THE PRESIDENT: What do you find in the law, sections 1 to 4, which limits the applicability of that law to Poles and Jews who had been in Poland on the first of September 1939? In other words, perhaps I can make the question simpler. Did the law, sections 1 to 4, apply to Poles or Jews who were in the Altrich on 1 September 1939?
A. No.
THE PRESIDENT: And what do you find in the statute that says so, except in the title?
A. Unfortunately, I haven't got the text with me.
DR. SCHUBERT: May I hand the text to the witness?
A. That is evident from the section which is headed, "Extension of the Sphere in which the Law Applies." Roman numero XIV. There it states: "The provisions under Roman numeral 1 and 4 of this decree apply also to Poles and Jews who on the first of September 1939 were resident in the territory of the former Polish State or who were staying there permanently and who committed the offense in an area of the German Reich other than the incorporated eastern territories." From that, it is evident that the substantive legal provisions applied to Poles and Jews as well, but only to those Poles and Jews who on the 1st of September 1939 were resident within this territory of the State of Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: That's all. Does any other defense counsel desire to make this witness his own? If not, you may proceed with the cross examination.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. WOLLEYHAN:
Q. Dr. Rothaug, with respect to your decision in the case Grasser, which is Exhibit 139, now in evidence, you recollect that from the evidence and from your discussion it appears that Grasser was indicted under the Malicious Acts Law. A day and a half before the trial, you decided that he could also be convicted under the law against Public Enemies, and you appointed his defense counsel on that day.
You arrived at that decision, as you stated, despite the fact that the Ministry of Justice had ordered prosecution for the lesser offense and despite the opinion of the prosecutor in Munich that it was the lesser offense, and despite efforts made by Dr. Doebig to dissuade you from applying the more severe offense. I ask you, Dr. Rothaug, was your theory in the Grasser case in applying the more severe Public Enemy Law, authorizing the death penalty, that Grasser much more than merely dispairaging the Nazi State and Party had by his utterances made his friends less enthusiastic about Germany's waging the war? Was that your theory?
A. I didn't understand that last sentence. Would you mind repeating it please?
Q. Was your theory in the Grasser case in sentencing the man to death for violating the Public Enemy Law even though he had not been indicted for that offense because you felt that he had made Germany's waging of the war more difficult?
A. Above all, the conditions, the prerequisites on which you base yourself in asking the question are not altogether correct, but I have already pointed that out during my direct examination; what happened was not that the case as the senior public prosecutor passed it on to Nurnberg was the basis of the indictment which was filed with me. From the Grasser files, I was not able to establish in what form the Reich Ministry of Justice in this particular case would instruct the prosecution for the reason that in those files one page, page 50 was missing, and that important decision by the Ministry of Justice was missing in the files. It happened repeatedly that the Ministry, for example -
Q. Dr. Rothaug, you are getting apart from the question. The case record and notes of the trial speak for themselves. They are in evidence. I am asking you now again was your theory in sentencing Grasser to death as a public enemy because you felt that by his utterances he had made his fellow workers less enthusiastic about helping Germany wage the war?
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
DP. KOESSL: Just a moment. May it please the Court, the witness has replied altogether within the framework of the question, and it is impossible to answer the question which the Prosecutor put to him unless the basic question which the witness broached is properly explained, it is the indictment is of decisive importance.
THE PRESIDENT: Your objection is overruled. Go on with the cross examination.
Q Dr. Pothaug, if you want to, you could simply answer that question yes or no.
A But I don't want to.
Q I didn't think you did.
