Therefore, the fact that the skull was submitted could not have been done in order to explain or to clarify whether the defendants committed murder or manslaughter. I can only believe that Cuhorst demanded the presentation of the skull in order to explain with what force it had been beaten. The entire top of the shall was smashed. It had burst into small pieces possibly. That is what he wanted to show by presenting the skull.
Q In your affidavit, you state, "Cuhorst's manner in conducting proceedings against Poles was just as brutal as in other cases."
A Yes.
Q And that judgment on your part is based on what other facts except those which you have described and told us about? What other facts do you know from your own knowledge?
A That Cuhorst's manner of conducting proceedings was often brutal? I believe I explained it by calling it a sadistic way of conducting proceedings, and naturally, it did not differ in cases against foreigners. Therefore, it is only a repition of a more general judgment.
Q In your affidavit, you state that Cuhorst after the presentation of evidence mot the Prosecutor of t at proceeding?
AAs is well-known, there was a directive from the Reich Ministry of Justice to the Prosecutor, that not only the Reich Ministry of Justice, but also the Court should be informed by them what measure of penalty they had pleaded for. They were supposed to do that in the manner that the Prosecutor would inform the bench what kind of a plea he intended to make after the presentation of evidence. That, of course, also occured in cases where Cuhorst presided. That I have stated explicity in my affidavit. In all cases Cuhorst made it clear that he would act according to his own idea, that is to say, he would in no way be influenced by any such conversation.
Q Does that mean that he tried to maintain the independence of the Tribunal?
A I believe that Cuhorst, based on his own resistance, his own tenacity, which he showed very often, that for that reason alone he wanted to maintain a certain independence and did so.
Q You say in your affidavit also, "We were compelled to bow to his wishes because a deviation of the plea from the final sentence would have caused us a rather serious reproach from higher up."
A Yes.
Q One moment. Was it so that the prosecutor from higher up, that is from the Reich Ministry of Justice, in more important cases received directives concerning the measure of punishment mentioned in his plea, and that the prosecution felt itself bound to these directives, at least generally?
A The prosecution as an administrative office was under obligation, on the basis of general directives, to present to the Reich Ministry of Justice all indictments concerning the special court and to state their intention concerning their plea. The report in such cases read perhaps as follows: "Against so and so, I have submitted the indictment, copy of which is enclosed. I intend to request that and that penalty." If that indictment coincided with the ideas of the Reich ministry of Justice, nothing more happened; no more directives came down. If it didn't, the senior prosecutor, either through the general prosecutor directly, received a directive that by his deputy he should demand the penalty which was prescribed by the decree.
Q What you mean then in your affidavit by saying, "I do not understand why we"--that probably means the prosecutors--"we were compelled to bow to his wishes"?
A That sentence should not express that Cuhorst was the one who prescribed our plea, and the measure of punishment demanded therein, but it has to be read together with the last part of the other sentence, since a deviation of the plea from the sentence would have brought a considerable reproach from higher up.
That is to say, if it was discussed that the court considered the case more severe than the prosecution, it would have come to a cancellation of the verdict, if it could have been seen that the prosecution had pleaded for a more lenient sentence than that expressed in the verdict. It was, therefore, not a compulsion really which Cuhorst influenced upon us; but I merely wanted to express it was a practical necessity in a case of that kind to be of the same opinion as the bench--the court, and to plead for that punishment which the court considered the right one in order to make the sentence valid.
Q Was that a usage or a ruling that was based on directives which were generally practiced, not only in special court proceedings under Cuhorst or other presiding judges, but also in other courts, for instance, the penal chamber or penal senates?
A How it was in the case of the Strafsenat--the penal senate--I cannot say, but I am convinced that the prosecutors at the penal senate also received directives of that kind from the Reich Ministry of Justice as did the prosecutors at the special court and at the penal chamber in cases of that kind where they had to submit indictments.
Q Would you answer the question as to whether the phraseology of this sentence, "We were compelled to bow to his wishes"--whether that could not be misunderstood and therefore should be corrected in the manner which you have described to the Tribunal now.
