Prussia, became a power by its military and by its civil servants, and the Administration of Justice in Prussia was always somewhat behind, a stepchild. The former Reich minister of Justice Schiffer expressed that once in the words "To command and to rule has always been more important in Prussian than to administer justice." At Hamburg many institutions of the Ministry of Justice were removed after the first year. I should like to mention also the considerably higher salary of the judge which he always had in Hamburg was reduced. The title of the judge in Hamburg which had simply been judge was removed, and in its place was put the Rat (counsellor), Local Court Counsellor, the District Court Counsellor, and so on. The disciplinary jurisdiction which existed so far for judges in Hamburg was removed, and thus the entire professional level of judges in Hamburg was lowered. To that extent the centralization of justice, (Verreichlichung der Justiz), as seen from Hamburg was a disadvantage.
Q. Could you also describe what occurred in the field of the police?
A. During the same year, 1935, when the Administration of Justice was merged, the police also was centralized. That also meant that thereafter decisions on the part of the police in Hamburg were not made as heretofore, but through the Reich Security Main Office, RSHA in Berlin, which, at least in questions of fundamental importance, had the right of decision. That led to it that also in Hamburg frequently on the basis of decisions made at Berlin sentences were corrected that people who had been acquitted were rearrested and that the prestige of the Administration of Justice here again suffered greatly.
Q. Did such things occur in Hamburg?
A. Yes, these matters became visible in Hamburg in the beginning. As far as the Reichstatthalter, Reich governor could, he removed these, but he could not always achieve a removal because the RSHA had the final decision.
Q. What did you do in such cases, in cases of transgression on the part of the police and the SS?
A. First I tried in the reports which were sent monthly or bimonthly to the Ministry of Justice to emphasize these bad conditions which existed. But since this alone was not sufficient to bring about a change, I considered my duty to go before the public. For the first time in the end of 1938 during a meeting at the University of Kiel I protested publicly against the attacks made particularly by the Schwarz Korps, The BlackCorps, against the profession of German judges. I stated there literally that a state where it is possible that a judge be publicly attacked is not as it should be and cannot continue to exist. That fact became known in Berlin and the Minister of Justice of the Reich asked me therefore in January 1939 to speak on a conference of all the presidents of the District Courts of Appeal and General Prosecutors about that subject. In that speech I listed all the attacks the data on which I collected, asked Minister Guertner not satisfy himself by coming to an arrangement with Himmler because I did not expect anything from that, but to report to Hitler directly and to see to it that these attacks should be publicly taken back in the press. In that report, in that speech, I emphasized the consequences which that attitude on the part of the Schwarze Korps would have, of necessity, for the judges of Germany and for the German people's legal feeling. In Document NG 629 reference is made to that speech of mine.
Q. It is Exhibit 28, volume 1-B on Page 48. And what did you do about that in Hamburg thereafter, Dr. Rothenberger?
A. Returning from Berlin I assembled all judges and prosecutors at Hamburg and Bremen and in a large hall in the prison building I reported about my trip to Berlin, and in very clear terms expressed what the consequences of such an attitude on the part of the SS toward the Administration of Justice would have to be. I told the judges of hamburg that if they would be attacked personally in any form whatever, they could be sure of my protection.
Q. Dr. Rothenberger, do you recall a conference of 1 February 1939, a conference of the presidents which is contained in Exhibit 28, NG 629? Do you remember particularly that you asked them that all cases where the judge was under the impression that the police performed any corrections of sentences should be immediately submitted to you?
A. Yes. In NG 629 the page before last is in addition to the speech about the Schwarze Korps, the Black Corps, I mentioned that is on the page before last; in the middle -- that any measure for correction, as it had become known in various instances in the Reich, should immediately be reported to me, and that all cases where arrest took place in the courtroom by the police should also immediately be reported to me, so that I could see to it that these measures be discontinued.
Q. Did it become know to you from any judge as to the effects of your speech concerning the Schwarze Korps, of 28 January 1939?
A. In that presidents' meeting I asked the presidents of the courts for the results of that speech, and I was told, as could be seen from the minutes, that the impression was that there was hope for improvement on the basis of my statements. However, doubts were voiced as to whether the Reichminister of Justice would be successful in counteracting the Schwarze Korps, and these doubts were based upon the passive attitude displayed hitherto by the Ministry.
