* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * "In passing sentence the court was guided by these considerations:
The policital life of the German people under National Socialism is based on the community. One fundamental factor of the life of the national community is race. If a Jew commits racial pollution with a German woman, this amounts to polluting the German race and, by polluting a German woman, to a grave attack on the purity of German blood. The need for protection is particularly strong.
"Katzenberger has been practicing pollution for years. He was well acquainted with the point of view taken by patriotic German men and women as regards racial questions, and he knew that by this conduct he insulted the patriotic feelings of the German people. Nor did he mend his ways after the National Socialist revolution of 1933, after the passing of the Law for the Protection of German Blood, in 1935, after the action against Jews in 1938, or the outbreak of war in 1939.
"The court therefore regards it as indicated, as the only feasible answer to the frivolous conduct of the defendant, to pass death sentence, as the heaviest punishment provided by paragraph 4 of the Decree Against Public Enemies. His case takes on the complexion of a particularly grave crime as he was to be sentenced in connection with the offense of committing racial pollution, under paragraph 2 of the Decree Against Public Enemies, especially if one takes into consideration the defendant's character and the accumulative nature of commission.
This is why the defendant is liable to the death penalty which the law provides for only such cases. Dr. Bauer, the medical expert, described the defendant as fully responsible."
We have gone to some extent into the evidence of this case to show the nature of the proceedings and the animus of the defendant Rothaug. One undisputed fact, however, is sufficient to establish this case as being an act in furtherance of the Nazi program to persecute and exterminate Jews. That fact is that nobody but a Jew could have been tried for racial pollution. To this offense was added the charge that it was committed by Katzengerger through exploiting war conditions and the blackout. This brought the offense under the Ordinance Against Public Enemies and made the offense capital. Katzenberger was tried and executed only because he was a Jew. As stated by Elkar in his testimony, Rothaug achieved the final result by interpretations of existing laws as he boasted to Elkar he was able to do.
This Tribunal is not concerned with the legal incontestability under German law of these cases above discussed. The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that katzenberger was condemned and executed because he was a Jew; and Durka, Struss, and Lopata met the same fate because they were Poles. Their execution was in conformity with the policy of the Nazi State of persecution, torture, and extermination of these races.
The defendant Rothaug was the knowing and willing instrument in that program of persecution and extermination.
From the evidence it is clear that these trials lacked the essential elements of legality. In these cases the defendant's court, in spite of the legal sophistries which he employed, was merely an instrument in the program of the leaders of the Nazi State of persecution and extermination.
From the evidence it is clear that these trials lacked the essential elements of legality. In these cases the defendant's court, in spite of the legal sophistries which he employed, was merely an instrument in the program of the leaders of the Nazi State of persecution and extermination. That the number the defendant could wipe out within his competency was smaller than the number involved in the mass persecutions and exterminations by the leaders whom he served, does not mitigate his contribution to the program of those leaders. His acts were more terrible in that those who might have hoped for a last refuge in the institutions of justice found these institutions turned against them and a part of the program of terror and oppression.
The individual cases in which Rothaug applied the cruel and discriminatory law against Poles and Jews cannot be considered in isolation. It is of the essence of the charges against him that he participated in the national program of racial persecution. It is of the essence of the proof that he identified himself with this national program and gave himself utterly to its accomplishment. He participated in the crim of genocide.
Again, in determining the degree of guilt the Tribunal has considered the entire record of his activities, not alone under the head of racial persecution but in other respects also.
Despite protestations that his judgments were based solely upon evidence introduced in court, we are firly convinced that in numberless cases Rothaug's opinions were formed and decisions made, and in many instances publicly or privately announced before the trial had even commenced and certainly before it was concluded. He was in constant contact with his confidential assistant Elkar, a member of the criminal SD, who sat with him in weekly conferences in the chambers of the court. He formed his opinions from dubious records submitted to him before trial. By his manner and methods he made his court an instrumentality of terror and won the fear and hatred of the population. From the evidence of his closest associates as well as his victims, we find that Oswald Rothaug represented in Germany the personification of the secret Nazi intrigue and cruelty. He was and is a sadistic and evil man. Under any civilized judicial system he could have been impeached and removed from office or convicted of malfeasance in office on account of the scheming malevolence with which he administered injustice.