A I believe-
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Pardon me, witness, please. If Your Honors please, I object to that as calling for a conclusion of the witness in the structural meaning of the sentence. The witness has fully explained what he meant.
THE PRESIDENT; We see no ambiguity of that language and the objection to that will be sustained.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q Witness, in your affidavit, you state further that you were afraid of Cuhorst because of his high position in the Party, since you were a faithful Catholic and he could have become very dangerous to you.
A I have already stated in the beginning of my examination, that the complaint which Cuhorst had made about me was very disagreeable for me, and I personally suffered extraordinarily from this complaint, and it was not my intention to mix into affairs which were none of my business. But since I had received that answer from Cuhorst, it was of the utmost importance for me to restrain myself in every manner and to prevent a renewed complaint--disciplinary complaint--against myself.
Q That fear, did it express itself in the manner in which the special court under Cuhorst in your opinion came to decisions? Did it have any bad consequences? Was the finding of a just verdict influenced by that?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Please, witness, don't answer. If Your Honor please, that wasn't the purpose of the question on direct examination and has nothing to do with what Cuhorst might find. It was to establish the fact as to whether this man was afraid. He stated the facts. It's for the Court to determine whether they consider it significant. I didn't ask the man whether it entered into the verdict. I object to the question.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q You referred to the high position in the Party. Did you have to deal with cases yourself where party leaders played an important part?
A No.
Q You gave your affidavits and signed your affidavits on the third of November and the tenth of January in Stuttgart and swore to them. Where was that in Stuttgart?
A My first interrogation took place in the offices of the former military government, in the Weimarstrasse. The second interrogation took place in a private building.
Q And where was that private building? In what street?
A It is in Stuttgart, in a side street of the Olgastrasse, where there is the mail censorship and other American offices.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I don't know what that indicates, but I believe it is leading. If it is, I object to it.
THE PRESIDENT: We cannot know what it is leading to, but it does no harm.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q On the basis of these interrogations, which both were conducted by Mr. Einstein, were you informed from the very beginning, that is especially during the first interrogation, what the purpose of your interrogation would be?
A When I -
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Wait a minute; could you give that question back?
INTERPRETER: On the occasion of your interrogations, especially during the first interrogation, were you instructed, were you informed what the purpose of these interrogations would be?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I object to that your Honor. I don't see that it goes to the probative value; I don't see that it goes to the credibility of this witness, or the value of the affidavit, as to what purpose it was to be used for, or the instructions given.
THE PRESIDENT: Let him answer.
A When I was called, there I did not know for what purpose I had been called, but it was to be assumed that there was a misunderstanding on the part of the German police.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. You were asked what you were told; what you assumed is not a part of the answer, and isn't responsive to the question.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I would like to have the question re-read to the witness.
A I wanted to say when I was called there, when I received the summons to go there I did not know for what case I was called, but when I was questioned -
THE PRESIDENT: That answers the question. He was asked whether he was told and he says he was not told.
A I beg your pardon, I was told. I was told the moment-
THE PRESIDENT: The witness now says he was told.
A I was misunderstood before. I wanted to say on the paper which I received from the German police, by which I was called, no reason for the interrogation was given.
However, when I was actually interrogated, it was explained to me that it was an interrogation concerning the case Cuhorst.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q During this interrogation were you asked about your own denazification proceedings -- how it stood?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Wait a minute. I hope people smile and have a lot of fun; I am not concerned whether this man went before the Spruchkammer or not, and I don't think that makes any difference. The witness has already testified that he was not in any way coerced or ordered to sign this affidavit. The Court has made a ruling that was conclusive. The only purpose I can see for this question is again to raise the inference of coercion. If the Court wants him to answer, it is all right, but I think we can drag on doing something else besides this.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained. He has already gone into that.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q Witness, didn't you last Wednesday, didn't you call me by telephone in my office in Stuttgart and ask to have an opportunity to speak to me?
A I had found out in the city that I would go to Nurnberg as a witness. At that time, however, I had no summons. Therefore, I was told that I could find out details from the defense counsel of Mr. Cuhorst. Thereupon I called him up in order to find out whether it was true, since on the previous day a notice appeared in the newspapers which included a statement about me. And I also went to see Dr. Mandry and found out from him that my calling as a witness was imminent since the prosecution had requested it.
