It is contained in my material, but it is not contained in the document books which I have already submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say it was. I perhaps misunderstood you.
DR. KOESSL: It has not yet been offered as an exhibit. This paragraph is contained in one of my document books which I am going to present.
Q Would you please read Article 22, Section 2.
AArticle 22, Competency Order, Section 2. The decision about opening of a, trial is abandoned. The application by the prosecution for t he instituting of a trial is replaced, by an application that the trial be ordered. When the indictment is received, the presiding judge -
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Mr. Wooleyhan, do you recognize the document that he is reading?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No, Your Honor, I don't.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do. If you are going to introduce it in evidence, you needn't read it. I think the government has already put in a similar provision. There is no object in reading something and then putting it in evidence too.
DR. KOESSL: Very well.
Q The witness Ferber described the work of the special court at Nurnberg -- outside the trial. I quote: -- English transcript at page 1350. "Decisions and statements outside the trial were enacted almost always by Herr Rothaug alone. Insofar as further signatures were required, there was a pencil note on who would have to co-sign, and in that form the documents were circulated by him through the office. I am referring to decisions to reject, for example, an application for a motion for evidence, a motion for evidence which has been made before the trial, or a rejection of a complaint, which had been registered, inadmissibly, for it was impossible to contest decisions of the special court; or, Herr Rothaug had passed on a document to the prosecution and had given his reasons, and his reasons being not in accordance with the views of the prosecution.
There was no consultation among the judges, in the meaning of the judges arriving at a decision, but, as I say, Herr Rothaug wrote his opinion down, and circulated it outside the trial." Ferber in cross examination confirmed. that that procedure was in accordance with the custom of the regular courts, and that you did not exceed your duty - English transcript 1727. All the same, would you please comment in general about these questions?
A Concerning this sphere which has been mentioned, I acted, in the same way as was customary with all courts in the cities of Germany, but I would like to point out that the decision which plays a part in this case, was almost exclusively the decision to reject a complaint concerning a warrant of arrest issued by the investigating judge.
It was a so-called formal decision. When the question of a complaint arose, I just filled in the forms one way or another and then circulated the forms to my associates. If one of my associates did not agree with the suggested decision, he decided on a proper decision that might be reached, and in that case we discussed the matter. I don't remember that matters ever took that formal course, but nobody could have any disadvantage from that.
Q. Did Ferber ever object to that way of proceeding, or did he oppose the contents of a suggested decision?
A. Nothing of the kind happened.
Q. Ferber does not mention a decision concerning complaints against warrants for arrest, but he mentions a decision concerning a motion for evidence which had been made before the trial -- English transcript page 1350. What kind of decisions were they?
A. To put it in one sentence, after the indictment had been filed with me and had been sent to the defendant and the defense counsel, and when the date for the triad had been set, at that moment the defense counsel, if he considered it necessary, made a. motion that more evidence should be presented -- that is, more evidence than had been listed in the indictment -- and that such evidence should be produced at the trial. He could ask for a certain witness to testify to certain facts, and he could ask that such a witness should be heard at the trial If possible, we had to make a decision before the triad was held so that the defense counsel might be given an opportunity to call and to produce that witness.
Q. Ferber maintains that you drafted the decision and passed it on to the associate judges for their signatures. Is that what happened?
A. That was not possible according to the order of proceedings, because, on such a motion for evidence, not the Court had to decide, but the presiding judge alone.
Q. Will you now please read Article 219 of the Penal Code?
THE PRESIDENT: Is this also an exhibit which you propose to offer?
DR. KOESSL: No, this Article has not been presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you propose to offer it in evidence?
DR. KOESSL: No, I have not prepared the.
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been offered by the prosecution either?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No, Your Honor, that Article is not in our document books.
TEE PRESIDENT: All right, go ahead.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. Article 219.
A. Article 219, from Loewe, Penal Proceedings:
"If the defendant demands that witnesses or experts be called or that more evidence be procured for the trial, the defendant, by stating the facts about which evidence is to be produced, must submit his motions to the presiding judge of the court. The ruling issued in reply to his motion must be accounced to him."
Section 2 is uninteresting.
Q. Please also read annotation 1 in that commentary by Loewe.
A. "As to the ruling concerning the motions by the defendant about evidence, such decision must be made not by the court, but by the presiding judge."