Upon the evidence in this case it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant Rothaug is guilty under Court three of the indictment. In his case we find no mitigating circumstances; no extenuation.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Brand speaking for the Tribunal. The interpreters will not find this portion in the transcript. Pages 243 to 247 are removed from the text and constitute no part of the opinion of this Tribunal. In lieu of those pages, the following statement is to be inserted:
"The evidence has not convinced the Tribunal beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant Barnickel. He is therefore acquitted on all counts."
JUDGE BLAIR: Judge Blair continuing with the judgment of the Tribunal.
The Defendant Petersen Upon the evidence submitted, it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant Hans Petersen is not guilty under any of the counts charged against him in the indictment.
JUDGE HARDING: Judge Harding continuing with the reading of the judgment.
The Defendant Nebelung Upon the evidence submitted, it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant Nebelung is not guilty under any of the counts charged against him in the indictment.
JUDGE HARDING: Judge Harding continuing with the reading of the judgment.
The Defendant Cuhorst The defendant Cuhorst is charged under Counts two, three and four of the indictment.
There is no evidence in this case to substantiate the charge under Count two of the indictment.
As to Court four, the proof established that Cuhorst was a Gaustellenleiter and so a member of the Gau staff and a "sponsoring" member of the SS. His function as Gaustellenleiter was that of a public propaganda speaker.
In its Judgment the International Military Tribunal, in defining the members of the Party Leadership Corps who came under its decision as being members of a criminal organi zation, states the following:
"The decision of the Tribunal on these staff organizations includes only the Amtsleiters who were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsteitung, Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other staff officers and Party organizations attached to the Leadership Corps other than the Amtsleiters referred to above, the Tribunal will follow the suggestion of the prosecution in excluding them from the declaration."
There is no evidence in this case which shows that the office of Gaustellenleiter was the head of any office on the staff of the Gauleitung.
With regard to the SS the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal is as follows:
"The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter the group composed of those persons who had boon officially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became or remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter * * * ."
Referring back to the membership enumerated, the Judgment declares:
"In dealing with the SS, the Tribunal includes all persons who had been officially accepted as members of the SS, including the members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members of the SS Totenkopf Verbaendo, and the members of any of the different police forces who were members of the SS."
It is not believed by this Tribunal that a sponsoring membership is included in this definition.
The Tribunal therefore finds the defendant Cuhorst not guilty under Counts two and four of the indictment.
As to count three the problem is considerably more complicated. There are many affidavits and much testimony in the record as to the defendant's character as a fanatical Nazi and a ruthless judge. There is also much evidence as to the arbitrary, unfair, and unjudicial manner in which he conducted his trials. Some of the evidence against him was weakened on cross examination, but the general picture given of him as such a judge is one which the Tribunal accepts.
The cases to be considered as connecting him with crimes established in this case under Count three involve the question as to whether the evidence establishes his connection with the persecution of Poles. In this connection we have given particular consideration to the Skowron and Pietra cases.
Unfortunately the records of the Special Court at Stuttgart were destroyed at the time that the Place of Justice in Stuttgart was burned. There are, therefore, no records available as to the cases tried by Cuhorst.
From the evidence available, this Tribunal does not consider that it can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of inflicting the punishments which he imposed on racial grounds or that it can say beyond a reasonable doubt that he used the discriminatory provisions of the Decree Against Poles and Jews to the prejudice of the Poles whom he tried, While the defendant Cuhorst followed a misguided fanaticism, certain things can be said in his favor.
He was severely criticized for his leniency by the defendant Klemm in a number of cases which he tried. He was tried by a Party court for statements considered to reflect upon the Party, which he made in a trial involving Party officials.
