Does that name mean anything to you at all?
A No, that name I don't remember. Buck? B/U/C/K?
Q B-U-K-H.
A No.
Q That was the name of the prisoner in the concentration camp who was tortured to death.
A No, no, that name I don't remember. I ask to have this submitted to me or shown to me. May I ask during what year that allegedly took place, these two occurrences?
Q Perhaps in 1941 or 1942.
A No, no; with the best of intentions, I have no recollection of that.
Q Did you ever hear of the Fuhlsbuettel concentration camp? F-U-H-L-S-B-U-E-T-T-E-L?
A No.
Q You never heard of that camp?
A No.
Q It follows -
A Fuhlsbuettel?
Q Yes.
A I thought I heard Wolfsbuettel first. Was ist Fuhlsbuettel?
Q Yes.
A Fuhlsbuettel is not a concentration camp, but a prison.
Q A prison conducted as a concentration camp, then. Did you ever hear of a man by the name of Dusenschoen? D-U-S-E-N-S-C-H-O-E-N?
A No, without seeing any evidence of that I have no recollection of it. Dusenschoen?
Case III, Court III
Q You don't recall that he was a director of the prison Fuhlsbuettel, or concentration camp Fuhlsbuettel? You don't recall that he was a director of that?
A No, no, the prisoners were not subordinated to me; The prisons were under the General Public Prosecutor. Therefore, I have no recollection of the names of individual personalities. I had nothing to do with the prisons in Hamburg, nothing at all.
Q And you don't recall, I suppose, the quashing of the case against Dusenschoen for misdeeds committed by him against inmates of his concentration camp, or jail, as you put it? You don't recall anything about the quashing of charges which were sought to be brought against him?
A No, no; I have no recollection of that either, that I had anything to do with it.
Q I want to read you, Dr. Rothenberger, a portion of information which is in our possession. I say right now I am not going to introduce it in evidence at this time; we will present the documentation as soon as possible and in our own way, but this particular document will not be introduced in evidence. I merely want to read it to you and then ask you again if you have any recollection whatsoever of any of the facts, or any of the alleged facts contained in it. Now our information is to this effect, and I will read a portion of it:
"In order to remove the traces of the crime in such and similar cases, there was a verbal agreement, which was not put into writing, between Streckenbach, the Chief of the Hamburg Gestapo, the Reichstatthalter Kauffmann, Justice Senator Dr. Rothenberger, and Attorney General Dr. Graesser, according to which, contrary to the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the bodies of concentration camp inmates who had allegedly died by suicide were to be transferred immediately to the crematory through the Hamburg State Office, thus by-passing the Public Prosecutor and the law courts."
Our informant goes on to say:
"I myself experienced such a case which should obviously have been dealt with in that way, but where the files "by mistake" had been channeled to the Public Prosecutor."
Do you still say that you know nothing about the facts, the alleged facts, which I have just read to you?
A I can only emphasize again that if today, after a number of years -- I don't know when that is alleged to have occurred -- from information, and I don't know what kind of information that is, a sentence is read to me, it is quite impossible for me to remember these matters without knowing what they deal with concretely and when that was supposed to have happened. I will only be in a position to comment on that after I have seen the details on it, in writing. With the best of intentions, I cannot recollect anything.
Q Dr. Rothenberger, doesn't it seem logical that if you were mixed up in a deal like this, in Hamburg, in 1941, in 1942, or for that matter, in 1931 or 1932, that you would certainly remember it?
A I can only say the same thing that I said before; I can only comment on it after I hear the details, but not if I hear only one sentence from information of which I do not know anything else. To the best of my knowledge and with the best intention I cannot recall the circumstances after that first question having been put to me; I cannot do it.
Q You recall quite clearly that you remember no abuses whatsoever in the concentration camps in Hamburg and in Mauthausen and in other places, don't you?
AAs far as I understand from that information it is a question of suicides, isn't it?
Q Yes.
A Or isn't it?
Q Yes, suicides are involved; you are quite right.
A Well, that a suicide might occur in a concentration camp or in a prison, or anywhere else, that is not a rare occurrence, is it? But I don't even remember that, that suicides occurred. However, that, of course, is possible, it goes without saying; that happens everywhere.
