read from paragraph 4 which again deals with lines of communication:
4.) Reports were often varied as to style. Units would often use verbs such as annihilated, shot, killed in order to avoid using this word "gefallen" (fallen). In the fall of 1942 I rode with a Lieutenant-Colonel on the General Staff from Zagoeb to Belgrade, and I heard from him, by way of conversation, that, upon inquiry on the part of the OKW with respect to the carrying out of reprisals for the killing of Germans, he had referred to the enemy dead of the recent skirmishes as "executed hostages" in his report in order to satisfy the "armchair strategists."
5.) Our prisoners were brought directly to the battalion or to the division, if it happened to be in the proximity. The division was glad about every prisoner because the taking of prisoners in the Croatian theater of war was exceptionally difficult due to the partisan warfare. As an example of the treatment the following incident may be mentioned: A woman partisan of the telephone exchange was captured in Livno. She claimed to have been impressed into the service. At first she was kept in the field kitchen; later she was taken to her relatives in Split.
And I shall now offer the final document in this connection which is Leyser Document No. 57 which is contained in Document III of the defense, on page 194, This is offered as Leyser Exhibit 43. It is an affidavit by the former Colonel Lothar Berger, sworn to before me here in Nurnberg on 17 October 1947. May I draw attention to a misspelling in the document: It is under paragraph 1. It says there: "from 1943 onwards I was in the Reichswehr." May I have this corrected into 1932?
He first of all describes his military career. He says "in October 1943 as a commander of the 721 Light Infantry Division, I came to Croatia and at First to Zara."
"At that time the 114th Light Infantry Division was subordinate to the 15th Mountain Army Corps. This ceased at the end of November 1943, when the 264th Infantry Division occupied this area. I can fix this date so exactly because I remember that me successor for the Zara area, Colonel Schmidt, Regiment Commander in the 264th Infantry Division, was able to negotiate alone with General Von Leyser already in the last days of November on the occasion of General von Leyser's third visit to Zara. I believe that we were Army-reserves at the time to be used for mopping-up operations on the Islands local mopping-up operation "Ziethen" subordinate to the 5th SS Corps because the Reconnaissance-detachment of the SS Division Prince Eugen, aside from other foreign army units, was under my command. The operation "Ziethen" which had as its object the capture of Livnos was besides far out of the Corps area within the area of the 5th SS Corps.
Reports regarding the "Ziethen" operation were, due to signal technical reasons, dispatched via the 15th Army Corps to the Army because the range of our radio installation did not extend to the 5th SS Corps nor did we have their radio-code. The mopping up operations of my battalions left behind at Grahac, Obrovac and Zara were for the same reasons reported via the 15th Army Corps. On our march to Italy reports were for the same reasons also dispatched via the 15th Army Coprs, especially as we had some motorized radio stations put at our disposal by the Corps.
2.) From my own recollections I am unable to give any account of the 14 bandits shot in accordance with martial law which are mentioned in Document NOKW 1331 Exh. 362 presented to me. But generally speaking I am able to testify that cases of this kind were handled by us in the following manner. Prisoners were on principle handed over to the Division in order to be interrogated by the Intelligence Officer (1c). It is impossible to talk of an immediate execution by shooting. The expression "in accordance with martial law" denotes besides that regular legal proceedings were carried out by the Division.
3. With regard to the presented document NOKW 1331, Exh. 367 (page 9 of the document), the supplement to the daily report dated 15 September 1943, I am able to make the following statement:
May I interrupt here briefly? The document to which the affiant, has reference here is contained in Document Book XV of the prosecution on page 2 of the German and page 21 of the English books. To continue:
Operation "Ziethen" of which I have spoken already above, started about December 4th or 5th. I was in action during this operation myself, therefore I am able to make any statement in regards to the occurrences Northwest of Knin from my own experience. But I know that one of my Regiment's battalions, stationed at Grahac with orders to safeguard the convoy traffic artery Grahac - Knin, was not in action at the "Ziethen" operation, but had remained at its post from where it was used for local mopping-up operations.