Subsequently he was relieved as a judge in Stuttgart because he apparently did not conform to what the State and Party demanded of a judge.
This Tribunal does not consider itself commissioned to try the conscience of a man or to conform to what the State and Party demanded of a judge.
This Tribunal does not consider itself commissioned to try the conscience of a man or to condemn a man merely for a course of conduct foreign to its own conception of justice. According to its training and conception of the law, it is limited to the evidence before it as to the commission of certain alleged offenses. Upon the evidence before it, it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant Cuhorst has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes alleged and that he be, therefore, acquitted on the charges against him.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Brand continuing with the reading of the opinion of the Tribunal.
The Defendant Oeschey The defendant Oeschey joined the NSDAP on 1 December 1931.
He was war representative for the Gau Main Office for legal aid and legal advice. After filling other offices he was appointed on 1 January 1939 to the office of Senior Judge of the District Court at Nuernberg; which office he held until 1 April 1941. He was then appointed District Court Director at the same court. He was a presiding judge of the Special Court in Nurnberg.
By decree of 30 July 1940 of the Reich Legal Office of the NSDAP, he was provisionally commissioned with the direction of the legal office of the NSDAP in the Franconia Gau, and the Leadership of the Franconia Gau in the NSRB, the National Socialist Lawyers' League. He carried out his duties in the Leadership Corps of the of the Party at the same time that he was serving as a judge of the Special Court.
His personnel file in the Reich Ministry of Justice shows that he was highly recommended for his Party reliability by at least five different public officials.
He was drafted into the army in February 1943, and remained in the army until the end of the war; however, he was released for the period from 4 April until 14 April 1945, during which time he functioned as chairman of the civilian court martial at Nurnberg. The record discloses that he and the defendant Rothaug were the guiding if not controlling, spirits of the Special Court at Nurnberg, which was known as the most brutal of the special courts in Germany.
Among many cases which gave evidence of his arbitrary character we will give detailed attention to two:
In March 1943, Sofie Kaminska, a widowed Polish farm laborer, and Wasyl Wdowen, a Ukrainian, were indicted before the Special Court at Nurnberg for alleged crimes as follows:
Kaminska for a violation of the law against Poles and Jews in connection with the crime of assault and battery and threat and resistance to an officer; Wdowen for the alledged crime of being accessory to a crime according to the law against Poles and Jews, and for attempting to free a prisoner. The case was tried before the Special Court, the defendant Oeschey presiding.
The facts on which the sentence was based may, with complete fairness to the defendant Oeschey, be very briefly summarized. Shortly after the invasion of Poland, Kaminska "came to Germany, being committed to work there". Kaminska and Wdowen were lovers. They were both working for a farmer, Gundel. They demanded pay from Gundel, which was refused, and they became more insistent. "The defendant Wdowen actually gave the farmer a push". "In his distress Gundel called for help of the Pfc. Anton Manner, who was in uniform and happened to be spending his leave there." A quarrel followed.
Kaminska slapped the soldier's face, and the soldier slapped her face. During the dispute the soldier's combat infantryman's badge fell to the ground. There were various demonstrations; the soldier drew his bayonet and Kaminska ran out of the room and took a hoe, but did not get a chance to attack the soldier because he closed the door. Shortly thereafter, the soldier was riding on his bicycle and the Pole, Kaminska, threw a stone at him without, however, hitting him. The next day a police official came out to the farm and arrested Kaminska, who followed him "unwillingly". Wdowen, contrary to the instructions of the police officer, followed them. The policeman slapped Wdowen's face twice to force him to turn back. Nevertheless, Wdown followed to the door of the cell and attempted to assist the Polich woman, Kaminska, in resisting imprisonment. The very most that can possibly be said of the evidence, as stated by the defendant Oeschey himself, is that there was good squabble with mutual recriminations and threats. It is to be understood that many of the statements heretofore made, as quoted from the opinion, were denied by the defendants in that case but, as before stated, we do not retry the case upon the facts. The court argues at great length concerning the claim of the prosecution that the stone weighed a half a pound and should be considered equal to a cutting or thrusting weapon. The court said:
"The defendant had the insolence to attack a German soldier; she took up an offensive position which would have led to a great blood bath if the soldier had not evaded the stone which was hurled at him."