Q Did I, in a frightening manner, explain to you on the occasion of that visit that I did not want to come into any suspicion of trying to influence a witness?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: If the Court please, I don't charge him with in fluencing the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: At any rate the question is not material, and the objection to it, if made, will be sustained.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I object, Your Honor, to the charge that the man was doing anything to the witness. As far as I can tell, what the witness has testified to, he hasn't done anything good to him.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has testified that, he was not coerced and that his statement was a free voluntary statement, and that is as far as we need to go.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q Didn't you on the occasion of that visit in my office let me understand, make me understand that you desired to supplement your affidavits or to even correct them?
THE PRESIDENT: Whether the witness desired to supplement or correct them or not, whether he said so to counsel is wholly immaterial. If counsel wanted to bring out some supplement to his testimony or to state another matter, that is insofar as it reflects upon the conduct of Cuhorst as a judge, proceed.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q In your affidavits and during your interrogation, during the examination today, did you have an opportunity to tell the Court everything that you wanted to say about Cuhorst?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, I believe one third of this Court does not care to hear what everybody has to say about Cuhorst; we are trying this case on the issues. The question is so broad that it isn't of any value whatsoever.
BY DR. MANDRY:
Q Concerning your affidavit, you have stated here in your affidavit that you were a member of the NSDAP and of the SA. Did you have any rank in the SA?
A I was not in the SA, but I was in the SA-Reitersturm, and there because of a fractured skull; and, therefore, I could not do any writing any more; I did administrative work; and in that capacity on an honorary basis I was Obertruppfuehrer; a promotion for Sturmfuehrer was not approved, also on an honorary basis.
Never, however, was I active leader, but it was a purely honorary, administrative function such as other jurists who did not serve actively in the SA also executed it. Apart from that I was in the reserve of the Reitersturm, and I never had any active service since 1937.
Q Witness, in your first affidavit, to which I shall refer again, you mentioned the case Wolf. Did Karl Wolf take over a formerly Jewish owned enterprise?
AAbout the business affairs of the brothers Wolf I don't know anything; it is only known to me that in my native city, my home town, Bad Cannstatt, they had this business; they had a store which I have often passed and from where I knew the name.
Q Do you know the consequences that the case Wolf had before the party court for Cuhorst?
A I only heard in that session, in that meeting, a statement of Cuhorst, allegedly made a statement about a uniform, but what the consequences were as far as Cuhorst was concerned, I do not know, but I could not imagine that -
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, we are not interested in what you imagine. You were asked what you knew and you said you do not know; don't tell us what you imagine.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not what someone would imagine. You were asked whether you know, and you said you did not know. Do not tell what you imagined.
DR. MANDRY: May it please the Tribunal I have concluded my cross examination. I would like to add the statement on my behalf, that I ask to be excused, during the conduct of my cross examination, for some questions which I might have asked, in that I lack experience, so that I have made mistakes.
BY DR. SCHILF: (for defendant Klemm and Mettgenberg):
For my plans, I have two short questions to put to the witness.
Q. Witness, in your second affidavit of 10 January 1947, you spoke about the question that the prosecution before a sentence was pronounced, but at the end of the presentation of the evidence, got in touch with the court. I am referring to the sentence which has already been discussed. May I ask you to look at your affidavit of 10 January 1947, page 6, the third paragraph from the bottom of the page. There you said, "We were compelled to...." and -so-on. You used the term "from higher up", may I ask you to explain to the court what concretely you meant by that term? What you wanted to have understood?
THE PRESIDENT: One moment please. Dr. Schilf, you referred to page 6 of the affidavit of 10 January 1947. The copy which I have has only a page and a little over, so I cannot follow you on that.
DR. SCHILF: I beg your Honor's pardon, I said page-it is page 2.