A By answering this question, I also don't want to concede that all what was stated by the introduction of the question was correct. My judgment, my opinion, at the time when I considered the offense to be a more grave offense than had been assumed in the indictment, to begin with was this: the defendant when he committed his offense, in consideration of the circumstances which attended his remarks, that is to say inside armament plants where people were heavily over-worker, and in consideration of the person of fee defendant, who, as we know before 1933 had been an active communist who had continued his communist activities after 1933; who, because of that had been sentenced for high treason; who, after he had finished serving his term had been transferred to a concentration camp; and, finally, was discharged from the concentration camp and was rehabilitated because he had promised to conduct himself properly, my view was and that was on account of the suspicions that this man in considering all the points which I have mentioned here, when he made those remarks, was not merely conscious that he was making the derogatory remarks, but was aware that he affected the attitude of the people working in an armament plant and that he was exploiting their weariness to make remarks which would undermine their morale. That was the first consideration which guided me. Then I considered the question whether Article 4 of the public enemy law was applicable.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
The question which the prosecutor has just broached, the question of undermining military morale, that, if one refers to the aims of the offender lies in his direction: That at least in part it was the intention of the offender to undermine confidence in the conduct of the war and the chances of winning the war in his surroundings. Those subjective facts were such of a malicious acts law case, but it was the psychological situation that reached into that field, and that was what caused me to take a graver view of the offense; but the opinion which was finally decisive, because the law for undermining military morale, even for the ordinary case, considers the death sentence as a rule. It is important and I pointed that out during my direct examination that that point of view concerning the undermining of military morale, to begin with, after I had first examined the files -
Q Dr. Pothaug -- as you said, you pointed all this out before in your direct examination. I believe that at some length you have answered my question about whether or not the relations to the war was the factor of the judgment in the Grasser case. I now ask you if you think it was justifiable -
A But -
Q Dr. Pothaug, may I ask you the question, please. I now ask you if you thought it was justifiable to sentence a man to death for a crime for which he had not been indicted, and to defend himself against which he had a defense counsel appointed for him a day and a half before the trial.
A Unfortunately because the second question was put so soon after the first question to me, unfortunately because of that, I haven't had an opportunity to answer the first question exactly, and I haven't had a chance to explain why the point of view of the undermining of military law entered into the problem at all. I don't know whether the Tribunal would like me to make some remarks on that subject.
MP. WOOLEYHAN: Your Honors, may I ask for an instruction that the witness make some attempt to be responsive?
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness should learn, even at this late date, to answer with some conciseness and brevity the questions that are put to him, bearing in mind what he has already said in his direct examination. Now, this was a short question, and I think you can answer it briefly without being exhaustive.
A The judgment from the point of view of the undermining of military morale law, that judgment was based upon the basis which was legally perfectly correct. There are no faults in the proceedings according to the legal situation. In Germany the same facts on which the indictment was based, those same facts also supported the trial, and the only thing that was new was the legal question which had turned up at the trial as to whether the facts were to be judged not only from the point of view of the malicious acts law and the public enemy law, but also by the paragraph of the law against undermining of military morale. The fact that I deviated from the original legal opinion, or if I supplemented the original legal opinion by locking at it from a wider angle, as it was the case here, if I did all that, then under the code of procedure I was merely under obligation to inform the defendant that there was a possibility that a new legal point of view might be applied, and to tell him so that he would be able concerning the new legal situation which might arise to consult with his defense counsel. It is evident from the records that the defendant was instructed accordingly, and he was instructed before the public prosecutor and the defense counsel had given their view in their final pleas. I believe that that is what you wanted to know.
Q And you said just now, I believe, that on the same facts upon which the prosecutor indicted Grasser, for the minor crime of malicious acts utterances, that you decided that he should be sentenced to death; is that correct?
A The original indictment was made under the malicious acts law. That legal specification did not bind the court in any way, but the court was under obligation if in its view a more grave specification Court No. III, Case No. 3.should be made, to adopt that point of view, and to apply the more grave measures.
On the other hand the court was also able to deviate from the more serious specification of the prosecution and give way to a more lenient view. The judge is not bound in one single point by the legal judgment of any one event; he is not bound in that respect by the judgment of the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you a question. Can the judge convict a man for a crime which is not described in the indictment under your procedure? Just answer that question. Can he or can he not?
A Naturally he cannot do that.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all.
A He must not bring in new facts, but that was not the question in this case.
THF PRESIDENT: I understood your other answer.
Q Dr. Pothaug, with regard to the case Schlamminger, you were discussing the testimony of the witness Ostermeier, in which he charged you with re-writing his opinions in a more political vein. You stated that you knew your style and Ostermeir's style, and that you could say with almost absolute certainty that the opinion in the Schlamminger case, which we had before us that day, in its main points was a product written by Ostermeier. I show you a paper. Does that appear to be the handwritten draft of the Schlamminger opinion, from which the one -
A That is the handwritten draft.
