Court No. III, Case No. 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Well , what is your purpose in going into the files of that case? Let me ask you, for example, is it to show that, in that case, proper weight was given to the testimony of Poles? I'm just guessing at that.
DR. KOESSL: I want to show that the same importance was, attributed to the testimony of Poles as was attributed to the testimony of Germans and that, therefore, the charge which has been leveled against the defendant is wrong. Furthermore, this case shows that the Poles were allowed to submit the same evidence and that the conduct of the trial of Poles was conducted on the same basis on which Reich Germans were tried. Also, that the procedure was the same, that they were allowed to call all witnesses they had asked for and that, even beyond that, the court itself produced witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: This is another case of a general charge which you propose to answer by showing that in a particular case there was no impropriety. The witness is permitted to state, in a general way, in answer to the general charge, whether he gave equal weight and fair trial to Poles, but we have ruled in a case, identical to this, that it is improper for you to put in a separate isolated case, not involved in any charge against the defendant, merely for the purpose of showing that, in that isolated case, proper procedure was followed. You will not be permitted to put it in or to testify concerning it.
DR. KOESSL: May it please the court, may I say something about the evidence in the Zudchik Case?
THE PRESIDENT: We don't care to hear it at all. It's not offered for a proper purpose. It has no probative value upon the charge made. The prosecution hasn't charged that in every case the defendant Rothaug tried he wag guilty of violation of Control Council 10, and to show that he tried some page in a proper manner is not of probative value in this cage.
Go on with something else.
DR. KOESSL: I beg your pardon, Your Honor. In the Polish cases Court No. III, Case No. 3.the prosecution has, to a far extent, charged the defendant Rothaug and has pointed out that, quite apart from individual cases which have been mentioned - there were also cases which have not been mentioned - and the prosecution said that, generally speaking, Rothaug had tried Poles in a different manner than he tried Germans and, therefore, I would ask you to permit me that I refute that general charge of the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You may refute it in the manner in which we have indicated. You've heard our ruling and you'll have to abide by it.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Witness, in Polish cases did you proceed in the same way in which you proceeded in the case of trying Germans, and did you admit all evidence for which the Poles had asked to clear them?
A Polish cases were tried on the same basis and while adhering to the same ruling of procedure. If they made motions for evidence, such motions were examined from the same objective points of view from which one examined such motions if they had been made by Germans. There was no difference. During the trial they were asked, just as the Germans were asked, whether, for example, they wished to ask the witnesses any questions. Beyond that - and that is what is to be proved by the Zudchik case which concerned the destruction of live stock which has been of such importance here; I am charged with having sentenced people to death just for cruelty to animals, and I would like to say that I called experts from far away when I had doubts whether the charge leveled against the Pole that he was guilty of having destroyed that flock of sheep, was justified. I conducted that trial, and the outcome was that the Pole was acquitted. I was bound to return him to the Gestapo because that was where he had come from, and, by finding an employer for him at the session, I saw to it that that man started work instead of being returned to the police. But I am not saying all this to prove anything very much. All I am saying is, if he did right, he did not come to any harm. The proof which I wanted to produce goes no further.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you, whenever you tried a person on a charge involving violation of the law against Poles and Jews, I presume that you followed that law, did you not?
THE WITNESS: Naturally, that was my duty.
THE PRESIDENT: And such provisions as Article 7 which provides that Poles and Jews cannot challenge a German judge on account of partiality? You would have enforced that rule too, wouldn't you?
THE WITNESS: In the individual case, that man was only indicted with me from the general provisions. It was only later on that the specific provision was issued. During the whole of my twenty-five years, nobody rejected me. I don't think it would have occurred to anybody to reject me, but naturally, if I had been rejected by a Pole, I would have acted in accordance with that legal provision because that was my duty. What else could I have done?
THE PRESIDENT: Does the same apply to the other legal provisions of the law of 4 December 1941, with reference to procedure?
THE WITNESS: That is not correct. I have to correct that. Those provisions from the decree against Poles and Jews from the year 1941 as such would have afforded us the opportunity, in the case of a Pole, to be more liberal in the way we conducted the trial, but I did not make use of that opportunity in one single case; I tried all Poles according to the German Code of Procedure, just as I tried Germans. And Oeschey and Ferber did exactly the same as I did. I know that because we discussed the matter and told each other that, from the purely technical point of view, we considered that that provision was nonsense because, after all, it is much less difficult for a judge to conduct his sessions in a way to which he has become used to over a great number of years than to find a new form from case to case which, on the other hand, could not be so free as to violate the most primitive legal principles.
