DR. KOESSEL:: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will -- Just amoment. We will number your exhibits in chronological order, beginning with your document 97 in Document Book 2, which will be marked and received as Exhibit 72.
DR. KOESSEL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Thereafter all of the exhibits in Book II, will be numbered with exhibit numbers consecutively in the order in which they appear in the index with chronological numbering, of exhibits. All of those exhibits are received in evidence with the exception of Documents 151, 152, 153, 190, and 154.
DR. KOESSEL: The exhibits --.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, now. We have received all of the other exhibits now, and it is unnecessary for us to make separate rulings. We will permit you to make a brief statement concerning each of these documents if you insist on doing so, beginning with Document 98.
DR. KOESSEL: Document No. 98, Exhibit 73, demonstrates why Groben submitted the files to the Prosecution, because it is stated here that the arrest warrant has to be annulled by the investigating magistrate if the Prosecution gives that order. Thus the responsibility is transferred to the Prosecution, and that is what Groben wanted to achieve.
Document 99 contains article 33 of the Penal Code of Procedure, the one that Groben referred to when he explained why he approached the Prosecution for its opinion. Groben was not supposed to have referred to that article 33, because it only applies to the court but not to the investigating magistrate. From the text of that article one can see that it is only the court and not the investigating magistrate who can base himself upon it.
In Document 100 the legal foundation is explained why the Prosecution submitted the complaint against the arrest to that penal chamber where the indictment was originally filed.
Document 101 regulates the parallel competency between Special Courts and regular courts.
Document 102 establishes the competence of the Special Courts.
Document 103 shows the requisites which are necessary for the Prosecutor to file an indictment or to close a case.
Document 104 shows what was the final action which ended the competency of the investigating magistrat in arrest proceedings. I have to point out that the indictment was filed with the penal chamber at the end of July 1941, and immediately after it was filed it was withdrawn and that the indictment with the Special Court was filed only many months later. The control ever the arrest in the hands of the investigating magistrate exceeds by far the time when Groben became a judge at the Special Court.
Document No. 105 reveals who was authorized to sign and who, in the Katzenberger case caused the case being brought before the Special Court. The question is whether one can assume that the Prosecution acted on its own initiative and whether the mea sure which it wook upon its own initiative was later reversed by it, the Prosecution.
Document 106 shows who had to examine the competency immediately when the indictment was received by the penal chamber, and it proves that the presiding judge of the penal chamber, Ferber, had the legal duty to examine immediately, whether it was he who was competent in this case, or whether a different court was competent.
Document 107 shows the legal basis upon which the indictment could be withdrawn.
Document 108 describes the duty of the Prosecution to report in Special Court cases, to superior agencies all the way up to the Reich Ministry of Justice of Bavaria. In this connection I refer to the statement by the witness markl, English transcript Page 3653 and following pages.
Document 109 explains the competency of the presiding judge of the Special Court. I point out that according to Article 20, Section3, Sentence 2 of the regulation concerning competency the Special Court had to decide on the complaint against the arrest. That is to say, all three of the judges and net the presiding judge a lone.
In document 110 it is established to what extent the general code of criminal procedure are applicable in trials before the Special Court.
Document 111 contains a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to the case where in a civil procedure a question of penal law arises. That is what Ferber had pointed out in his comparison to a divorce proceedings. I emphasize that this Article 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an optional provision.
In document 112 the parallel case is shown from the Code of Criminal Procedure. Here again it is an optional provision. It explains what the Court has to do if in a penal case a question of civil law arises. As for the perjury case of Seiler and its handlings, neither the requirements of Article 149 of the Civil Code of Procedure nor the requirements of Article 262 of the Penal Code of Procedure were there, but the case was much simpler: namely, in a criminal trial, a question of criminal law was to be solved. That reveals that the comparison which Ferber offered was absolutely irrelevant.
In Document 113, Articles 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are required, and the general principles about connecting of penal cases.
Document 114 describes the sphere of work of the presiding judge cf the Special Court and his duties after the indictment has been filed.
Document 115 contains a further possibility of connecting criminal cases. This document, particularly, explains the concept of connection.
Document 116 also contains principles concerning the connection of criminal cases. The legal basis for joining the cases Katzenberger and Seiler is explained in Document 117. On account of this Article 15 Section 2 of the decree on jurisdiction the cases Katzenberger and Seiler were connected.
