There the conscientious detailed examination of the politically neutral facts of the case, here the arbitrary political act supported by administrative regulations of the Ministry of the Interior. A cross-section of the general situation at that time, a key to the evaluation of so many happenings discussed in this trial!
As to the euthanasia measures dealt with in paragraphs 15 and 27 of the indictment it must be stated in advance that no proof of any kind has been offered that the Defendant Schlegelberger at any time knew of the application of the euthanasia decree to foreigners. The Defendant, too, emphatically denies this. As to the conduct of the Defendant in this field. I can refer to the detailed explanation he gave on the witness stand. Here, too, we notice his immediate and active intervention against anything he felt to be a wrong. He does not accept the situation he found in existence when he took office, on the contrary, he attempts to change it - in spite of the fact that the chances of exercising any decisive influence were small for a merely acting Minister. The Defendant has stated - in my opinion convincingly -- why he, if we assume that Hitler's decree had no binding force - was unable to interfere with criminal prosecution. He chose the road which he, according to his duty, considered to be the only possible and promising one. Only considerations of expediency could bring a Hitler to change his opinion. In order to arouse such scruples in him, he systematically collected and passed on complaints from church circles to Hitler. This brought result. The carrying-out of the Hitler decree was stopped in August 1941. This is proven by the affidavit Brandt (Schlegelberger Exhibit 121) and the letter of Gauleiter Mayer to Bormann of 17 September 1941 (Schlegelberger Exhibit 122). If the Defendant under cross-examination (English transcript page 4542) was reproached with the fact that also in the years 1941 and 1944 euthanasia killings had been carried out, that merely permits the conclusion that later, after the Defendant had left the service, euthanasia was administered illegally.
The reproach raised against the Defendant in paragraph 16 of the indictment and the opening statement of the prosecution is unjustified that in exercising his right to grant pardon he had given unequal treatment to Germans, foreigners and Jews. The legal foundations of the German clemency system and the clemency procedure of the Reich Ministry of Justice have been repeatedly discussed in detail in the course of this trial. The same is true of competence. I restrict myself to remind you that as far as death sentences were concerned -- the defendant Schlegelberger had, it is true, the power to reject a clemency plea - however, he could only suggest a pardon to Hitler who had reserved for himself the right to make his last decision. This was, at any rate, the legal situation during the entire time when Schlegelberger was in office. The delegation of more extensive powers to Guertner which is evident from the Prosecution Exhibit 625 was given only temporarily for the assumed brief duration of the Polish Campaign and was renewed only at the time of Thierack as it has been frequently discussed in the trial.
The statements of Schlegelberger on the witness stand concerning the management of the right of pardon have been impressively confirmed by other witnesses. As to the preparation of his decisions we have the statements of the witnesses Gramm (English Transcript page 4613/4) and Huppertschwiller (Schlegelberger Exhibit 114).
We hear about the care with which Schlegelberger proceeds before he forms an opinion. Huppertschwiller, in regard to this point emphasizes particularly that it made no differences to Schlegelberger in forming his opinion whether the condemned was a German or a foreigner. It is proved by documentary evidence that Schlegelberger tried to obtain pardon for Poles and Jews as well.
If Schlegelberger considered a pardon to be justifiable (he always took the more lenient point of view) and not to be completely hopeless according to Hitler's practice which with necessity had to be his standard , he conferred with the Minister of State and Chief of the Chancellery of the Reichspraesident Meissner who had to report to Hitler about the suggested pardons. We learn from Meissner that Schlegelberger together with him searched for ways which would have made it possible to get pardons from Hitler even in very dubious cases. According to the result of the evidence Schlegelberger is absolutely right when he says to this point under direct examination that by his manner of working he had forced through a pardon for a large number of cases, which could not have been done if they had been dealt with merely according to office routine, even if all the demands of duty had been fulfilled.
For the assertion that Schlegelberger had "granted a pardon after sentence had been passed to such NS party comrades who had committed serious crimes against inhabitants of the occupied territories" (paragraph 16 of the indictment) no proof has been submitted by the Prosecution.
