A I assume that he was satisfied with me because he was loath to lose me. When he said good-bye to me, he said, by exaggerating the actual conditions somewhat, that he had complained only of my Bloody Applications. Unfortunately the courts had complied with my Bloody Pleas too frequently. But I would like to say that this expression, Bloody Judge, and Bloody Pleas, and Bloody Judgments, and Bloody Chambers, is a rough manner describing severe pleas because in Hof I participated only in very few murder cases. I was on very good personal terms with public prosecutor Dietrich who was a very "un-bloody"democrat. We took many hikes together in the Fichtel-Gebirge, and this brought us into a very close relationship.
Thus, in spite of the clashes which I had again and again with my superiors, our relationship, especially when I said farewell to Hoff, was ideal.
Q In what technical fields did you work as local court judge at the local court of Nurnberg?
A When I was transferred to the local court of Nurnberg I had to make a call upon the chief judge of the local court. On that occasion he told me that he know me already through his friend, the district court judge Schmidt of; that he had thought up a special task for me. At that time six to eight jury courts at the local court of Nurnberg had gotten into serious arrears. Therefore, a so-called "flying jury" court was established and its basis was that the presiding judges of the existing jury courts referred the cases in which they were in arrears to this so-called "flying jury" court and then it was my task in regard to the cases which had reached me in that manner, to try them.
This was an institution which was established in 1929. In this field I worked until the fall of 1930. In the fall of 1930 I was, by surprise, transferred to the civil division and then became a judge in civil cases.
Q What was that?
A I remained in that capacity until I was transferred to the position of a first public prosecutor in the summer of 1933.
Q What was the reason for your transfer from the penal division to the civil division?
A In general one did not find out the reasons for such transfers. Usually there was an official reason, but my transfer at that time has a certain similarity to matters which have been discussed here, and, therefore, perhaps it is significant to point this out. The following incident occurred. In the course of 1930 a criminal case was being dealt with, which concerned the Deutsche Tag of 1929 in Nurnberg German Day. This German Day - Deutscher Tag - was Propaganda and Parade Day of the parties of the radical right, and during this day an entirely unpolitical incident occurred.
One of the participants in this day - a member of the NSDAP - the Nazi Party - had attracted a young girl of 14. to 16 years and had raped her, had taken her along when he went home to Northern Germany and there a had left her to her own devices. So that this young girl became a prostitute in order to got the financial means to get back to her home.
At that time - and I emphasize without any political thought - we tried the case. I was presiding judge of this court and because of this offense, an far as I remember, because of abduction, we condemned this man to three years in the penitentiary and only now did this incident assume its real significance.
Naturally, the Social Democratic press utilized this incident against the NSDAP and the NSDAP on its part denied it. In any case, the and result was that the Administration of Justice took the case up and actually it was none of its business at the time.
Then an appeal was lodged with the result that this sentence was quashed because the legal facts were alleged not to have existed. Those reasons did not convince me. However, the case was closed as far as I was concerned.
Then in August, 1930, I Went on leave and returned in September. When I returned, the name of my office had been removed and I had been transferred to the civil division. Since the order itself had not been made known to me I was interested in finding it out and I was informed that the orders had been issued a long time ago, a long time before I went on leave at all, and the most important thing is now this: My inquiries with the department chief far the reasons of this transfer led to the following conversation:
The department chief told me that I was not forgiven this case of the German Day. Later on he said, "Since the girl as such was no good anyhow, one should not have made so much fuss about the whole thing." And when I objected that under the law this was not a point, he answered that this was not important.
Thus, at that time already there were cases of the Leuneburger type. The difference was only that after 1933 the matters were written down on paper; whereas, before 1933 these things were done in an underhanded manner. I mention t is because this question plays a role in regard to any relationship to the Administration of Justice.
Q Before 1933 was there a political party which represented the point of view which was in accordance with your personal political basic attitude?
A I call to your attention that there is a question which you have to ask first because otherwise this does not make any sense.
Q What was your political attitude before 1933?