THE PRESIDENT: I was simply interested in knowing whether, in applying the law against Poles and Jews, you complied with these special Court No. III, Case No. 3.provisions as to procedure which are contained in that law.
THE WITNESS: No, I applied the German provisions, nor did the law compel us to conduct the trials according to new forms and I don't think that was done anywhere in the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: The law against Poles end Jews provides that the judge and the prosecutor may dispense with the provisions of the German law. If you dispensed with those provisions, you would still be complying with the law against Poles end Jews, wouldn't you, because it provides for such dispensing?
THE WITNESS: Only with reference to the provisions concerning procedure, it was left at the discretion of the judge to deviate from the German law and to conduct the procedure in whichever way he considered advisable, but in regard to the substantive provisions concerning the procedure, we were bound. We had no liberty in that respect.
THE PRESIDENT: I am referring to the procedural matters. Thank you. That covers it.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q In proceedings against Poles, did you reject German prosecution witnesses if you were of the conviction that the incriminating points were not sufficiently founded?
A In my view, by introduction of the question of the so-called incredibility of Poles, the whole problem is shifted onto another plane. It is a matter of course that a nation, which has been subjected by another nation, and which is in a state of stress - that a citizen of such a country which has been subjected to another, vis-a-vis the victorious nation, finds himself in quite a different moral-ethical relationship. It is useless to shut your eyes against reality. Of course, he finds himself in a different moral relationship from the relationship in which a German citizen would find himself. It is so natural, there is no point in ignoring it. There is no need to lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you a question. You followed the rule I presume, which provides that Poles and Jews should not be sworn in Court No. III, Case No. 3.criminal cases?
Article 9. Paragraph 9, perhaps. "Poles and Jews are not sworn as witnesses in criminal proceedings." That which provided that they may be punished for perjury anyhow. Did you follow that rule?
THE WITNESS: At my time, when I was a judge, I believe no Pole was ever examined as a witness at a trial. I can't remember it.
THE PRESIDENT: They were tried, weren't they? You don't mean there weren't any Poles tried?
THE WITNESS: With us in Germany, not even the German defendant can be sworn.
THE PRESIDENT: But you mean that, although Poles were tried, no Polish witness was ever called?
THE WITNESS: Well, there never were any Polish witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: That's what I suspected.
THE WITNESS: Unless, and perhaps I may add, that there was a case among Poles. I mean if it were a case that was pending between various Poles, like that murder case. In that case, I had Polish witnesses and they were taken under oath.
THE PRESIDENT: Time for our recess of fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, in answer to the Tribunal's question concerning the translation matter discussed before the recess, I ask the Court's indulgence for a very brief expert witness on the matter, which will take no more than two or three minuses.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Will you please call the witness Arnold Buchthal?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Rothaug may leave the stand for a few moments.
ARNOLD BUCHTHAL, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: The witness will testify in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to be sworn by the German oath or the English oath?
THE WITNESS: The English oath.
JUDGE HARDING: Will you repeat after me the following oath?
I swear that the evidence I shall give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
THE WITNESS: I do.
JUDGE HARDING: You may be seated.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q. Will you please state your name and the date and place of your birth?
A. Arnold Buchtahal, B-U-C-H-T-H-A-L, born on the 28th of November, 1900.
Q. Mr. Buchthal, in what countries did you -- I beg your pardon, did you state where you were born, Mr. Buchthal?
A. No; at Dortmund
Q. Now, in what countries did you live from the date of your birth until 1933?
A. Until 1933 I lived in Germany.
Q. And from 1933 until 1939 where did you live?
A. First I lived in Austria, and then after the Anschluss, the annexation of Austira, for a while in Germany, then in Switzerland, and then in England.
Q. I assume, then, that German is your native language; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have before you the original opinion of the Nurnberg Special Court in the Lopata case?