Q. You have now acquainted us with a number of positive and negative impressions from your point of view. Since we have come to the time when the war broke out, will you please describe to us your attitude at that time as a result of all these impressions about the beginning of the war.
A. The course which the administration of justice had taken up until the beginning of the war in Germany was apt to cause very serious misgivings in the mind of any jurist. Yet it is not possible to say that at that time on could know, and had to know, in what direction that development was to continue and where it was going to lead to. At any rate, one could not do so if one sat there in Hamburg.
For one, because in Hamburg one was lacking the necessary oversight over the entire political development and tendency. One had no insight in the high politics, and above all I had always had the experience in Hamburg that it was possible if one stuck to one's point of view to convince the various political authorities, and in the positive sense one depended on the general propaganda which continued to stress the social aspects time and again which stressed the desire of Hitler to come to an arrangement with England which underlined the naval agreement, At any rate, the result was that the jurists would see danger in the future but did not have to have the impression that the road to a reasonable development was blocked.
Q We come now to a new subject which plays an important part within the scope of National Socialism; that is, the Jewish question. Will you please tell the Tribunal quite generally what your point of view is concerning the Jewish question.
A Concerning the Jewish question, there were in the NSDAP, already before 1933, two factions which opposed each other. One was the so-called Streicher wing which put the racial problem in the foreground. The other wing was the so-called social wing, led originally by Gregor Strasser. Gregor Strasser, already as early as the end of 1932, want into open opposition, and in 1934 was killed together with Roehm. Among the men who emphasized the beliefs of that social group was Kauffmann. That was conditioned by the fact that in Hamburg, of course, social problems played an important role. The Jewish question did not play the same part in Hamburg as in many other parts of the Reich. One reason for that was that on account of a large Portugese immigration in Hamburg, the connection to western Jewry had been very strong for centuries; particularly the socalled good old Hamburg families are greatly mixed by intermarriage. Furthermore, it was due to the fact that the people of Hamburg are generally more tolerant in their basic temperament.
Another indication of the attitude of the people of Hamburg to the Jews was, for instance, that the display of the so-called Stuermer Boxes in Hamburg was prohibited by Reich Statthalter Kauffmann. I, of course, officially and also privately was in close contact with Jews. I knew the advantages and disadvantages of Jewry.
Q Now, of course, it is known to you, Dr. Rothenberger, that the party program ambiguously states its position to the Jewish question. I assume you knew the party program at that time. Could you comment on that as to what thoughts you had concerning the attitude the Party would take to the Jewish question?
A In the beginning of 1933, I believed that just as in many of the Party platforms, many points are made which later do not play an important role. Gradually, however, I realized that the general line became more severe. It is beyond doubt that any German under the influence of propaganda considered a limitation of the Jews in cultural and spiritual life absolutely required, and so did I. But what was generally rejected in Hamburg was any method of violence, any economic exploitation and any kind of hatred. As for the general line, such as it developed gradually in Germany, I could not change anything anymore. In each individual case of my personal and official sphere of influence, individually and from the human point of view, I helped.
Q In connection with this question, the pogroms against Jews of November 1938 play a part. Will you please state to us what experiences you have made of these pogroms and what your attitude was.
A On the day before the pogroms -- that is the night before -- by way of rumor I heard of the intention that Jewish shops were to be looted. There again to obtain information I got in touch with the Reichstatthalter Kauffmann who told me that he had asked for information in Berlin because he and also heard about it and he had already alerted the Hamburg police too. He had posted them before the Jewish shops so that nothing should happen, and in fact, in Hamburg nothing did happen with the exception of a few individual cases. About that, in the document submitted NG-629 -
Q I refer to Exhibit 28 which has already been mentioned.
A It also mentions that due to the attitude of Reichstatthalter Kauffmann, nothing happened.
Q Will you please discuss now the question of the legal position of Jews, as far as you had to do with it.
AAs for the legal point of view, of course in the course of years many instances of conflict occurred to everyone; also to me. In a meeting in Berlin about various legal questions, negotiations were made and the result of these negotiations, as far as it concerns questions of civil law. was passed on by me to the subordinate courts. As far as matters of penal law were concerned, it was passed on by the General Prosecutor at Hamburg.