Document 118 presents the possibility that a codefendant can be used as a witness for another codefendant, and that for the purpose of testimony the case may temporarily be severed.
Document No. 1, which will be Exhibit No. 94, contains princi ples which were explained in the official organ of the University of justice, the gazette "Deutsche Justiz" about the scope of the penalty in cases of pollution.
Document 12 presents a decision of a Reich Supreme Court concerning the concept of sexual intercourse in connection with racial legislation.
THE PRESIDENT: What document is that? I didn't get that.
MR. KOESSEL: That was Document No. 12 which will be Exhibit No. 95. That decision by the Reich Supreme Court contains the concept of subsidiary actions in the sense of racial legislation.
Document No 49 contains the pertinent parts of the law for the protection of German blood, by which race pollution was made punishable.
Documents 171 and 173 also contain decisions by the Reich Supreme Court concerning the question of race pollution.
That concludes the submission of Document Book No. II, and I offer the documents which I have just discussed to be received as Exhibits 54 to 101.
THE PRESIDENT: All of those exhibits have already been received except as indicated. The Court did not exclude the last five documents as yet until we hear your statement as to what they are. Objection has been made to them. If counsel for the Prosecution has accurately stated the fact that these merely represent cases as to which there is no claim that there was any impropriety or irregularity, then we think that the documents are immaterial and should be excluded. What is you position as to that?
DR. KOESSEL: By the Kraeutlein case I only wanted to submit a case which was quite similar to the Katzenberger case. Rothaug was not charged with the Kraeutlein case, but by submitting it I wanted, to show, how here also it was a question of circumstantial evidence and how in this case also the indictment was filed first with the regular penal chamber as well as the fact that the penal chamber transferred the case into the sphere of the Special Court.
That was the same thing as in the case of Katzenberg. In addition, I wanted to show that also in this case it was the Prosecution who first had the idea to apply the Public Enemy Decree and not the Special Court, that is to say, Rothaug.
THE PRESIDENT: Was Rothaug the judge in this case?
DR. KOESSEL: He was the judge in this case.
TEE PRESIDENT: He was?
DR. KOESSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: It was a case of race pollution?
DR. KOESSEL: No, Your Honor, it is a case of arson.
THE PRESIDENT: The objections are sustained.
DR. KOESSEL: In Document Book III the Lopata case is dealt with. As Document No. 195 I offer a collection of photostatic copies which, primarily are designed to show what the attitude of the Prosecution and of the witness Dorfmueller was in the Lopata case. I refer the Tribunal to all the pages of that document where the name Dorfmueller appears and where the initials Do, the abbreviation Do, the first two letters of the name Dorfmueller, can be found. That document reveals that the idea of pronouncing the death sentence did not emanate from Rothaug but that it can be found for the first time in the indictment filed by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment -- The exhibits which were offered in evidence and rejected, being the last five in Document Book II may be marked Exhibits 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106 offered and rejected, but they will retain their numbers for the record. We now turn to Document Book III, and there being no objection, we understand that you are offering all of these exhibits in Document Book III?
DR. KOESSL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will receive in evidence all of the documents in Document Book III with the exception of Document 169, 172, and 26, as to which three exhibits we will hear counsel before ruling upon them. The first exhibit in Document Book III, Document 195, will be Exhibit 107. Thereafter, all of the exhibits in that book, in the order in which they appear in the index, will be marked by exhibit numbers which will chronologically follow Exhibit No. 107.
DR. KOESSL: That makes Document No. 30, Exhibit 112, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Document 30 is Exhibit 112?
DR. KOESSL: Yes, 112; and Document No, 169, No. 172 and Document No. 26, I did not offer to prove the atrocities mentioned there but only to show what was told to the German people in this field in order to make understandable the attitude and the opinion of the German people.
THE PRESIDENT: We are ready to rule on those exhibits, We understand that they are not offered to prove the truth of the allegations therein, but to prove the nature of the propaganda to which the German people were exposed. For that purpose, we will receive them in evidence. No. 169 will be exhibit -
DR. KOESSL: 113. No. 172 would be 114, and No. 26 would be 115, Your Honor. As for the documents 121, 122, 37, 28, and 30, which will be exhibits 108 to 112, I briefly want to recapitulate that in Document 121, it is shown what the significance was of the fact that in the case before the Special Court, a now group of facts were produced which incriminated Lopata. It can be seen from the clemency report that the fact that the farm was threatened with the pitchfork played an important part in the question of determining the penalty for Lopata.