A. Yes.
Q. In that opinion do you find a reference to Poles, in German, as "Untermenschen"?
A. I find here the designation "Polnisches Untermenschentum", which is used here with reference to the defendant Lopata.
Q. Mr. Buchthal, what is the literal translation in English of that German phrase you have just read?
A. The literal translation is "Polish subhumanity".
Q. Did you ever see or hear the word "subhumanity" or "Untermenschen" in Germany before the year 1933?
A. I cannot remember any such thing. As far as I know, I never heard that word before 1933.
Q. If you ever heard or saw that word used in Germany or Austira after 1933, in what context did you see or hear it?
A. The context in which I read that expression or heard it after 1933 was always a political one. As a rule, the word was used in connection with the adjective "Jewish", later "Polish", occasionally, I believe, also "Czech", and then very frequently with the adjective "Communist."
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No further Questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I wonder, for our convenience, if you would give us your translation of the entire sentence that that phrase is in. It begins, "The defendant gives the impression of definitely degenerate personality," I think. Do you find the place?
THE WITNESS: Yes. The entire sentence, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
THE WITNESS: "Thus the defendant gives the impression of a thoroughly degenerate personality, which is marked by excitability and a definite trend to mendacity, or to lying. The whole inferiority of the defendant is, I would say, lies in the sphere of character and is obviously based on his being a part of Polish subhumanity, or in his belonging to Polish subhumanity."
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No further Questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
DR. KOESSL: I ask to be permitted to put a few questions.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. Witness, what education did you have in the field of languages?
A. From 1942 until 1945 I was senior interpreter in a German and Italian prisoner of war hospital.
Q. You said also that you had not heard the word "Untermenschentum", "subhumanity", before 1933 in Germany. Did I understand you correctly?
A. Yes, that is correct. I had only heard the word "Superman" or "Super-humanity", which, as you probably know, comes from the writings of Nietzsche, and from which, apparently after 1933, by way of contrast, the word "Untermenschentum" had been created.
Q. Of course at the moment I cannot submit a book to you because I did not expect this, otherwise I would show you books from the year 1912 where that word "Untermenschentum" was used, Do you mean to assert that the word "Untermenschentum" was only cheated or invented after 1933?
A. No; I only said that according to my recollection I never read or heard that word before 1933, and that only after 1933 it became part and parcel of the language, particularly the language of Nazi propaganda.
Q. You have never worked in the field of criminology?
A. Yes; I am a jurist.
Q. Then I want to ask you, didn't you find the word "Untermenschentum" in the technical language of the criminologist?
A. It is possible that occasionally I might have found it there, but certainly not frequently.
Q. Thank you. May I ask you briefly where you are employed?
A. I am employed with the prosecution.
Q. The prosecution. Thank you.
DR. KOESSL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness is excused.
(Witness excused).
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Rothaug may resume the witness stand.
OSWALD ROTHAUG (Resumed) DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. Witness, the general charge has been raised against you that particularly in cases against Poles you were fanatically severe and the main insitgator for the application of severe penalties. Do you have any definite recollections that the other offices, particularly the General Public Prosecutor, or in some cases even the Ministry, gave directions to the prosecution in cases against Poles which went beyond your opinion and evaluation of offenses committed by Poles?
A. First of all, I object to the assertion that the severity of decisions in our courts was based on the fact that we had tired to act against the Pole for being a Pole. Against that charge I want to state that in spite of all the severity which may have been applied in one case or another, only viewpoints of penal law were decisive, which, of course, were greatly influenced by the conditions of danger that existed and by the descriptions which were generally given about the danger that existed and by the descriptions which were generally given about the danger. "I remember one case, for instance, where we, at our level, did not even intend to made this a big case. It was a matter of cruelty to animals in that case; in fact, it was of course more than that, of course, but since we were still inexperienced we thought that as he was a young man, a prison term of several years would be sufficient. That was the way the report was made. However, we soon received different instructions. We were told that even if the offender is a young person, it is not right to give him a moderate penitentiary term. If one cannot sentence him to death, then at least it should be a considerable penitentiary term.
That case was brought before the court of the third instance, which said that a penitentiary term does not suffice under any circumstances. If the facts are proven by all means, one has to try to pronounce the death sentence. The fact that the offender was young could only make it possible to sentence him based on the law concerning juvenile heavy criminals. The result in that case, in the case before us, was acquittal.
