OESCHEY joined the NSDAP at an early date, namely, in 1931. His entry into the Party can only be attributed to conviction, as at that time he could not expect to derive any advantages from it. Up to the year 1940 OESCHEY held no Party office, nor did he obtain any professional gain from the Party, as I shall prove. It was only the need for personnel caused by the war and the special circumstances in the Franconian Gau called into being by the discreditable departure of Streicher and his gang which brought OESCHEY to legal office in the Gau (Gaurechtsamt) and to leadership of the National Jurists' League (Rechtswahrerbund). The latter is not a criminal organization and may be eliminated from the following consideration.
The judgment of the IMT did not declare the entire body of political leaders of the NSDAP criminal but, as regards the staff organizations, only those "office managers" who were managers of offices on the staff of the Reich, Gau, and Kreis managements. I shall prove that OESCHEY was not an office manager as defined by the IMT judgment's formula. I shall, however, also try to prove in event that OESCHEY had no knowledge of the criminal dealings by the corps of political leaders which were referred to in the IMT judgment, let alone participated in such dealings. For the rest, his professional and personal political influence was remarkably slight.
It is my opinion that the prosecution overestimated the position and influence of the defendant OESCHEY when it brought him to trial before this Tribunal.
DR. ORTH (Counsel for the defendant Altstoetter):
Mr. President, Your Honors:
If this trial should result in a sentence, forming a precedent for the future, the proceedings must constitute a trial directed against human beings, a trial of persons, not of documents and papers.
In that event personality will have to take the center of the stage. I shall therefore, as defense counsel of the accused Altstoetter, try, in my demonstration of the case, to place Altstoetter, as a man, at its central point and from this point to conduct my defense in the four directions of the indictment and enter further upon them.
Altstoetter as a man, in his inmost being, is characterized by genuine piety. This feeling is the center of his understanding life and world-outlook. He acknowledged it without fear and timidity even during the anti-religious period of National Socialism. It was from this central standpoint - sub specie aeternitatis - that he regarded matters, including political matters.
This way of thinking determined his activities and dealings; it was the basis for the work on behalf of his people whom he was capable and desirous of serving at a difficult time. Altstoetter's religiously determined ethical views were, however, the source, also, for the very high appreciation of human cultural values, human dignity and human rights, which he indeed always upheld and represented.
I.
In the first count of the indictment Herr Altstoetter, like all the other accused, is charged with conspiracy.
As to the question whether this term can be legally used in this connection and the question whether conspiracy constitutes a criminal act according to existing definitions, these matters will be discussed by one of the associated defense counsel. The questions will be answered in the negative.
The indictment declares from the point of view of actual fact, that Altstoetter plotted with other persons to commit crimes against humanity and the laws of war. No proof cf these statements was given by the prosecution. No document has been produced proving the participation of Altstoetter in any crime and no witness has been heard who has stated that Altstoetter took part in any wrongful act or that he in any way deserted the standard of justice to which he was bound in virtue of his office. The defendant Altstoetter and I myself paid particularly close attention to the production of documents and the whole argument of the prosecution, for we could not at all imagine what charges relative to conspiracy could possibly have been brought. The negative result of the case made out by the prosecution in this respect was expected by us.
Altstoetter was not a conspirator, unless, indeed a man may be a conspirator who, as we shall prove, set himself in opposition to all measures and laws containing any element of injustice.
In the document PS-654, Exhibit 39, which contains the record of the discussion between Thierack and the Rcichsfuehrer SS, the aliens Law (Gemeinschaftsfremdengesetz) is mentioned in No. 7. This law, which had already been put into shape at the time of Altstoetter's arrival at the Ministry of Justice, and of which he only hoard by accident, he cancelled the last minute. That is not the act of a conspirator.
The Party Liability Decree (Parteiraftungsvorordnung) had also already been put into shape at the time of Altstoetter's arrival at the ministry. It transpires from document NG-889, Exhibit 436 (Document Book I, Supplementary Volume) that he also put that decree to the debate once more on the grounds of its injustice and finally, in collaboration with the defendant Klemm, prevented its being passed.
This was not the act of a conspirator.