Q And the suicides that occurred in the Hamburg concentration camps, which later, upon the investigation of a few courageous individuals, were found to have been suicides induced by camp guards, you don't know anything about that? That type of suicide never reached your attention; is that right?
A I can only repeat again; I don't remember such cases.
Q You said before you knew this character Streckenbach. How long was he in Hamburg, or how long had he been in Hamburg, say, in 1942?
A I cannot say that with precision. I don't know when he left Hamburg. I believe he left Hamburg before the war, but I don't know that for certain. I could not say that with certainty. I didn't know him that well, and I didn't have much to do with him. I only know that he was transferred to Berlin, but I no longer remember when that happened.
Q And you don't know what his subsequent history was, what he did during later stages in the war?
A No, that I don't know.
Q Dr. Rothenberger, we will come back to this general subject again, and at that time perhaps we can arrange for you to see more of the document. In the meantime, if you have any thoughts that differ from what you have stated today, we would be glad to hear them at any time.
I wonder if you recall, Dr. Rothenberger, Exhibit 28, which is NG-629? That is in document book I-B. I will tell you briefly what it is; perhaps we won't need to get out the document book. However, if you want it, we certainly will get it.
Case III, Court III.
The facts -- part of the facts in that document to which I wish to call your attention are as follows: This is another one of those situation reports, if you recall, and in that report you state that fifteen cases have been tried in the Special Courts, mostly in Hamburg, that all the cases have been in violation of the Public Enemy Decree. Now you go on to say that fuller use of the Public Enemy Decree should be made. You also say that the Hamburg cases have met with approval in Berlin. Then you say two other things which are of interest. You say that the oral -- a report of the oral verdict in those cases is sufficient for purposes of having the deat sentence reviewed. And lastly you say the sensational aspects of these cases should not be played up in the press. Now I take it you recall this document and you recall these statements concerning the Special Court in Hamburg, is that right?
A: May I ask to have the exhibit submitted to me, because-
Q: Did you find the reference, Dr. Rothenberger?
A: Yes.
Q: I think you will find that what I stated is essentially what you say in the report. I want to ask you a couple of questions based on that. You speak there of the Public Enemy Decree. Yet this came at a time -
A: I beg your pardon. Not I speak of it, but the General Public Prosecutor does.
Q: All right. We will waive for a moment the question of who speaks about it, but the Public Enemy Decree is mentioned there, is it not?
A: It is mentioned the decree against gangsters. The decree against gangsters is mentioned. I no longer recall.
what that is. That is not the Volks-Schaedlings Decree. That must be something else. That is something else. That is not the Public Query Decree.
Q: That is my first question, Dr. Rothenberger. Do you know what particular decree this is?
A: I couldn't say that from memory. A certain decree was called the gangster decree, but from memory I cannot say what decree that is. I would have to look it up.
Q: The other, the public enemy decree, was not passed or did not become a decree until September of 1939, which was some few months after this report. So it obviously could not be the public enemy decree which we have talked about here in court a good deal in the past few months.
A: No, I also believe that the public enemy decree is something basically different than the gangster decree, but I no longer remember. I could no longer tell you out of memory what was contained in the gangster decree and what was meant by it. The word itself means that it was to apply only to gangsters. Therefore I ask to be afforded an opportunity to find out what was meant by gangster decree, which so far in this trial has not been mentioned.
Q: Well, Dr. Rothenberger, one of the reasons I have presented this matter to you is to have that answered clearly in my own mind. I didn't know, and I thought perhaps you did, since it was in one of your situation reports, I thought it likely -
A: No. I beg your pardon.
Q: -- that if you were reporting on a statute or a decree which had worked so well in your court, you might possibly know what the decree was about.
A: There is a misconception on your part. That is not a situation report which I rendered, but it is a report on a meeting at Hamburg in the course of which the General Public Prosecutor, who was concerned with that gangster decree, reported in the year 1939, and it is quite impossible for me today, eight years later, for the first time to know immediately what the General Public Prosecutor meant and what was contained in that gangster decree he referred to.
That I would have to look up in the Reich Gesetz Blatt. And before that time I am not in a position to comment on it.
Q: Well, that brings us around to the Public Enemy Decree which became an effective law on 5 September 1939, as a result of which, as you and I know, many cases reached the Special Courts. Isn't it conceivable to your mind, Dr. Rothenberger, that the rather glowing situation which is described in Exhibit 28, NG 629, gave you personally some hope that the Special Courts could deal effectively with the expected prosecutions under the Public Enemy Decree which was passed in the fall of 1939?
A: No. On the contrary, I am just told by you that the Public Enemy Decree dates of the 15th of September 1939 -
Q: 15 December, 1939.
A: --15 December 1939, but this meeting took place already on the first of February 1939, and certainly not one year before or eight months before one could have talked or thought about a decree which would only be promulgated in December thereafter.
Q: You are quite right. You have misunderstood me. Let me put the question again. As of the fall of 1939 after the Public Enemy Decree became effective law, that was on 6 September 1959, you had reason to believe, did you not, through your experience with the previous cases of which you speak about in Exhibit 28, you had reason to believe, did you not, that the Special Courts would be fully able to cope with the problems, the trials expected under the Public Enemy Decree?
In other words, it wasn't a new experience to try this type of case in Special Courts in Hamburg?
A: I believe I do not understand you. Here mention is made by the General Public Prosecutor about his experience with the people who had been sentenced on the basis of the gangster decree, that is, cases which had been tried before, and to draw any conclusions from that to the Public Enemy Decree which was promulgated 10 months thereafter, that I do not consider possible and applicable.
Q: You don't think that the experience which obviously you thought was good could serve any purpose at all in the Special Courts handling the Public Enemy Decree cases. You see no connection between that at all?
A: No, none at all.
Q: Do you recall the fact that you established a Special Court in Bremen the 14th of September, 1939?
A: Yes, I was reminded of that by an exhibit which has been submitted, and I already commented on that in my direct examination.
Q: Yes, I read your comments on that, Dr. Rothenberger. Now you said that when you established the Special Courts in 1933 actually you had no alternative because you were required to establish them; is that right?
A: In the year 1933 the Reich government had ordered that throughout the Reich Special Courts be established, and according to that instruction I also in Hamburg, as well as everywhere in the Reich, established a Special Court and mentioned already on the occasion of my direct examination that also from the legal point of view in considering the question whether that was admissible under the Weimar Constitution I asked for a legal opinion by my personal referent at that time, Prof.
Dr. Bertram and the then president of the District Court of Appeals, President Kieselbach. That can be seen from the exhibit which was submitted to me.
Q: In 1933, Dr. Rothenberger, pursuant to this new law, what kind of cases did you envisage which would eventually reach special courts for trial, the simple cases or the more complex cases?
A: Complicated as well as simple cases. What the nature of these cases was individually I could no longer remember, because I was never active in the Special Courts myself and had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Special Courts.
Q: Now this court that you established in Bremen in 1939, you established that on your own initiative; you weren't told by Berlin that it had to be established, were you?
A: No, not on my own initiative. It can be seen from the exhibit that by a decree of 1 September 1939 one Special Court each had to be established for each Gau. Up to that time and before that I have already explained in detail the Special Court in Hamburg was also active in Bremen, and owing to the fact that now for Bremen a Special Court of its own was established, it was no longer necessary that the Special Court Hamburg had to go to Bremen. It made it easier for the Special Court Hamburg, relieved the burden of work, and it was an advantage to the application of jurisdiction.
Q.- Dr. Rothenberger, you are quite right. You have explained that before in your direct examination.
A.- But here also may I say that of course I have no personal recollection of this establishment of the Special Court. I only see that from the exhibit which has been submitted. A change of competency did not occur by the establishment of the Special Court in Bremen.
Q.- I assume that you will not deny, Dr. Rothenberger, on the basis of the exhibits that I have called to your attention here in the last few minutes, that you were opposed to the principle of Special Courts?
A.- At that time I was not at all opposed to the principle of the Special Courts; however, in my plans for reform of the Administration of Justice I provided that these Special Courts should be abolished, but for that period at that time I considered the establishment of a Special Court a necessary thing.
