It was determined, as I felt quite sure, that the prosecution in this case - meaning myself - had not seen At to order the release of Karl Schroeder under any circumstances.
Under those circumstances, the rule, I think, in a sense requires me, but certainly permits me, to ask for a strict interpretation of the rule, and I am asking for it.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the prosecution intend to call the witness Schroeder as its witness in future proceedings in this trial?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I don't know at this time, Your Honor, on the other hand, I can not spy that we might not intend to call the witness Schroeder. I may be unduly technical, but until the rule is changed it seems to me that that, under the rule, is not a. material issue. I have not released the witness Schroeder.
DR. SCHUBERT: May I say in reply, briefly, this: May it please the Court, concerning the case of the witness Zimmermann, which also to begin with led to a dispute between Mr. LaFollette and me, that case I did not mention before that dispute was settled because of the new ruling that has been submitted to the Court.
I do not share Mr. LaFollette's view that Article 23, in its present version, is clear, and evidently Mr. Ferencz and Mr. Wartena were also of that opinion. They have interpreted the new ruling. The interpretation is before the Tribunal, and they, too, do not consider the new ruling to be an amendment or curtailment of Article 23 but they consider it an interpretation of Rule 23.
If Mr. LaFollette were right in his interpretation to the effect that the word "witnesses" or "prospective witnesses" for the defense in the Nurnberg jail refers to all witnesses who are there, the Figure 2 of the new interpretation rule should not have been incorporated at all, because that, too, deals with witnesses in the Nurnberg jail, and in that case Mr. Ferencz and Mr. Wartena evidently agree that such witnesses may be interrogated without a representative of the prosecution being present.
If Mr. LaFollette, points out the provision in Article 23 that the defense, when the Prosecution interrogates a defense witness, may be present, as well as the other way around: The Prosecution may be present when the defense interrogates a witness, I have a point out that that, however, is not a reciprocal arrangement because in effect the Prosecution is able to prepare its case at a moment when the defense has not got going yet and, consequently, the Prosecution is able to interrogate all its witnesses without a defense counsel having the slightest opportunity to attend such interrogations.
I am concerned here with a case which, in my view, has not yet been settled, that is to say, the case of a witness of the Prosecution who is, at the same time, a defense witness.
THE PRESIDENT: It is, of course, obvious that what ever persuasive effect may be given to an Administrative interpretation, the Tribunals - and I speak of them all - which have adopted a rule are not concluded by the interpretation of some administrative official as to what that rule is. The Tribunal will take this controversy under consideration and will announce its decision at a later time.
OSWALD ROTHAUG - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - (Continued)
DR. KOESSL: (Counsel for the Defendant Rothaug): May I continue with the examination of the defendant as a witness on his own behalf?
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Witness, yesterday you said that about thirty cases came in per day. When you mentioned that figure were you talking of a definite period?
A That figure referred to the time when the most cases came in. In effect, the development was in fact the way I have already indicated the number of cases rose - reached a certain climax and then, on account of the effects of the war, the figure dropped considerably until finally it came down to zero.
Q Concerning the number of cases of the undermining of military morale in 1944, can you give us any exact information?
A I can only give a very approximate figure. Judging roughly from the whole situation I took over from Barnickel's department a great deal of arrears, and since the number of cases that came in rose constantly and we were overburdened with work, and because of all that it was quite natural that arrears should have accumulated with Barnickel. From 1944 onward, every month more and more cases continued to come in. That was due not so much to the fact that in the Reich more such cases were actually discovered, but to the shortage of personnel with the police which took effect more and more.
However, the senior public prosecutors had been instructed to submit all cases which, in some way or other, might be cases of undermining of military morale, and that took effect only gradually.
In addition, on account of the fact that the official agencies were badly staffed, there was an endeavor, which was understandable, in that way, to get rid of as many cases as possible, and that was how the little brook which originally had been harmless swelled and rose until it became a flood. That, roughly speaking, was the general development.
Q Yesterday you mentioned that about two or three cases were dealt with every day at your section. Did that mean that an indictment was filed in every case?