Q. (Continued) Will you please answer my question?
A. The General Prosecutor was intent to see that the directives of the Reich Ministry of Justice concerning the pleas of the prosecution were abided by, and repeatedly expressed, to the officials themselves that it was his desire that these directives should actually be carried out. If these directives would not have been applied in sessions, then the General Prosecutor, by report, would have demanded explanations by indorsement as to why these directives were not carried out. I know of one case, myself where a prosecutor was disciplined by the General Prosecutor because he did not follow those directives concerning the measures of punishment.
Q. If I understood you correctly, Witness, by "higher ups" you mean the immediate superior office, that is, to say, the General Prosecutor?
A. Certainly, I could only speak of the office immediately superior to mine, and to whom I was immediately responsible.
Q. In the same sentence you mentioned the word "reprimand" or "reporach"?
A. Yes.
Q. May I ask you to explain this to us in a manner that will make it clear to all of us, just as to how we should understand it?
A. By reprimand I did not mean a disciplinary measure, but just a reproach on the part of the General Prosecutor or with the threat that under certain circumstances he would have to take measures in order to prevent further activities of that particular prosecutor.
Q. That is to say, a reprimand on the part of the General Prosecutor to the prosecutor immediately subordinate to him?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, after these two terms are clarified, I cannot quite understand how you could say that you and the rest of the prosecutors who were subordinate to the General Prosecutor could have been under any compulsion from Cuhorst. I would like to ask you to clarify that once more. You have explained to us quite clearly that you were afraid of the General Prosecutor and that he was the only one who could issue any directions to you.
JUDGE BRAND: Just a moment please. Dr. Schilf, may I ask you what interest you have in cross examining this witness other than to ascertain whether his testimony applied to either Klemm or Mettgenberg. Is that not a limitation upon your interest in the case?
Dr. Schilf; Yes.
JUDGE BRAND: Have you not elicited from the Witness, when he spoke of reprimand or a matter of that nature, that he was not referring either to Klemm or Mettgenberg. I think that is clear to us. Is it not to you?
DR. SCHILF: I have to beg your pardon your Honor, I have one other question and that is----
JUDGE BRAND: (Interposing) Does it relate to your clients?
DR. SCHILF: Yes, it relates to my clients.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q. Witness, before I put the second question to you, I have to return to the preliminary question, that is, the preliminary question; why you felt forced by Cuhorst, apart from the wishes of the General Prosecutor--
MR. LA FOLLETTE: (Interposing) I object to this line of questioning, your Honor. The defendant can be represented on cross examination by one counsel, and surely he cannot be represented by two, one counsel who is the attorney for two other defendants.
I object to the question as not being pertinent to any issue or pertaining to the defendant of Dr. Schilf, and coming after the cross examination by Cuhorst Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Schilf, you were asked by one of the members of this Tribunal in what way the question would affect your clients. It does not yet appear how it affects them or whether it affects them at all or not; and before we know that we cannot know whether to approve of you going ahead.
DR. SCHILF: I did not intend to explain the purpose of my question at once because I wanted to have the preliminary question answered. However, if the Tribunal desires to know the purpose, wants me to tell the purpose of my question, then it is the following: The Prosecution has set fourth that the courts were directed by the Reich Ministry of Justice. Therefore, according to the assertion of the Prosecution there was an immediate influence in the administration of justice and its jurisdiction.
THE PRESIDENT: My recollection of the answer was that the directive from the Ministry of Justice was not the court but to the prosecution. Am I wrong about that?
DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, I have gone a step further with my question. I am no more concerned with the reprimand. I am not concerned with a further completion of the question which refers to the fact that the prosecution has asserted that the judges were immediately directed, that by the Reich Ministry of Justice. My question which I should like to out to the witness now-
THE PRESIDENT: The testimony of this witness was that the directives came to the prosecution.
We have not heard this witness say that any directive from the Ministry of Justice came to the court, and your question assumed that it was directed to the court. That is my inquiry.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Your Honor, please, I think, for myself, I am satisfied with what Dr. Schilf has in mind, but I do not believe it is proper cross examination. There is evidence in the record, in documentary form, that there is a directive from the ministry of Justice to the judges, but it was not so testified to by this witness; therefore, Dr. Schilf is attempting to reach an issue and refute it. I do not believe he can do it by cross examination of this witness, but he must do it by direct examination, of a witness of his own.