I believe that is sufficient.
Q. Were those laws generally known?
A. Yes, those laws concerning that legal situation were naturally known generally.
Q. What about rejecting a complaint which had been made, although it had been made inadmissibly? That is the way Ferber put it.
A. Here again, the ruling which he criticizes was impossible under the law. Concerning such an inadmissible complaint, the Penal Send of the District Court of Appeal, and not the Special Court, had to decide. The normal case was that the defendant protested against a warrant of arrest issued by the Special Court.
That complaint was inadmissible, but it wasn't the Special Court, it was the Penal Senate of the District Court of Appeal that had to decide.
Q. Please read, from the Loewe--Rosenberg commentary, footnote 61 regarding Article 306.
A. Note 6, concerning Article 306, says:
"The Court of the first instance is not competent to reject a complaint which is found to be inadmissible, but such a complaint must be submitted to the court dealing with compalints, 'Beschwerdegericht'."
Q. Was that general knowledge too?
A. Naturally, that was a matter of general knowledge too. It happened frequently, and every presiding judge and every member of a special court knew it.
Q. Were complaints admissible when, before the trial, the presiding judge had rejected a motion?
A. Such a complaint was not admissible, and it was not admissible with any court. That is evident from Article 305 of the Code of Penal Procedure.
Q. Please read Article 305, of the Code of Penal Procedure.
A. "Article 305, Code of Penal Procedure.
"Decisions by the courts who are competent to pass judgment;
"Decisions by such courts prior to passing judgments are not subject to complaints, with the exception of decisions concerning arrests, confiscation, or fixing a penalty , as well as all decisions which affect third persons," That is to say, a motion for evidence is not affected.
Q. Was such a complaint ever made?
A. I never saw it happen, and I do not believe that it was at all possible because every defense counsel knew that a motion for evidence which had been rejected before the trial could, at the trial, be made again.
THE PRESIDENT: You say it could be made again?
THE WITNESS: Yes, it could be made again. By that I meant to say if, before the trial, the motion had been rejected, the defense counsel had the right to make that motion for evidence again, giving the same reasons or other and better reasons, at the trial. It was then not the presiding judge who had to decide about that motion, but the court.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. In that connection, Berber mentions a case where you sent to the prosecution a document expressing an opinion. What is that about?
A. That matter does not properly fit into this context because that document was not an order or a ruling, but it was just an opinion that was voiced there which, in the interest of preparing the trial, had been written by me as the presiding judge. It was a letter concerning the Kleinlein-Schaller case, where I pointed out to the prosecution that the Schaller case, which was connected with the Kleinlein case, had been incorrectly described by them legally, according to my view.
This opinion of mine, which was not based on formal legal facts, naturally did not need the signatures of my associates.
DR. KOESSL: That letter by Rothaug is mentioned in the Oeschey . affidavit, Exhibit 223.
Q. At another place--English transcript page 1704--Ferber asserts that the defense counsel felt themselves curtailed in their activities because Heir Rothaug, before the Trial, as a matter of routine, had refused written motions for evidence and that the court -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): We have passed the time for our recess; 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. KOESSL: I ask to be permitted to continue.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q.- Witness, in a different passage on page 1704 of the English transcript, Ferber asserts that the defense counsel had felt restricted and I quote, "because of the fact that written motions for evidence had been rejected by Rothaug before the session and that the calling of this or that witness had been considered irrelevant and therefore rejected."
What can you say in connection with that?
A.- In order to answer a reproach and to give reasons in my answer, it would be necessary to describe an example. An example would have to be offered to show that I ever rejected a motion for evidence before the main trial; that I had done away with that motion as the witness says because he apparently wants to say that the intended motion was not considered as important as it should have been. Generally speaking, I can say that whenever a motion was made for evidence, I examined it carefully and decided it, basing myself purely on the question whether that means of evidence or the fact which was to be proved by it was relevant for the evaluation of the facts in the case and was of any importance for it.
If I arrived at the result that it was important, then the witness, for example, was called. If I arrived at the conclusion that it was not so, then, as it was my duty, I refused to have the witness called and explained in detail what reasons I had for that refusal.