This circumstance, however, had not been submitted to the local court in Newmarkt nor to the Reich Supreme Court when they made their decisions. In Document 122, it is shown what was the legal basis for appointing defense counsel and the necessity that defense counsel be appointed if the death penalty might arise. Document No. 37, contains a judgment by the Reich Supreme Court which describes the necessity of protection for women and children as especially urgent. That judgment by the Reich Supreme Court and the reasons for it were of decisive importance in the Lopata case. Document No. 28 shows that when the requirements for the Public Enemy Decree prevailed, one was confronted with a new type of offense. Document No. 30 also contains a decision by the Reich Supreme Court which also emphasizes the necessity of considering, particularly during time of war, protection for women.
Exhibits 113 to 115 afford an insight in to the propaganda against the Poles. Documents No. 27 and No. 41 speak for themselves. Both these documents explain the position of the then competent Under-Secretary Freisler concerning the question of the law against Poles. Document No. 7 and Document No. 34 contain the points of view of the Reich Supreme Court concerning penal jurisdiction during war. Document No. 52 is an excerpt from the opinion against Milch. Here Military Tribunal No. 2 states that the Poles who worked in the Reich were forcibly brought into the Reich only since the beginning of the year 1943. That is in agreement with the statements made by the defendant Rothaug; to wit, that during the entire time that he worked at the Special Court, only voluntary Poles were sentenced by the Special Court. From that document No. 52, it can be seen that the first Poles who were displaced against their will could come only after the time when Rothaug worked at the Special Court.
That concludes the submission of Document Book No. III.
THE PRESIDENT: The record will show, Mr. Secretary, that all exhibits in Rothaug Book III are received in evidence, being Exhibits 107 to 120, both inclusive.
DR. KOESSL: Concerning Exhibit 107, may I submit to the Tribunal the photostats, because the photostatic copies show the handwriting of Dorfmueller and the handwritten initials of Dorfmueller; whereas, the, copies of the documents, and the translations of the documents submitted do not show them as clearly. Therefore, I ask to accept the photostatic copies of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Those photostatic copies are copies of the exhibits of the documents in Exhibit 107?
DR. KOESSL: Yes, Your Honor. In Document Book No. IV, the Grasser case is dealt with. First, document No. 120, which I offer as Exhibit No. 121 contains Article 2 of the Malicious Acts Law.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. We haven't received the books yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Has counsel examined these exhibits?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please Your Honors, I believe I stated before that I have no objection to anything in Books IV and V-A.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. We will dispose of these in the same manner as before.
DR. KOESSL: I think I can be more brief in my statements here. Document 120, which is going to be Exhibit 121, contains Article 2 of the Malicious Acts Law Document 188 contains an interrogation of the accused Grasser by the investigating magistrate. I consider it significant in this case that already the investigating magistrate considered the offense by Grasser as a crime, and classified it as a case of high treason according to Article 83 of the Reich Penal Code. Document 119 concerns that article 83 of the Reich Penal Code. Document 178 contains Article 5 and 6 of the Decree concerning jurisdiction which reveals that that offense came under the competency of the People's Court.
Document 165 contains the basic legal position of the Public Prosecutors, here, special attention is called to Article 147 of the Judicature Act which shows that the general public prosecutor's office in Munich had no right to give any directives to the Senior Public Prosecutor in Nurnberg regarding the Grasser case. It shows that the transferring of the Grasser case to the Senior Public Prosecutor in Numberg took place for reasons of competency. Document No. 179 proves that it was possible for the Public Prosecution in Nurnberg to prosecute Grasser to the same extent as originally charged, although the Senior Public Prosecutor in Munich had stricken some of the charges. By the appeal against the arrest made by Grasser, which is contained in Document 180, Rothaug got in contact with the Grasser case for the first time. Here we see again that the investigating magistrate, as is shown in Document 181, also had rejected Grasser's appeal; the Senior Public Prosecutor also objected against the appeal made by Grasser, to be found in Document 182. Finally, there is the ruling of the presiding judge in Document No. 183. This document also contains a ruling by the Senior Public Prosecutor wherein he terms Grasser's offenses as continuous offenses against the Malicious Acts Law.