A No, by no means. Those two or three cases represented roughly, ten percent of the total number of cases. I read through the documents and a certain percentage of cases could immediately be stopped for reasons of fact or legal reasons. Another number of cases, for legal reasons, had to be transferred to other departments. For example, because high treason was in the dominant. Other cases were not concerned with the undermining of military morale but, after they had been properly examined on a legal basis, they were found to be offenses against the Malicious Acts Law. From the legal point of view of the undermining of military morale, they were rejected and transferred to the Special Courts as offenses against the Malicious Acts Law. The remaining cases were passed down to the General Public Prosecutors of the District Courts of Appeal.
The cases which remained in our department did not mean that in every case an indictment was filed. To start with, they were passed on to various experts who examined them thoroughly. They were examined by these experts from the point of view as to the offenders' attitude. It was also examined as to whether they could be transferred to the Senior Public Prosecutors or whether they could be transferred to the General Public Prosecutors with the District Courts of Appeal. If the expert decided that one of these methods could not be adopted, then he had to examine as to whether an indictment was to be filed or whether, before doing so, further investigations were needed.
If he thought the moment to file an indictment had come, he drafted an indictment before the Peoples Court. Otherwise he ordered that further investigations be made. If he choose the latter method, I was the person who had to sign the first order "by authority" of the higher authority. According to the results of further investigations the case was then dropped, an indictment was filed, or the case was transferred. That was the procedure.
Q What papers did you sign; which did you chief sign?
A On principle my chief signed all papers which were to be submitted to the Reich Ministry of Justice, the indictments which were sent to the Peoples Court, the opinions which caused the case to be transferred to the Senior Public Prosecutors, as well as general basic instructions as to what cases were to be sent on to the General Public Prosecutors.
I had to sign the first orders, which ordered that further investigations be made, and I also had to sign the orders for transfer to the General Public Prosecutors. That is to say, I did not sign orders transferring the case to the Senior Public Prosecutors; I signed by order of my chief, im auftrag. Further orders in connection with the execution of the sentence, I also had to sign and again by order of my chief.
Q. What civil servants dealt with the steps which had to be taken in connection with the execution of punishment?
A. Those measures which, as a rule, were a result of the fact that judgment has been passed, were, generally speaking, of a purely formal nature, and were dealt with on the basis of printed forms. To a farreaching extent they were dealt with by the Rechtspfleger. They were officials of the Administration of Justice who were neither judges nor public prosecutors.
Q. An example, for such methods concerning the execution of punishment can by obtained from Exhibit 435. Were Rechtspfleger subordinate to you?
A. No; the Rechtspfleger worked under the chiefs of the offices and they were subordinate immediately to the chief. A Reich prosecutor only acted as a superior official to others when he acted as deputy for the chief.
Q. Did you ever deputize for the chief?
A. No, I was the youngest Reich Prosecutor in office. The permanent deputy of the Chief Reich Prosecutor was Reich Prosecutor Parisius.
THE PRESIDENT: You told us about that yesterday.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. When a case was dropped did you have special difficulties with your chief, Lautz? Did he make it difficult for you to prevail with your opinion?
A. In view of the great many cases which came to my department and in particular on account of the nature of these cases, there were a great many cases which we did drop immediately.
There was not one single case when Chief Reich Public Prosecutor Lautz made any difficulties. All he asked was that one should give him some convincing reasons so that we would be able to prevail with our opinions as far as the higher authorities were concerned. In that field he was very generous and he was not afraid of the higher authorities.
Q. Did reports have to be made to him on cases where an indictment had been filed and where a death sentence might be passed?
A. Yes. He himself decided those cases, but the purpose of the decision was that an application was only allowed to be made at the session under the condition that the facts of the case changed considerably according to the files, and not on the basis of the facts that had come out of the trial.
Q. Did you ever attend such reports?
A. In view of the fact that I, myself, was over burdened with work, but because I had participated in the work and because there had been reports from assistants, I do know the general policy which was adhered to.
Q. What points of view were decisive for the question as to whether the death sentence was to be asked for at the trial?
A. There were quite a number of decree and decisions of a general nature on that subject, and there were decisions or rules which, in concrete, individual cases, had been issued by the Reich Ministry of Justice.
Furthermore, there was the jurisdiction of the Peoples Court which naturally amounted to directives for us. We were bound by directives and we were not able to ignore the jurisdiction of the People's Court, yet there was a general tendency on no account to exceed the line of policy which in itself was rigid.