In this connection may I point out that particularly before the Special Count it would have been a very clumsy procedure if I had refused to accept any means of evidence or any proof of facts relevant for the case because in doing so one would have created the basis for a retrial. That also explains that particularly the sentences pronounced in our Special Court were very carefully worked out in order to assure that no double work had to be done afterwards.
Therefore, I want to say that it was our intention to work extremely carefully and that required us to use, as far as possible, as exhaustively as possible, all tangible matters of proof.
Q.- Ferber mentions a motion made by attorney Kroher - K-r-o-h-e-r on page 1704 and 1705 of the English transcript. That attorney filed a motion directed against a medical opinion and his intention was to have the defendant examined in a public mental institution. Since there was no possibility of appeal against decisions made by a special court, that objection could not have been passed on; and an objection which would have had a disciplinary proceeding as its consequence did not come about because in the meantime the main trial had been scheduled and attorney Kroher had himself represented in court by an. assistant. That can you say about that, witness?
A.- Particularly as far as that case is concerned, we succeeded in obtaining the files in question. This is what actually happened: First the defendant had been examined by the official doctor of the court who considered him fully responsible. That medical opinion had not been submitted to us, that is, to the court, but to the public prosecutor. After we had received the indictment the defense counsel made the motion that the defendant should be brought into a mental instition, in order to have his state of mind examined there. That was the situation at that time, that is, before the main trial, and I had to do something about it.
Q.- Now, would you please read Article 81 of the Criminal Code of Procedure and the footnote No. 4 pertaining to it?
A.- In order to evaluate that situation I had to refer to Article 81 of the Penal Code of Procedure which was competent for it and I quote: "For the preparation of an expert opinion about the state of mind of the defendant the court, upon a motion made by an expert and after hearing the defense counsel, may order that the defendant be brought into a public mental institution and be observed there."
Paragraph 2 is not interesting. Paragraph 3 is as follows: "An immediate objection can be made against that decision which can only postpone the effect of the decision."
Q.- And then Footnote A.
A.- Here it is set forth footnote A. That is in Loewe's Commentary of the Code of Procedure: "The examination of the state of mind of the defendant has first to be carried out by the official court physician or by another physician or by several physicians. Without a motion on their part or a motion by anyone on their part, that measure cannot be taken. The participants in the trial can only suggest a motion of that kind, but they cannot file it. That motion is decided by the court at its own discretion." I believe that is sufficient.
Q.- Why did you send that motion to the court physician of the district court?
A.- The motion made by defense counsel in accordance with that regulation I first forwarded to the court physician with the request to have him state his opinion, whether he, as the physician competent to do so, intended to file the formal motion to have the defendant transferred into a mental institution. I was obliged to forward the motion by defense counsel to the doctor because only the doctor, not the defense counsel, was entitled to file that formal motion for transfer into a mental institution. That can be seen from the text of the law.
Q.- But defense counsel made a motion, didn't he?
A.- As for that motion by defense counsel, that is only a wrong expression used. According to its legal nature that motion made by a defense counsel was only a suggestion, not a formal motion.
Q. And did the doctor file the motion?
A. The doctor specifically refused on his part to request the transfer of the defendant into a mention institution because he did not see any cause for that.
Q. And what happened thereafter?
A. As can be seen from the files, I notified defense counsel that his suggestion could not be carried out because the physician competent to make that decision, according to the law, had not filed that formal motion.
Q. Therefore, that matter was handled a sit should have been?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. We will refer to that procedure again in the case of Gaishauser. One more question of a principle nature. Ferber says, "Since there was no recourse against decisions by the People's Court, any detailed appeal could not have been passed on."
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. Do you mean the People's Court?
DR. KOESSL: The Special Court; I am sorry.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. On the basis of Paragraph 81 was there no recourse against that decision?
A. Here again the opinion expressed by Ferber is completely wrong. As for the decision to have the defendant transferred into a mental institution, there is an immediate objection, that can be made, that is, in cases before ordinary courts. Before special courts, this decision also, that is, the decision for transfer of the defendant, cannot be appealed because decisions by the Special Court could not be appealed. However, as far as the transfer, as wa,s the case here, was refused, that decision, neither before ordinary courts nor before special courts, is open to appeal.