In this document for the first time, there appears a different legal evaluation of the offenses committed by Grasser in contrast to the evaluation by the Senion Public Prosecutor in Munich. In Document 184, it appears again that the examining magistrate assumed only one offense had been committed. Here one can see a certain difference in the legal opinion of the investigating magistrate and the Public Prosecutor. Document 185 deals with the position of judge concerning the indictment and the motions by the prosecution. It shows that the Judge is not bound by the legal evaluation of the prosecution nor by their motions.
Document 186 contains the provision of the Dode of Criminal Procedure, according to which a defendant has to be notified of any charge of the legal evaluation, if the court should charge its point of view. Document 187 contains a sentence of the former Bavarian Supreme Court, and here already in 1934, this court sentenced Grasser for Communist activities. Document No. 24 is a reproduction of an opinion of the Reich Supreme Court concerning the Malicious Acts Law; also, in Document No. 40. Both opinions make it clear that the point of view was a rather severe one as to the application of the Malicious Acts Law.
Document No. 6 contains an opinion wherein the Reich Supreme Court elaborates on the relation between malicious acts and undermining of military morale, and in particular, defines the term "public." The question as to whether it was an offense against the Malicious Acts Law or a case of undermining of military morale played an important part in the Grasser case; in addition to that, the question as to whether it was committed in public. Document No. 191 contains three decisive rulings by the Reich Supreme Military Court where the concept "public" is given a rather wide scope, and according to which one had to assume also in the Grasser case that the offense was committed publicly.
Document 174 contains a desertation about the competency of the Special Courts in cases of undermining of military morale. At that time, in 1940-1941-1942, temporary the Special Court was made competent for cases of undermining of military morale; whereas, later, for cases of undermining of military morale, the People's Court became competent.
The last document No. 20 is particularly important in the Grasser case because Rothaug did not change his evaluation of the Grasser case. From the decision by the Reich Supreme Court, which is contained in Document No. 20, we can see that Rothaug, as a judge, was not authorized to make Doebig's opinion of the Reich Ministry of Justice as the basis for his decision, and to deviate from his own opinion as a judge. This decision by the Reich Supreme Court specifically recognizes principle according to which Rothaug acted.
That concludes the submission of my documents for today. I offer the documents from Document Book IV, which I have just discussed, as exhibits.
THE PRESIDENT: All exhibits in document book Rothaug No. IV, are received in evidence, being Exhibits 121 to 140 inclusive, and covering in chronological order Documents No. 120 through 20. I shouldn't say "chronological order"; I mean in the order in which they appear in the index.
We understand that Document Book V-A is ready.
DR. KOESSL: Document Book V-A is ready, I believe, but I wanted to submit it in connection with V-B and VII and VIII, which are still in the Translation Department.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that VI-B has been distributed.
DR. KOESSL: Yes, Your Honor, but cases are dealt with here concerning which there are supplements in Book VII and VIII so that I would prefer, if possible, to submit them together.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't see how you can discuss more than one exhibit at a time. Why can't you start with V-A?
DR. KOESSL: I could start it, of course, but it was because there is a supplement to the cases discussed in V-A, which is in Book VII.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are going to take up one book at a time and one exhibit at a time. We suggest that you start with V-A.
DR. KOESSEL Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution should have V-B; it has been distributed.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: It may be that I just haven't seen it, Your Honor.
DR. KOESSL: May I continue with Document Book No. V?
THE PRESIDENT: Book V--A, is it not?
DR. KOESSL: V--A, Your Honor. First the Gaishauser Case is referred, to. The individual documents are clear by the discussion of the Gaishauser Case with the defendant in the witness box. I believe that I may submit these documents as Exhibits 141.
THE PRESIDENT: You are offering all of the exhibits in the book?
DR. KOESSL: As Exhibits 141 until 160.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 163, I think.
DR. KOESSL: Yes, Exhibits 161 and Exhibit 162 no longer deal with the Gaishauser Case, nor do they deal with the Schegerer Case. They have to do with the Heller-Muendel Case. They are decisions and the legal requirement for the case concerning the auto trap law which plays a part in the Heller-Muendel Case.