The case mentioned in the document must according to the name of the village concern a mopping-up operation of this kind, where the Battalion captured a depot of captured goods held by the bandits. It is shown by this fact that the area concerned was a typical bandit area, situated in a northerly direction from the convoy traffic artery, from where the convoys were continuously attacked. In the mapping-up operations these forces had considerable casualties of their own as shown by the document itself. To me it is a well known general fact learned in the fighting against bandits, that these units were customarily attacked within the village when on these mopping-up operations. If in Document NOKW-1331 mention is made of the razing to the ground of villages partial to bandits, then this is due to the fact, that also in these villages mentioned attacks by bandits took place while the search of the village was in progress or after the depots had been ascertained. In many cases it turned out that while the units marched in, the village a neared peaceful and the population looked cheerful, women and children welcomed the soldiers while no men were to be seen around. As soon as the soldiers started to search the houses, found hidden bandits or depots women and children vanished and shooting started from all houses. During the battle which then ensued the easily inflammable houses of the village, usually consisting of only a few huts, were affected.
4. Many of the villages were destroyed in the wars for religious and national beliefs as in Croatia everyone fought against anyone. I experienced it so myself in the operation Livno that they plundered and murdered behind the fighting soldiers who had just reached the far side of the village. This was reported to me and I drove over there right away to ascertain whether this had been done by our soldiers. But I had to convince myself that a Cetnik detachment whose presence had been unknown to me, had appeared and in the rear of the troops invaded the village whose inhabitants were predominantly of the Moslem faith. With some quickly assembled groups I arrested this Cetnik detachment and kept them for the time being under guard.
On the second day following I turned them over to the division. This act of the Cetniks against the Mussulmans of Livno was an outcome of the cruelly carried out wars for religious and national beliefs just mentioned.
5. In regards to the question of cooperation with the native organization, especially Ustaschas and Cetniks, I can make the following statement: The forces of the Ustaschas had their own Commanders from whom they received their basic orders. I took them on principle, under my tactical command if they were stationed within the area of my Regiment, but time and again I had the experience that they had vanished a few days later without notice of departure. There has never been any fixed attachment of army-units and thereby a fixed subordination. There was no possibility of carrying out disciplinary measures against the Ustascha or its Commanders. In cases of this kind, whenever we considered intervention necessary, it was only possible to report the matter concerned to higher quarters so that through the Croatian Liaison-Officer in charge, measures could be suggested to the Ustascha Command. Of course I have never witnessed a success, but this might have been due to the fact that the Ustascha - units retired as soon as they noticed that something was to be planned against them.
"The Cetnik United were self-defense formations in the areas with Serb population which, as far as I know, were not centrally commanded. These formations joined the German troops, when a German unit operated in their locality, or fixed up permanent quarters there, without formally subordinating themselves. They accepted orders from the German commands and executed them, as far as security and reconnaissance operations were concerned. Naturally, the connection was rather loose; they also frequently operated on their own bat, and the commanders were unable to influence them in any way. Of course, it was not possible to punish these formations or their leaders.
"Although these Ustascha and Cetnik formations were not subordinated militarily, this fact was, however, reported to the division. When the army learned about any crimes committed by these formations, which they had done on their own bat, and which, according to our opinion, was unjustifiable, this was reported in the prescribed manner, in order, as mentioned before, to enable the high commands to give the necessary orders in this connection." ....
In paragraph 6 the affiant deals with General von Leyser's character and says -- this is the last sentence on the same page , "He was extremely anxious to bring to an end the national and religious fights by reducing the existing differences, to pacify the area and solidify and promote the confidence of the population in the German Wehrmacht.
On the other hand, he demanded of his soldiers the necessary firmness to save his troops any further losses. For instance, he was of the opinion that reprisal measures should only be employed as a last recourse, when military necessities made this imperative. Above all, the reprisal measures and the incident precipitating them had to be within reasonable proportions. I personally did not know that an order for proportionate reprisal shootings existed at all. General von Leyser did not mention this order to me either, and was not interested in executing such an order. His guiding principles were the security of the armed forces." ....
In the next paragraph the affiant describes welfare measures taken by General von Leyser for his troops and what he insisted that his commanders would do. I read the last paragraph:
"General von Leyser was also interested in the welfare of the population as far as this was possible. He repeatedly mentioned that by necessity the war also imposed hardships upon the population; that, on the other hand, however, it was the task of a responsible commander to alleviate them, within his powers. For instance, he issued an order expressly prohibiting that artillery or air force units should attack villages and towns, or destroy them, unless there was particularly serious and stubborn enemy resistance in them."
This brings me to the end of my documents in this connection and I should like to continue with my examination of the general.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. When you described the fighting done by the 114th Division, that on its march to Italy they were to carry out mopping up operations. One of the operations where the 114th Light Infantry Division took part was Operation "Dreznica", where, according to an entry in the war diary, the 392nd Division was also participating. This brings me now to the service done by the 392nd Division. Let me ask you a basic question first. In what area was that division serving?