Q. Will you please read Footnote 9 to paragraph 81 in Loewe's Commentary?
A. Footnote 9 to paragraph 81 of Loewe's Commentary in the Criminal. Code of Procedure reads: "Immediate appeal which here exceptionally has the effect of a postponment of the measure, can be made by the defendant himself, by defense counsel and by the prosecution. The provision of Article 297 is not applicable here. The expert, according to his position, cannot raise any objection if his motion has been denied Against a decision to deny the motion the participants mentioned above, since they have no right for appeal, have no right to make any objections Section, Article 3, as can be seen from the provision concerning postponement, refers only to the decision by which the measure is ordered."
THE PRESIDENT: Would you please inform us as to the date of the Commentary from which the witness has been reading?
THE WITNESS: This is Penal Code of Procedure Commentary by Loewe from 1929, That is what has been quoted up to now all the time.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. These facts which we have just discussed, were they generally known?
A. This is more a matter of consensus of opinion. It has always been the consensus of opinion and it was, of course, known to everyone who had anything to do only for a short time in this field.
Q. Ferber also mentions disciplinary objections. What does that mean?
A. The disciplinary objection is so to speak, outside the legal channels, outside the competency of the courts. It means that any individual may make a complaint about the attitude of an official or a judge and that to the superior agency, as far as official's actions are concerned, of course, the superior office has no right to interfere with a decision. As far as such disciplinary complaints are concerned, they could only be by far complaints concerning the technical handling of the matter. What a disciplinary compalints would have had to do with this matter is not clear to me.
I cannot understand that.
Q. What was the situation if an indictment was filed with the president of the Special Court which had technical shortcomings?
A. It was simply the following: The indictment was filed with the files containing the result of the investigation by police or prosecution and submitted to the president of the court. It was his task to fix the date for the trial. The question arises now what possibility the presiding judge had to keep an indictment from coming to trial. That possibility was very restricted, according to law, because he could only refuse if the so-called prerequisites for procedure were not there, in the indictment. However, - and I believe that is the purpose of your question - he did not have the right as such to examine an indictment to the relevancy and probative value or on account of the legal foundation for the charges or to object against it. I say that as far as procedure was concerned, he did not have the right to do so. The law did not specify anything in that connection.
Q. Were you compelled, for instance, to fix a date for a case which seemed quite hopeless?
A. A certain routine developed here which was based on the following: In a normal procedure before ordinary courts, between the date when the indictment was received by the presiding judge and the date for the trial, a file had to be composed by the court which was considered the decision to initiate the trial. In that decision the court had the possibility to examine the charges to find out whether the facts could be proven whether the legal foundation was tenable. And the ordinary court, therefore, according to its opinion which it may have had developed, could accept the position which it considered the correct one. That decision for insitiating the trial, however, was not used in the case of the Special Courts in order to make a trial more expedient. But by eliminating that procedure the requirements which had to be fulfilled of course were not eliminated. We also frequently were faced with the problem that we did not consider proof offered in any particular case sufficient or that we did not agree with the legal evaluation contained in the indictment.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
For that reason, we took up contact with the Prosecution frequently in order to tell them what our misgivings were. The prosecution, on its part, of course, before the date for the trial, still had the possibility to withdraw the indictment or to put it on a different legal foundation then the one originally applied. The prosecution could, as I said, withdraw the indictment or change it.
Q Could that result in any disadvantage for the defendant?
A The purpose of that procedure was also in the interest of the defendant because one wanted to counteract certain deficiencies which were due to the fact that the institution of a decision to initiate trial no longer existed for the special courts. The prosecution, of course, was quite free in its decisions as far as the opinion voiced by the court was concerned. It could stick to its original opinion. They could actually state, that in their opinion, they could bring sufficient proof in the main trial, but in all these cases the date for the trial had to be set and the trial had to be carried out. If the prosecution decided to share the opinion of the court, then, if, for instance, the legal foundation was not sufficient, the indictment was withdrawn and it also occurred that we recommended to make a renewed report to the Ministry in order to have the question examined whether it wouldn't be advisable, in view of the critical questions, that the charges concerning malicious intent should be withdrawn.
Q I believe that question has been sufficiently discussed, witness.
The witness Escher in Exhibit 223, in the case of Kleinlein and Schaller, spoke there of defeating the purposes of the law because, before the main trial, you had informed the prosecution of your opinion, and, according to this opinion, you did not agree with the legal specifications made by the prosecution. He says that your task, according to Article 202 of the Penal Code of Procedure, had simply been, and had been restricted to, the fixing of the main trial. What happened here?