Exhibit 254 submitted by the Prosecution shows that Schlegelberger opposed successfully Hess' wish for an amnesty for crimes committed in the East (Ost-Amnestie) which was to go beyond the amnesty of 4 October 1939). If Schlegelberger, in this matter, had pointed to the fact that minor property offenses committed during the time of active warfare and soon afterwards -- these were the offenses Hess had pointed to could be prosecuted only when there were particularly important reasons for it, this was completely in accordance with the regulation of Article 153 Paragraph 2 of the German Criminal Procedure.
The prosecution in its indictment wrongly takes offense to the fact that Schlegelberger finally had in mind a well-intentioned examination of the individual case. It overlooks the fact that this was an act of politeness customary in ministerial circles which was not binding at all.
The reprieve of two German police officials mentioned in the indictment (Prosecution Exhibit No. 255) only took place after Schlegelberger left.
May I now summarize the case of the defendant Schlegelberger. I would recall to mind my opining words that in a state ruled by force, as Adolf Hitler's state was, no statement or action can be assessed objectively, but only in conjunction with and under consideration of the actual conditions prevailing at the time. This last examination will in individual cases often be difficult, sometimes impossible. And the defendant himself was faced, in the explanation of the motives, with a very difficult task. Only his written statements which have become public are available. To determine on the basis of memory, after years of the most stirring events, what motives he had, what were the actual facts and what he could foresee at that moment, is an almost impossible task. But how much more difficult it is for anyone else to obtain a clear picture of the situation in the individual case. It is beyond the limits of human perceptibility to judge whether this or that measure could have been avoided or delayed by using perhaps other means.
We are therefore compelled to observe this problem as a whole. In the case of Schlegelberger we have an excellent expedient to assist us in passing correct judgment. When Schlegelberger declares that he remained in office from the purest motives and that every deviation from the traditional rules of a former German judicial system 14 0ct.
-A-BK-23-2-Goldberg (Int. Hahn) generally recognized as exemplary may be interpreted only by taking into consideration the overall conditions, then we can verify the correctness of his defense by that which happened immediately after he relinquished office.
A comparison of Thierack and Schlegelberger will give us an explanation of that which Schlegelberger strove to prevent and during his tenure of office actually did prevent. We shall realize from the unconditional compliance of Thierack with party demands some measure of what it meant if Schlegelberger opposed them so obstinately - particularly if we consider the increased difficulties which faced Schlegelberger as a result of the fact that he was only in charge of the Ministry and in a very weak position with regard to the Party.
If, with regard to Schlegelberger's official activity, one can perceive a characteristic quality in almost every one of his actions, in every phase of his activity, then it is his consistent warding-off of the penetration of Himmler's police into the realm of justice. What do we find, on the other hand, in the case of Thierack? He immediately unites himself with the powers who always advocated a Police State, mainly with Bormann and Himmler. He sacrificed all those things for which the judiciary had been fighting for years. He handed over to the Police those who were in protective custody, i.e. those people who had been sentenced to protective custody by a verdict of the court according to Art. 20a of the Penal Code.
Everything which since 1939 efforts had been made with difficulty to preserve was completely sacrificed. I remind you that Bouhler had in 1939 secured an order by Hitler to the effect that persons in protective custody must be handed to the Police. Guertner knew how to handle the matter in a delaying manner and did not carry out the order. In the case of Schlegelberger also it remained at this stage, although according to the testimony of the witness Hecker (English Transcript, page 2376) in Schlegelberger's time party pressure in this matter had increased.
In the same way, in the field of execution of other punishments, all other so-called a socials, namely, Jews, Gypsies, Russians, Ukrainians and Poles with sentences of more than three years, and Czechs and Germans with sentences of more than eight years were handed over to the Reichsfuehrer-SS for annihilation by overwork (Prosecution Exhibit No. 39).
It went still further. His purge started already with criminal prosecution. He excluded Jews and Gypsies from the right to trial by a court. The duty of instituting court proceedings against them was transferred to the Police and the application of the legal principles of the criminal law regulations concerning Poles and Jews was accordingly withheld from Jews (Prosecution Exhibit No. 143). The same applied to Russians and Poles who were living or staying in the Soviet Union or Poland respectively before the 1 September 1939.
In what still remained of penal justice for the other classes of criminals methods became considerably harsher.
The proceedings before the special courts lost important protective regulations for the defendants. The period between the presentation of the indictment and the date fixed for the main trial could be reduced from one week to 24 hours. (Ordinance of 29.5.1943 ReichsLaw Gazette I, page 243). Instead of the criminal division the special court assumed competency for decisions regarding motions to reopen proceedings in favor of the defendant. (Ordinance of 29. 1.43, Reichs Law Gazette, I, page 76.). The significance of this regulation lies in the fact that top to then almost every special court came under the revision of the criminal division competent also for other offenses. The necessary defense was abolished. (Ordinance of the 13.12.1944).
Passive defeatism, which was hitherto punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years according to the so-called "Law against Malicious Political Acts or Insults against Party or State", could now be punished by the death penalty (Ordinance dated 29.
1.1943, Reichs Law Gazette I, page 76).
With the progress of the war, developments led eventually to the creation of the summary courts (Ordinance of 15.2.1945 Reichs Law Gazette I, page 30).
That Thierack persuaded Himmler to introduce punishment by flogging of which Schlegelberger always disapproved on the grounds that it was uncivilized, seems to me beyond this fact to be particularly symptomatic.
The verdict of the party itself may be seen from the following: the demoralising criticism in the party press suddenly ceased. It was no longer necessary, as Thierack, Bormann and Himmler were all in agreement. (Prosecution Exhibit No. 35). News of orders to the police to take over persons who had allegedly been too lightly sentenced also ceased. Thierack and Himmler had, agreed, it is true, on the 18.9.1942, that they would settle between themselves this matter of "special treatment by the Police" but in the case of differing opinions they would call in Bormann. Thus Thierack had finally transferred to the jurisdiction of the Party the responsibility for amendments of judgments against which Guertner and Schlegelberger had fought.
If one bears in mind this rapid and complete decline of justice under the leadership of Thierack, into which process the great army of conscientious judges and public prosecutors were innocently drawn, one must draw the conclusion that every delay was a victory for the German nation and that this victory also justified the sacrifice which the defendant, from many years' experience in the service of the law, considered necessary.
I would point to the complete change in the personnel policy under Thierack, who surrounded himself in the Ministry and in the most important branch offices with new men, of whom he expected conduct different from that of those of Guertner's time who were bound by tradition.
Schlegelberger as a witness has described this revolution adequately and has also referred to the purging of the judiciary of half-Jews, of persons closely related to Jews and of non-party members. If one considers the significance which the personal views of an official have in the administration of justice and if one imagines that the attitude of German law officials, with relatively few exceptions, was a dam holding back the flood of National Socialism, one will obtain the fairest picture of the significance of the former personnel policy and the present revolution. Far be it from me to wish to infer that now all law officials have changed their opinions, I likewise would not like to identify Thierack's colleagues with him, nor to assert that they all came right up to Thierack's expectations.
It is, however, significant that by means of this reshuffling Thierack's policy made this complete change of system obvious to every justice official and robbed him of the feeling of security based on the knowledge that at the head of the Ministry of Justice was an adherent to the principles of law. In numerous affidavits which have been submitted by me and by other defense counsel - I refer particularly to the affidavit Richter (Mettgenberg Exhibit 43) this feeling repeatedly makes itself evident. Everyone who experienced with anxiety in those days the onslaught of the opposing forces knows what the personality of Schlegelberger at that time meant: namely the existence of justice itself, of a concept which was the only value saved from former times, in spite of all limitations which have become inevitable, brought about by the state of force which made itself keenly felt to us every single day.