The opinion which the Ministry stated at that time in matters of civil law was just about in accordance with my own opinion.
Q Here again we are concerned with Exhibit 28, which has already repeatedly been mentioned; specifically the point of view of the Ministry which Dr. Rothenberger mentioned and which he shared and passed on to the subordinate officials can be found on the last page of the Exhibit 28.
A If I may be permitted, I would like to point out that during the same meeting -- the conference of presses -- I mentioned two further points; the one the question of sensational reports in the press about trials, where I promised to get in touch with the competent agencies to see that such sensational reports should have to cease; and the other concerning the speed of signing the sentences. I pointed out that no pressure should be permitted to be exerted on judges so that they should be given an opportunity to work on their opinions in all peace and quite.
Q Would you please describe your attitude toward foreigners and how in your profession it became apparent?
A The relations between Hamburg and foreign countries were, of course very close, both economically and personally. Consequently, I, before 1933 as well as after 1933, had close personal contacts, particularly to the western countries. Up until the outbreak of the war, I had a continuous exchange of service of jurists between England and Hamburg. English barristers would come to Hamburg continuously and vice versa. I sent judges from Hamburg to England in order to exchange experiences. With the outbreak of the war, of course, that stopped completely, so that I personally no longer had any connection with foreign countries. Professionally, I continued to remain only in two kinds of relations with foreigners. For one, in my capacity as presiding judge of the German Prize Court, an institution which was purely the capacity of a judge who had to decide or to investigate the legality of taking prizes and secondly, in connection with the so-called custodial administration of foreign property.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our recess now for 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: May I continue the personal examination of the defendant?
BY DR. WANDSCHNEIDER:
Q: Dr. Rothenberger, please continue your statement.
A: I had stopped with the question as to what extent I had to deal with foreigners during the war. One of the tasks I mentioned was my activity at the Prize Court, and I was just beginning to tell about my second task, foreign property.
In 1924, and until 1933, a large amount of foreign money had been invested in the large corporations in Hamburg. The foreign property was given to a trustee during the war. He was appointed by the President of the District Court of Appeal, and supervised by him. During my activity in Berlin, when I was Undersecretary, I also dealt with that question in Division VII.
Already a few days after my appointment, the Party Chancellery in particular, the Ministry of Economics, and the Reichsfuehrer SS, urged liquidation of this foreign property. I arranged a meeting of the Undersecretaries, in 1943, and, in cooperation with the Foreign Office, we succeeded in beating back these attacks by the Party Chancellery and foreign investments remained in the same condition until the surrender, that is, under a custodian, and then they were handed over.
Q: We now come to the seventh question. Can you now make some statements about developments during the war, from 1939 to 1945?
A: For the Administration of Justice, the war brought with it an increase in difficulties from another external point of view, which were merely due to the fact that a large number of the personnel was drafted into the Wehrmacht, while the police did not have to give up their personnel to the Wehrmacht.
The legislation excluded legal recourse to a large extent because of the economic bottlenecks which Germany had. The administrative, legal procedure was eliminated altogether, and thus the Administration of Justice felt that it was pushed more and more into a defensive position due to the war.
Q: Please state some individual cases in which you protested against this development from your position in Hamburg.
A: In the current situation reports to the Reich Minister of Justice, I called attention to all the bad situations which had arisen. I happen to have some of these situation reports still in my possession, and if I may be permitted to do so, I would like to mention some examples from these situation reports.
In one situation report of 17 November 1940, I again had an argument against the Schwarze Korps. I said: "Unfortunately, the "Schwarze Korps" again deals with questions of the Administration of Justice, and especially with the German judge. Since I am of the opinion that only immediate representations can avoid the impression that the Administration of Justice lets attacks on it go on without objection, I point out the article about "The Law in the State." When a group which has no idea whatsoever about the tasks of a judge talks about such basic questions as independence of the judge, and writes about them in the official paper of the Reichsfuehrer SS -- that is, "The Schwarze Korps" -- that has to be prevented by all means. The individual German judge has this article put to him in many cases; he will be the object of attacks if a higher office does not immediately write an article which does justice to the difficulties of the tasks a judge has to fulfill."
In another article I express the following -- and this is also a situation report, which I happen to have in my possession, of 12 March 1942.