A This letter concerning the case Kleinlein is an example for Court No. III, Case No. 3.the general principle which I have just explained.
In this case, the prosecutor had classified the act by the co-defendant Schaller as receiving, punishable under the decree against public enemies. That qualification was untenable. Schaller had kept, in her darkened apartment, goods obtained by thieves during blackouts. The receiving of such, therefore, could not have been committed without making use of the fact of the blackouts. But, in fact, however, the deciding element of her action was that she essentially helped the thieves and that she agreed, before the acts were committed, to hide their thefts. That, however, was participation as a co-offender and I pointed out to the prosecution by that letter which was mentioned that this offense was not specified correctly from the legal point of view, in order to afford them the opportunity to change the indictment before the main trial so that the defendant should be in a position, before the trial started, to find out about that. That, of course, I could just as well have told the prosecutor personally or over the telephone. However, since I could not reach him directly, I wrote him by way of an interoffice communication. That letter went quite openly, through all channels, which goes to show that there were no objections against it. The prosecutor, however, did not react on that letter. He was not obligated to do so because it was up to him whether or not he wanted to share this opinion. He could decide that quite independently. At any rate, he let it come to the main trial and there my opinion was finally approved and accepted by all individuals concerned. The defendants, if the prosecutor had accepted my suggestion, could have found out about that, not only in the main trial, but a certain time before the date of the trial and it would have become clear to them on what basis the trial would be conducted against them. According to the law they had no right to that, but objectively speaking, it would have meant an additional advantage for them. What we see here is nothing else but the intention to serve the principle, to prepare the main trial in such a manner that it can be carried out without any difficulties, Court No. III, Case No. 3.and I emphasize, whenever a defense counsel came to see me in order to discuss matters referring to the preparation of the trial then, also in dealing with them, I always expressed my opinion because everybody knew that was my personal opinion and not the opinion of the court as such and that it only served the purpose to guarantee that the trial could be carried out without any friction or difficulty.
Nobody would have thought, at that time, to consider that as defeating the purposes of the law or to find reasons in it to challenge the judge with it.
Q Now, we want to deal with another charge, the charge that all the presiding judge had to do after he received the indictment was just to fix the date. Will you please read, in this connection, Articles 155 and 224, of the Penal Code of Procedure, page 428?
AArticle 155 reads:
"The examination and decision is restricted to the offense described in the indictment and the individuals mentioned there. Within these limits, the courts are entitled, and it is their duty, to act independently. Especially, they do not have to apply to the law concerning the motions made to them."
Article 224 deals with the position of the presiding judge.
"The presiding judge may officially order that witnesses be called, or other means of evidence, be brought before the court."
Q Tell us now, quite briefly, what the results were, as far as you as presiding judge was concerned?
A These provisions contain a guiding principle to the effect that the presiding judge, as far as material in favor or material in disfavor of the defendant is concerned, can act on his own initiative with the interest of a regular and orderly preparation of the main trial, and that he can act in this independently of his associate judges.
Q Now, Attorney Escher in Exhibit 223 stated that had he known that you informed the prosecution in the Case Schaller he would have had an opportunity to object against it. What can you say concerning this statement by Escher?
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
A The fact that a reason existed to challenge a judge in itself does not mean that there was a question of defeating the ends of the law. It has to be emphasized here, however, that the letter against which he objects did not concern Kleinlein, but the defendant Schaller. Escher, however, was defense counsel for Kleinlein and I cannot see, therefore, how he could have had the right to challenge the judge on account of a letter which did not even concern his client Schaller.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
Q But now we want to prove that it would not have been possible to challenge the judge at all. Will you please read paragraph 24 of the Penal Code of Procedure on Page 123?
A Loewe Legal Code of Procedure, Article 24:
"A judge, in cases where he is excluded to act as a judge by the law, or when there is a suspicion that he is biased, may be challenged. On suspicion of being biased, the challenge takes place if there is a reason which is designed to justify suspicion against the independence of the judged."
In footnote 3a, the following statement is made in that connection:
"If the judge is of a legal opinion which is not in favor of the defendant, this is not sufficient to base upon it a motion challenging the judge."