The Prosecution in its argument, reproached the Ministry of Justice with having instituted the Special Courts and the Reorganization of the German Legal Constitution, Altstoetter extracted from Thierack, the Minister, the promise that these Courts should be abolished at the end of the war. And I must repeat that this was not the act of a conspirator.
I shall prove in a number of other cases in this connection that altstoetter set himself in opposition to all inroads against justice and that he contested every act of injustice wherever he came across it.
Above all, however, I shall prove in my argument that Altstoetter, in his handling of personal questions, never allowed himself to be influenced by any Party points of view in politics. Had he been a conspirator, it would have been unintelligible for him to have appointed as his permanent representative a man known to have been an opponent of National Socialism, and it would have been unintelligible for him to have employed in his department a large number of experts and "referents" (sub-department chiefs) who are once more today filling the highest positions of the German authorities of Justice, and for him to have thrown himself heart and soul, for example, into getting a man appointed as President of the Senate at the National Hereditary Farm Court, who, on account of his having been Public Prosecutor at the trial of Hitler in 1924, was one of the most hated men in the Third Reich.
By means of these and other facts I shall give the most cogent proofs that Altstoetter was not a conspirator.
Ad Count II of the Indictment:
The prosecution has not given any proof against the defendant Altstoetter bearing on the second count of the Indictment. It has neither produced any documents for which he is. responsible nor has it examined witnesses in this direction. No proof has been given that Altstoetter intentionally and knowingly committed war crimes as defined in Control Commission Law (Kontrollratsgesetz) No. 10. He has neither committed any such crimes himself nor instigated or promoted them.
The name of the defendant Altstoetter is only mentioned in the indictment with reference to its second count, at No. 13 and No. 17 (Crimes against Jews).
The defendant Altstoetter had nothing to do with the Decree. He only heard of this decree, and its execution by the Ministry of Justice, after the end of the war. I shall prove that Department VI of the Ministry of Justice only once came into contact with the idea of NN matters as an incidental reference during its dealings with questions of civil rights, without however either itself or in particular the defendant Altstoetter being informed of the nature of the NN Decree and its object or of its being put into effect.
The defendant Altstoetter was not concerned with a single decree depriving the Jews in Bohemia and Moravia of their citizenship and in particular he is also not in any way connected with the decree of the 13th order for execution of the Reich Citizenship Law of July 1, 1943 (NG- 715 - Exhibit 112). His responsibility, therefore, for the reversion of Jewish capital to the Reich is also nil.
The prosecution has indeed produced a few other documents in which , the name of Altstoetter appears. But these documents contain no indication whatever of any criminal activities and can easily be disposed of. I shall be able, therefore, to restrict my argument with regard to the second count of the indictment.
The third point in the indictment contains, so far as Altstoetter is concerned, the same charges as are made against him under Count 2.
In the indictment and bill of indictment no specific charge is made against the defendant Altstoetter arising out of the arrangements made by the Hereditary Health Court. The prosecution has, however, submitted a document relating to the Hereditary Health Court, which bears the signature of the defendant Altstoetter. I must therefore emphasize the fact that Altstoetter had nothing to do with the establishment of the Hereditary Health Court. The whole business of Hereditary Health was the affair of the Ministry of Interior. It was only the organization of the Court that was administered, as well by the Ministry of the Interior as by the Ministry of Justice and by Department VI of that ministry. I shall, however, prove, by producing orders issued during Altstoetter's period of office and by means of affidavits, that the work of the Hereditary Health Court was almost completely suspended during Altstoetter's period of office. Furthermore, the indictment has in fact not cited a single case occurring during the time Altstoetter was at the Ministry of Justice which permits the inference of any unjust or actually criminal manipulation of the regulation already laid down at an earlier date; that, for the rest, these instructions were not criminal and were not used in any criminal manner will be proved by Undersecretary Schlegelberger.
In relation to Nos. 25 and 29 of the third count of the indictment the same considerations apply as I have referred to above in connection with paragraphs 13 and 17 of the bill of indictment.
The defendant had in no sense or manner to concern himself with the crimes which almost exclusively composed and still compose the object of this trial. He was only active in the sphere of civil affairs. The letters produced as Document NG-702, Exhibit 481, and Document 783-NG, Exhibit 484, will also be explained in this sense.