Q. This afternoon, in answer to my question as to what extent in the Lopata case you were bound by the decision of the Reich Supreme Court, you answered that you had discussed that question this morning. However, this morning you only spoke quite generally about the extent to which the courts were bound by the decisions of the Reich Supreme Court. I want to ask you to what extent, you were bound by the decisions of the Reich Supreme Court, or the opinion of the Reich Supreme Court in that particular case.
I wanted to put that question to you in connection with the decision of the Reich Supreme Court in the Lopata case.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I object, Your Honor; that is repetitious and cumulative, and that answer was given to the Bench in response to a direct question on that point this morning?
DR. KOESSL: May it please the Tribunal, this morning it only concerned the extent to which the courts were bound in general to the policy involved which was apparent in the decisions of the Reich Supreme Court, and not the extent to which they were bound in an individual case which was subsequently brought before it. That is a different matter than the question of being bound--
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may answer the question.
THEY WITNESS: In a case of that kind, where the lower court received a decision from the Reich Supreme Court by which objection was made to the sentence by that lower court, and by which the Reichsgericht, so to speak, commissioned the lower court to reexamine the case--in that case, of course, the lower court was bound by the decision of the Reich Supreme Court. However, the decision of the Supreme Court did not go to far that it would direct the lower court as to what it should consider proved and to what conclusion it would have to come in the application of a certain principle. That was a matter of course. The way it happened was this.
The lower court was bound to apply the legal principle which had been established by the Reich Supreme Court in the re-examination of the legal facts, and to consider that legal principle as correct. Therefore, it could not arrive at the conclusion that the principle which the Reich Supreme Court had established was not correct; that of course, the lower court could not do. It had to accept that legal principle as a dogma and make it the basis for its new decision. However--and that was very decisive--it was not bound to establish certain actual facts to support that principle.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you have made that clear.
DR. KOESSL: I now want to deal with the Platzer case. The Platzer case is mentioned in Exhibit 476, and it was mentioned during the cross-examination of the witness Wilhelm Hoffman, at pages 3941 to 3946 in the English transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: The Exhibit number again, please?
DR. KOESSL: Exhibit 476, Your Honor. That is the affidavit by Wilhelm Hoffmann, who mentions that case.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. The witness Wilhelm Hoffmann criticizes that in the Platzer case, in his opinion, mitigating circumstances were not evaluated sufficiently and the opposite too much. Witness, will you please look at the file and tell us what file of the Special Court it is?
A. These are the files of Platzer, Fritz, for a crime relating to Article 1 of the Decree Concerning the War Economy. File note SG 42, from 43; 42 from 43.
Q. Will you please look at the opinion and tell us what the basic facts were in the Platzer case and what principles were of importance for the extent of penalty?
A. The Platzer case was the most serious case of an offense against the war economy which had occurred in our district. I believe the witness Hoffmann himself stated that here.
It was a case where fabrics were removed which had an over-all length of more than 100 kilometers. One could have paved the railroad from Nurnberg to Wuerzburg with that cloth. What a large quantity of that kind means in time of war and testile shortage I believe does not have to be further explained. The defendant committed the offense so that in case of a bad ending of the war he would be left with good merchandise rather than bad money. He himself did not really need to do things like that because he had made so much profit from the German people that one could be of the opinion that during times of stress he could do his duty. Therefore, we drew the logical conclusion, and I believe that in every nation which found itself in the same situation as we did, the same thing would have been done.
Q. Please read briefly Section V of the opinion, Roman numeral five, where mention we made of the reasons for the extent of the penalty. Page 70.
A. I will restrict myself to just giving the contents. It is stated here that the man lived in comfortable circumstances, that he was not affected in any way by the war, that his business could continue without any restrictions, and that therefore he was not endangered in any way. He was one of those of whom we could and had to demand that they fulfill their duties in every respect without fail, that is by taking into consideration in particular that he was at home while others were in combat. However, instead of keeping this in mind, he took advantage of the emergency situation of war-time and made it the basis of business transactions for his own personal gain. It is further explained that in the case of this man it was surely the case of a racketeer who was out to take advantage of the war. The extent of his offense is stressed further, and on the basis of all these considerations the conclusion is drawn that parasites of the type of the defendant, in the interest of creating a deterrent, should be punished by the most severe penalty.