Q I ask you if you find there page after page completely lined out and re-written in your own handwriting. I ask you if you find ten of fifteen pages at the end -- completely -written in your handwriting.
A If I make a rough guess, I guess I think that it is approximately fifty-fifty -- the statements which I put down here by way of correction and amendment; perhaps they are in excess of the others.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all; you have answered the question.
Q Dr. Pothaug, in addition to other cases involving Polish laborers brought to Germany for work, some of whom at one time or another Court No. III, Case No. 3.turned up in your courtroom.
I ask you if you remember the case of Murzyn, M-u-r-z-y-n, which occurred in the Upper Palatinate. Do you remember presiding over this trial of a Pole who had found some deonators in a field, such as are used to blow out stumps, and had kept them with his belongings? Do you remember sentencing that Pole to death on the assumption that he intended to commit some undefined act of sabotage?
A I do not remember the case, but it is possible that the case was tried when I was presiding judge, but this case was not a subject of the direct examination.
Caurt III Case III
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will take care of that problem. You may just answer the questions.
BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. Further, outside of your conception of the scape of the direct examination, I ask you if you remember the case the pole, Pawula, and four other poles, tried by,you in the fall of 1942.
DR. DOESS: Hay it please the Court, I do net know to what extent the Prosecution is to be allowed to introduce new cases, and by doing so attacking the jurisdiction of the special court Nurnberg concerning Polish cases. I introduced cases in order to show the opposite tendency, and the Tribunal did not consider that that is a sufficient reason to allow me to introduce new cases. I believe, therefore, that introducing New Polich cases on the part of the Prosecution should also not be posibel.
THE PRESIDENT: Your objection is overruled. The idstinction is rather a clear one. The introduction of evidence against the charge that some other case was improperly tried; and this is proper cross examination in view of the statements made by the defendant in his direct examination.
BY. MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. Do you remember, Dr. Rothaug, in this case of Pawula and four other eastern nationals, that they were housed in a labor camp of foreign workers, and that they had stole clothing and sold the clothing to other polish workers; and that both the Poles who had stolen the clothing, and the receivers of the clothing, were sentenced to death in 1942?
A. I don't remember that case; I cannot remember it at all, and the facts of that ease I don't know anything about them.
Q. Dr. Rothaug, do you remember about this same time in 1942 a case before you of the Pole Salisch, who had been a prisoner in the headquarters of the Nurnberg police, and during an airraid he had escaped and stolen a watch and other small luggage form the police station; after which you sentenced him to death as a plunderer; do you remember that case?
A. I remember that case quite vaguely; as to whether a Pole or any foreigner was involved in that case, that I doubt. The way I remember the case, it was not a foreigner who was the offender, but I might be wrong. At any rate, what happened was this: After a heavy airraid, when bombs had been dropped on the police prison in Nurnberg, at police headquarters, the doors of the cells burst open, the offender used his chance and immediately went to look over the badly destroyed prison for things he might steal, and in the course of doing so he got into the room where the possessions of the prisoners were kept, and immediately he started to steal. As to the legal point of view by which that man was sentenced at that time, I don't know; but according to the nature of his offense, it was altogether possible that he you have been sentenced to death for plundering, for the death sentence is mandatory for plundering.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, all the foregoing cases involving roles, just distributed, were taken from Document NG-932. They are a sworn affidavit of Dr. Heinz Hoffmann, who was associate judge at the Nurnberg-Special Court from mid 1940 until the end. The Prosecution offers as Exhibit 556 that document.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit is received.
BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. Dr. Rothaug, with respect to your enforcement of the malicious attack law, would you say tn t it was a fair statement of you purpose in enforcing that law that violations of it endangered the public peace?
A. I assume when you speak of malicious acts decrees, you are referring to the malicious acts law. It was the aim of the maliciuos acts law to protect not only the public peace, but to protect the confidence of the population in their political leaders. I think that is the aim of the malicious acts lsaw, but the maliciuos acts law and this is important, does not demand, does not stipulate that the will of the offender should be aimed at destroying that confidence, but it is sufficient for the offender to be aware that by making a certain statement he might undermine such confidence.