Finally, the defendant Altstoetter is reproached with being a member of the SS, which has been declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
In opposition to that I will state that Altstoetter was only Ehrenfuehrer (honorary leader) of the General SS, and so, contrary to the claim of the military court, was no ordinary member, that he rendered no service of any kind and that according to his attitude of which I spoke at the beginning, his attitude was anything but in accordance with the SS. If in the indictment it has been maintained that Altstoetter was a favorite of Himmler, I will also oppose these assertions in showing how Altstoetter came to the SS and what opinion Himmler held about Altstoetter. The letters submitted by the prosecution do not prove the assertions of the charge. They are easy to explain and will be rendered easily understandable to any unbiased person by the evidence documents which I shall submit.
The International Military Tribunal has expressly declared in the general statements concerning the question of declaring the organizations criminal:
"Since, as was already stressed, the declaration concerning the organizations and groups will determine the criminal character of their members, then this declaration should exclude those who had no knowledge of the criminal aims or acts of the organizations...
"Mere membership is not sufficient to be affected by such declarations."
And in the case of the declaration on the SS it says again expressly:
"The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter the group composed of those persons who had been officially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the proceeding paragraph who became or remained members of the organizations with knowledge that they were being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter..."
The International Military Tribunal has therefore stressed twice that knowledge of criminal actions of the SS is the basis of the judgment. Evidence of this knowledge must be brought by the prosecution. In the case of Altstoetter it has not been brought. In the opening speech the prosecution declared to believe that it was encumbent upon the defendant to produce the evidence that he had no knowledge of the criminal acts of the organizations. The prosecuting authorities themselves took as the basis of the judgment:
1. membership after 1 September 1939 2. knowledge of the criminal acts.
On what grounds they believe that they are obliged to prove only the first supposition is just as inexplicable as their viewpoint that the problems of the weight of evidence are purely academic. They are not, at least with respect to the defendant Altstoetter, for he has committed no criminal acts himself and he also had no information about the criminal acts of the SS before 1939 and in particular since 1 September 1939 - and it is a question only of this organization and the criminal acts committed by it since 1 September 1939 since the beginning of the war. If the prosecution put forward as evidence of knowledge of the crime the fact that Himmler had tried hard to ensure that the German justice was fully informed of the ideology of the SS and of its criminal aims, then this is a completely false conception of the case and an entirely mistaken idea of Himmler's personality.
I shall prove that Himmler expertly succeeded in keeping secret the crimes committed by the SS and that also in his speech which he delivered in July 1944 before the Presidents of the District Courts of Appeal and the General Public Prosecutors at Kochem he did not say one word about these crimes or even about the criminal aims of the SS.
If Altstoetter had known about the crimes committed by the SS, then without doubt he would have acted accordingly and would have withdrawn from his unofficial membership in the General SS. Furthermore, he would have refused any cooperation in such a state, for a man like Altstoetter, who always and with a very rare energy acted as mouthpiece for the idea of the law-abiding state (Rechtsstaat) and who, as I shall prove, resisted the unjust claims raised by the SS, is not two-faced (zwiespaeltig). He cannot fight against injustice fully employing the weight of his personality on the one side while idly looking upon the same injustice on the other side. The conception of justice as it was represented by Altstoetter has not got two sides. In its innermost pre-supposition it is a mental demand, which is not of a worldly nature and which therefore according to the conviction of the defendant Altstoetter cannot dispense with a firm and lasting bond with the world of eternity.
It is my intention to draw a faithful picture of Altstoetter before the Court. This picture will not be a criminal one, but will be the picture of a man who was filled with an ardent desire to serve justice.
THE PRESIDENT: Are we to understand that this completes the making of the opening statements except for that of Engert?
DR. SCHILF: Yes. Mr. President, may it please the Court, for all the defense counsel I have undertaken to examine Professor Jahreis, professor of law, as an expert. If the Tribunal expects that now, immediately following upon the opening statements, the expert is to be examined, I should like to say the following. Professor Jahreis will, above all, deal with German constitutional law. Professor Jahreis attaches importance to the fact so that he can clear up everything for the Tribunal, that he should read his statements based on a chart. I have a copy of the chart here. The charts themselves are to be enlarged on the model of this chart and will be hung up here in the courtroom. During the past few days I have made every effort to have the charts ready by today, but this morning I was told that the charts will only be ready by this evening.