I can thus content myself with drawing the final conclusion. All those things which Thierack's new regime had brought, all those things which had been preserved with great effort and were now sacrificed without a struggle, even sacrificed willingly, wore worth fighting for.
The aim of preserving even one of them would have been sufficient inner justification for Schlegelberger to remain in office.
This decision was certainly not easy for him to make. The affidavits Matthias (Schlegelberger Exhibit No. 103), Schwister (Schlegelberger Exhibit No. 41) the statements of Cramm (English transcript page 4723), the affidavit of Krieze (Schlegelberger Exhibit No. 102), the statement of Meissner (English Transcript page 4516) and other exhibits show us that , in spite of spiritual oppression and against the advice of his doctor, Schlegelberger remained at his post from a sense of devotion to duty.
For this must have teen the only motive, why he stayed in office. He was neither moved by personal ambition nor by any desire for recognition. We saw, how his professional career was only determined by the quality of his work and by no other influences.
Schlegelberger's case reveals clearly enough, what problems all those wore confronted with, who were collaborating with the National Socialist State. It is very easy to condemn all those, who in this State remained at their post in a leading position. The State was bad, consequently also those who cooperated with it were bad. Is not this cheap conclusion made obsolete by what we could learn about the efforts of the "old type" officials, who preserved for a long time what the Party tried to overthrow since it assumed power in 1933? They had to feel an inner obligation - to an increasing decree, if they were in a high position -- to act as a brake, while the car was rushing downhill. The State had been conquered by National Socialism. Only the Civil Servants themselves could resist the penetration of Administration with National Socialist ideas.
On the witness stand Schlegelberger revealed to us, why he stayed in office and what were the limits beyond which he would not go without resigning.
When he felt, that the dictator* s arbitrary methods no more limited themselves to restricting the sphere of action left to the Administration of Justice, out that it was now intended to transform the Administration of Justice itself into a tool of his power in its own judicial activity, then he knew, that he had to go. This attitude, which he did not hide from Hitler, separated him also externally from the National Socialist State, when he was discharged from his office.
Your Honors, it is now up to you to decide. What is wanted, is not a decision of the question, whether Justice was administered well or badly during Schlegelberger's term of office, but rather of the question, whether in the conditions of compulsion prevailing in the dictatorship he was able or was even justified to act otherwise than he actually did.
An immense mass of material has been examined in a six months' trial individually, but also against the background of general conditions; all this was done to ensure a just verdict. This justifies my confidence, that your verdict, which will determine the fate of the Defendant, will bet Schlegelberger is rot guilty of the charges brought against him.
To the statements made by the Prosecution this morning I have to add some short statements on my part. To start with, it is right that the Law No. 10, in virtue of which the indictment was filed contains now concepts of the facts of a case, and of the participation which were not known to German law. If, however, beyond that the Prosecution applies general concepts of law in this trial and takes these particularly from American law, then I wish to point out that a defendant without approaching the problem of reproductive force of the law No. 10 can be convicted only under those provisions which were recognizable as binding for him at the time at which he committed the deed. If this is true in a general way, it is true in particular with the construction concerning the responsibility of Schlegelberger for those acts which took place in the time of Thierack. The Prosecution says among other things that the legislation at the time of Schlegelberger provided a possibility for now measures which Thierack took. Schlegelberger had expected that after he had left, a more severe course would be taken, and, therefore, had taken such developments into account in his intentions. This constention is erroneous and particular because it is proved by evidence that Schlegelberger in the case of his resignation was afraid that a more severe course might be taken, but just because of that was doing everything to avoid such a course.
If the Prosecution were consistent in its construction, it would have to take the view that Schlegelberger in all circumstances should have remained in office even beyond the limit that he had set for himself. The point which is generally interpreted in this favor, that is to say, his resignation at a time when he could no longer assume the responsibility of staying in office, his resignation to which special tribute was paid in the verdict of Tribunal II in the case of Erhardt Milch, is now the same point which he is being charged with.
Another point the Prosecution stressed is that the law against Poles and Jews besides being in the incorporated eastern territories and tho Altreich was also applied in the Government General. The Prosecution is wrong in saying so. In the Government General that law was not applied. There in effect the conditions prevailed which it was possible to avoid in the territory where the law against Poles and Jews applied. The IMT-Trial revealed a clear picture as to the terrible effects which the transfer of competency to the Police had in those territories.
Further more, I recognize the right of the Prosecution to draw a picture of a defendant which shows merely the incriminating points, and particularly to evaluate the motives. However, if in its expression, contents and legal construction it goes beyond a comprehensible measure, I can only appeal to the objective, critical sense of the Tribunal. This is true in particular concerning the interpretation that Schlegelberger had opposed the efforts of the police because he was jealously intent on the prerogatives of the Ministry of Justice. Such a misinterpretation can naturally not be opposed with any obvious signment-
THE PRESIDENT: You have covered that point very adequately already. You had adequately covered that point already as far as you can.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And now, in conclusion, may I deal with the statement made by the prosecution concerning Schlegelberger's resignation.
It is easy to discredit a commendable fact by bringing it into contact with material interests. It is true that Schlegelberger when he resigned did receive a check for 100,000 reichsmarks. He did not however, ask for that check, and he didn't expect to get it. Meissner described the situation and stressed that it wasn't possible to recuse such a gesture of Hitler's. What reasons Hitler had to give that check to Schlegelberger one can only guess. Hitler looked carefully to it that when Schlegelberger left office, nothing was there to show that there were inner differences of opinion within the higher authorities of the state. Therefore, as a rule minsters and under secretaries when they left office were awarded a title or a high rank for show. I refer to the cases of Nourath and Yhacht. In the case of Schlegelberger he believed that he had to do something of lesser importance. Schlegelberger never used that check, nor did he ever intend to use it. If later on in connection with his request to be given permission to buy some real estate he made reference to that check, he only did so to have a better chance of having his request filled. We shall be able to understand that he asked permission to buy the property. If in view of the housing conditions, as they have been described, at his age he wished to retire to a small farm which he wanted to buy with his own money.
THE PRESIDENT: It may be an appropriate time to call attention to it before the next argument begins, to the fact that we have allotted this week to the defendants, subject only to a brief closing by the Prosecution, and that we have also had the agreement, as we understand it, with the Defense Counsel, that they are to divide their own time in their own way. We have allotted a gross sum of time to the entire Defense. It follows that if the first defendants who are represented and whose counsel speak absorb an undue proportion of the time, the complaints which we will hear no doubt from the last defendants will be a complaint directed at their associates and not at the Court.
You may address the Tribunal in behalf of the next defendant.
DR. SCHILF: If the Court please -
THE PRESIDENT: This argument has been translated, we are told.
INTERPRETER: No, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will save time by finding out where the translation is. You are not ready? It was the suggestion of the defendants that we should extend the arguments somewhat over the usual time, but in view of the fact that this argument has not been translated, I think we will postpone your opening argument until tomorrow morning at the usual time, Dr. Schilf.
DR. SCHILF: Yes, I believe that would facilitate matters.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours, 15 October 1947.)
Court No. III, Case No. III.
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal III in the matter of the United States of America against Josef Altstoetter, et al, Defendants sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 15 October 1947, 0930-1650. The Honorable James T. Brand presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal III. Military Tribunal III is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if the defendants are all present.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: The proper notation will be made.
Two corrections should be made at this time for the record, and they are minor. Dr. Kubuschok, the SecretaryGeneral advises that your exhibit for Schlegelberger, No. 128, was Document 164. It was marked for identification only. It has been reoffered and accepted as Exhibit 158-the same identical document. The Exhibit 128 will be withdrawn and it will take the number 158.
An error was also made in the offering of exhibits for the defendant Petersen to this extent, that two exhibits were offered, each of which was given the exhibit No. 138. In order to avoid changing the numbers of subsequent exhibits, the Secretary-General is directed to name or to designate the second of the two exhibits as 138-A. That will correct the error.
You may proceed with the closing argument.
DR. SCHILF (For the Defendant Klemm):
Mr. President, Your Honors:
"In view of the preliminary decision of the court I need no longer deal with Count I of the indictment, that is with conspiracy. The prosecution on the other hand declared in its opening statement that it will not prosecute as crimes, acts that have been committed prior to the outbreak of the war.
This applies not only to war crimes as such but also to crimes against humanity. Thus, so far as the Prosecution have submitted evidence dating from the period prior to the outbreak of the war I need only deal with it to the extent in which the Prosecution think they can explain by it a crime at a later date, inferring this, a participation of my client. In introduction I may further point out that the corpus delicti 'which the Prosecution consider constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity are the same. I may therefore be allowed to deal with them simultaneously and discuss their factual merits, under legal aspects, under Counts 2 and 3 respectively.
"I. My client is charged with having participated in the creation of a criminal discriminatory law for members of foreign races and Jews. In doing so the following legal provisions would be taken in consideration: the penal decree against Poles, the 13th amendment to the Reich citizenship law which excluded Jews from German jurisdiction and the exclusion of Juvenile Poles, Jews and Gypsies in applying German Juvenile law.
"1a. The evidence offered established unequivocally that my client did not participate in the creation of a discriminatory law against Poles. This special decree against Poles was enacted already in 1940 (Schlegelberger document book I, No. 60, page 18) that is at a time when Klemm was still a soldier and could not have exerted any influence on German legislation (compare Klemm's testimony, page 4920 of the English and page 4842 and the following of the German transcript). When Klemm took charge of Justice group III c in the Party Chancellery, legislative work on penal law against Poles was practically concluded. Moreover this department III C had not at all participated in this work.
In creating a penal law for Poles, the political factor to treat the Poles according to their race out weighted the legal aspects. Consequently all preliminary work on the Penal decree against Poles was not done by department III c. It is not evident at all from the document submitted by the prosecution that the Party Chancellery dealt with the special penal decree against Poles again after its basic letter of 20 November 1940 (Exh. 200) and the discussions of 10 December 1940 (Exh. 342) - that is to say prior to Klemm's time of office in the Party Chancellery (Klemm testimony page 4921 of the English and page 4843 and the following of the German transcript).
"Klemm likewise did not participate in any way in the later legal measures in this field. The party Chancellery also was not asked regarding the establishment of courts martial in the so-called incorporated Eastern territories. Involved here was only the execution of provisions of the already previously enacted penal decree against Poles. (Klemm testimony, page 4920 of the English and page 4844 of the German transcript). The same applies to the transfer to Reichsstatthalters (Regional Governors) in the so-called incorporated Eastern territories of the power to pardon Poles. Exh. 556, that is Lammer's accompanying letter reveals clearly that it was not the Party Chancellery (Partei Kanzlei) which participated but rather the so-called 'Chancellery of the Fuehrer.' This was an organization completely separated from the Party Chancellery which had been established by Hitler in Berlin, with Reichsleiter Bouhler."
I now interpolate. The day before yesterday, the prosecution, concerning Exhibits 199, 200 and 334 said that Klemm could be in connection with these discriminating laws for the mere reason that "approximately at the same time" he was appointed to the Party Chancellory.
But the Prosecution exhibits themselves show that those questions were settled by April 1941. Klemm--I shall show that later-was never Martin Bormann's legal adviser. As has been revealed by the evidence, Bormann was nearly always at the Fuehrer's Headquarters, which at that time was more than 1,000 kilometers away from Munich. Bormann always had his so-called legal adviser at Hitler's Headquarters.
"In this connection it is worth mentioning that my client never participated in the previously considered amnesty for so-called 'ethnic Germans' in Poland. The general accusation of the prosecution that Klemm destroyed the equity of the law by granting legal favors to certain circles of persons is likewise without base. It is of course correct that the Party Chancellery once suggested amnesty for ethnic Germans. This however was also done prior to Klemm's entry into the Party Chancellery (compare Klemm testimony page 4924 of the English and page 4855 of the German transcript). The Ministry of Justice rejected the proposal at that time and this proposal was never taken up again after my client had entered the Party Chancellery.