The intention of the offender to destroy that confidence, if the offender has that intention, then that actually is a crime of the nature of high treason. For example, his intention is to make the population waver -- to make them doubt as to what will be the outcome of the war inner aspect which is decisive for the legal point of view which in the last analysis, will be decisive.
Q. In the Schosser case-- our clergyman from Vilseck. Did it take you thirteen months to make up your mind that Father Schosser had undermined the people's confidence in their political leaders?
A. That did not take me thirteen months, but it was quite a different thing, as with the documents at hand I nave proved quite clearly during my direct examination that, not I out the public prosecutor first got hold of that case, and in August, 1942 the case came to me in the form of an indictment.
At that time I not only had the rights but I definitely was under and obligation to examine the question as town whether Schosser, in his sermon, had made remarks which were derogatory to the State. Within the limited extent of the judgment that fact was established, and, in favor of the defendant, we assumed that only those few passages had malicious intent and that the defendant in his sermon did not mean to go out for aims of high treason. In other words, it did not take me thirteen months to find that out.
Q. Why did the Kreisleiter write directly to the Nurnberg Special Court seeking an arrest warrant for Father Schosser when the normal procedure would have been for him to request the same of his local investigating judge in Amberg?
A, The Kreisleiter in Nurnberg did not write to the Special Court of Nurnberg-
Q. Dr. Rothaug, one moment, please. I didn't say the Kreisleiter in Nurnberg, I said the Kreisleiter of the area wherein this case arose.
A. In Amberg.
Q. Right you are. Why didn't he write to the investigating judge in Amberg, which is ho normal procedure, instead of writing directly to your court for an arrest warrant?
A. That is right; it was not he Kreisleiter of Nurnberg, it was the Kreisleiter of Amberg who wrote that letter. However, the Kreisleiter of Amberg did not write to my court, he wrote to the office which was competent to deal with that question, and that was the prosecution at Nurnberg. That was the normal office to contact. The investigating judge in Amberg had nothing to do with the matter, because this was a malicious acts case, where the public prosecutor at the Special Court in Nurnberg was competent.
Q, Dr. Rothaug, after you received notification from the pro secution in Nurnberg about this case and you made up your mind that an arrest warrant was justified, did you ask any other judge to issue the arrest warrant?
A. I remember the case vaguely. When that case came to me I simply assumed the following, according to the description that had been given to me, because I know the conditions in general, and also because I assumed that other persons too knew those conditions, particularly if, like Schosser, they were living under those conditions. On account of all that, I assumed that he suspicions were such as we had concluded from our legal specifications.
Q. Dr. Rothaug, one moment please. I don't like to interrupt, but my question was simply whether you requested another judge at the Nurnberg Special Court to issue a warrant of arrest for Father Schosser.
A. Therefore, because I happened to be in court that day, I asked my deputy Ferber to deal with the ease in my place.
Q, Did Ferber refuse to issue he warrant of arrest?
A. Ferber did not refuse to issue the arrest warrant, but, as was frequently the case with my people, they did not quite know what to do or they had certain misgivings. Because of that, he waited until I came out of the courtroom. Then he said to me that he would rather discuss he matter with me and, as I was then free to deal with the matter, I told him he had better leave the files and I would deal with them. I did deal with them myself, and I dealt with them according to my best knowledge within the meaning of the law, and according to my conviction concerning what law was to be applied as well as concerning the facts which had to be assumed.
It is obvious that Ferber did not oppose my attitude to a great extent because an appeal was made against the arrest warrant, and that was done after the defendant--and I didn't know that at the time-had made detailed statements. Ferber also rejeted that appeal a gainst the warrant, which he rejected with me at the time, although today he charges me with having rejected it.
When I decided on that appeal Feber know, but I didn't know, about some facts which soon gave cause for suspending tho trial.
Q. Dr. Rothaug, one moment, again. The question still is simply that Ferber did not issue the arrest order after you asked him to. Is that correct?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And then thereafter you did issue an arrest order, did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And thereafter was that arrest order that you issued later revoked and the prisoner released by Dr. Ferber?