Concerning certain sentences passed by Freisler's senate, which has been mentioned h re repeatedly, we certainly did not come up to that standard.
In particular, in. cases of the undermining of military morale, one has to bear in mind , above all, that the law as such made the death sentence mandatory for the ordinary case, that is to say, that the legal situation here was not as favorable from the defendant's point of view as it is, for example, in laws where the death sentence was tied up with the fact that a particularly serious offense had been committed.
In particular, the ministerial decisions which have been mentioned here several times, signed by Ministerial Councillor Franke, were aiming at that. According to their point of view, an exception could be made from the rule when overwhelming mitigating reasons existed. Here, too, concerning the reports made to Lautz, there was a tendency, in doubtful cases to choose the more lenient direction.
Q. You have mentioned that reports had to be made in connection with the death sentences. Were there any other cases before the Peoples Court?
A. Naturally not only cases were indicted before the Peoples Court where it had to be assumed that a death sentence would be passed or where it was intended to ask for a death sentence. There was only a small percentage of cases where, from the very beginning, it was intended to ask for the death sentence, they frequently were found during the trial to be based on facts which were less aggravating and for that reason one refrained from passing the death sentence.
It is also important here - a point which has not been mentioned up to now - that the transfer to the District Courts of Appeal was not dealt with according to the principle that only such cases were transferred to the District Courts of Appeal where one did not think a death sentence should be passed.
Rather, the way the selection was made as to what cases were to go to the Peoples' Court and what cases were to be passed on to the general public prosecutors was on the basis as to whether a case, without consideration for the sentence which might be passed, was of a certain amount of importance to the Reich, as a whole, or not. In other words, the decision of the question whether a case was to remain in Berlin or was to be transferred, in itself did not involve by any means a decision laying down that the cases which remained in Berlin were likely to be punished with the death sentence, whereas the cases transferred were not likely to be punished with the death sentence. The provision which formed the basis of the transfer matters in no way forced us to deal with cases on that basis. In other words, for example, such cases were left in Berlin where we were interested in getting a decision from the central authority. On the other hand, it was obvious, of course, that the bulk of the insignificant cases were transferred to the district courts of appeal and that, on the other hand, cases which had caused a great deal of sensation and which, on account of the seriousness of the offense, alone had achieved importance beyond the purely local, all remained in Berlin.
Q. You mentioned that, in cases where one had thought of passing the death sentence during the trial reasons against it could come out. I'm asking you, therefore, was the prosecutor at the session bound to ask for the death sentence if, to begin with, one had considered the death sentence necessary?
A. By no means. Rot a single public prosecutor was committed in that way. The meaning of the directives which were issued was always, and could not have been anything but, that the prosecutor was only allowed to ask for the death sentence if, at the trial, no facts emerged which, to a considerable extent, spoke in favor of the defendant.
Q. What steps did the prosecutor have to take when he found, art the trial, that the facts of the case had changed considerably in favor of the defendant?
A. On his own initiative he could refrain from asking for the death sentence and the main reason for that was in the situation as it existed, because, in the final analysis, he was the only person who gathered all the true impressions of the trial. However, in that case he had to assume full responsibility for it.
Q. What ruling applied in doubtful cases?
A. If he had doubts and if he didn't know what to do, he had to ask for directives from his chief.
Q. Did it happen that the Senate either exceeded the punishment for which the prosecutor had asked, or passed a more lenient sentence than the one for which the prosecutor had asked?
A. Both cases did happen, for the court was not obligated by the law to act according to the sentence which we had demanded.
Q. Was it the custom at the People's Court for the judges and the prosecutor to get in touch with each other concerning the sentence?
A. That was not the custom at the Peoples' Court.
Q. If the death sentence was passed, was then the clemency plea made to the Ministry of Justice, the clemency plea which the Oberreichsanwalt had to sign, and what did it say in such a clemency plea?
A. During time, those clemency pleas were submitted in a very abbreviated version. The report on the clemency question contained mainly the following points: "I enclose judgment passed by the Second Penal Senate of the Peoples' Court, dated 3rd of April 1944, of Anton Huber, for undermining military morale. The death sentence is in accordance with the demand made by the prosecutor", or, "my prosecutor has asked for eight years in a penitentiary." Those were the only points mentioned in the report on the clemency question. In other words, no opinion was given on the clemency question.