The court said of Kaminska: "She thereby characterizes herself as a Polish violent criminal", and then stated:
"As the defendant on 1 September 1939 was a resident in the territory of the former Polish State, she had to be found guilty, in application of paragraphs II, III, and XIV of the Penal Law against Poles, of a crime of assault and battery in coincidence with a crime of threat, a crime under paragraph 1, Section 1, of the law against violent criminals, and of a crime of offering resistance to the authority of a State."
The fact that the discriminatory law against Poles was involked in this case is established. The opinion signed by Oeschey states:
"Under paragraph III, Section 2, of the Penal Law against Poles, the death sentence must be passed if the law threatens with it."
Concerning Wdowen, who was a Ukrainian and therefore could not be sentenced under the law against Poles, the court commented on the fact that he know that the German economy, on account of war-time conditions, was dependent on foreign labor, "in particular labor from the Eastern territories". The court drew the conclusion that Wdowen, who had used at most only a little force in attempting to protect Kaminska, was guilty of having taken advantage of extraordinary war-time conditions and of violating the law against violent criminals. Both defendants were sentenced to death by the defendant Oeschey. The associated judges in the Kaminska and Wkowen case were Doctors Gros and Pfaff. They are guilty of having signed the judgment. Both submitted affidavits and both were cross examined before this Tribunal. Dr. Gros stated that Oeschey demanded the severest counter-measures in similar cases. "We associate judges were powerless towards such an attitude. It must be mentioned that none of the defendants had criminal records and that they were eliminated in a most objectionable way by Oeschey for racial and political reasons."
The other associate judge, Dr. Theodor Pfaff, spoke of the Kaminska case as "the most terrible of my entire career. *** The sentence of death and the consequent execution of these Poles offended my sense of ethics and has continually preyed upon my con science.
I would like to state here that Oeschey forced his will upon us."
The two associate judges are to be condemned for their spineless attitude in submitting to the domination of the defendant Oeschey, but we cannot fail to give weight to their statements, which in effect amounted to confessions of their own wrong doing.
In this case Oeschey, with evil intent, participated in the governmentally-organizcd system for the racial persecution of Poles. This is also a case of such a perversion of the judicial process as to shock the conscience of mankind.
The progressive degeneration in the administration of justice came to a climax in 1944 and 1945. A decree by Thierack on 13 December 1944 abrogated the rules concerning the obligatory representation of accused persons by defense counsel. It was left for the judge to decide whether defense counsel was required. On 15 February 1945, as a final measure of desperation and in the face of imminent defeat, the law was passed for the establishment of civilian courts martial. The statute provided that sentence should be either death, acquittal, or commitment to the regular court. Pursuant to this law Gauleiter Holz set up a drumhead court martial in Nurnberg. It consisted of the defendant Oeschey as Presiding Judge, with Gau Inspector Haberkern and a major in the Wehrmacht as associate judges. On 2 April 1945 Karl Schroeder was appointed prosecutor. The judges and prosecutor then wont to the office of the Gauleiter, where he delivered a speech in which he stated:
"That the main point was to stop the American advance; one could count upon introduction of new weapons, and that he expected that the court martial would give the necessary support to the army at the front by applying the severest measures."
The officials were sworn in on 3 April. The affidavit of Schroeder, who later appeared for cross examination, discloses that Holz intended that the first case he tried on the third day of April.