DR. SCHILF: May I say one more thing. The witness has made an affidavit, the contents of that affidavit could be the subject of cross examination, subject to cross examination. I am compelled to out that question because of that one sentence in the affidavit. The so called measure directing the steering of the measures involved. I believe I am correct in putting t is question. Although, the witness in the direct examination was not asked about these steering or directing measures, but there is something in the affidavit to that effect.
JUDGE BRAND: What is the sentence in the affidavit to which you refer. Will you read it?
DR. SCHILF: On the last page, page 2 of the affidavit of 10 January 1947, it is about in the second half of the page, it begins: "I should also like to mention that during the proceedings, after the presentation of the evidence, the prosecutor got in touch with the presiding judge of the court. He was ordered to make his plea according to the sentence.
And that also applied to Cuhorst. During that meeting, he was often of a different opinion than the prosecution, and made it clear that he would act according to his own Intentions. We, on our pert, were forced to bow to his wishes since a deviation of the plea from the sentence would have caused a reprimand."
THE PRESIDENT: The Court sustains the objection.
DR. SCHILF: What objection is meant by that? I did not hear an objection on the part of Mr. LaFollette.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought Mr. LaFollette had made an objection. In any event it's a question -
MR. LAFOLLETTE: I think I said -- maybe we weren't clear -- that there was evidence in this record in other places connected the judiciary with the Ministry of Justice but then I didn't find it in the testimony of this witness and for that reason I objected to his being cross examined.
THE PRESIDENT: It docs appear that there was an objection and the objection is sustained.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: Then I have no more questions. Your Honor, we can put in maybe two or three documents this afternoon but not very many. I am wondering whether defense counsel and the Court want to -- when they want to argue this pending motion or whether they would rather decide it on the written briefs of counsel or whether defense counsel wants to argue it. I do think it should be disposed of. If defense counsel wish to argue then in addition to their written motion then I will certainly accomodate them. If they do not desire to I am willing to lot it be submitted in the written motion but I do think -- I seem to be very fast again -- but I do believe that it should be disposed of because it's been pending quite awhile.
THE PRESIDENT: I had understand Dr. Schilf to say that additional memorandum would be provided.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: It hasn't been provided to me. I haven't received it. I can furnish then copies and copies can be made.
DR. SCHILF: Mr. President, I don't know whether the memorandum of the 7 April 1947 of the entire defense was already admitted to the Tribunal.
It has the date of the 7 April 1947. If that is in the hands of the Tribunal then as far as I am concerned, I don't know if all my colleagues are of the same opinion, I have only one more statement to make. That is the following: as far as we defense counsel could find out in Case No. 1, the first trial, the defense agreed that on the basis of the first -
MR. LAFOLETTE: If Your Honor please, I have no further re-direct examination. I am terribly sorry. I would like to have the witness excused, and I hope that Dr. Schilf will excuse no but I don't like to see the witness sit in the stand all day.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may be excused.
MR. LAFOLLETTE: The witness may be excused. I have finished. I had finished. Come ahead. I had just forgotten he was there.
DR. SCHILF: May I repeat? Defense counsel has found out, having been informed that in Case No. 1 in the doctors' case, the defense counsel in that case to a limited extent agreed that witnesses of the prosecution who are here in the Witness-house in Nurnberg can only be interrogated through a Commissioner, that is, an official of the Tribunal for the defense. Our motion of the 7 April 1947 contains at the same tine the request to amend Rule 23. I believe that that motion as far as procedure is concerned is correct. Ordinance No. 7 of the Military Government of the 18 October 1946 entitled "Constitutional Competency of Certain Military Tribunals" on 17 February 1947 was corrected by Military Government. In the Supplementary Decree of the 17 February 1947 by Art.
3, Ordinance No. 7 by including a new Article 5-B was amended to state that also upon motion by defense counsel a plenary session of Military Courts can take place, if a rule of procedure which was accepted for one Military Tribunal is not being accepted by the other Military Tribunal. It isn't sure to me whether the Tribunal - the Rule of the 17 February 1947 - if that is not the case I should like to read it. It's Art. 5-B, First Paragraph A.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the original Ordinance No. 7 that you are referring to or an amendment of it?