Q. Did you have to give your views on the question of the extraordinary appeal?
A. No, for the Oberreichsanwalt did, according to the external form, make use of that legal remedy, but it was not he who decided about it. He could only make such an appeal at the instruction of the leadership of the state.
Q. Please don't use too many nouns in your replies. That is making it rather difficult for the interpreter.
Did you have anything to do with the work that was done on extraordinary appeals?
A. I have already mentioned that a large number, or perhaps the majority of cases, were passed on to the general public prosecutors for them to deal with them, and finally, to indict these cases before the Senate of the district courts of appeal. When the district courts of appeal decided on these cases, we were sent a copy of the judgment and of the opinion, so that we had an opportunity to supervise and examine the practice of the district courts of appeal. But, as the decision about the extraordinary appeal did not lie with us, we only dealt formally with that part of the work. That is to say, we never suggested to the Reich Ministry of Justice that an extraordinary appeal should be made, nor was there any reason for us to do so, because the Reich Ministry of Justice, too, was informed about every judgment passed by the district courts of appeal because it received a copy, and because we knew that the Ministry itself supervised the jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal, and the Ministry made the decision as to whether an extraordinary appeal was to be made against a judgment.
Q. Do you know of a case where the Reich Ministry of Justice made an extraordinary appeal in favor of the defendant?
A. I never heard of a case of that kind, but by that I would not like to say that such a case never occurred.
Q. You heard of a Will Case. It is mentioned in the Weimann Affidavit Exhibit 495.
That man was sentenced to death. Next the extraordinary appeal was made. Do you know that case?
A. My department dealt with the case. It's the Will Case, and these briefly are the facts of the case: Will had been an unimportant little attorney in Hamburg. From 1933 he had known how to use the National Socialist Revolution for his own ends and thus he got to the very profitable top at one of the largest brewery concerns and, as he could prove by showing letters which were sent abroad and which were sent cut inside Germany, until a certain time of the war he had been an enthusiastic adherent of the Nazi Party. That attitude of his changed when the war situation became critical, when there was a threat that National Socialism might become dangerous. From that moment onwards, he changed his political views to the opposite. In that change, however, he was rather careless. That was how it happened that, at a meeting of the Board of Directors, he said in public that the war had been lost and all that mattered now was to save whatever could be saved. He suggested that no more material was to be used up and that all the money was to be invested in goods. He canvassed for his plan, making all sorts of promises to his audience, and, in lengthy statements, he tried to refute all arguments which the audience brought up against him. At the first session, he was sentenced to death.
THE PRESIDENT: The time has arrived for our fifteen minutes' recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. KOESSL: I ask to be permitted to continued.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Was the extraordinary appeal in the Case will made in favor of the defendant?
A Since there was a death sentence pronounced it had formally to be made in favor of the defendant. The real reason, however, was a different one. Freisler had the habit of preparing himself the reasons for his sentence. In doing so he often caused a great deal of embarrassment for us and for the administration of Justice. This also was a case of embarrassment of this kind. The reasons were so confused, so complicated that an evaluation of what the facts actually were in this case could not be made; and thereupon the instruction which we received had been based that is to make an extraordinary objection against this sentence. It had been pointed out that large parts of the charged raised ware not at all dealt with in the reasons given for the sentence, and that what was contained in the reasons was actually full of contradiction. We were instructed to express that criticism of the reasons in our extraordinary objection, and that was done. As for the One hundred thousand Marks which we have mentioned have frequently which were left to the dependents of the person convicted of the first sentence, there was no mention of it in the instructions. Therefore, that is to say, for a trivial matter of that kind the extraordinary objection would not have been made. The second trial proved the same facts which apparently had been produced in the first trial. Beyond that I remember that witnesses who had been called to speak in favor of the defendant to a certain extent turned out to be against the defendant. Thus, the second trial also resulted in a death sentence.
Q Did you finish?
A The extraordinary objection, therefore, had its reason apparently in the fact that the Leadership of the State should be provided definite foundations, for its decision especially in the clemency question.
Q What were the principles on which Ministerialrat Franke based himself in connection with the extraordinary objection?