Schroeder stated this would be impossible because he would need time to examine the case. The first case to be tried was that of Count Montgelas. Schroeder states that the case was the most difficult in his practice, but that it had to be tried "because the Gauleitung pressed for a quick decision of this matter." The defendant Oeschey testified concerning the court martial procedure as follows:
"Proceedings were to follow the provisions laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure which had been very strongly simplified. Nevertheless, courts martial had observed in their proceedings the most important principles of protecting the interest of the defendant. The defendant's right to be heard, oral trial, admission of defense counsel, thorough presentation of evidence, a vote among the judges, and so forth."
The procedure followed by Oeschey as Presiding Judge in the case Montgelas did not conform to the following statement. Count Montgelas had for some time been represented by defense counsel Eichinger, who had an office in the courthouse adjacent to that of the prosecutor, and who had dealings with the prosecutor concerning the Montgelas case. The defendant Oeschey testified that he had directed that Eichinger was not notified concerning the trial, but in any event Eichinger was not notified and Oeschey informed the prosecutor that he would conduct the trial without defense counsel because the "legal prerequisites for trial without defense counsel did exist". He apparently had reference to Thierack's decree of 13 December 1944, supra. Eichinger, as attorney for Count Montgelas, received his first information concerning the trial after Montgelas had been convicted and shot.
The statute creating civilian courts martial specifically provided that they should consist of "a judge of a criminal court, as president***." At the time of his appointment, Oeschey was a soldier serving in the Wehrmacht and was not a judge of a criminal court. He testified that the statute meant only that it was necessary "that a man be appointed who has the qualifications to exercise the function of a judge."
The Nurnberg civilian court martial functioned for the first time on 5 April, held ten sessions, and disposed of twelve defendants, ten of whom were charged with political offenses. On 16 April the American Army was approaching Nurnberg, and on that date at noon the civilian court martial ceased to function.
An exhibit was offered in evidence containing the results of an official investigation of the defendant Oeschey and Prosecutor Schroeder for perversion of justice, conducted in August 1946, before German judicial authorities. An objection to the receipt of the exhibit was first made by counsel for Oeschey but was later withdrawn. The exhibit was received and is before us for consideration. From this exhibit we learn that Dr. Wilhelm Eser was the investigating judge in the Montgelas case. He states that at the hearing of Montgelas a Gestapo official was present, and that if Montgelas had not been arrested the official would have taken him back to the Gestapo "as it was demanded in the record of the investigation ***." Eichinger, who appeared as a witness before the Tribunal, had been employed in February by Countess Montgelas to defend her husband. He stated that he had conferred with Prosecutor Dr. Mueller and had been informed that the prosecutor recognized "the competence of the People's Court and therefore he submitted the record of the case to the Chief Public Prosecutor at the People's Court for a decision.
I asked him to inform me immediately after the record was returned, respectively after receiving the decision of the Chief Public Prosecutor.
He promised me this, and I was completely reassured."
At this time Montgelas was in the sick ward of the prison for solitary confinement. On 10 April Eichinger went to the prison office to examine the files in the Montgelas case, whereupon the Director of Nurnberg Prison informed him confidentially that Count Montgelas had been summoned before the court martial on 5 April at two p.m., sentenced to death, and shot the next day. The crime for which Count Montgelas had been shot consisted of remarks made by him in a private room in the Grand Hotel to a lady, Mrs. Pfleger of Bamberg. The Count had made insulting remarks concerning Hitler, among others to the effect that his true name was Schickelgruber. He also expressed approval of the attempt upon Hitler's life of 30 July 1944. We are convinced from the testimony of Eichinger before this Tribunal that if any serious effort had been made he could have been notified prior to the trial of his client. Eichinger expressed the opinion, with which this Tribunal concurs, that a summons issued at 1400 hours to appear at 1500 hours before a court martial is an offense against justice. The only witness who appeared against Count Monteglas was an SS Fuehrer, who had been shadowing him for many days in an attempt to secure evidence against him. By concealing himself in an adjoining room and by the use of a mechanical device, he was able to overhear the conversation between Montgelas and the lady and to testify concerning it. Eichinger states that the statements of the SS Fuehrer who was the cavesdropper at the hotel were "in important points contradictory" to tho statements Montgelas had made to his attorney and that the latter had already proposed to summon the lady with whom Montgelas had made to his attorney and that the latter had already proposed to summon the lady with whom Montgelas had conversed as a rebuttal witness in behalf of tho Count.