"In the article by Dr. Hueber, the Administration of Justicem in 'The Justice in the Fuehrer State', is frequently discussed by the judges. They especially express their joy that the great significance of the security of the law is pointed out to the population. However, one would prefer it if these statements are made not only in a journal which is read merely by members of circles who are active in this field, but would appear also in a public journal."
In the same situation report I stated that these cases accumulate in which political leaders interfere in pending trials and address themselves directly to the Court. The Reichsstatthalter, at my suggestion, ordered this stopped.
In a further situation report, I said the following: "A catastrophic effect on the morale of the judges had been achieved by an article in the SS Journal, "Der Schwarze Korps', which was entitled 'Mental Blackout'. The last paragraph of this article compares the acts of the judges with those of a public enemy who commits his crimes by exploiting the blackout. If the judges see that the position of the judges is not justified to the outside world, an increase in bad morale on the part of the German judges can hardly be avoided."
DR. WANDSCHNEIDER: If I may interrupt, we are concerned here with documents which, unfortunately, I cannot Court No. III.
Case III.
submit to the Court as yet, but will have to leave to the reading by the defendant, for the reasons which were stated before, that in spite of the fact that I submitted my document books on time they cannot yet be submitted. I ask the Tribunal to forgive this circumstance and to excuse the fact that these statements of the witness take longer.
Q: Will you now please state your opinion as to the other documents, the situation reports which have already been submitted as an exhibit?
A: I wish to point out some special circumstance which occurred at the Chief Presidents' meeting in Berlin in the spring of 1941. At intervals of several months, there were meetings in Berlin, under the chairmanship of the Minister, where all Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal and General Public Prosecutors were present. It was the constant worry of the Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal to describe the emergencies to the higher authorities in which the judges of the country found themselves. On such an occasion I too, in the spring of 1941, tried to talk about the worries of the judges as to their needs concerning the administration of Justice. Thereupon Undersecretary Freisler, who was present, interrupted me with the following words: "If you don't like to work with the Administration of Justice then put on your top hats and leave." With that, the other presidents too were deprived of the possibility to make the interests of the judges known in that important time.
Q. Dr. Rothenberger, can you now state your opinion to the situation reports which the Prosecution submitted as NG 387 and 388? They are exhibits 400 in Volume 8-A, Page 98, and Exhibit 111, Volume 1-B, Page 67. You have those two situation reports of 4 July 1941 and 6 September 1941, before you?
A. The situation report of 4 July 1941, NG 371, is concerned with two problems, first again with the Schwarze Korps. I already referred to that before. And secondly with the problem of the so-called law concerning asocials. In Hamburg I had been informed confidentially that Himmler intended to submit a Gemeinschaftsfremdengesetz, that is a law against the asocial elements, a law against those foreign to the community. In this law it had been provided the the police should be given the authority to arrest an asocial person for an indefinite period of time, and to determine who was asocial would be up to the police. And this decision of the police would also be binding for the judge who might possibly have to decide about sterilization Therefore in this situation report I requested that these decisions, if the law should be promulgated at all, should be in the hands of a court, as well as the question who was asocial as the question who should be sterilized. Competent for this question was not the Reich Ministry of Justice, but the Reich Ministry of the Interior. It was my intention in this situation report to point out this to the Ministry of Justice. The second situation report, NG 388, is concerned, among other matters, with the question of concentration camps in 1941. Various judges had expressed wishes to me to the effect that they wanted to inspect a concentration camp once, that they had heard rumors to the effect that everything was not quite all right in the concentration camps.
I took this suggestion up because I, too, wanted to see matters clearly, and then in Neuengamme there was an inspection of the concentration camps by the judges, and even though in this situation report it is not mentioned that I was there, too, I was there. We inquired about the food conditions, the accommodations, about the method of work, and were informed about them. We had an opportunity to speak to some inmates, and we did not see any abuses. I said quite frankly at the time, even recommended to the Ministry to try this method in other districts, too, so that the Administration of Justice would not shut its eyes, but would look to see what is going on.
Q. Dr. Rothenberger, may I in connection with the first mentioned document, NG 387, come back again to the concept of the "asocial person". Did you regard that concept in a general criminogical way in this report, or did you imagine certain categories of persons were asocial?
A. I personally only regarded it from a generally criminological point of view. I don't know how it was considered in this draft, but I think it was also in a generally criminalistic way only. But I don't remember exactly.