At that time that sentence did not meet with any criticism on the part of the population; and here, for the first time, I am told that the man who filed the indictment with us on that basis has a rather critical view of these matters today.
Q I want to talk to you about the Schosser case - S-c-h-o-s-s-e-r. The Schosser case is mentioned in the English transcript on page 1743 by the witness Ferber; and in the English transcript on page 3021 through 3066 by the witness Schosser. Witness, in this case the main charge against you is that you displayed special initiative. In addition to that the charge is made repeatedly that Schosser was "prosecuted because he buried a Pole. Between what proceedings does one have to distinguish when the name Schosser is mentioned?
A This is a case of two proceedings in fact. The first case had to do with the funeral of a Pole, but I want to state right now that naturally the funeral itself was not considered a punishable offense. That is the more recent case. Then, another proceeding is of importance here which has to do with the sermon on a Sunday in church. That case, the first case, in connection with the funeral of a Pole did not lead to a main trial or a sentence, but this sermon on the Sunday did. Those are the first things between which one has to distinguish because in this connection the charge is made that I had started or initiated the second case after I had failed with the first one; and my aim is now to prove to the Court by submitting evidence, submitting documents, that I was not the initiator in this case, and in general I object against that charge.
Q Did you also deal with the first case that you find in the file before you? Look at page 6 of the file attached to the main file. It is the case SG-948, from 1942.
A There are two cases, and it would probably be helpful to mention the file designations to avoid confusion. The first case (the case of the funeral of the Pole, if you want to call it that) has the file designation 1-C SG 948, from the year 1942.
Q What was the cause for that case?
A That case was initiated on the basis of a denouncement which the Kreisleiter of Amberg on the 12th of June, 1942 sent to the public prosecutor- at the Special Court Nurnberg-Fuerth.
In this report it is set forth that by the behavior of the accused Schosser in church, particularly by making an announcement about the funeral, and by guiding people to the cemetery, the German population to a far-reaching extent was caused to attend the funeral; and that that behavior was considered an offense against the measures which were prevailing at the time concerning the separation between Germans and Polish people.
Q What did the senior public prosecutor do?
A In this connection it may be necessary to point out that there was a definite regulation which I find in the official gazette for the diocese at Regensburg, published by the Bishop's office, Regensburg. In this publication, periodical, is a, re-print of a decree, an official decree, concerning the spiritual care of civilian workers employed in Germany of Polish nationality. The Bishop's office reprints that decree by the Reich Defense Commissar in the defense districts 7 and 13. Our area was in that district, and this was published for the information of the priests. The decree deals in detail with everything that had to be done. Figure 5 is of importance. It says the internment of Polish civilian workers, male or female, can be taken care of by German priests. Participation of the German population has to be reduced to the absolutely necessary minimum. No sermon may be held. That decree contains eight sections. I do not know if the remainder is interesting to the Tribunal. I could just refer to them if it is desired.
Q If the Court is interested, will you please refer to them.
THE PRESIDENT: You may.
A First, on Figure 1 it is stated that participation of civilian workers of Polish nationality in the church services of the German population is prohibited. Then it is stipulated that church services for Polish workers, male or female, have to be conducted separately. Where there aren't enough Poles living, individual spiritual care is Permitted, but under all circumstances it should be avoided, that Poles and Germans should be together in the same room for that purpose.
Services should only be conducted in the German or the Latin language. Publication of newspapers, periodicals, or Sunday magazines in the Polish language is prohibited. The priests had to restrict themselves just to the spiritual care of the Polish people. It ends with the words as follows: It is expected that the German priests should always be conscious of being Germans and of the duties arising from that fact and that offenses will be punishable.
Q Was it made clear whether Schosser knew anything about that regulation?
A That at first could not be seen from the report received, but after he was interrogated, he referred to the fact that he had not known anything about all these circumstances and that that was what had got him into this trouble.
A Now, we want to find out what happened after that report was made.