Q.- Just one more very minor question on the matter of Special Courts. I noted your comments on Exhibit 114, which is NG-515, in which you said -- that was in establishing the Special Courts in 1933 -- that some cases would be so simple that it would not be necessary for the defendant to have a defense counsel. You, I think, explained that somewhat in your direct examination. I just wanted to ask you one thing. Before a case is heard, Dr. Rothenberger -- you as a former judge can probably give me the answer -- how can you determine whether a case is so simple that no defense attorney will be required?
A.- That depends on the peculiarities of German trial procedure. By the preparation of the main trial on the part of the objective prosecution, the judge is put in a position to evaluate whether a case is simple, whether nothing is denied; for instance, the defendant admits everything: admits having committed a small theft, or whatever it may be: or whether it is a more complicated or more difficult case where it is necessary to have a defense counsel appointed. You see, according to German legal procedure it can be seen in advance whether a case is simple or complicated.
Besides, that suggestion made by me never became law.
Q.- Dr. Rothenberger, you have previously said that the SD filed reports on some of these cases, which you knew to be faked and false. Now on the basis of that, how were you in a position to tell what the course of the trial would be: that the defendant would not repudiate statements already made, or something else would occur during the trial which might alter the facts that were so simple that no defense attorney would be required? Would you give us your formula for determining, as you would have to, the simplicity of a case.
A.- May I first, in order to clarify a misunderstanding, may I first say that I, myself, was never active as a judge at the Special Court; and secondly, may I add that if in the course of the proceedings it appeared that the case was not simple after all, that then also, according to my suggestion, it was within the discretion of the presiding judge immediately to appoint a defense counsel. That can be seen from my suggestion.
Q.- But until the judge decide that the defense counsel was necessary, the defendant was floundering around on his own, is that right?
A.- The judge had the possibility to appoint a defense counsel or he had the possibility not to appoint a defense counsel, depending as to whether according to his judgment the case was a simple one or a complicated one, or did become so during the proceedings.
Q.- The point is, Dr. Rothenberger, that you believed that the defendant was not entitled as a right, in every case, to have defense counsel? That is the essence of it, is it not?
A.- No.
Q.- Well, what is the essence of it?
A.- If the defendant claimed that the case was not simple in his own opinion, then of course he could file a motion -- following that suggestion of mine -- he could make a motion to have a defense counsel appointed.
Q.- And then it was within the discretion of the judge as to whether his application would be granted?
A.- Yes, yes.
Q.- Dr. Rothenberger, on your direct examination in connection with Exhibit 165, which was NG-530, you said that in June 1942 you argued strenuously to have looters turned over by the police to the Special Courts for trial. Do you recall that testimony?
A.- In connection with NG-530, as far as I remember, I have said that the danger existed -- a matter which had been reported to me from various cities as an accomplished fact -- the danger existed that looters, after a capital air raid on a city, were simply shot by the police. In order to prevent that from happening in Hamburg also, I put the police under obligation by that agreement which I had made that the police would turn over the looters which they had arrested to the public prosecution for the purpose of having them tried by the regular courts. That, according to the context, is also to be found in NG-530.
Q.- And your authority in having the looters turned over to the Special Courts was, I suppose, that they would in their turn before the Special Court have a trial according to law, is that right?
A.- Of course; certainly.
Q.- I think that brings us to the Pretolinas case, Dr. Rothenberger. It's Exhibit 163, NG-547. Do you recall that Petrolinas, a resident of Essen, a looter, who quite in accord with your formula was turned over to the Special Court for trial? The Trial lasted one day. At the conclusion of the trial, the public prosecutor got a hold of you -- you were now in Berlin -- and asked you what to do with it: whether the fellow should be shot or not? Your answer was, of course, that he was to be shot. So he was. Then later it developed that the public prosecutor had failed to state a few facts about this case to you over the telephone, and so it developed that Petrolinas was shot without a complete review of essential facts of the crime with which he was charged. Now, Dr. Rothenberger, does it make a whole lot of difference whether a man is shot by the police without trial or by the Special Courts without adequate safeguards?
The net result is the same, isn't it?
A.- I have already commented in detail on that case. Now, however, I have to say that there is a basic misconception on the part of the prosecutor. Petrolinas was not without a trial, but quite normally just as everybody else, was executed after a trial. The reasons for the sentence arc even available in the exhibit. He was sentenced to death in an orderly procedure; that is to say, not as the prosecutor says now, "Without trial he was shot," but he was sentenced to death by the court. It is here only the question of the decision, whether that death sentence was to be executed or not. I have already explained in detail for what reasons I, in spite of all my misgivings which could exist in that case, decided to confirm the sentence.