THE PRESIDENT: Just answer the question.
A. No, the defendant was not released by Ferber, but the prosecution suspended the case because the defense had shown that the defendant had been with the armed forces for some time and therefore had not been properly informed about matters concerning tho Polish problem. The prosecution then, under Article 126 of the Code of Procedure, made an application; and as to that application, I have already said that it forces the judge to revoke the warrant.
So as to leave no doubt about his competency, I remember that, in the files, Ferber expressly incorporated Article 126 in his order. BY HR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. Now, Dr. Rothaug, after Ferber, by his order, revoked your arrest warrant based on the fact of a speech from the pulpit made by Father Schesser thirteen months before?
THE PRESIDENT: That question can be answered yes or no.
THE WITNESS: In the further course of the proceedings I issued the new warrant
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question yes or no?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Your Honor, the prosecution offers the two arrest warrants signed by the defendant Rothaug, the release order signed by the witness Ferber, and the facts for each arrest warrant as contained in the Special Court files, which is document NG-1808, as Prosecution Exhibit 557.
THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit is received.
BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. In connection with this matter of arrest warrants issued by the President of tho Nurnberg Special Court for his deputies, you have frequently repeated here, Dr. Rothaug, that on your own initiative you could not under take prosecution or ask anybody else to institute proceedings, but that your work in that respect always depended upon tho prosecution. I ask you how you explain Article 125 of the German Code of the Criminal Procedure, which I am sure is known to you and which reads as follows:
"In case of emergency the President of the Special Court can have issued a warrant of arrest on his own initiative without any motion of the prosecution."
Is that compatible with your view of your own initiative in that matter?
A. This is what happens. Before the indictment is filed, the investigating judge, on his own initiative--that is, without the prosecution having made an application-can issue a warrant for arrest if there is any danger. That provision is the basis for all so-called arrest warrants in the big cities. People who are arrested by the police, for the sake of simplicity, are frequently brought before the investigating judge so that he may issue an arrest warrant and not under that provision, but under the competency ordinance.
I believe it is Article 22, but I don't know that by heart. It was under that provision that, instead of the investigating magistrate, it was the presiding judge of the Special Court who could also make that decision. However, as far as I know, such cases did not occur actually. What happened was always that tho prosecutor made the application with us. That was not compatible with our usual procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: Our recess time has arrived. We will recess for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER (for the defendant Dr. Rothenberger): May it please the Court, as concerns the absence of the defendant Dr. Rothenberger from the session today, I just got in touch with the prison officer and asked him for the reasons. He did not give me any further explanation but to say that Dr. Rothenberger was ill -- probably for a period of two weeks -- but he could not at this time give any further information; he would be able to do so in a few days. Therefore, I ask that Dr. Rothenberger be excused from the sessions until further information and that I be permitted to postpone the submission of documents, which was intended, until he is well again, because under these circumstances I certainly would not like to submit any evidence in his absence.
THE PRESIDENT: The request of counsel for Dr. Rothenberger that he be excused will be allowed temporarily and provisionally only until such time as the Tribunal is informed as to the cause of his absence, and we will not prejudge the matter as to whether he should, be excused at this time, nor will we make any order with reference to the time at which you should proceed with the case in his favor.
DR. WANDSCHEIDER: Yes, and I will be able to do that at any time, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: We will expect a report as to the cause of his absence at the earliest possible moment.
BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q: Dr. Rothaug, in connection with the Nazi confiscatio of Jewish property by forced sale, which was described, here at some length during your direct testimony, did you aid or abet such activity in your capacity either as a judge in Nurnberg or a prosecutor in Berlin?
A: No.
Q: Don't you remember a very short time ago really -- in March of 1945, your going from Berlin to Landshut to initiate the People's Court prosecution of one, Baron von Opennheim, for daring to file legal protest against the forced sale of his castle to the local Gauleiter? Don't you remember that?
A: I remember that case, but I do not remember that event which is put to me here. I had nothing to do with it. But as far as I was concerned, it was all only because it was alleged that statements were made in the nature of undermining of military strength by that man.