DR. SCHILF: The Amended Ordinance No. 7 which has the number 11.
THE PRESIDENT: What paragraph of that amendment are you now proposing to read?
DR. SCHILF: 5-B, sub-paragraph A.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you may read it. Then we will all have it before us.
DR. SCHILF: A plenary session of Military Courts may be called by each one of the Presiding Judges of the Military Court or upon motion to one of the Courts on the part of the Chief Prosecutor for War Crimes or the defense counsel of any one of the defendants whose interests are concerned and findings of a Military Court which concern an important material or technical question and are in contradiction with the findings of another Military Court are incompatible with it may then be discussed and examined. End of quotation. Since our motion of the 7 April 1947 is concerned with a change of Rule of Procedure No. 23, therefore, I as defense counsel of the crime concerned and my colleagues will state that on their part would like to second the motion.
I want it to be made clear that I make that motion now. May I carry further on? It only refers the fact that for this procedure that these proceedings be asked for a change of Art. 23 and move that witnesses who are here in the Nurnberg Prison may be examined by the Defense Counsel without a Commissioner - without supervisory officials.
JUDGE BRAND: I have the English text of Art. 5-B before me and it must be the authentic text. It authorizes counsel for the defendant to make the motion which you have made, to review an interlocutory ruling. This Court hasn't made an interlocutory ruling as yet. We think this motion premature. You are suggesting that a joint session be held on a matter on which we have not yet ruled.
DR. SCHILF: May I say the following? I have before me the Rules of Procedure, the heading of which reads "Office of Military Government, U.S.", sub-title "Uniform Rules of Procedure, Military Tribunals, Nurnberg." I emphasize that it says "Uniform Rules of Procedure for the Military Tribunals" plural and the date given is revised to 1 April 1947. In these so-called Uniform Rules of Procedure under Art. 23 we find the heading "Commission ers" and there we find that again the defense counsel has made the motion on 7 April 1947. If the Tribunal does not consider these uniform rules of procedure binding for this Tribunal then of course, we do not see any cause to call a plenary session on our part because the notion won't be possible. If the Tribunal is bound to these uniform rules of procedure, if that is not the case then the motion can remain as it was specified and formulated on 7 April 1947. May I therefore ask the Tribunal to include the matter of these Uniform Rules of Procedure in their deliberations.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I still believe that the request for a joint session will be premature at this time. As I read the motion, it is a motion asking this Tribunal to modify Rule 23. Also, of course, it addresses itself to the second part of my motion, but primarily it asks this Tribunal to modify Rule 23. Now, I believe that that is still a Tribunal matter until the Tribunal should deny the motion, in which event there will he a ruling from which a request for a joint ruling could lie. I believe that this Tribunal must first rule on the request to modify. That is my thinking on the matter.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems very clear that we have not yet reached the point for calling a joint session. One of the primary things I can think -- one of the primary things I think we ought to have settled now, is about this additional memorandum which I understood that Dr. Schilf would submit. Am I wrong on that?
DR. SCHILF: That is correct. However, may I emphasize the following: If we want to question witnesses now, who are inside the Nurnberg prison, we cannot interrogate them freely because Rule 23, I would like to say, automatically is applied against us, but that is a ruling according to the Uniform Rules of Procedure of April -- In other words, in practice, these Uniform Rules of Procedure, including No. 23, are automatically applied. Therefore, if we want to interrogate a witness who is in the prison, or the witness house, we can only interrogate him if a commissioner of the Tribunal is present. For that reason we believed that we should assume that these Rules of Procedure, these Uniform Rules of procedure, including Rule 23, should be applied in our case. Apart from that, it is clear, if the Tribunal does not accept these Uniform Rules of Procedure, that then a change in practice would be necessary -- a change in that practice which is valid until today concerning witnesses whom we want to interrogate.
THE TRIBUNAL (JUDGE BRAND): As I understand it, Rule 23, now is the uniform rule of all of the Tribunals.