In case the Tribunal wishes to hear Professor Jahreis immediately following upon the opening statements, I would have to ask the Tribunal to call Professor Jahreiss at the beginning of tomorrow morning's session. But I should like to make the following statement. Two of my colleagues, in their opening statements, have put forward provisional motions, Mr. Haensel on behalf of all defense counsel in respect to Count I to have the indictment declared insufficient by the Tribunal.
Mr. Haensel pointed out that very much material for this trial would not have to be produced by the defense if the Tribunal would make up its mind to decide that question beforehand. Mr. Doetzer asked before he produces evidence for the Defense, on behalf of his client, that cass should be discontinued, that is to say, to declare the indictment insufficient also in that respect.
THE PRESIDENT: Only as to his own client, you mean.
DR. SCHILF: Yes. Mr. Doetzer put forward that motion on behalf of his own client, and that for all counts of the indictment; whereas, Mr. Haensel put forward the motion on behalf of all Defense Counsel concerning Count I. If the Tribunal can make up its mind to comply with their suggestions, that would be of the greatest importance for the future course of the trial. We would welcome it, therefore, if the Tribunal would inform us of its decision before I call Professor Jahreis.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: May it please the Court, I gather from Dr. Schilf's remarks that if the Prosecution is to treat, or be asked to treat the opening statements of the Defense as some sort of an informal motion to strike any or all parts of the indictment, with regard to any or all defendants, we certainly request the proper statutory notice to give the Prosecution opportunity to answer that motion before any ruling of the Court is made thereon. That is obvious.
THE PRESIDENT: When did the Prosecution receive the copies, in English, of the opening statements made in behalf of Nebelung, and the statement by Dr. Haensel.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I can't give you the exact hour, but sometimes yesterday at varying hours; but even if we had received the copy of the opening statements days ago, it was still, we respectfully submit, not incumbent upon the prosecution to treat the statements in the opening statement as a motion.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that although the formal procedure which would be followed in the United States when a defense counsel wished to make a motion for a non-suit has not been followed, that nevertheless it is plain from a reading of the opening statements that two motions have in fact been made. I think there is no ambiguity about that. One motion is that by Dr. Doetzer, who asks that at this stage of the cas the entire charge be dismissed as to the defendant Nebelung. That is the nature of Dr. Doetzer's motion, is it not? Yes. That motion the Tribunal has considered -- not merely at this moment, but previously. The motion to which I referred will be denied, and that, of course, is with our prejudice to the presentation of a similar motion by this defendant or any other defendant, if warranted, at some future time. That motion is denied.
We will hear counsel on the motion made in behalf of all the defendants relative to the sufficiency of Count I tomorrow morning at 9:30. My assosiate calls my attention to the fact that the motion relates, of course, not only to the sufficiency of Count I, but to the sufficiency of any evidence relative to Count I. We will consider the motion as made with reference to Count I and the evidence tomorrow morning at 9:30.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: One question, Your Honor, please. To which opening statement, or combination of them, is the Prosecution deemed to be under notice as constituting the motion as to the sufficiency of Count I?
THE PRESIDENT: It is Dr. Haensel's opening statement; it is my recollection that the portion is underlined, and is also in one brief paragraph which makes expressly this motion or this request.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Is it the Court's opinion that, with regard to the opinions expressed therein, the Prosecution are required to meet them tomorrow morning, and no others?
THE PRESIDENT: The question is whether the motion as made shall be allowed or denied.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: The motion being made explicitly in Dr. Haensel's opening statement.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right. That motion was made in Dr. Haensel's statement in behalf of the defendant Joel, was it not? Yes. Is there anything else this afternoon?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: The Prosecution has no objection to proceeding with the Defense's case and production of witnesses of which we have had notice.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Schilf, did I understand your request to be that the examination of your first witness should be made only after the chart is presented and available?
DR. SCHILF: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So that we may observe. Will you have it ready tomorrow morning?