The wife of the martyr Montgelas stated in the official investigation that Chief Prosecutor Schroeder told her that "There had A Dec 1947-A-MSD-22-3-Goldberg not been time to comply with my husband's urgent request to get a defense counsel". Schroeder also told the Countess that she was not to be given any information on the disposal of the body of her husband because he had died a dishonorable death.
Thus, on the last days of the war, when the American Army was almost at the gates of Nurnberg, and within a month of the total collapse of German opposition, a sickman, after solitary confinement, is indicted on 3 April, tried on 5 April, and shot on 6 April without the knowledge of his counsel, in secret proceedings, and without the benefit of witnesses who wuold have testified for him. Such a mock trial is not a judicial proceeding but a murder.
It is provided in C.C. Law 10 that persecutions on political as well as racial grounds are recognized as crimes. While the mere fact alone that Montgelas was prosecuted for remarks hostile to the Nazi regime may not constitute a violation of C.C. Law 10, the circumstances under which the defendant was brought to trial and the manner in which he was tried convince us that Montgelas was not convicted for undermining the already collapsed defensive strength of the defeated nation, but on the contrary, that the law was deliberately invoked by Gauleiter Holz and enforced by Oeschey as a last vengeful act of political persecution. If the provisions of C.C. Law 10 do not cover this case, we do not know what kind of political persecution it would cover.
We have already indicated that we will not convict any defendant merely because of the fact, without more, that he participated in the passing or enforcement of laws for the punishment of habitual criminals, lo*ters, hoarders, or those guilty of undermining the defensive strength of the nation, but we also stated that these laws were in many instances applied in an arbitrary and brutal manner shocking to the conscience of mankind and punishable here. This was the situation in a number of eases tried by Rothaug and Oeschey, but concerning which we have no transcript of testimony and we must, therefore, of necessity rely upon statements of associates and close observers.
In this connection we shall have reference to affidavits and to testimony of associates of the defendant Oeschey. We shall refer to statements of affilants only in these cases in which the affilant was also brought to court and verbally cross examined concerning his statements.
Dr. Hermann Mueller was a prosecutor at the Special Court in Nurnberg. He said:
"He (Oeschey) frequently insulted the defendants and presented the crimes to them as if these crimes were already a proven fact. His behavior was often so extreme that one might well believe he was a psychopathic case. The abusive insults that he inflicted upon the defendants were, to the highest degree, unworthy of a court trial. He wielded such influence over the form of the administration of justice through his close Party affiliations that the other officials of equal rank at the Nurnberg Administration of Criminal Justice were almost always forced to yield."
Mueller mentions several cases in which Oeschey announced before trial that the defendant would be executed. In a case against Schnaus he states that Oeschey:
"told me that, as a result of a discussion with government officials, he was certain to obtain the death sentence. At that time I was still unaware of the changed situation at the Special Court occasioned by the war, and turned to my immediate superior for information. He then informed me of the very close relations existing between judges and the prosecutors."
Concerning the case Montgelas, Mueller stated:
"Concerning the case of Montgelas it must be pointed out that this was a case of political extermination, which was handled in a most hideous fashion."
Again, he said:
"Oeschey was the most brutal judge that I have ever known in my life and a most willing instrument of the Nazi terroristic justice."
Dr. Armin Baur was the medical officer at the Special Court. He said:
"One always had the impression that the verdict was already previously decided upon and that Oeschey and Rothaug were just playing cat and mouse with the defendants for hours. No occasion was missed to insult the defendants in the filthiest way."