Q.- You didn't have all the facts when you made that decision, though.
A.- They were missing only to the extent that the prosecutor who had reported to the referent and to myself about the case had not stated that that fellow Petrolinas a few days before that time had been bombed out himself, and that mistake was omitted by the prosecutor.
Q.- So you didn't have - inadvertently or not - you didn't have all the facts when you made your clemency denial.
A.- That fact of a mistake on the part of the prosecutor was not -
Q.- Excuse me -- that is a question which is subject to a yes or no answer; you have explained it repeatedly; the question is -- you did not have all the facts when you denied the clemency, did you?
A.- That one fact was not known to me.
Q.- All right -
A.- Because had it been known to me I probably would have made a different decision.
Q.- As a person in a position to grant or deny clemency, you may order a number of things done in any given situation, may you not? You can have the sentence investigated; you ca.n go out and investigate it yourself, if you deem it necessary; or, you could take other courses of action to assure yourself of the accuracy of the facts as represented to you. That is true in every case, is it not, that ever came to you for clemency review?
A.- I wont to emphasize again that there exists a basic mistake, a misconception on the part of the Prosecution. I have tried to explain that already this morning that it not only applied to the cases where I in exceptional cases had to decide on clemency matters, but it also applies to any handling of clemency decisions I believe in any country. If the leadership of the state, the supreme authority in the state, or his deputy, who in this case was the Reich Minister of Justice, decides whether a sentence is to be executed or whether it is not to be executed then it is not possible for him -- it is not neither his duty nor his right -- to again investigate facts which an extensive trial has already established; because, otherwise the head of the state would be a last resort.
It is a task of the head of the state, on the basis of established facts, of facts established by the competent courts to decide whether there is reason for clemency or whether there is no reason for clemency. No concept would lead to the fact that the independence of the decision would be abolished; a decision on facts, that is, if the head of the state would be in a position to revise the facts as they had been established in the trial, and I don't think that that is really your idea.
Q.- No, it is really not, Dr. Rothenberger, because I wasn't talking about the head of the state. I was talking about the secretary, which position you held. The head of the state is another matter; the question I asked you was whether or not you had the right to take any measures you deemed necessary for ascertaining what the facts were in a case in which you had to pass on whether or not clemency would be granted, Now you said you didn't have the duty; that is not what I asked you. I asked you if you had the right -- if you could do it. Now, the answer to that is only yes; is that right? You did have the rights nobody ever denied you the right, did they? You weren't denied that right by any statute, were you?
A.- I, in these individual case, as a deputy of the head of the state, no more did I have the right to interfere with the right or the decisions of the courts than he himself, meaning the head of the state.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you a question in that connection. Did party officials ever submit to you their reports or their ideas with reference to whether clemency should be granted or denied?
A.- No, no.
BY MR. KING:
Q.- Dr. Rothenberger, to get the record straight, let me ask you again.
Do you. deny -- do you not -- that you had the right to investigate the legal and factual points on which the cases rested which came before you for clemency approval or disapproval.
A.- I can only say again from the very limited experiences which I had in such matters that I do not believe having had that right. That can be seen from the entire nature of clemency matters and clemency decisions, and based upon my conception of the independence of the courts, which are the only ones competent to establish facts and nobody else.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you once more -- did you ever receive any reports from any person other than the opinion of the judge tendered to you for your consideration in connection with the clemency plea?
A.- I don't remember that in the few cases from any other individual than from the defendant or the court or the prosecution I received any applications or any information to decide in this or that sense. That I don't believe.
BY MR. KING:
Q.- Dr. Rothenberger, let's pass on to another subject. That was your feeling, Dr. Rothenberger, about the Jewish question in Germany?
A.- As for that question I have made various detailed statements in my direct examination; and, therefore, I ask if you want any supplementary statements,to put a definite question to me.
Q.- I believe you said at one time or another that Jews should no longer hold office; is that right? Public Office -
A.- That I said that? On what occasion?
Q.- If I am not mistaken, you said it at Lueneburg -- in your speech there on the 17th February 1943.
A.- May I ask you to submit the exhibit to me?
Q.- I will come back to that in a moment, Dr. Rothenberger.
A.- I don't believe that at Lueneburg I mentioned the Jewish question or discussed the Jewish question altogether, but I couldn't say for sure.
Q.- I will come back to the Lueneburg question in a few moments later; I will get the document out at that time. I still a propose the general question of your attitude toward the Jews. I believe you said in your direct examination that you did everything possible to protect the Jews; that you steered a middle-of-the-road course as long as possible -- or, words to that effect; is that in general your position?
A.- I am just looking through the Lueneburg speech, and I find out that I have not said anything there about the Jewish question. In general on the whole, in my direct examination I have stated that when I saw that the Jewish question in Germany was growing more and more difficult, I have tried to within my sphere of influence to help individually and as humanely as possible at that time in Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you in that connection: I understand that the report on the meeting of the presidential board on 1 February, 1939 was not over your name, but it purports to report some things you said at the meeting. That report, I believe, quotes you as saying in substance that the fact that a debtor is a Jew should as a rule be a reason for arresting him. Did you make the statement which was attributed to you?
A.- May I ask you on what page? I don't remember; may I ask you -
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 28; I believe it was point number six -if my notes arc correct.
MR. KING: What exhibit number?
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 28.
A.- NG-629, Under Roman numeral VI.
I find there under VI, according to this transcript, which was not made by me -- I find the attitude and opinion of the Ministry concerning several questions dealing with the handling of Jews, which I expressed to the Presidents of the Courts under my supervision.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, my question was whether you expressed the view which was attributed to you with reference to it.
THE WITNESS: I have no statements. I have passed on matters which had been decided in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the information? Just read it, will you please? I haven't it before me.
THE WITNESS: First, there are various points. First in all cases where a Jew asks that a decision to be put into effect against an Aryan, the official of the court cannot refuse to carry out that execution.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that Point 7I?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is VI, It is Point I under VI.
THE PRESIDENT: What is Point 6 under the Roman Number?
THE WITNESS: Roman Six.
THE PRESIDENT: See if you can find right there the quotation to which I referred, will you?
THE WITNESS: I did not understand the quotation, your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a debtor is a Jew should, as a rule, be a reason for arresting him. Was that in your report as to the attitude of the Ministry?
THE WITNESS: Now I found that point. It was the opinion of the Ministry that the fact of being a Jew as a debtor as a rule could be reason for arrest; that, moreover, however, it depended on the individual case. May I remark in connection with that, first, that that was not my personal opinion; and secondly, that reason for arrest means an entirely different thing here than what the Tribunal understands by that at the moment. Arrest means arresting a person; whereas I have reported here about the position in civil law, the position of the Jews.
THE PRESIDENT: I wonder how you knew, incorrectly, what the Court thought was meant by arrest. Now let me ask you, under another point a little later than that, did you also report the viewpoint of the Ministry that no conviction based on the testimony of the Jew alone or that the Jews' testimony should be weighed with caution? What was that point?
MR. KING: That is at Point 8 under VI, Dr. Rothenberger.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What was that report that you made?
THE WITNESS: That was the question as to how far a Jew could or could not be heard as a witness, a question which was discussed in Berlin and it was stated that of course he can be heard as a witness. However, one should be careful in evaluating his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: And that there should be no conviction on the testimony of a Jew alone?
THE WITNESS: Alone, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
BY MR. KING:
Q. Dr. Rothenberger, you are entirely correct so far as I have been able to determine. I was not thinking of the Lueneburg speech. In fact, I think I was referring to this particular document which Jude Brand has been questioning you about. I wonder if you have the document before you. Would you look under Point 5 which reads as follows: "The Chief public prosecutor then reported briefly that civil servants with Jewish blood are on principle excluded from employment and that it is necessary to make a report on exceptions." You agreed with that point of view, did you not?
A. The question which the General Public Prosecutor raised here was the following: There were civil servants of Jewish decent who already since 1935 on principle could no longer be civil servants. In Hamburg, in suite of that, I still and until the surrender held several persons of mixed blood in office.