DR. SCHILF: Yes.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: In fairness to the Prosecution, if that chart is to be treated as a document and offered into evidence in this case, we insist upon our notice.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hasn't yet been advised that it is offered, or will be offered in evidence.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I am merely making that statement for the notice of all concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Schilf, do you have a small copy of the chart?
DR. SCHILF: May it please the Court, it is not evidence which I am going to submit in the shape of a chart, but it is merely an aid in order to make it easier for Professor Jahreiss to make his statement. Unfortunately today I am unable to hand the copies to the Tribunal. Of the four charts I have only one small copy, which, however, Professor Jahreiss has asked me to return to him for the examination tomorrow morning.
Before the beginning of the session, I shall be able to hand to the Tribunal and the Prosecution small copies of the chart.
THE PRESIDENT: And I understand that the chart will be used as an aid for the purpose of explaining and elucidating the testimony of your expert.
DR. SCHILF: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30 -just a moment.
DR. KUBOSCHOK: (Attorney for Defendant Schlegelberger) May it please the Court, I only have a brief request.
After the expert the evidence for Schlegelberger will be submitted, and I am still a little behind with the preparatory discussions with my client. I should be very pleased if I would have the opportunity to talk to my client tomorrow afternoon. Therefore, I would ask you to excuse my client, Schlegelberger, from tomorrow's afternoon session so that I can talk to him in the customary way.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any objection to the defendant Schlegelberger being excused from attendance in Court for the period of tomorrow afternoon?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No objection in principle, Your Honor, except that it is highly irregular, and I don't want it to start a precedent. There is ample time to confer with his client other than during trial hours, but, I have no objection -- but it does seem irregular.
THE PRESIDENT: The right to be present in the courtroom is more a right and privilege of a defendant than it is an obligation, although it may be both. If the defendant Schlegelberger, through his counsel, asks for a special exception to the usual rule, the Tribunal will grant him this permission to be absent from the trial during tomorrow afternoon only. Do you wish to make that application?
DR. KUBOSCHOK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will not treat this as a precedent, and we think it would be bad practice as a general practice. After you have gotten started with your witness, other counsel are admonished to be ready with theirs, without any further delays.
Now, is there anything else this afternoon? We will now again attempt to recess, and we do now recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 25 June, 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Josef Alstoetter, et al., Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 25 June, 1947, 0930-1630, the Hon. James T. Brand, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal 3.
Military Tribunal 3 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ascertain if the defendants are all present?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom except the defendant Engert, who is sick.
THE PRESIDENT: Proper notation will be made.
Concerning the motion against Count. I, the Tribunal has ascertained that similar questions are being presented in several of the different Tribunals. For that among other reasons we suggest to counsel for both sides this morning that they make only brief statements as to their general position upon the issue, and this Tribunal will not pass upon the issue until later notice ha.s been given to both parties and probably until further hearing or briefs have been called for. Consequently this morning we suggest to you that you merely state briefly your positions upon the motion which has been made and then proceed with your evidence.
Docs the moving party, to wit, the defendant, desire to make such a statement at this time?
DR. HAENSEL: May it please the Tribunal, the question has been raised as to how far for legal reasons Law No. 10 will form a basis for charges on account of the Anglo-saxon principle of conspiracy. If that is to be treated fundamentally, this question is of great importance and takes a lot of time to deal with it. I am quite ready to speak about that subject one two, or even six hours in order to treat it exhaustively.
The question is, however, how in accordance with the expediency of the Tribunal, it would fit that a lecture on that subject could be included, or am I today to say just that to elucidate that which I have hinted at in my speech, and am I to explain this further? How much does the Tribunal intend to hear? Because as far as the history of law is concerned, one can give a great number of reasons and explanations.
Please, may I have just one indication as to how far I am expected to go? On the other hand, I do not want to restrict the possibilities of the prosecution, and I understand that the Prosecution also intends to have some time for preparation. Therefore I ask to be informed as to how the Tribunal intends to have this matter dealt with.