A. The 392nd Division was serving in the Right Sector of the Corps; it was in that part which, after the surrender of the Italians, was not yet occupied. That is the reason why, as mentioned before, Operation "Panther" was carried out, which was a preparatory operation for the advance of the 392nd Division to the Coast. The 392nd Division arrived, and I believe I have mentioned this before, in December 1943, and was then given the order to reach the Coast.
Q. What was the other assignment of that division, General?
A. The assignment given to the division was more or less the same as the one given to the 264th Division, to occupy the coast, mopping up on the islands, and extend the positions; and also to safeguard the area in the rear.
Q. When we discuss documents concerning that division, I should like to mention now the first operation in which this division took part, - Operation Dreshnica, which apparently was a joint operation of the 392nd Division and the 114th Division. That Operation is mentioned in the Inductment, under Count 3, paragraph 9 L. The Prosecution have said that between January 1944 and March 1945, troops of the 392nd Division, under the command of the 21st Army Corps, destroyed and plundered the villages of Dreznica, Pisac, Tuzevic and Vojvodersa.
What can you tell us about this count in the indictment?
A. The 392nd Division was at no time subordinate to the 21st Corps because the 21st Corps was not serving in Croatia but in Albania. Therefore I think the prosecution have made a mistake. The 392nd Division was under the 15th Army Corps, which is the reason why this really must be a mistake on the part of the prosecution.
Q. Perhaps I can ask you an additional question, general. It says there in this count of the indictment that these destructions had been carried out between January 1945 and March 1945. You said just now that the division was subordinate to the 15th Army Corps. May I ask you to tell the Tribunal, for the sake of clarity, when you handed over the 15th Army Corps?
A. I handed over the 15th Army Corps at the end of July 1943.
Q. That means, doesn't it, general, that that division was subordinate to you until the end of July 1943?
A. Yes, it was subordinate to me until the end of July 1944.
Q. Now, General, we have endeavored to glean facts from the prosecution documents which are at the back of the various counts in the indictment. From all the material submitted by the prosecution did you find out on what the prosecution based this particular assusation?
A. No. When I went through all these prosecution documents I found the names Pisac, Tuzevic and Vojvodersa , which , it is alleged, have been plundered by the 392 Division, at no place at all. The only think mentioned in the prosecution documents is the village of Dreznica. That, I think, was mentioned in three or four documents, but there we shall have to find out soon that this was a typical combat action. That will come later on.
Q. May I say first in what prosecution documents the term Dreznica is contained. At first it is contained in Document Book 25, in Document NOKW-1770, which is Exhibit 568, on page 47 of the English and 37 of the German. Then the name Dreznica also turns up in Document Book 25 in Exhibit 570, which is Document NOKW-1772 on page 50 of the English and 39 of the German.
And for the last time we come across the name of Dreznica in Document Book 16, in Document NOKW-1416, Exhibit 389, on page 79 of the English and 121 of the German.
General, before discussing these various documents, I would like to ask you to tell the Court briefly what the purpose of the Dreznica Operation was.
A. The area around Dreshnica, as I have said repeatedly before, was occupied by the Italians prior to tho surrender of the Italian Armed Forces. After the surrender it was, for a lengthly period of time, not occupied by German troops. But we received reports about it to the effect that in that area the bands had formed large-sized depots and dumps from Italian supplies. Tho purpose of the operation now was, as was the case with all other operations, to disperse and smash the bands and then to clear up the camps so that they would lack any support for any future actions. The documents themselves, which were mentioned just now, do not say very much about that. I think other documents should be mentioned as well here which will show how this operation Dreshnica proceeded.
Q. May I say in this connection, Your Honors, that the Prosecution have submitted a document which perhaps, if it were complete, would show us what the Dreshnica Operation was about. But unfortunately it is not complete. In Exhibit 568, which is Document NOKW-1770, contained in Document Book 25, on Page 37, there is the cover of tho operational file, concerning tho Dreshnica Operation, but unfortunately the actual contents of the file are lacking so that we can't reach any conclusions from that. I would like to ask you now, General, to take Document Book XXV and look at Exhibit No. 568. The document to which I have reference now is on Page 37. I am sorry; it's Page 47 of the English Document Book and on Page 37 of the German Document Book. Can you tell the Tribunal what that document is and what conclusions you reach from the contents.