Then, decisions of the Reich Supreme Court are mentioned and other sources.
Q Escher, therefore, wouldn't even have had the possibility to challenge you as a judge?
A The judge in Germany always had the right to state his legal opinion also to third persons without that giving cause to the right to challenge a judge.
Q In the English transcript, on pages 1680 and 1683, Ferber reports that the special court at Nurnberg had three penal chambers. In two-thirds of all cases you had been presiding judge. What do you have to say about this?
A His manner of expression here is wrong. We did not have three chambers, but three shifts, because there existed only one penal chamber and it was so arranged that, at the beginning of the war, together with my deputy, I had to act on two shifts; later on, three shifts with another deputy. There were always two associate judges with me or with my two deputies. As to how the cases handled were distributed among the individual shifts or presiding judges could be found out pre Court No. III, Case No. 3.cisely on a basis of the session diaries which I kept where very precise notes are made about the dates of the sessions, who was presiding judge, and who were the associate judges.
Unfortunately, I have not succeeded, up to now, to find this session book which would be very interesting also in other respects. If Ferber claims that two-thirds of the cases were tried by me, I have to contradict. I would not mind to take the responsibility for all cases if I had tried them, but that statement of two-thirds is not in accordance with facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is your estimate as to the proportion of cases that you tried? You say he is wrong, but you don't state what is correct.
THE WITNESS: I have no actual basis to make any estimate, but I don't believe that I tried more than one-half of the cases, so that I probably tried one-half, whereas my deputies tried the other, but it is quite possible that that proportion is still more in my favor, because frequently I only went on trips to the sessions outside Nurnberg, whereas most cases were tried in Nurnberg.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q I submit to you Exhibit 238. That is the list of death sentences which were executed. What can you say concerning that Exhibit 238?
A I could discuss cases which are on this list which I certainly have tried, as far as these names still mean anything to me or as far in the meantime I have seen files which show that I had something to do with them. As for the majority of these cases, I could not make any definite statements. I could not even say which one of my deputies was presiding judge in these cases, but that question also could be clarified beyond doubt if one could find the session diaries which would eliminate any doubt in this direction. If it is considered important, I am quite ready to designate those of the cases which I can say with certainty I had to do with.
During 1936 and 1937, no death sentence at all was pronounced Court No. III, Case No. 3.at the Special Court in Nurnberg.
Only the end of 1938 brought the case Heller-Muendel. Here, the 16th of December 1938 is listed as the day of the sessions and execution of sentence. Up to now, I always spoke of the 18th of December, 1938, because that was the way I remembered it.
Then, there is a case Weidinger, Erich. Here I remember that that was no special court case at all, but a case before the Jury Court at Nurnberg. How that case happens to be listed on this list of death sentences pronounced by the special court I cannot say, of course. That was a case of murder by poisoning.
I had to do with the case Schruefer, also the Case Gaishauser. As for Hoerndler, I haven't seen any files recently. In 1939, according to that, there would have been only two death sentences. Hoerndler was sentenced in 1940. I handled the Case Engelbauer. That case has been discussed here in detail. Then there's a trial against three, Fenn, Stengel and Schulz. Those were the first sensational chain burglaries during blackouts in Nurnberg. The Case Wendel is known to me. Yes, I handled the Case Wendel. Kastner, I don't remember. Chlebowski, I don't remember either. I don't know anything about TenElsen. Breitenthaler, I don't know anything about that. However, I know the Case Neupert, Egon. That was a sex offender who, as a serious sex criminal, was sentenced to death. Then I remember the Case Wild. I handled that, and that was mentioned in connection with the testimony by Fritsche. The indictment, in fact, was submitted in evidence here. I can't say anything about Gruber, Schmitt, Vostarek, Bakalarz, Greiner, Rost. In all these cases I may have had something to do with them, but I don't know. Then, there's the case of Dwetryszyn, Iwan, Klarzynsky, Josef, and Olejniczak, Martin. They were three Poles, but they were not voluntarily or involuntarily as agricultural workers in Germany, but they were roving bandits who took advantage of the conditions of the war to travel into Germany and they committed quite a number of very serious burglaries and also, in Nurnberg, committed a Court No. III, Case No. 3.burglary on Koenigstrasse in a jewelry shop by taking advantage of the blackout and killed a man.