MR. LAFQLLETTE: I think that I can aid the Tribunal and Dr. Haensel in this matter if possibly Dr. Haensel and the Tribunal would permit me to speak first. I would not ask for a rebuttal, which would be normal. In other words, Dr. Haensel may follow me. I feel that what I have to say would be beneficial with reference to the introduction of evidence pending the final disposition of this matter, and after I have spoken I think Dr. Haensel would then have a fuller idea of the fact that he will not probably have to elaborate upon the technical legal issue. And again, as I say, if permitted to address the court first, I would waive any further statement, so that he may follow me, which he would be able to do were he to speak first and then I to speak and then him to make his rebuttal. So I don't think it is unfair, and it might advance the disposition of the matter, if that is agreeable to Dr. Haensel and the Tribunal.
DR. HAENSEL: I appreciate the suggestion by Mr. LaFollette and I should like to ask him, if the Tribunal approves, to begin with his statements.
THE PRESIDENT: Alright.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: May it please the Tribunal, I appreciate very much the fact that the Tribunal has stated that which I am fully conversant with, that this matter is pending in other Tribunals, However, the indictments in other Tribunals do, in fact, stem from the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, which controls all of these cases which are on file. Therefore, as far as the technical legal argument is concerned, I do net feel that I am entitled to make a final, technical argument because I might in some way preclude other counsel occupying a relative position to mine in the organization who have matters pending in other Courts who might feel that they could make a better argument or at least arguments which they consider more persuasive. I am aware of the fact, of course, that a finding of this Tribunal would not technically be binding upon any other, but we are all aware also of the factual aspects, namely that it would probably be persuasive.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
I believe that General Taylor, my superior and the Chief of Counsel, would be available next week or certainly the week after, since next week is a short week, to at least supervise and approve, if not prepare, the briefs which might be presented and which are of concern to this whole organization.
However, leaving aside as I do the technical legal question as to whether or not there is found a substantive crime of conspiracy to commit war crimes or a substantitive crime of conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity in Law 10, I think it is proper to give some attention now to the theories which the prosecution before this Tribunal has and which were set out, I thought, as principles in the opening statement in this Tribunal. That has to do with whether or not certain evidence and certain connections of these defendants are not presented under the indictments which in turn are based upon the language of Law 10 without regard to whether or not the Tribunal eventually determines that there is a substantive crime of the conspirators which I have mentioned.
Section 2 of Article 2 of Law 10 declares as follows: "Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in Paragraph 1 of this article, if he was (a) a principle, or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same, or (c) took a consenting part therein, or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission."
I do not quote from phrase (e) because an examination of the indictment in this case would disclose that the relationship to a crime set out in phrase (e) of Paragraph 2 of Article 2 is not alleged anywhere in this indictment. But it is profitable, I believe, to turn to the Indictment in this case, and on Page 4, Paragraph 2, which is contained in Count I--the count which is designated generally as the Conspiracy Count--to Paragraph 8, which is the first Paragraph in Count 2--War Crimes--and found on Page 8 of the indictment, and to Court No. III, Case No. 3.Paragraph 20, which is the first paragraph of Count 3--Crimes Against Humanity--which is found on page 14.
I read first from Paragraph 2, "Throughout the period covered by this indictment, all of the defendants herein--" then I eliminate the language "acting in concert with each other"--and simply say, "were principles in and accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity."
I read again from Paragraph 8, and find that it alleges that, "Between September 1939 and April 1945, all of the defendants herein unlawfully, willfully and knowingly committed war crimes as defined by Control Council Law 10 in that they were principles in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with crimes and enterprises involving the commission of--" and thereafter follow allegations which allege crimes as defined as War Crimes in Article 2 of Law 10.
Likewise in paragraph 20, which is the first paragraph of Count 3, Crimes Against Humanity, it is alleged, "Between September 1939 and April 1943, all of the defendants herein unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly, committed crimes against humanity as defined by Control Council Law No. 10 in that they were principles in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises--" and thereafter follows language which specifically alleges Crimes Against Humanity as set out in Article 2 of Law 10.
My point is this: that while it is true that under the law of conspiracy, every conspirator is liable for the criminal act of any other conspirator, yet he must have knowledge of the existance of the conspiracy and. he must have knowledge of the intent and purpose to commit the act. From the standpoint of the presentation of the evidence in this case, it is my opinion, having regard to the way I view the law generally, that the evidence in this case to date will have to Court No. III, Case No. 3.be meticulously combed to find the existence of one single conspiracy involving all of the defendants in the dock.