A. The document contains two entries which, moreover, are described as notes, which becomes clear from the heading. The first note is the final report by the 392nd Division, concerning the Dreshnica Operation. Enemy dead, prisoners, deserters, and military booty are mentioned. The next note is a similar report by the 114th Division, concerning operations in this area. It has no heading or signature, as this document reveals.
Q. General, what is your explanation of these notes?
A. As I see it, it must be a compilation perhaps made by the man who kept the War Diary. There are many corrections and many things struck out; so one cannot say what is correct and what is not correct.
I think that can be done only when one looks at the second document about the Dreshnica Operation, and I think I should have a look at it first.
Q. May I then ask you, General, to look at the second report to which you had reference just now, which is contained in the same Document Book, on Page 50 of the English text and Page 39 of the German text. It is contained in Document NOKW-1772, which is Exhibit 370. This document is called the final report about the Dreshnica Operation. Can you give us your comments on that document?
A. This final report is a final compilation of the reports contained in the above mentioned notes by the 392nd and 114th Divisions. The same figures and destructions are reported in this report which I mentioned before. The purpose of the operation was, as I said before, to disperse and smash the organization of the bands. And that entailed, above all, the destruction of the depots and other supplies. In the same report there is a mention made that it was not possible to take the booty along because of difficult terrains and surprise attacks on the convoys. As the troops did not wish to occupy this area all the time, and I emphasize "wish," what they had to do in order to smash the bands effectively was to destroy the depots of the bands. What the troops were concerned with was to deprive the bands of the possibility of forming a cohesive organization.
Q. As I told you before, General, the Prosecution in the Indictment have asserted that four villages had been burned down and looted. Can you, on the basis of that document, tell us something about that, because we have no other document concerning this point?
A. As I said before, from the documents submitted here, nothing can be seen about that, with the exception, of course, of the Dreshnica Operation. About the other three villages mentioned I did not find anything as far as plundering of civilian population is concerned, as maintained by the Prosecution, I don't think that this can be maintained, especially because I don't see what this loot was supposed to have consisted of.
According to this report it consisted of 34 light machine guns, 8 heavy machine guns, 12 light mortars, 25 rifles, 24 trucks, 3 armored cars, 3 armored cars, 3 motorcycles, 1 armored reconnaissance car, 35 Italian tents, 500 heavy mines, 18,074 mm. shells, 120,000 rounds of Infantry ammunition. No looting of civilian property is mentioned at all.
Q. I shall now come to the last document, General, where the name of Dreshnica is mentioned. This is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution. There in Exhibit 389, on Page 82 of the English text and Page 124 of the German text we find the name "Dreshnica." The document number is NOKW-1426. Dreshnica is mentioned here in the Dally Report of the XVth Army Corps of the 22nd of April 1944. In that Daily Report it says, under 392nd Division, to quote briefly: "Keulenschlag: In the course of continued mopping up of the area west Dreznica at present inconsiderable resistance by minor bands. Five enemy dead, three prisoners, 2 deserters. Booty established up to now: 30 tons of Infantry ammunition, 15 tons of Artillery ammunition, machine gun and trench mortar material, 50 cubic meters Diesel, 60 tires, 100 bags of salt, several cases of cigarettes and cigars, matches, 60 cart loads of boards." And then it reports the destruction of two barracks.
Can you tell us about this point, General?
A. Here we have again a mopping up operation in the same area. As the list of booty shows, all these things are military objectives, not those usually owned by civilians. It is quite clear here that the troops again made a thrust into this area which they wanted to occupy only temporarily in order to check up on things. And this showed that they could always go wherever they wanted to go at any time at all.
Q. The 392nd Division, General, has now been discussed conclusively I think. There are a very few documents about its area. There is one more incident from the area of that Division which is included in the Prosecution documents. May I ask you to take up Document Book XXV for this purpose? There, in Exhibit No. 570, on Page 51 of the English and Page 40 of the German, the 392nd Division is mentioned.
The document to which I have reference now is a Daily Report by your Corps of the 8th of February 1944. Under 392nd Division it says: "Intention: reprisals for attacks on Pricie," and in the next Daily Report of 9 February 1944, which is contained on the next page of that document the Division reports a reprisal measure carried out. It says, "As a retaliation for the stabbing of an officer western sector of Pottom, 3.5 km NE of Obrovac, and burned down." This is the only case of reprisal measures in the area of that Division.
What can you tell us about that incident, General?