A My basic permanent attitude before 1933 was not a party political attitude. Since I had returned from the war only one single wish was burning in my heart: the wish for freedom, from the defamation of my country and freedom from the burdens of the time. Naturally, I was not thinking of a war because of that one could not think at all; but I was thinking perhaps the world could not think at all; but I was thinking perhaps the world could or would realize the situation into which Germany could involve a great danger to the world, and actually this was the case because what developed after 1933 was actually in accordance with its character -- if one left out all the accompanying circumstances -- actually only an uprising of slaves because its special danger lay in the fact that this development was instituted under the slogan: "Against oppression and injustice." And Hitler's person in this development is, in its nature, nothing but the result of this outside and inner condition.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. KOESSL: May I continue.
A Before the recess I discussed my basic potitical attitude on certain political developments that occured before 1933, and now I shall conclude this line of thought. As I have already stated, in my opinion the development of the NSDAp, the Nazi Party before 1933, was strongly influenced by the conditions that were the consequence of the Versailles Treaty. I am convinced that neither the party platform, nor political speeches, nor the book Mein Kampf, nor all propaganda that was made before 1933 would have been able to lead the German people on the dangerous path of a one party state if they had not understood it by utilizing the economic emergencies to make Hitler appear as the last help. I myself did not approve of this development, in my inner-most self, and toward the outset-not because I was an enemy of these people, because I saw a tremendous danger for the state and my country in this development. I did not care for parties at all, and in all of these developments I saw and still see for the life of our German people always something dangerous, because we Germans contrary to other peoples, take these matters too seriously. The quotation is well known which says -- laws are made in Rome; in Austria they read the laws; and in Germany they obey them. With us everything is inclined toward fanaticism, and we Germans were so great that we gave an unusual richness of thought and ideas to the world. In politics we are blind. Therefore, I was and remained a monarchist --- and still am.
Q Inspite of that attitude could you be a prosecutor in a democratic republic state?
AAs such, especially in view of the position that a civil servant has in a democratic state, this had nothing to do with this attitude. In my service, my official service, I had to apply the law, and in applying the law I had to enforce not my will -- I had to realize that it was not my will but the will of the law; and a monarchist can do that in a democratic state, too.
His private opinion had nothing to do with his official duty. This is contrasted to the position of a civil servant in an authoritarian state. There it is required that the civil servant also recognizes and approves of the political tendency.
Q If there had been a monarchist putsch, would you not have entered into a conflict of conscience?
A I already indicated that such a conflict could not arise because according to the oath of office I was obligated to apply the law as it is willed. In my own heart I can think whatever I want to think. It is obvious, and a matter of course, that I was not allowed to participate in a putsch myself; but, and this is my own personal opinion, if I am of the conviction that the restitution of a monarchy is the salvation, then I would have to go with the others; and probably I would have seized the eternal rights, the laws which cannot be changed and are as permanent as the stars themselves, but this would have to be done outside my office hours.
Q Why did you not have any confidence in the republic platform of the state?
A My basic attitude in regard to this question is the following: Every form of government is a matter which has to grow out of the character of the people. Those people which are happy under a democracy, a historical development which has gone on for hundreds of years, is after all the product of this historical development, and these peoples cannot be happy in any other system then the democratic one. Our development, however, went from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarachy, and the principle of this development is the principle which is indigenous to us and has grown in our country. Forms of government cannot be established by demand and thus be made indigenous. In fact, the removal of the monarchy in Germany in 1919 brought about the Reich and this was the basis for the later consequences of political power. The most free democratic constitution of the world brought legal dictatorship.
Q What was your attitude toward the parties?
A Toward the parties I absolutely lacked every interest before 1933. I especially was opposed to the radical wings, because in these, in particular, I saw the great danger whether one or the other of the radical wings should succeed. In effect, it was like this: That in 1933 they destroyed the middle course, and the only question was whether Germany would become authoritarian state or the basis of bolshevism; or, an authoritarian state on the basis of National Socialism.
Q What was your attitude toward the political change in 1933?
A Later on I shall go into detail in regard to the fact that already years before 1933 I was a follower of the Lundendorff movement. Lundendorff was in sharp contrast to the MSDAP and its leading men. This attitude I had also in 1933 exclusively because of the worry that my fatherland could be harmed if it would enter upon the risky course of a one party state which could be controlled and criticized by no one. In saying this, I have to emphasize particularly that one of Lundendorff's basic demands was freedom of religion and political freedom.
Q As first prosecutor, how were you employed, in the summer of 1933, and until the fall of 1934?
A First, for a few weeks, I was given a so-called General Referat (Section), which dealt exclusively with matters of general criminality. Few weeks later, however, I became an assistant to the General Public Prosecutor of Nurnberg, and in addition I was deputy of the Division Chief of Division II of the Public Prosecution in Nurnberg. Political matters were not connected with these jobs.
Q What technical fields were assigned to you in the General Public Prosecution?
A Here I had to review when proceedings were quashed by subordinate prosecutions, I had to deal with clemency questions, and with that, also with the supervision of the legality of the jurisdiction of the courts.
Q What tasks did you have to fulfill?
A I think I have answered that essentially.
Q Did that duty apply to the prosecution quite generally?
A You mean the duty of the supervision of the legality of jurisdiction? This duty applied to the prosecution in general, and according to the prevailing opinion it was regarded as general duty.
May I especially refer here to Loewe?
Q I believe that you have Loewe in your hand. Please state briefly what book you are talking about.
A I am concerned with the Code of Criminal Procedure for the German Reich, the Loewe commentary, new edition by Werner Rosenberg, from the year 1929; that is, before the seizure of power.
Q Is that the recognized work?
A This commentary was the standard book in the field of the code of criminal procedure in Germany. This general duty of the prosecution to supervise the legality of jurisdiction is mentioned in the Loewe commentary in footnote 5 to paragraph 155. This paragraph 155 describes the position of the judge in regard to an offense which is brought before the court, and in that connection it also deals with the position of the prosecution.
In the footnote 5 which I mentioned, under the letter "C", it states;
"The prosecution, in its investigations, must keep in mind the entire interest of the State. The State, however, is mainly interested in the proceedings being carried out in a legal manner, that the repealing of decisions and the repetition of proceedings should be avoided as far as possible. Therefore, the Public Prosecution is called upon to make all the applications which it considers suitable in that direction, and by these applications to see to it that the legal regulations are obeyed, not only when the prosecution is caused to make a statement by the court, but everywhere, when it observes nonconformity with legal regulations."
This means, in other words, that the public prosecution is the organ of the government, whose vocation it is to test the legality of jurisdiction and to supervise the legality of jurisdiction in order to increase the legal guarantees for the citizen. The prosecution is obligated especially to take into consideration also the rights of the defendant himself and to exploit them fully. Violation of these rights would be just as serious a violation as if, for example, the prosecution would disregard the interests of the State, because, according to German constitutional law, the violation of the interests of the defendant would, at the same time, also mean a violation of the interests of the State.
Thus the prosecution, in the group of problems, is not only in a central position, but also in a harmonious position.
Q Did this not affect the independence of the courts?
A This did not affect the independence of the courts, because the situation was as follows:
The prosecutor, in making proper applications and representing his opinion in the manner in which it was regulated by law, had to see to it that the court would act in accordance with the will of the law.
The State and the leadership of the State, according to German Constitutional law, are absolutely the masters of their decisions so far as the sentence is concerned.
The leadership of the State, for any reason that it considers suitable, can refrain from having a sentence executed.
Q Does the leadership of the State not at least have to execute a sentence which in itself it considers as correct in every respect?
A The State is not obligated, according to German constitutional law, to execute a sentence. The State can also refrain from executing a sentence that is absolutely correct.
Q Can you give an example of this?
A I can cite an example which I experienced myself, and which demonstrates this legal situation unequivocably.
As prosecutor, I was called as deputy to work on a case which concerned Swedish subjects who were indicted because of treason against Germany. They were people who had confessed. Moreover, the evidence was so overwhelming that no doubt could exist as to their guilt, and the penalty, too, was determined by law. All the participants knew, including the defendants themselves, that their situation was hopeless. The sentence was pronounced accordingly.
However, even though this sentence could not be objected to under any point of view, and though if the facts had been identical it would probably have been the same as it was pronounced here in every country of the world.
In spite of that, the sentence was not executed, but the condemned persons were exchanged for five Germans who were arrested in Sweden because of treason and thus they gained their freedom and their lives. Thus, this example shows that, according to German constitutional law, the German state is not obligated to execute a sentence even if one is convinced that the sentence cannot be appealed from any point of view.
I believe that's enough.
Q. All right.
If now you were told or if you saw from the submission of evidence that a sentence was not conclusive from the facts, or that the sentence was doubtful for legal reasons, or even if the Reich Ministry of Justice uttered such misgivings?
A. Do you mean what should be done then?
Q. What should be done then?
A. What should be done then is obvious. If such a sentence was pronounced in which, from the point of view of facts or the law, showed certain errors or omissions, then the public prosecutor had, first of all, to exhaust the existing means of legal recourse.
Q. Is it not up to the discretion of the prosecutor whether, in favor of the condemned person, he wants to begin a legal recourse or a legal aid?
A. That is a question which was already broached here before, but which was not treated exhaustively. It is a matter of course that it cannot be up to the discretion of the prosecutor whether, in the case of a sentence which he considers to be incorrect, he can use a legal recourse or a legal aid. I have already pointed out, and this is of decisive importance here, that the prosecution, in general, has the duty to supervise the legality of jurisdiction. However, the law provides the prosecution only with the possibility to do it, but this means under no conditions, that it is up to the discretion of the prosecutor whether he avails himself of this possibility or not if he considers a sentence to be a wrong sentence.
Rather, this legal possibility is given to him so that he can fulfill his general duty to bring about a legality of jurisdiction. This is in agreement with what I already announced before.
Q. You were speaking about the prosecutor. What did the general public prosecutor have to do with this?
A. The circle of duties which I have described applies first of all to the prosecutor. Above the prosecutor is the general public prosecutor. He is the official supervising authority. That is to say he, on his part, has to supervise the prosecutor in turn to see to it that he fulfills the duties which the law imposes upon him. Thus, as a supervising authority he has to intervene when the prosecution does not fulfill the duty that is imposed upon it and, because he has to supervise that, logically this obligation is also his.
Q. What is the position of the Reich Ministry of Justice, now?
A. The Reich Ministry of justice is the supervising authority over the public prosecutor and the general public prosecutor. The Reich Ministry of justice therefore has the sane obligation as the general public prosecutor, only in a more emphatic way, and with more extensive possibilities of intervention. In other words, also the Reich Ministry of justice has to supervise jurisdiction in regard to its legality and see to it that its subordinate authorities - that is, the general public prosecutor and the prosecutor - fulfill their obligations in this respect. That is essentially the position of the machinery of the administration of justice surrounding the sentence of a judge, with the task and the aim to see to it to create the most extensive guarantees of right that a wrong judgment cannot grow into damage to harm a person.
Q. Instead of a legal recourse or a legal aid could the public prosecutor not suggest that these condemned persons be pardoned?
A. He cannot do so. That is to say, in order to be understood completely, I would like to cite a seemingly exceptional case. If a man is sentenced to a prison term of six months because of fraud and the public prosecutor reaches the conclusion that actually not fraud but embezzlement exists, if he considers the penalty of a six month's prison term also appropriate for embezzlement, he will, of course, let the judgment prevail.
In such a case there are no misgivings either that if he considers, instead of six months, three months more appropriate, to ask for clemency to lower the penalty to three months and would not insist on exhausting the legal recourse here because the interests of the defendant or condemned person are maintained sufficiently. However, these exceptional cases do not affect the basic question. If one is convinced - and this is the principle involved - that a sentence is wrong, and this can happen and it happens daily in the world, than the person concerned has a right to demand justice and not a right to demand a pardon or clemency. An example: if a man, because of arson, under the application of the corresponding article of the law prevailing during the war, is condemned to death and the circumstantial evidence is not considered to be conclusive, then, of course, it is impossible to commute the man's sentence to eight years in a penitentiary because it is conceivable that he is the offender, but, first of all, one has to exhaust the legal remedies. This principle, moreover, is apparent quite unequivocably in the clemency regulations in which it is expressly emphasized that the method of asking for clemency is, in no case, a substitute for legal remedy.
This duty, however, exists also over and above that, I mean, the duty to use legal remedies when clemency has been denied. This is quite clear from the method in which the so-called re-opening of the case was handled which was discussed here frequently which requires the court to be present on the method of discussion up to the place of execution because up to that moment the possibility that legal remedies would be used -- for example by the way of the so-called re-opening of the case -- is still possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor, may I ask you a question the discussion that you have just been giving relates to clemency matters. You were not discussing, were you, at that time the matter of nullity pleas?
A. No, your Honor, I was speaking of the relationship of the method of clemency to the legal recourse in general.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand. Go on.
A. And I only mentioned the possibility of re-opening of a case as an example. And now I may continue. These general principles which I have developed here, of course, apply to an increasing extent in regard to such legal remedies, in which the possibilities of the condemned person are limited by virtue of the fact that the condemned person is only allowed to suggest the legal remedy. As for the example, in the case of a nullity plea, here in such a case, if necessary, the Reich Ministry of Justice which was superior to the Chief Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court, the Reich Ministry of Justice then has to instruct that the nullity plea was not put into the hands of the head of the state; therefore, this could not be decided by means of the decision on the clemency plea. Rather in the case of the nullity plea, it was a legal remedy which was put into the hands of the administration of Justice which the Public Prosecution and the General Public Prosecutor could suggest to the Chief Reich Public Prosecutor, and the Reich Ministry of Justice as the superior authority to the Chief Reich Public Prosecutor could order the Chief Reich Public Prosecutor to use it, and it had to be ordered it in the conception of the Reich Ministry of Justice a wrong sentence was in question. The Public Prosecution thus is cooperation with the rest of the Ministry of Justice had to supervise the leg ality of the jurisdiction.
Thus one cannot say -- and this is why I made these explanations -- that our system of law does not provide sufficient methods against possible errors in jurisdiction. It did have these possibilities until the last moment in the individual case.
Q. How did your transfer to Schweinfurt come about?
A. That was a simple, harmless event. One day my then chief the then public prosecutor, came and he know that I would like to remain in Nurnberg. He came to me in order to tell me that the position of a district court in Nurnberg Fuerth would soon be vacant, and he recommended to me to apply for that position and also told me that he wanted, in spite of the fact that I w s transferred to work as a judge, to keep me I did apply for that position and that was certainly not a world- shaking affair because it was a transfer to a position on the same level. Only instead of a position with the prosecution, it was a position as a judge. I made this application and expected that it would be complied with in consideration of the fact that it was a matter of course. However, about two weeks later, to take immediate effect, I was transferred to the district court of Schweinfurt.
Q. Was that unusual, and how did you regard that transfer?
A. It was unusual to the extent that in general, formerly matters that were only put into the form of a request, but actually which were not requested, one could bring to the superior office authorities without involving the danger that special disadvantages would accrue from this. For in effect, it was as follows: Already during the preceding years, because I was used a great deal, I lived apart from my family from time to time, and I had just obtained apartment in Nurnberg for three year, and now again I was without an apartment far my family. I was supposed to be transferred to Schweinfurt to a city where the scarcity of apartments had assumed special proportions. Moreover, in consideration of my stomach disorder, I was already at that time limited. In any case; there were a great number of reasons which were against my wanting to be transferred to the city of Schweinfurt.
Q. Did you know that Haberkern at that time had an important political position in the Gau of Frankonia.
A. For that, you are coming back to the old subject. Of course I knew that. Already in 1933 I found that Haberkern, whom I had met in 1926 in Pfaffenhofen on the Inn, since 1933 immediately after the seizure of power, had been given the position of Gau inspector for the Gauleitung of Frankonia. That was in every newspaper at the time.
Q. Did you again resume your contact with him?
A. Even though I had found out that Haberkern took this political position in 1933, I did not take up contact with him even though I was also living in this city here; and for me it would have been an easy thing to do to again restore these connections.
Q. Why did you not take up connections with him?
A. That has a purely human reson. If I would have found out that Haberkern in accordance with the professions which he had learned before, had opened a butcher shop, I would have been the first one to have gone to look him up in order to restore the old connections of Pfaffenhofen on the Inn, but this was not the case. But due to the seizure of power, Haberkern was given an important political position in the Gau of Frankonia, and this condition in particular prevented me from renewing such connections.
Q. Why did you not at least turn to him now in this matter of transfer?
A. The affair of the transfer was for me as well as for my family, as I have already described an extraordinarily unpleasant affair, because in effect what happened to me was approximately the same thing that would happen to a mere member of the Social Democratic Party in Germany in 1933. He was, just against his will, transferred to another place.
Since, in 1933 I did not take up the connection with Haberkern, because I wanted to prevent even the appearance of such a thing. I, of course, did not approach him the more in this transfer, an affair which for me was extraordinarily unpleasant.
Q. But was that not the usual thing?
A. Of course, anybody could act as he wanted to. At that time it was quite usual or became the usual thing, namely, what had not been the usual thing before. In my opinion in that connection, it was not so much the question of what was general usage at all, but for people of our type it was a question of taste.
Q. How were you employed officially in Schweinfurt?
A. In Schweinfurt I was a member of a civil chamber, of a penal chamber, of the Court of Assises, and in each case I was associate judge. Moreover, I was presiding judge of the jury court, at the local court of Schweinfurt.
Q. What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Schweinfurt?
A. My attitude toward the NSDAP, first of all, did not change in Schweinfurt either. I was a human being as everybody else, and especially the transfer to Schweinfurt I could not quite get over. However, I would like to emphasize, in order not to create the impression, or as if I wanted to create the impression, that I had been transferred to Schweinfurt for political reasons. Under no condition do I want to maintain that. I rather regard this transfer merely as a stupidity of the then personnel referent dealing with personnel matters.
Finally-- how do I say this -- the clumsiness of NN actually hits one under certain conditions just as hard as any intentional deed.
Q. I asked you for your attitude about the NSDAP in Schweinfurt.
A. Yes.
Q. Just a moment. I haven't quite finished. Do you want to add something?
A. Anyway, my attitude did not change basically. An important change occurred about 1936. I shall come back to this in detail but already at this time I want to emphasize that this change came about in the direction of a positive attitude toward the NSDAP but I remained as ever, in my innermost soul, a follower of Ludendorff until the catastrophe.
On the other hand, the idea, from this critical and perhaps also ambiguous attitude, to damage the National Socialist State in any sphere or in any way, thus, for example, to sabotage it by official acts, that idea was out of the question for me. From the day of the so-called seizure of power until the catastrophe in no circumstances thus for myself I do not demand that out of anger in an individual case or out of a basic negative attitude toward the NSDAP I should not even have toyed with the idea of harming the state, to which I had given the oath of loyalty by misusing my official position.
To me that was not a political question, but a question of the ethics and character. Thus, I can make no report of having helped this or the other person in a round-about way. Whatever I did, I did consciously and with the intent to move within the scope of the law. I did it because in following that line I saw the maintenance of the interests of my fatherland and they were above all else.
Q. The witness Dehm, on the 28 of March, 1947, in the afternoon page 735 of the English transcript - testified that in Schweinfurt a judge and an assessor had reported to him that you delivered educational lectures for future lawyers. Were those political lectures or lectures about laws and who ordered you to deliver those lectures? You are supposed to have used the expression:
"to knock off the bean". What does that mean?
A. First of all, well, I would like to say the preliminary remark; that in Schweinfurt, while I was employed there, I did not deliver any lectures. These are events which were not later, from the point of view of time, and they probably occurred in 1943-44 at that time, in the NS Lawyers League. That is the professional organization for judges, prosecutors, lawyers, administrators of law, economic lawyers. In that professional organization so-called weekend affairs were organized. Their aim was, first of all, to foster comradeship and in addition to advance technical education. Of course, in these educational affairs, political education was also furthered.
Now, people from my home, Wuerzburg, who knew me from earlier times and from other circumstances asked me to come once to such a weekend affair and to deliver a lecture about the development of war tine legislation. I gladly complied with that request.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until one-thirty this afternoon.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 11 August 1947) OSWALD ROTHAUG - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. KOESSL (Attorney for the Defendant Rothaug) May I continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
Q.- Witness, before the recess we came to our stop at the explanation of the occurrences which were mentioned here by the witness Behl. Would you please continue.
A.- We were talking of the week end training centers at Gelsheim, in lower Franconia. This morning I described the events of these week end training courses in general. I said that I was invited to go there to give a lecture about legislation in war time. Such week-end courses, on a voluntary basis, were usually attended by approximately twenty to thirty people. The course itself was held in my home district, and I knew most of the people who attended for a long time, and I had known them personally for a long time. That, in fact, was the reason why I was very pleased to accept that invitation. The fact that lectures of that kind were usually given on a friendly basis, the lecturer sat among the audience and told them what one had intended to tell them. These lectures were not given in the way they were given at a very official occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. There is no charge against the defendant for giving a lecture and the explanation of the reasons for lecturing are entirely immaterial to the Court and we have no interest in them. Assuming that the subject matter was proper, there certainly is no objection to any lecturing on a legal subject. I think that should be made more brief.
A.- I merely wanted to explain to the Tribunal the critical expressions
THE PRESIDENT: We have explained to you. Now, just proceed in accord ance with our suggestion.