Q: I hand you a paper, Dr. Rothaug.
(Witness is offered a paper).
Does it appear that that paper is a letter written to the Palace of Justice, Nurnberg, on 24 July 1947, and signed: Baron von Oppenheim?
A: Yes, that is correct.
Q: Does the letter read -- halfway down the page -the following, and I am quoting:
"By taking advantage of my forced, position, the Gauleiter Ritter von Epp, bought my castle on 1 December 1944. Beginning 1 March 1945 I filed protest against the bill of sale and obtained a temporary decision."
Skipping to the next paragraph:
"On 23 March 1945, the former Chief Reich Prosecutor Rothaug of Berlin, appeared at the District Court prison Landshut, had me summoned, and stated as follows: 'I want to see what such a Jewish bastard looks like who dares in his present condition, to ask for a temporary decision against the Gauleiter von Epp. Your wagon will be fixed very soon, and in fact in the very next weeks!"
Do you remember that, Dr. Rothaug?
A: I remember that.
DR. KOESSL: One moment, witness. May it please the Court, I want to state that I myself, do not know the nature of the letter is that has just been put to question. I assume it's just a letter and not an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: It's not been offered in evidence. This is cross examination. It's not necessary that you know what it is at this time. The witness may answer.
THE WITNESS: I have to state that the affair, such as it is described here, is absolutely incorrect and untrue. One has to take into consideration that the sale of that estate Ast has no connection whatever with Aryanizations. Moreover, the following was the case: Baron von Oppenheim had sold his Studdary to the Waffen-SS for breeding purposes and for purposes of the Waffen-SS. As a compensation for that, he and his brother were permitted to purchase one estate each. He at that time purchased that estate at Ast. Apart from that, he, as far as I know, had a certificate in hand which was signed by hammers, according to which though there was a certain mixture in his descent -- he was supposed to have been half or quarter Jew --should not incur any disadvantages. But I had absolutely nothing to do with that entire matter. It was so that the denouncement against Oppenheim, who had not been arrested by us, was received in Berlin, and because I had serious misgivings whether in consideration of the background of the whole story in connection with the estate, it might have been possible that wrong statements had been made, I went personally to Landshut in order to investigate matters myself and asked to gain a direct impression of the people who had their hands in that affair.
I made extensive investigations, particularly concerning the character of the incriminating witnesses.
After I returned to Berlin, I reported to my superior that I considered the whole affair not clear at all; and that I considered further investigations at Toelz or some other place very necessary in order to examine thoroughly the statements made by the incriminating witnesses. That was where the files were sent to subsequently. My motive in that entire affair, therefore, was quite contrary to what is intended to be put against me here.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, we offer as Exhibit 558, for identification only, the letter just discussed. We will subsequently offer it in affidavit form.
THE PRESIDENT: If it's not in affidavit form, I think it would be advisable for the Secretary to refrain from marking it for identification unless it is in some form which we could recognize.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Very well, Your Honor.
BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q: Dr. Rothaug, you have repeatedly affirmed here that in your court the defense was never denied access to relevant evidence or witnesses on the defendant's behalf. You have also repeatedly denied that Gauleiter Streicher ever had any influence on Special Court trials which you conducted. I snow you a paper. (Witness is offered a paper). Does it appear at the top of that paper that it is a sworn affidavit by the former attorney-at-law Ludwig of Berlin?
A: The introductory statement is --- and I don't know whether that is in accordance with the rules of the Court;
"I, the former attorney and notary, Fritz Ludwig of Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Siegburgerstrasse 14, born 8 July 1899 at Bad Harzburg, after having been warned that I may become punishable for making false statements, state under oath voluntarily and without compulsion the following:
"And there is a statement.
Q: I believe that is sufficient, Dr. Rothaug. On page 5 of that document, in the second paragraph, does it appear that in a trial over which you presided as President of the Nurnberg Penal Chamber, in which the lawyer Ludwig was defense counsel, that you refused to hear any and all of the defense witnesses he called because permission for them to testify had not yet been granted by Gauleiter Streicher? Docs that appear in the second paragraph of Page 3?