A The formal dealing with extraordinary objections was such that in most cases we immediately received a binding instruction to make an extraordinary objection. In rare cases we first received the files, and at the same time leaving to our discretion we wanted to examine the question, and whether we wanted to express our opinion to the Ministry. The instructions which we received to file extraordinary objections had reached such an extent in my department that the department frequently for weeks had nothing else to do than to handle these matters of extraordinary objections as we had been instructed by Franke. The consequence was that we, of course, were opposed to all extraordinary objections from the point of view that the nature of this offense was such that it wasn't worthwhile to display any particular initiative in this direction.
Q Now, in the case of Will, in the second trial, wore you the prosecutor?
A Yes.
Q Did Freisler in other cases also cause such embarrassment as in the case of Will?
A I remember one more case which I will briefly describe, and which also is another way is somewhat characteristic. In that case a physician from the Bavarian Forest had been charged with having made defeatist statements and was sentenced to death. The main witness in that trial had not been appeared for the trial. The prosecution in the session therefore tried hard to obtain a discontinuance of the trial because the statements which were most important in this case only be made by this physician in the presence of that witness.
Freisler achieved that the trial went on; and also when during the session the application was made for discontinuance, he disapproved that, but sentenced the defendant because the defendant in his defense had made certain confessions concerning the alleged statements; but that did not go as far as to provide per se a basis for the death sentence. That manner of dealing with this matter became a subject of a report and of discussions at the Reich Ministry of Justice by the Chief Reich Prosecutor. It was pointed out that one could not proceed in this manner. Thereupon I received the assignment to make a trip to the Bavarian Forest to find out where that witness was and to question her thoroughly in order to find out what actually had happened. I carried out this investigation. The witness, however, in a very credible way, confirmed the charges so that as far as the substantial accuracy of the results was concerned there could not be any doubt. Later the clemency appeal was decided against the defendant.
Q Did you inform yourself currently about the jurisdictional practice of this special penal senates? Were there only death sentences pronounced?
A Not at all, that is quite out of the question . Even acquittals occurred, and it happened that the sentence which originally had been for a term in a penitentiary was commuted and reduced considerably. In these proceedings one had to expect 11 sorts of outcome. They were particularly more critical as far as evidence was concerned because a considerable amount of time had passed since the previous sentence and the new trial, and frequently witnesses changed their minds. Therefore, also in these cases, it frequently occurred that surprises arose. In addition, the Senates and that included Freisler, too, were very much opposed against the large number of extraordinary objections and were not really inclined to encourage that tendency from emanating higher levels.
Q Did the Chief Reich Prosecutor have any supervision over the General Public Prosecutors?
A The General Public Prosecutors were subordinated to the Reich Ministry of Justice. The Chief Reich Prosecutor had only a limited right of issuing instructions to them on the basis of paragraph 146, of the judicature Act, that is to say, on the basis of the authorization which is stipulated there and which I have already mentioned today.
Q. Did the Chief Reich Prosecutor with the People's Court have any supervision over the Senior Public Prosecutors?
A. He did not have such a right of supervision.
Q. However, did he have the right of supervision when he transferred cases to the Senior Public Prosecutors because they were not cases of undermining the military morale but of malicious intent?
A. That matter is entirely different from the general transferring of cases to the General Public Prosecutors. Whenever we transferred cases to the General Public Prosecutors, we were competent for these cases; and the General Public Prosecutor acted so to say on the basis of our assignment we gave him. Consequently, we also had a certain right of supervision and direction; however, when cases were transferred to the Senior Public Prosecutor, those were matters which really did not fall under our competency, but for which the Senior Public Prosecutor himself was competent. Therefore, as for the further handling of these cases, we had no right of instruction.
Q. Was the General Public Prosecutor with the District Court of Appeals bound in anyway?
A. The General Public Prosecutor with the District Court of Appeals was only bound to instructions on the basis of the transfer assignment which he had received; therefore, we could only direct that he had to file an indictment in a case of undermining of military morale before the senate of the District Court of Appeals. That was the extent to which we could justify any binding directive and that was the reason for the transfer of these cases.
Q. Since the case Grasser raises that Question, Exhibit 139, I want to ask you what did the General Public Prosecutor at the District Court of Appeals have to do if he is not inclined to consider a case as being one of undermining of Military morale?
A. Of course, the General Public Prosecutor with the District Court of Appeals had the right to examine the case itself for its legal merits and was not only our executive instrument.
If, on the basis of such an examination, he had come to the result that it was not a case of undermining of Military morale, but for instance a case of malicious intent, then, according to the rules and regulations which were generally in force, he was obliged to explain to us his point of view. We would have examined that point of view and according to the result of that examination we would have said that we either approved of his point of view or that we disapproved. Each party gave reasons for his cause, but if the original instructions remained in force, then, of course, the general public prosecutor had to act as he had been instructed by us.
Q. Was it possible for the general public prosecutor to transfer something to the senior public prosecutor?
A. If we agreed with the opinion of the general public prosecutor that it was not a case of high treason or undermining of military morale, then he could transfer it to the senior public prosecutor; but in this connection one has to observe that here also another element comes into play. The general public prosecutor could examine the case from the point of view, or rather he had to examine it from that point of view, as far as facts were concerned, whether these facts could actually be proved, and frequently it occurred that when he was confronted with an extended statement which was alleged to be a case of undermining of military morale, he found that about three-fourths or nine-tenths of that statement could not be proved, and that he transferred the balance to the senior public prosecutor, as a case of malicious intent. In this case, however, formerly he would have been obliged to ask our opinion also, but for reasons of expediency that was not done.
Q. Was the senior public prosecutor bound by the opinion of the general public prosecutor?
A. In the case where the charges were dropped or part of the charges were dropped and in the case of purely legal questions, the Senior Public Prosecutor was bound by the opinion of the general public prosecutor, if the general public prosecutor was the superior authority of that particular senior public prosecutor to whom in fact the case had been transferred, that is to say, that the senior public prosecutor could not very well disregard the transfer order of his superior; but he also is under obligation to examine the case personally and independently, and if his opinion deviates from that of his superior, he has to report that dissenting opinion to his superior.
Of course, he can deviate from the opinion expressed by his superiors, but that is an internal matter. It is essentially different when the senior public prosecutor does not belong to the district of that particular general public prosecutor who makes the disposition. That is for instance when a, case has come to the general public prosecutor in Munich, a case of suspected high treason or undermining of military morale, to be tried for these reasons and on the basis of these charges, and now the general public prosecutor in Munich with or without the approval of the Chief Reich Prosecutor arrives at the legal opinion that it was only a malicious act because, for instance, large parts of the charges had to be dropped for some reason; and if now the general prosecutor transfers the case to the senior public prosecutor in Nurnberg, then the senior public prosecutor at Nurnberg is in no way bound to accept the opinion of the general public prosecutor at Munich because the general public prosecutor at Munich happens to be in no relation of a superior to the senior public prosecutor in Nurnberg. If, therefore, the senior public prosecutor in Nurnberg finds that the legal evaluation on the part of the general public prosecutor at Munich could not be shared by him, then he has to adopt the point of view which according to his own legal opinion and conviction is the right one, because the legal handling of these cases is based on that.
Q That situation prevailed in the case Grasser, the situation which was just described. The transfers to the general public prosecutors are said to have had a notation concerning the case. Will you please explain to us what that notation was about?
A I have already pointed out that on the basis of these transfer orders there existed a right for the chief Reich public prosecutor to issue instructions to the Reich Public Prosecutor. This right was in fact connected with the obligation of the general public prosecutor that he had to file an indictment based upon the same legal considerations which prevailed when the case was transferred. Now, in connection with the facts of undermining of military morale and all the questions concerning the extent of punishment, and also in connection with tbs great divergencies of evaluation, of conditions and circumstances, particularly circumstances brought about by the war, all through the Reich from the North Sea to the Serbian Border, it was quite natural that the practices and sentences showed great differences in different areas. It was quite possible that cases whore the facts were quite the same were punished, the one at Graz with a prison sentence, at Munich with a penitentiary term, and in east Prussia with a more serious penalty. These circumstances brought it about that this large number of extraordinary objections which I mentioned frequently poured in with the intention of bringing the practices of the various courts to the same level. In addition to that, we also wore interested, and that in the interest of legal security which would provide equality in interpreting the law. Therefore, and because we knew the general decisions as well as the special decisions made within the Reich Ministry of Justice, we knew the practice and the decisions of the People's Court, and also had an insight into the practices of the district courts of appeals.