This medical expert dealt with cases which were tried both by Rathaug and by Oeschey. In the Katzenberger case the defendant Rothaug told the doctor that he wanted the defendant examined but that the examination was a matter of pure formality because the Jew "would be beheaded anyhow", and he added, "It is sufficient for me that the swine said that a German girls sat on his lap." Dr. Baur states that "foreigners were generally dealt with by Rothaug and Oeschey as inferior beings whose task it was only to serve the German Master Race."
Hans Kern, defense counsel, stated "that foreigners were told at the beginning and throughout the trial that they were to be annihilated". Again he said:
"Rothaug and Oeschey declined, as a matter of principle, to believe Polish citizens who were under accusation. They were branded as liars. It was assumed that their inmate tendency made liars of them."
He describes Oeschey as a "nororious Pole biater".
Dr. Gustav Kunz, leading court doctor at Nurnberg, was an excellent and reliable witness. He stated:
"Insult, humiliation, and mental torture of the defendants' were routine and the two judges, especially Oeschey, did not even renounce them in cases in which -- according to the legal situation -- the verdict had to be and actually was acquittal or an insignificant sentence."
Kurt Hoffmann, prosecutor at Nurnberg, states that Oeschey was severe as to the German defendants and was:
"even more severe with regard to sentences against foreigners and much mere furious in his conduct of their trials, especially in the case of Polies."
Adolph Paulus, former public prosecutor, speaks of the "brutality of which only Oeschey was capable".
Friedrich Doebig, who was President of the District Court of Appeals at Nurnberg, later Senate President of the Reich Supreme Court, stated that "Oeschey like Rothaug was a fanatical Nazi, who consistently interpreted and enforced the law in accord with Nazi ideologies".
Dr. Herbert Lipps served with defendant Oeschey on the Special Court, Nurnberg. He states that Oeschey was autocratic and would not tolerate contradiction.
"Defendants were insulted by Oeschey in the most abusive manner and death candidates were told by Oeschey right at the beginning of the session that they had forfeited the life.
"Towards foreigners, particularly Poles, Oeschey was especially rigorous and here upheld the National Socialist theory of liquidating where rationals of the occupied territories were concerned. I remember a ease in which a Polish farmhand was ill-treated by his employer and defended himself. Oeschey told the defendant that a Polo was not allowed to oppose a German."
Dr. Franz Gros was an associate judge at Nurnberg. He states that Oeschey followed the harsh procedural methods of Rothaug and was a "fanatic National Socialist who pursued his dishonorable motives with conviction and who willingly lent his hand to bloodthirsty National Socialist jurisdiction".
Dr. Pfaff was an associate judge at Nurnberg and corroborates the statements of Dr. Gros.
Dr. Joseph Mayer was a Referent in the prosecutor's office at Nurnberg. Concerning Oeschey, he said:
"Oeschey *** was obviously of Rothaug's school. Outwardly he gave the impression of being morose and unrelenting. I cannot remember ever having had a personal conversation with him. As a rule he began the proceedings with a pre-conceived opinion to which he adhered. Anyone who tried to oppose this opinion was overridden by him in the most brutal way. He insulted the defendants all the time in a most offensive manner, informing them repeatedly all the way through, what he intended to do with them. He had an extensive vocabulary of invectives for that purpose, the use of which he developed to a fine art. *** It was literally tormenting if one had to listen to this tirade often for hours at a time. When his face became distorted into a repulsive mask by his continual scolding and abusive language, Faust's words to Mephistopheles would often quite involuntarily come to my mind: 'Thou freak of filth and fire'." Foseph Eichinger, defense attorney at Nurnberg, stated:
"His prejudice was so strong that he did not consider, seriously the statements of the defense and dismissed them rudely or ironically. Even during the trial he repeatedly addressed the defendant thus: 'People such as you deserve to be exterminated', 'You will be convicted or he called the defendant insulting and humiliating names such as 'criminal', 'scoundrel', 'enemy of the people'."
Again, he said: