Q And you referred to that fact that in cases of undermining the defensive strength which did involve political considerations, it became important to discuss the political aspects of the case?
A Yes, quite.
Q During what periods did the court on which you sat try cases of undermining the defensive strength? During what period did you have jurisdiction over that crime, do you remember?
A If I remember rightly, until about the beginning of 1943. I am practically sure that at the beginning of 1943, the competence for the cases of Article 5, Sub-section 1 of this military law had been transferred to the People's Court.
Q And up until what date did you have jurisdiction in the Special Court?
A Do you mean for undermining defensive strength?
Q Yes.
A Until about the beginning of January 1943. I am not absolutely certain of the precise date.
Q And did we understand you correctly that you would make as a estimate, the statement that approximately half of the defendants who were tried before the Special Court were represented by defense counsel?
A Yes, quite.
Q Thank you. That is all. We will recess for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Brieger just asked us to make a ruling which is based on a question presented yesterday. He appears not to be here. Perhaps Dr. Schubert , as representative of all the defense counsel can tell him about it. It is not a matter of great importance.
The affidavit Scholl or the statement in lieu of oath was taken by the husband of the woman who made the statement. The usual procedure under the rule which was adopted, whether it is of fundamental importance or not, must be adhered. The rule provide that statements in lieu of oath may be taken before a notary or before defense counsel who acts upon his honor as an officer of the court and only in cases of great inconvenience, the rule says, can the statement be taken before a Buergermeister, much less before the husband of the affiant.
There is no showing that there was extreme inconvenience in this case and we feel that we should adhere to the rule. We do so with some regret.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q Witness, the Tribunal has just asked you about the political cases which were tried by the special court and cases where the undermining of defensive strength were mentioned in that question. Did these cases of the undermining of defensive strength constitute the majority of the political cases which were brought before the Special courts?
Can you tell us something about that, please?
A The special court did not mainly deal with cases of undermining of the defensive strength. It mainly dealt with offenses against the Malicious acts Law. The undermining of defensive strength was punished as I have said, under Article V of the extraordinary wartime Penal Law.
Q Were from the very beginning of 1942 onwards all cases of undermining of defensive strength removed from the special court or did after that the special court still remain competent to try some of those cases?
A Cases of undermining of defensive strength under Article V of the Extraordinary Wartime Penal Law, were only removed from the special court inasmuch as they were cases under Numeral 1 of that law; that is so to say, inasmuch as cases of undermining of defensive strength in the more narrow sense of that term were concerned, but cases which were dealt with under Numeral 2 and 3 of the Extraordinary Wartime Criminal Law, that is to say, the persuasion of another person to desert the Armed Forces and the infliction of injuries on our self, these cases remained in that the competency of the special court.
Q Is it correct for me to say that thereby, from the beginning of 1943 onward, there were removed from the competence cf the special court offenses committed through utterances, that is to say offenses which consisted in making a remark insofar they constituted an offense against the undermining of defensive strength law?
A Yes, one can put it that way.
THE PRESIDENT: Then when the facts of a case brought under the Malicious acts Law appeared to involve a violation of the law against undermining, you transferred those cases to the People's court when the evidence showed that situation to have arisen, did you not, under Section I?
THE WITNESS: Under the Law the case had to be transferred to the People's Court, yes.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q Now my last question to this group of problems. If in a case of undermining it had to be expected that the death sentence would be passed, was it then necessary to appoint an official defense counsel for the defendant if he had not yet got a defense counsel of his own?
AAs long as the so-called essential or necessary defense was maintained, that is to say, until approximately the middle of December, 1944, in such cases the court had to appoint an official defense counsel for the defendant, unless he had already chosen a counsel for himself.
Q Thank you, I am now reverting to your relationship with defense counsel. The witness, attorney Meyer, in the prosecution affidavit exhibit 231, described how you had barked at him, using the words, and I quote, "Counsel, we don't understand such matters."
Please give us a brief account of that matter.
A That clash with attorney Dr. Meyer occured over the von Praun Case. I cannot recall all the details for I did not attach any great importance to the matter even at the time it occured. May be I became rather violent. The arguments between myself and Attorney Dr. Meyer did, however, have no influence on the case as such, nor did it have any other effects. What caused me to use those words was that the defendant von Praun, during an air raid, had tried to threw two young girls out of an air raid shelter, because in the view of Herr von Praun they had gone to an air raid shelter which was not available to them. Even now I still lack all understanding for such an attitude.
Q The witness. Attorney Eichinger, in the Prosecution affidavit Exhibit 227, says that you had curtailed him in his defense of his client and that had happened over the Zipelius case which was tried by the courts marshall where you had told him to go back to his chair because he had been standing next to a witness and because he wanted to hear better. What are you comments on that?
A In this case I had every reason to call attorney Eichinger to order. While a witness was being examined whose testimony was extremely important, attorney Eichinger left his chair and stood right by the side of the witness who was considerably irritated by his doing so. The behavior of Attorney Eichinger was inadmissible and improper. Therefore, I requested him to return to his own chair. He complied with my request and the further examination of the witness was continued without any difficulty.
As you know, the outcome of that trial was in favor of the defendant those counsel was Attorney Eichinger.
Q. A number of defense counsel, in the affidavits introduced here by the Prosecution, criticized the fact that you had almost always rejected motions for evidence made by defense counsel. Please comment on the matter.
A. A proper decision was made about every individual motion. If such motions were rejected as being irrelevant, one must differentiate as to whether that happened before the trail or during the trial. Before the trial it was the presiding judge alone who decided on such motions. If he rejected such a motion as irrelevant that did not mean that the defendant had been deprived of all further possibilities to produce evidence. He could either call the experts or the witnesses to trial itself or the defense counsel could make another motion for evidence at the trial itself.
Q. Who decided about such motions made at the trial itself.
A. It was the court that decided after the prosecutor had been heard, not the presiding judge.
Q. What could the defense counsel do if his motion was rejected?
A. In cases which were tried by the special court he could then make a motion for a reopening of trial and in certain circumstances he could suggest with the chief Reich prosecutor of the Reich Supreme Court that the nullity plea be made.
Q. Was such legal recourse ever taken against a verdict pissed by you because a motion for evidence had been rejected?
A. Not in one single case did that happen.
Q. A number of defense counsel have complained that the time limit between the day they received the summons and the day the trial was set was too short. I am referring to Exhibits 230 and 232. Attorney Kern says that frequently the time limit of one week had been often cut down. Please tell us something about that.
A. The time limit in cases before the special court, as far as I remember, according to the legal provisions, was only 24 hours. A time limit of one week was the usual time limit with the ordinary courts.
Q. And what time limit did the special courts usually set?
A. In 95 percent of all cases where I set the date of the trial, the time limit lay somewhere between two weeks and six weeks. The number of cases which came in was so great that one could not operate at all with short time limits. Cases where the trial was held 24 hours after the indictment had been filed were extremely rare and those were always entirely clear cases. A case, where, immediately after the offense had been committed, an indictment was filed and the case was tried immediately, never occurred at all. The change made by those defense counsel must, I think, refer to quite a different point.
Not frequently, but occasionally, it happened that just before the date of the trial the counsel who had been chosen by the defendant personally gave up the defense of the defendant and in that case only two or three days before the trial began an official counsel was appointed for the defendant. For that officially appointed counsel the time in which he could prepare his defense was comparatively short but it was left open to hom on ccount of that difficulty whether he would ask for the date to be postponed and motions for postponement, which were based on that reason, I always complied with.
Q. Witness, also the court physicians have some criticism about you to offer. They charge you with having paid no attention to the opinion of the court physicians and that in particular you paid no attention to psychiatric borderline cases. I am referring to Exhibit 157 and 233. Please comment briefly on that matter.
A. The most important question from the point of view of the court to which the medical expert had to answer was whether the defendant was perhaps not in full possession of his mental capacities or whether perhaps his sense of responsibility was reduced.
I cannot imagine any case where the court did not give credence to the opinion expressed by the medical expert. The same was true of other psychopathologic conditions of the defendant even if they did not mean that his sense of responsibility was reduced considerably.
COURT III CASE III
Nor did I ever object if the psychiatric export pointed out that the defendant showed certain psychological defects which, however, did not constitute any pathological elements in the medical meaning but which were in some way or other connected with the offense. If such conditions existed in a defendant they were, if necessary considered extenuating circumstances.
Q. Dr. Kunze says that it had been positively dangerous to make any reference to psychological defects in a defendant as that was merely in additional reason for you to exterminate the defendants - Prosecution Exhibit 233. What have you got to say about that?
A. Such abnormal qualities of a psychological nature were never considered to be aggravating elements and certainly they were never made the basis for exterminating the defendant from human society. I do not know any law which allows such a thing.
The utmost that ever happened was that such reasons were not considered as extenuating circumstances, but that did not mean in any case that they were considered aggravating elements.
Q. Did you have anything to do with Streicher's criminary of aunthropological research?
A. No; I never saw it in all my life.
Q. I am no coming to the relationship which you had with your associate judges. What were your relations with the associate judges?
A. Relations between myself and the other judges of the special court, generally speaking, were of a purely official nature; but they were friendly. Mutual relations were always correct, and in all those years I did not have one single clash with any judge nor were there any friction or any other unpleasant arguments.
Q. The Prosecution has submitted a number of affidavits according to which you treated the associate judges more or less as stand-ins, as puppets, and according to which you considered them no more but a necessary evil. I am referring to the affidavit by Gross, Exhibit 229, the affidavit by Lips, Exhibit 228, and the affidavit by public prosecutor Meyer, Exhibit 226. Please comment on the matter.
A I find it difficult to say anything about those very general charges which do not contain facts but merely represent the views and the judgments of the affiants. I do not think that my associate judges in these days thought themselves puppets or that they allowed me to treat them as if they were puppets without telling me or their superior, or without registering complaints. If some of these judges now days described the matter rather differently, I can explain that to myself only because they are eager to be denazified. In effect, I treated my associate judges always as being members of the court in equal right.
Q In the Prosecution's affidavit by Meyer, Exhibit 226, it is stated that the associate judges hardly were put any questions showing thus that they were playing any part in the course of the trial; is that true?
AActually participants in the trial were not entitled to put questions to the defendant directly. After the defendant had been questioned, I in almost all cases asked the other participants in the trial, that is to say the associate judges, the defense counsel, the public prosecutor, whether they wished any further explanations or any questions. If any wishes existed, I always complied with them. Concerning the witnesses and experts, however, all persons who participated in the trial had an independent right to ask questions of them. I never curtailed that right. The associate judges made us of that right too, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly telling me in whispers what questions they would like to have asked, and then I asked that question. That right is so plainly a matter of course that the mere idea would never have occured to me to dispute that right.
Q Witness, now you have been talking about a right to put questions, were you referring to a laid which is laid down in the penal code of procedure?
A Yes.
Q In what way did you consult with your associate judges about the sentence and how did you vote?
A There was a full and conscientious discussion before every sentence. In many cases there were no difficulties and then agreement was reached soon about the question of guilt and penalty; but in all other cases the discussion was thorough and detailed and everybody could openly state his own view.
Quite frequently there were long and lively discussions and all possible pro and con was discussed. Naturally, it was not my duty, such as quite a few of the witnesses apparently believe, to give way to somebody else's opinion and make it my own; and, in the same way, no associate judge was under an obligation to follow suit and make my opinion his own. Naturally I would not depart from an opinion of which I was convinced, and for the contrary of which none of the associate judges had convinced me; nor, did I expect any of the associate judges to take up a different attitude. And, therefore, I did not expect them to display any different attitude; nor, did I ever see them display such an attitude. It was also a matter of course for me to try to persuade other persons to my opinion, and vice versa the associate judges tried to do the same with me. Objections which were significant or well-founded I always considered, and I revised my opinion immediately. I was never obstinate in insisting on letting my opinion prevail under all circumstances. If the other associate judges did not share my view, and they were quite free to have a different opinion from my own, I remained isolated and was outvoted; I was never annoyed by that, and if any associate judges did not share my opinion, I certainly never took that seriously, and the possibility that I might be outvoted was a matter of course in the nature of things.
Q Witness, the Prosecution has put in an affidavit by Amtsgerichtsrat Meier, Exhibit 226; according to that affidavit everybody who tried to oppose you was talked at by you in a very rude manner.
THE PRESIDENT: Don't you think that the witness has really answered that question already? I think he has.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q The witness Lips in Exhibit 228 has said that when sentences were being considered no vote was taken. What have you got to say about that?
A That is not true. In all cases in the course of the deliberations, concerning the question of guilt and penalty, there was always the same opinion shared by at least two of the judges. No sentence was ever pronounced to which not at least two out of the three judges had agreed -- such as it was laid down in the law.
Q The witness Pfaff, in Prosecution Exhibit 235, says that you had compelled the associate judges to apply the more severe war time laws. What are your comments on that matter?
A That statement is quite ridiculous. It misunderstand the position of the judge toward the laws, and also the position of the presiding judge. The application or non-application of the most severe war time laws after all had nothing whatsoever to do with my person; that did not depend upon my will. The associate judges, as myself, were subject to the law, and just as I myself were under an obligation and they were bound by their oath to obey the laws and to apply them if necessary. Any other attitude on the part of the judge -
Q Excuse me. I think you have answered that question sufficiently The witness Gross, who previously had appeared here in this courtroom dealt in particular detail with the manner in which you treated him during deliberation in the judge's room. He complained that no attention was paid to his objections, and that you were always interrupting him -transcript page 2839. Please make some brief comment on that particular case.
A I have to say first that Gross distinguished himself by being different from other members of the court because he was so alien and strange to realities of life.
That struck us in the case of many of his objections which were not of a legal fundamental nature or were not concerned with the extent of the penalty, but which referred to the actual events, and that it where it struck us that he was a stranger to the realities of life. Therefore, it was altogether possible in fact, it is certain that I did not pay any attention to such objections on the part of Herr Gross, but objections which deserved attention because they made sense, could he upheld, I discussed them with Herr Gross just as I did discuss them with all other judges.
Q I am now coming to the legal practice of the special court. Would you first please tell us briefly how many cases used to come before the special court of Nuernberg?
A The number of cases to be tried by the special court of tremendous, because people were continuously being called up for service with the armed forces and it was impossible to get any more staff, and, I have already said today that only in 1944 was it possible to transfer many cases to other courts to relieve our judges to a certain extent. At this trial here, with the court files, I had an opportunity to examine the statistics for the years 1940 to 1944 and ascertain fairly exactly the number of cases tried by the special court in Nuernberg. In 1940 approximately 300 cases were tried and the number of defendants was approximately 400. In 1941 approximately 500 cases were tried, where roughly 650 defendants were involved. In 1942 there were 1000 cases, with approximately 1,300 defendants. In 1943 about 900 cases Were tried involving 750 defendants. And in connection with that year 1944, one must bear in mind that about 350 cases were passed on to other courts on account of the relief plan. On an average we sat about four or five days a week.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Your figures related to trials before the special court at Nuernberg only, did they not -- just the special court?
A Yes, only the special court.
THE PRESIDENT: And how many special courts were sitting; how many divisions?
A There was only one special court with three presiding judges , there was a regular presiding judge; there was a deputy presiding judge; and there was a second deputy presiding judge.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it have been possible for three tribunals to be sitting at the same time under your practice?
A In the years 1943 and 1944 that would no longer have been possible, but in the earlier years that would have been possible because then there was enough staff, but from approximately the end of 1943 onwards, in the course of 1944, only two divisions could sit at the time -- no longer three.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q The special courts were obligated by the law to apply the war time penal laws. Those laws were extremely severe. Was that severity justified on account of the increase in criminality?
A Immediately after the outbreak of war there was an increase of crime, for which the special, unusual conditions created by the war were typical, above all, I am thinking of the blackout. Rothaug and Cuhorst already described these matters in detail. As the war went on, particularly as a result of the air war getting more and more severe, criminality of all kinds increased and the damage done by such criminals increased and the numerous cases of looting were very characteristic of that, also fraud concerning the war damage offices, bands, black marketing, etc. The criminal offenses themselves, were made a great deal easier to commit because on the account of the destruction by air raids, houses and stores were left without any supervision and, since the fall of 1943, one may say, that Germany had become a theater of war, and especially serious problems arose which could only be coped with by extraordinarily means of one wanted to master them.
The police themselves had been decimated to such an extant that they were no longer able to keep the criminal development in check, and that explains these severe war time laws and their application, which so it seemed alone would avert a catastrophe, and above all the terror regime of the criminal elements. It was necessary to curb the criminal offenses as far as possible by raising the penal risk.
Q In what way did the special court apply these war time laws?
A The special courts, to start with, that is to say at the outbreak of the war, were faced with an entirely new legal problem. The legal practice of the special courts lacked cohesiveness altogether and that in part explains Hitler's intervention with the Administration of Justice, but soon this was remedied because the nullity plea was introduced and from that time on the Reich Supreme Court dealt with the sentences passed by the special courts. From, I think, the beginning of 1940 onwards, the Reich Supreme Court took over the direction and the steering legal practice, because, of course, decisive for the special courts. As the war continued, generally speaking, sentences passed by the Reich Supreme Court became more and more severe, offenses which at an earlier time would have resulted in light punishments now, because the goods which had been lost due to some criminal act were difficult to replace were punished more and more severely. The increased rarety and need for protection was compensated by providing for a greater risk penal risk.
THE. PRESIDENT: May I ask you a question, witness. Did juries sit in any type of case after the war in Germany -- in any type of criminal case?
A No.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
AAnd by the way people were always again and again told in the press, over the radio, and even in the films, and particularly also by notice boards, what would happen if they committed offenses while exploiting the war time conditions and the people were not only warned in the German language, but in almost all languages of Europe.
DR. SCHUBERT: Your Honor, I believe your last question did not come through correctly. Would you kindly put that question again to the defendant?
THE PRESIDENT: I was inquiring it after the commencement of the war juries were employed in any criminal cases, and I meant before any of the German courts. Of course, we know they were not employed in the People's Court or the special court. The question was a general one as to whether juries were used in any criminal trials after the war. I understood him to answer that they were not.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q The Prosecution has put in a large number of affidavits where the sentences passed by you were subjected to severe criticism. I cannot possibly out all these affidavits to you in detail. In a large number of the affidavits expressions such as sadistic severity, blood thirsty judge, the exponent of the idea of extermination, etc., were used. Please comment on those matters.
A Such criticism by its lack of objectiveness and by its lack of truthfulness, I think, passed judgment on itself. The verdict passed by a judge can after all be nothing else but the faithful reflection of the law that the judge has to apply. If the laws are severe and ruthless, the sentences of course must be the same, and if one looks at the sentences passed by our special courts, one must take into consideration that I presided over a court which tried almost exclusively only offenses committed against the extremely severe war time laws. It is altogether wrong to say that the judge was not compelled to apply these severe penalties because almost all war time laws made a fairly wide scope of penalties available to him, and only in a few cases made the death sentence mandatory. That so-called scope of the judges is only an apparent scope if you examine the matter more closely. The legislator by threatening a penalty always curtailed the discretion of the judge, and particularly the limit of punishment was never left to the discretion of the judge, but the legislator fixed it. If as it was frequently the case in war time laws several types of punishment were open to the judge, he could not apply them according to his own discretion, but the law established directives and limitations, thus, for example if the law provided for penitentiary but allowed a prison term for extenuating circumstances; or if the death sentence was threatened, and a more lenient sentence could only be passed if it was a so-called of lesser gravity, or vice versa, if the punishment was penitentiary but in particularly severe cases the death sentences was mandatory.
There was no wide scope therefore but various penalties were threatened according to the fact, whether apart from the main characteristics of the offense other characteristics had to be taken into consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask a question in that connection? I am sorry to interrupt.
Q You have touched on a very interesting subject. Is it your view that in passing upon the question as to whether an act was one of lessor gravity or whether it was an act in a particularly serious case, that the Court in deciding either of those questions was deciding only a question of law, or were those in your opinion questions of fact?
A Whether a case was particularly serious or was not so serious that was a legal question, not a question of fact. The Reich Supreme Court in a large number of decisions established very accurate directives according to which those questions had to be decided.
Q And you applied the same rule in determining whether it was a question of lesser gravity, you considered that also a question of law and not of fact?
A That is a question of law.
Q Did you ever consider in passing upon those questions of law the evidence concerning the character or motive which activated a defendant in committing the crime?
A Yes, of course.
Q You considered those in determining the question of law?
A Yes, quite so, Your Honor, our decision was based on the consideration of that point of view as to whether a case was particularly serious or not quite so serious.
Q Thank you.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q This important point, the last point on which you touched, I should like to have explained with two examples. Please describe some offense which would have constituted an offense against Article 2 of the Public Enemy Law, that is to say, a black-out crime; what point of view would you have to take into consideration?
A First of all the actual offense that had been committed, let us say a theft. Concerning a theft the scope of penalty was one day up to five years. If it was an offense against Article 2 of the Public Enemy Law, the scope of penalty was one day up to five years. If it was an offense against Article 2 of the Public Enemy Law, the scope of penalty for the same theft was one year up to fifteen years in the penitentiary and if it was a particularly serious case, a death sentence.
Q And now would you please tell us the same thing about the habitual criminal. Will you again assume that the basic offense was a theft.
A In the case of an habitual criminal the scope of punishment of one day up to five years imprisonment was replaced by the penalty of the scope under article 20-a of the Reich Penal Code which provided in the case of an ordinary theft, one to five years penitentiary and in the case of serious theft, 1 to 15 years in the penitentiary. In the course of the war in the case of habitual criminals the sentences were made more severe yet and if the protection of the community demanded it or if the need for just atonement demanded it, the death sentence had to be passed.
Q And other provisions could be considered in the case of habitual criminals under what prerequisite?
A Under the prerequisite that he was not an incorrigible habitual criminal, but however a dangerous habitual criminal, and if the public safety demanded it, safety custody could be ordered.
Q Witness, did you ever pass a death sentence contrary to the law or contrary to your own convictions as a Judge?
A No, if together with the associate judges, we agreed to pass the death sentence we did so upon the conviction that was the result which the legislator had intended and which I had considered fair within the framework of the law. I based myself on the will of the legislator which was recognized in the preamble of the law or in the law itself or from the directives of the Ministry of Justice, as well as by the principles for interpretation established by the Supreme Reich Court and also based myself on my own convictions as a Judge and on those of my associate judges that the defendant merited the death sentence due to the particular circumstances of his case, also because we had a definite impression of his personality being that of a criminal. If within the framework of such a consideration we judges did not arrive at the conclusion that this defendant merited the death sentence and for example the youthful age of the offender or the fact that he had no previous convictions or the fact that particularly tragic circumstances of his life existed, circumstances which might provide for an excuse, or if the fact that the defendant had appeared to us to be capable of improvement, played a big part with us, in all such cases we abstained from passing the death sentence.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q I wonder if you would pardon another interruption, Dr. Schubert?
Pursuing this interesting question a little further, you remember that the defendant Lautz testified that his department under his direction passed upon a very great number of cases at the pre-trial stage, the indictment stage, and he or his associates in many cases considered whether a charge amounted to an undermining of military morale on the one hand or a malicious act under that law on the other hand, and the undermining cases at that stage of the war were turned over to the Peoples' Court, and the other cases which looked like malicious act cases were sent to other courts. Is it your opinion that at that stage also the determination of whether the facts in the file constituted a malicious act or an undermining of military morale was also a question involving no exercise of discretion on the part of the Prosecutor.
In other words, it is the same question again, did that present to him, in your opinion, a pure question of law?
A Whether an offense against the undermining law or against the malicious acts law had been committed, that first of all is naturally a legal question, a question which can only be decided on the basis of the whole circumstances which lead either to that utterance being made or the offense being committed. Above all one had to consider and one had to find out what had been in the mind of the offender when he made that utterance; what results he had intended to achieve.
Q You would say you are considering the facts, aren't you, and as an appraisal and estimate of the matter, the significance of those facts, then the legal question was solved, when you said you estimated the facts?
A Yes, quite so.
Q His testimony, Dr. Lautz' testimony sounded at least as if he had in many instances exercised a very sound discretion in passing upon this question that was presented to him. You wouldn't say he violated the law in doing that?
A I am afraid I didn't get that.
Q Wasn't it your impression that in passing upon those complicated facts that the defendant Lautz in his department had to exercise a very wise and sound discretion in determining which way to send the case?
A Your Honor, it is difficult for me to judge that. It all depends on the individual case and question. From my own experience all I can say is that frequently the utterances in themselves were of a type that could be described as undermining the military morale, that is to say, they were objectively undermining remarks, but such remarks somehow or other were connected with the distemper or anger or worry of the offender concerned, and, therefore, in such cases one could say it was not his intention, he did not deliberately underline the defensive strength.