Q. Did you gain a positive impression from your visit in Neuengamme? Did you yourself convince yourself about the food conditions?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Did you inspect the accommodations carefully?
A. Yes, yes. I want to state that this was in 1941.
Q. Dr. Rothenberger, you have already made repeated statements about Freisler. Would you please explain a letter which you received from Freisler regarding the political jurisdiction of the Hamburger senate on cases of high treason?
A. Freisler, who was competent for criminal legal policy in the Ministry repeatedly in very sharp letters, pointed out to me the political jurisdiction in Hamburg was to lenient. In one letter he emphasized that apart from the jurisdiction in one Gau of Austria it was the most lenient jurisdiction in Germany. He cited more than twenty individual cases which, in his opinion, were too lenient. I answered him that on the basis of a recheck I considered the sentences of the senate for high treason and of the special courts absolutely correct, and thereupon Freisler did not take any further steps.
Q. You have just told the Tribunal that and the manner in which you protested against the abuses in the Reich and made objections, in particular to the Reich Ministry of Justice. Can you now tell us what was the reaction of the leading men in the Administration of Justice to your statements?
A. During the years when I was in Hamburg in regard to the development of the Administration of Justice, especially its relation to the Party, every time when I was in Berlin, that was every two or three months, I spoke to Minister Guertner about it personally. During the first years I was under the impression that Guertner had a strong position with Hitler. He told me himself once that Hitler had described him as the conscience of the cabinet. However, gradually I noticed that Guertner let himself be pushed into the background more and more. I respected him very highly, but we differed in one respect, namely, as to our age and our temperament.
Guertner believed, as he always put it, that everything would again turn out all right in the end. He said that it had been similar after 1918 and that he did not want to impose himself. Undoubtedly in many individual cases he tried to stem the development, but he was not enough of a fighter to be up to fighting the forces which were opposing him. The worst thing was that in his Ministry Freisler exercised an overwhelming influence especially in the field of penal law. A great deal has been said here about Freisler's qualities, but one quality which made the judges and all of us in the province suffer especially was, as we in Germany say, his "bicyclist nature", a man who has no background toward superiors, but toward subordinates is the more scrupulous and strict.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
The entire Administration of Justice was subjected to this pressure, Every individual judge. We thought that we were without protection against the forces that were opposing us. The second man who again and again tried to undermine the Administration of Justice was Frank. About him too, I do not have to say a great deal any more, but his importance will be emphasized more clearly perhaps if I say that in his NS-Lawyers' League he combined all jurists of Germany. That is all of those people who worked in the Administration of Justice of the State as prosecutors or judges or attorneys. It was his task exclusively to fight against this Administration of Justice of the State. According to outside appearances, one often did not know who really was the Minister of Justice. Frank acted as such.
Q What conclusions did you draw from that situation as to any course which you should take, and in what did you see an improvement in the conditions?
A I was of the opinion that it was not sufficient to help in individual cases, but I believed that the causes of this development should be investigated, and I believed that it would not be sufficient to act on the defensive, and that one should not simply witness that the Administration of Justice was more and more undermined. People who were men of will and power purely cannot be influenced by the opponents withdrawing.
We saw this development, not only in the field of the Administration of Justice but also in the general cultural field in Germany. That in fact that one ceded more and more territory, one gave those persons a chance to build up their position more and more. I saw the only chance and the only possibility to stem this development in the corps of the German judges. I was of the opinion that this was the only organ which due to its independence and due to the idea of the personality was in a position to influence this development. For that reason, I principally attacked the problem of "how can one give a backbone to the German Judiciary in order to stem this development?" for Court No. III, Case No. 3.the German Judiciary had good basic material.
Only I shall go into this in detail on another occasion. Due to its historical development, it lacked one thing, and that was backbone.
Q Thus in this way it came about that you thought about activating the judiciary in order to take up the battle. This brings us to your reform program. Would you please state the stages of your reform program? That is a question in which we discussed the steps by which your steps assumed concerte form.
A The ninth question?
Q That is the ninth question.
A My thoughts about this question I expressed for the first time at the German Jurists' Meeting in May 1933 in public, and then in 1939 until 1942 in Hamburg, I explained this reform program in detail which was the basis of the memorandum to Hitler. To that extent, I am obligated because this memorandum to Hitler was made a subject of this trial and therefore I am obligated to go into it in detail.