"b. As far as legislation against Jews and general racial legislation on the whole is concerned, the previous phase of development prior to the outbreak of war need not oe discussed since the prosecution cannot support charges. For the rest, the Reich Ministry of Justice and in particular Klemm, who, prior to the outbreak of the war was not working in the legislative department of the Ministry but worked exclusively in the department for administration of the penal law had nothing to do witn legislative measures, especially with the Reich citizenship law. So far as legis lation against Jews during the war is concerned, the first incidents submitted by the prosecution occurred likewise at a time when Klemm was still in Holland.
When later on in March 1941 he came into the Party Chancellery he was not subsequently informed on the discussions mentioned in Exh. 396; he neither read of nor worked on the proposal by the Reich Ministry of Justice for amendment of the Jewish question (Exh. 401) (Klemm testimony page 5015 and page 4924 and the following of the English and page 4931 and page 4845 and the following of the German transcript).
"The question whether a limitation of legal remedies for Jews was to take place (Exh. 204) was, of course for the time being, the concern of the operational sphere of Justice Group III c of the Party Chancellery. Insofar as the Ministry of Justice * - had suggested such a limitation it was purely & legal matter; it was to affect proceedings in court. Klemm however has neither seen nor worked on Bormann's letter dated 9 September 1942 in which the latter gave his approval to this suggestion of the Ministry of Justice and proposed further implementation. (Klemm testimony page 4928 of the English and page 4849 of the German transcript). As is evident from the affidavits of Klopfer (Klemm Exh. 54) of Enke (Klemm Exh. 35), and of Mueller (Klemm Exh. 36), as well as from Klemm's own testimony (page 4912 and the following of the English and page 4834 and the following of the German transcript) it happened not infrequently that Bormann personally drafted such replies under the file notes of department III c without asking the expert and without subsequently informing him.
"This matter of evidence however is unimportant, for, even if Klemm had participated in this letter in any way, his collaberation would not have influenced the formulation of the legal position, since the agreement between Thierack and Himmler, which was approved by Hitler came about after the aforementioned letter. (Exhibit 38).
Meanwhile, during a conference held by the Secretaries of State, Kaltenbrunner had expressly demanded the elimination of Jews from the administration of justice. (Affidavit Stuckert: Rothenberger Doc. Book IV, No. 60, page 39). Thus this problem, which originated at the Ministry of Justice, did not concern the administration of justice any more, but belonged to the internal administration, and accordingly the handling of this subject was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior. The expert handling of matters by Justice group III c was thus automatically done away with after the organization of the Party Chancellery. Klemm therefore did not have any share whatever in the entire elimination of Jews from the administration of justice, which in accordance with the 13th amendment to the Reichsbuergergesetz (Reich citizenship law) led to their being subordinated to the authority of the police. Developments showed that something entirely different resulted. Due to the initiative of other offices, the problem of considering a limitation of legal remedies for Jews, had become entirely devoid of object. (Affidavit Klopfer, Exh. Klemm 34). For this reason, the previous discussions, from a criminal viewpoint, are not causal at all for the result, which Blight be seen in the 13th amendment to the Reich Citizenship Law.
As far as the fact is concerned that Klemm has parsed on Bormann's approval regarding the standpoint of the Ministry of Justice, that Poles, Jews and Gypsies should be excluded from the Reich Juvenile Law (Exh. 205), it is not the case at all of creating a new law, but only one of interpreting and clarifying an already existing law. According to its structure and its contents, the Reich Juvenile La.w could be applied), to no others but Germans, for it provided to a large degree the inclusion of the "Hitler Youth" and aimed essentially at educating the juvenile as a German (Affidavit Kuemmerlein,: Klemm Exh. 37 b).