I offer the documents in Document Book V-A as Exhibits 141 through 162.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibits 141 to 162, inclusive, are each received in evidence, being your documents from 60 to 48 in the order in which they appear in the document book No. V--A, Rothaug.
DR. KOESSL: Concerning the documents which deal with the Gaishauser Case, the passages referring to the witness Meiler and her statements are of significance; also the passages concerning the motions made by the attorney Kroher. The case has already been discussed in detail. As for the Schegerer Case, which was submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit 164, the unanimous evaluation of the case by the Senior Public Prosecutor in Regensburg, outside of the sphere of the Special Court, and by the Senior Public Prosecutor in Nurnberg and the General Public Prosecutor in Nurnberg in their reports is significant. The documents No. 11 and 48 deal with the auto trap law which was the basis for the sentence in the Heller-Huendel Case. That concludes my submission of documents for today, Document Book V-B has not yet been examined by the Prosecution.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: We have examined it and we are ready for Dr. Koessl to proceed.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, you may proceed with V-B.
DR. KOESSL: Then, I am ready to submit it right away too, Your Honor.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I have an objection -- I am sorry, it hasn't been offered yet.
DR. KOESSL: I offer Document Book V-B, documents No. 125 through 199, inclusive, in the order in which they are listed on the index, as Exhibits 163 through 188, inclusive.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, I object to the entire contents of this document book. It appears on the index that this book consists of extracts from three case files. The defendants in each of those cases were raised in this proceeding here only in that their names were mentioned in Exhibit 238, which was a list of death sentences passed by the Nurnberg Special Court. Since no charges were raised by the Prosecution that these defendants were in any way improperly tried, but only noted in one exhibit the fact that they had been tried and sentenced to death, I object to the entire book as being immaterial, on the same ground that I objected to the Kraeutlein Case a while ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, may we ask what was the purpose of the offer in which you presented evidence of the number of death sentences?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Aside from the actual case files, or other evidence showing the method of trial of a particular case, the only purpose of that list of death sentences is to show the volume of business handled in capitol cases by any or all of the defendants connected therewith. The list was intended to show volume, method of trial we hoped to show by case files and testimony; and, further, that list was also to show that many of the defendants mentioned in evidence before this Tribunal as having been sentenced to death were, in fact, executed.
In other words, contributing to the corpus delicti.
DR. KOESSL: I wanted to deal with these three cases because in a way they are significant to show that the prosecution was of the same opinion as the Special Court, and that particularly the initiative for greater severity did not come from the Defendant Rothaug. Furthermore, to show what the fundamental ideas and principles were for the application of the Public Enemy Law. I also wanted to show by submitting the Tiefel Case what means of recourse there were against the sentence by the Special Court, by way of reopening the trial, and in the final analysis I wanted to show that the regular courts outside of the sphere of the Special Court had the same legal conception in applying the Public Enemy Law and other war time laws as the Special Court. Moreover, it was somewhat surprising to find in a decision by the Senate of the District Court of Appeal of Nurnberg that this Senate did not exhaust the meaning of Article 26 of the competency decree which in this case was to the disadvantage of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The hour of 12:15 hag arrived, and we will recess until 1:30 this afternoon -- at which time we will rule upon the objection.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours, 29 August 1947.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The Tribunal reconvened, at 1330 hours, 29 August 1947.)
THE PRESIDENT: I believe that the objection of the Prosecution was directed generally to all of Document Book V-B; is that correct?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: That is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: V-B. And we understand that V-B contains excerpts relative to cases which were listed as halving resulted in the death sentences; is that correct, Dr. Koessl?
DR. KOESSL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal feels that not withstanding the limited purpose for which the Prosecution now claims it introduced the list of death sentences, notwithstanding that fact, there was some implication when the exhibit containing the list of death sentences was introduced, that it was in support of a contention that Teutonic laws had been severely enforced, and the Tribunal feels that if the list of death sentences was received in evidence, as tending to show statistics of severe sentences, that the Defense should be entitled to introduce a reasonable, limited amount of evidence for the purpose of showing the basis for those sentences. In fairness to the Defense, and notwithstanding the limited purpose expressed by the Prosecution, the Prosecution' s objection is overruled and the exhibits will be received in evidence. I take it you are offering all of the exhibits in Document Book V-B.