As I said, during those three years in Hamburg, I worked out this reform program in detail. I then requested the Reich Ministry of Justice to examine this reform program with closer scrutiny, and then in August 1941 a reform committee in the Reich Ministry of Justice met at my suggestion, and there I held a lecture in which the subject was, "Taking the Judges out of the Civil Servants Profession."
Q Here we have to mention an exhibit. I have to tell you the exhibit number later. The document is NG-392. I shall be able to tell you the exhibit number tomorrow.
A In this meeting, too, Freisler opposed me, and the hope of the Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal who were present and of the General Public Prosecutors was again buried. After the Reichsstatthalter Kauffmann had also made an unsuccessful attempt to approach Hitler, I, myself, made such an attempt and with success.
Court No.III, Case No. 3.
At the beginning of 1942, through a private connection, I met the navy adjutant of Hitler's in Hamburg; his name was Albrecht. Albrecht was not in Hitler's office, but had his own office in the Reich Chancellory in Berlin, and it was his task to examine entries that had reached Hitler regarding the Administration of Justice and complaints about it; and as such he too had made the same experiences as we of the Administration of Justice -- first, that the party and the SS tried repeatedly to attack sentences pronounced by courts; and, on the other hand, that there was nobody who tried to convince Hitler of the impossibility of this development. When I told him that for some years I had dealt with these ideas, he requested me to put down my thoughts in a brief memorandum. On the 31st of March, 1942, I then handed him this memorandum and he succeeded in putting this memorandum into Hitler's hands. And this is the way he did it: Hitler's personal adjutant, who was at his headquarters, was Albert Bormann, that is the brother of the infamous chief of the Party Chancellory, Martin Bormann; and these two men were such enemies that they did not even greet each other; and, via this Albert Bormann, Albrecht once gave my memorandum to Hitler. And at the beginning of May, Hitler apparently, as can be seen from the document, that is after his infamous speech, he read the memorandum.
Q This is Hitler's speech of 26 April, 1942. Can you state, Dr. Rothenberger, what was your reaction to Hitler's speech?
A I here have to state my opinion to the situation report, NG-389, which the Prosecution is charging me with. I believe that is Exhibit 76.
Q I shall hand them the document number tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT:NG-389?
ANG-389.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Exhibit 76.
A It was evident that Hitler's speech showed without doubt that between the leadership of the Reich and the Administration of Justice there was no confidence on either side. This condition with the German people as a whole was dangerous, and which should be alleviated with all Court No. III, Case No. 3.means available.
The causes for this were in my opinion of two kinds. First, they lay with Hitler. For years inciters in his environment who had no conscience, had incited him against the Administration of Justice. There was nobody who had an opportunity to convince him of the impossibility of this method and to divert him from this method. On the other hand, there was also the cause with the Administration of Justice, because, seen from my point of view in Hamburg, one had to try-because I had succeeded in doing so in Hamburg,-to influence Hitler, and to convince him that this way would lead to the decline of the Reich. Therefore, I wrote the memorandum which I mentioned.
Q You wanted to catch the effect of this speech; that is what you said. Would you first state the effect of the speech on the participating judiciary, and the rest of the people, and to what extent you wanted to catch it?
A In the situation report I expressed what effect such a speech had on the judiciary and on the German nation. A judge who is in danger of being retired any time is not a judge. Every day his existence is threatened; his living; now especially after the Hitler speech, he had to fear that every small political leader by referring to Hitler's speech would try to exert a pressure on him; the press, the SS, every defendant, possibly, could refer to Hitler's speech and say "you know very well how Hitler is thinking about you"; and in order to avoid these dangers, for the entire Administration of Justice, and thus for the entire Reich, in order to catch as I said these dangers, I took a number of measures, steps, in Hamburg. Once I called a meeting of the judges a few days later; and there, together with the Reichsstatthalter I stood before the judiciary of Hamburg and I personally assumed the responsibility to free the judge from every pressure that might be exerted upon him. In such a situation one could not leave the individual judge up to his fate, and in order to prevent that attacks were made at all against the judiciary, I informed all the offices from whom such attacks could be expected that I would put them under an obligation;