A It is first asserted here that I had commissioned Ferber, or that I had told Ferber that he should issue an arrest warrant, but Ferber had told me that he did not know what reasons to give for it and that subsequently I had handled the matter myself with a vicious remark and had issued the arrest warrant. The background, history of that arrest warrant seems very dubious, but I don't think it necessary to enter into that. On the 15th of June, 1942, I issued the arrest warrant and that arrest warrant was based upon paragraph 2, section 1 of the Malicious Acts Law, and paragraph 130-A or the Penal Code. In the case of this paragraph 130-A, of the Penal Code, we were concerned with the so-called pulpit paragraph, the offense of abusing the pulpit. It is of importance that that paragraph alone which would have supported the proceedings, is a regulation which has nothing to do with National Socialist, but is a paragraph which emanates from Bismarck's time, the time of the Kulturkampf in Germany, and the then liberal democracy factious in Germany brought it about against clericalism.
This concept is found in paragraph 130-A. The arrest as far as facts were concerned was not based upon the circumstances that Schosser conducted that funeral for the Pole, but because as one could assume, and certainly can assume today, but on his knowledge of the German regulations and provisions and on announcing the intended funeral, and the transfer of the body from the morgue to the cemetery, in order to persuade the German population to a far-reaching extent to participate, and, therefore, to indirectly demonstrate its opposition against the regulations of the state. The funeral itself is not a matter for the church, but a matter for the state, for the government of Germany and the clergymen are only permitted to participate in the funeral and to perform the duties commensurate with religious custom to say the prayers and everything that belongs with it. But the funeral was actually carried out by the municipal office. The discussion of such a matter and the announcement, conscious of the fact that it would cause a disturbance among the population, that was against the provisions of paragraph 130-A; and if this is connected with the intention to demonstrate opposition against measures of the state, which was certainly the case here, then the prerequisites required by law are complied with and I do not know of anything further to investigate, but if all these elements are there, I have the obligation to issue the arrest warrant and on that basis I did.
Q Now, the witness Schosser has pointed out that he had already been a rested by the Gestapo, and that at that time he had been punished; he had been sentenced to fourteen days. Can you determine from the files whether you issued the warrant of arrest before you knew of the police measures against Schosser?
A. From tho files it can be seen without doubt that when I issued the warrant of arrest I did not know anything about the occurrences at the Gestapo office of Regensburg, which found its climax in the protective custody imposed upon Schosser for fourteen days. That can be seen from the following.
Q. When did you receive information about that from the Gestapo?
A. I was just going to say that because you have already asked me. On the 15th of June, 1942, the prosecution sent the arrest warrant to the secret state police, Gestapo, at Regensburg. Subsequently, on the 18th June, 1942, the secret state police, Gestapo, Regensburg, replied with the information that it did not want to carry out the arrest at that time because a police measure was imposed, that is to say the protective custody for fourteen days on Schosser, and returned the files together with the arrest warrant to the senior public prosecutor and that is the way he was informed in connection with that funeral. The secret state police already had taken measures. I was not informed about these facts, as can be seen from the file. Just the Same, that arrest warrant was carried out, and that was justified.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you a question. Would you tell us in a few words the specific provision of the Malicious Acts Law which was violated in this case? I don't understand that.
A. That was Article 2, Section 1. I can read it if you think it is desirable; I can quote it if you think it is desirable.
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to hear that if it is brief; I haven't it before me.
A. This is the provision. Schosser-
Q. Give the legal provisions, witness.
A. Yes, that is what it is. It is suspected that Schosser made in public vicious remarks, derogatory remarks about the leadership of the state, the NSDAP, its provisions and institutions-
Q. Witness, will you please read the Malicious Acts Law itself? --Rather than-
A. -- Which are designed to undermine the confidence of the people in the leadership. In connection with that I want to mention that we always include the actual text of the law in the arrest warrant.
THE PRESIDENT: Give me the date of that law, please.
Q. The Malicious Acts Law.
A. The Malicious Acts Law is of the 20th December, 1934; 20th December, 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all.
Q. And now will you please tell us-
A. The law speaks of statements, but the same applies to behavior which permitted a conclusion, that is to say an act which looked at on its own merits may be correct, but by the evaluation which it is given by others, may have the character of a malicious act. I have also explained that we were not informed about these matters. The defendant was arrested and was questioned before the local court in Weiden.
Q. Did he do anything against his arrest?
A. He filed a complaint against the arrest, he filed a complaint against the arrest warrant; a decision was made.