DR. KOESSL: I offer them, and that is as Exhibits 163 through Exhibit 180 inclusive, in the same order in which the documents are listed in the index of Document -Book V-B. Concerning the Bellmer case which is dealt with first, I want to draw the attention of the Tribunal particularly to Document No. 129. That document contains a decision by the General Public Prosecutor at Nurnberg in which the General Public Prosecutor draws the attention of the Senior Public Prosecutor to the fact that his intention to ask for only five years in a penitentiary is entirely beside the point, and that one had to consider whether the death sentence should not be asked for.
Here again, we see that the suggestion that the death sentence should be passed was not initiated by the Special Court or by Herr Rothaug, but by the superior authorities of the prosecution. The same thing probably led to the death sentence being asked for in the Grasser case and led to the prosecutor Dorfmueller abandoning original intention to ask for a penitentiary sentence and, in fact, asked for the death sentence. By means of the files of the Special Court in the Sollfrank case, I wish to prove that the Senior Public Prosecutor in Weiden, who had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Special Court, on his own initiative had transferred the case to the Prosecution in Nurnberg for the indictment to be filed with the Special Court. Here, too, we see that a prosecution office which was outside the work of the Special Court had the same opinion which the Special Court and the prosecution of the Special Court held, and that the prosecution itself thought of applying the more severe war-time provisions. In the Tiefel case it is of particular interest how the procedure for the reopening of trial and the possibilities of contesting a verdict passed by a Special Court developed. In Documents No. 200, 198 and 199, these are the last three documents. I am presenting the various provisions of Articles 16 and 26 of the Competency Orders. In Document No. 200 the original version of the provision is contained according to which the verdicts of the Special Court -
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, I don't have Document 200.
DR. KOESSL: I shall produce it later. It is contained in my document book.
HR. WOOLEYHAN: I have never seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in our document book here, page 160, Document No. 200.
DR. KOESSL: This document No. 200, in Article 16 of the Order of the Reich Government concerning the establishment of Special Courts, and in Section II of the Article, reopening of trial in the case of verdicts passed by the Special Courts is dealt With.
That Article 16 is almost literally the same as Article 26 of the later Competency Orders which is contained in Document No. 198. This Article 26 of the Competency Order, just as the former Article 16, provides for reopening of trial in regular court, that is to saw, the revision of a verdict passed by a Special Court by the penal chamber of the regular district courts, and by the Senate of the District Court of Appeals. That version was in force during the time when Rothaug was the presiding judge of the Special Court, and only two months before he left that office, a new version of Article 26 of the Competency Order was promulgated. That new version is contained in Document 199. That shows that since 1943 and is since the end of January or the beginning of February of that year, the verdicts passed by a Special Court were no longer reviewed by regular courts, but from that time onwards, the Special Courts themselves were competent to decide whether a trail was to be reopened. That provision, however, did not come into effect while Rothaug was still in Nurnberg for in the meantime he had been transferred. The Tiefel case shows how such a motion for reopening of trial was carried out in practice and how proceedings were then brought before the penal chamber, through regular legal channels, and how when the appeal was made the matter came before the Senate of the District Court of Appeal. The Senate in this case demonstrated a very narrow construction and did not even exhaust all possibilities to revoke the verdict passed by the Special Courts.
I have now concluded my presentation of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude all the documents which you propose to offer?
DR. KOESSL: I still have some supplementary volumes -- Volume VII and Volume VIII; they contain photostats and affidavits. Some of those will follow later, because of new documents being submitted under crossexamination.
THE PRESIDENT: We assured Dr. Breiger that he might start his examination of the defendant Cuhorst this afternoon. However, we find one book of exhibits by the defendant Lautz, with about six exhibits. Could you present those at this time? What is the name of the book -Lautz -- IV Supplement. Are you prepared to present that? It should take only a few moments.
DR. GRUBE: Yes. It will just take me a few minutes to get the book when I get it here I am ready to present it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Breiger, it will only take a few moments to complete this book, and then we will hear your witness.
DR. BRIEGER: That is perfectly all right.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this your last book?
DR. GRUBE: Yes.