"by means of the law of 18 June 1935; the liberalist foundation of the old Penal Code: 'no penalty without a law' was definitly abandoned and replaced by the postulate: 'no crime without punishment' , which corresponds to our conception of the law."
"In the future, criminal behavior, even if it does not fall under formal penal precepts, will receive the deserved punishment if such behavior is considered punishable according to the healthy feelings of the people."
This is the Hans Frank (since hanged) who at his trial testified concerning the racial persecution in which he had participated. He said, we quote:
"A thousand years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be erased."
On 10 March 1936 the defendant Schlegelberger said:
"In the sphere of criminal law the road to a creation of justice in harmony with the moral concepts of the New Reich has been opened up by a new wording of Section 2 of the Criminal Code, whereby a person is also to be punished even if his deed is not punishable according to the law, but if he deserves punishment in accordance with the basic concepts of criminal law and the sound instincts of the people. This new definition became necessary because of the rigidity of the norm in force hitherto."
Reich Minister Thierack on 5 January 1943 said:
"The inner law of the guardian of justice is National Socialism; the written law is only to be an aid to the interpretation of National Socialist ideas."
In the words of the defendant Rothenberger the project was "to organize Europe anew and to create a new world philosophy". Again, he said, we quote:
" * * * this reaction of 'antigonism toward law' is justified because the present moment absolutely demands a rigid restriction of the power of law.
He who is striding gigantically toward a new world order cannot move in the limitation of an orderly administration of justice."
Strangely enough we find the Nazi judicial system condemned by a judge who in practice was its most fanatical adherent. The defendant Rothaug testified as follows:
"As of every other civil servant , of the judge there was demanded not only obedience but also loyalty and an inner connection with the doctrine of the State. The change-over of the judiciary to that different intellectual leval was attempted via the political factor of the Administration of Justice and that was when things came to grief; and it was then that the notorious 'back door' which I have mentioned, took effect."
After discussing the extraodrinary legal remedies by which final judgments in criminal cases were set aside by means of the nullification plea and the extraordinary objection, Rothaug said:
"As far as that went no objections could be made. What was more dangerous was the influence by means of judges' letters and the guidance of jurisdiction."
To the domination by Hitler and the political "guidance" of the Ministry of Justice must be added the direct pressure of Party functionaries and police officials. The record is replete with testimony of specific instances of interference in the administration of justice by officials of Party and police. But for the demonstration of the viciousness and universality of the practice it is only necessary to cite the words of the defendants themselves.
The defendant Rothenberger describes the manner in which the "administration of justice was burdened by the Party and by the SS", and referred to in his testimony to the "thousand little Hitlers who every day jeopardized the independence of the individual judge."
The defendant Schlegelberger spoke with more caution:
"If in a trial testimonials of political conduct were submitted for the characterization of the accused, it has to be left to the judge's dexterity to avoid conflict with the department which furnishes the testimonial of political conduct."
The defendant Lautz testified concerning attempted interference with his duties by the SS. We have already quoted the opinion of the defendant Oeschey as expressed in a letter to his brother.
A reliable witness, Dr. Harms AnschuetZ; testified:
"After the issuance of the German Civil Service Code; strong pressure was brought to bear upon all officials; including judges to join the NSDAP; or not to reject requests to join; otherwise there existed the danger that they might be retired or dismissed. But once a Party member; a judge was under Party discipline and Party jurisdiction which dominated his entire life as official and as private person. " The witness Wilhelm Oehlicker; formerly a Justice official and at present judge in Hamburg, testified that "the longer the war proceeded, in my opinion the more and more they (Party officials) tried to interfere with the courts and influence the courts directly."
The final degradation of the judiciary is disclosed in a secret communication by Ministerial Director Letz of the Reich Ministry of Justice to Dr. Vollmer, also a Ministerial Director in the Department. Not only were the judges "guided" and at times coerced; they were spied upon. We quote:
"Moreover, I know from documents, which the Minister produces from time to time out of his private files, that the Security Service takes up special problems of the administration of justice with thoroughness and makes aummarized situation reports about them. As far as I am informed, a member of the Security Service is attached to each judicial authority. This member is obliged to give information under the seal of secrecy. This procedure is secret and the person who gives the information is not named.
In this way we get, so to say, anonymous reports. Reasons given for this procedure are of State political interest. As long as the direct interests cf the State security are concerned, nothing can be said against it, especially in wartime."
In view of the conclusive proof of the sinister influences which were in constant interplay between Hitler, his Ministers, the Ministry of Justice, the Party, the Gestapo, and the courts, we see no merit in the suggestion that Nazi judges are entitled to the benefit of the Anglo-American doctrine of judicial immunity. The doctrine that judges are not personally liable for their judicial actions is based on the concept of an independent judiciary administering impartial justice. Furthermore, it has never prevented the prosecution of a judge for malfeasance in office. If the evidence cited supra does not demonstrate the utter destruction of judicial independence and impartiality, then we "never writ nor no man ever proved." The function cf the Nazi courts was judicial only in a limited sense. They more closely resembled administrative tribunals acting under directives from above in a quasi-judicial manner.
In operation the Nazi system forced the judges into one of two categories. In the first we find the judges who still retained ideals of judicial independence and who administered justice with a measure of impartiality and moderation. Judgments which they rendered were set aside by the employment of the nullity plea and the extraordinary objection. The defendants they sentenced were frequently transferred to the Gestapo on completion of prison terms andwere then shot or sent to concentration camps. The judges themselves were threatened and criticized and sometimes removed from office. To this group the defendant Cuhorst belonged. In the other category were the judges who with fanatical zeal enforced the will cf the Party with such severity that they experienced no difficulties and little interference from party officials.
To this group the defendants Rothaug and Oeschey belonged.
We turn to a consideration and classification of the evidence. The prosecution has introduced captured documents in great number which establish the Draconic character of the Nazi criminal laws and prove that the death penalty was imposed by courts in thousands of cases. Cases in which the extreme penalty was imposed may in large measure be classified in the following groups:
1. Cases against proven habitual criminals;
2. Cases of looting in the devastated areas of Germany;committed after air raids and under cover of blackout;
3. Crimes against the war economy - rationing, hoarding; and the like.
4. Crimes amounting to an undermining of the defensive strength of the nation; defeatist remarks; criticisms of Hitler; and the like;
5. Crimes of treason and high treason;
6. Crimes of various types committed by Poles; Jews; and ether foreigners;
7. Crimes committed under the "Nacht und Nebel" program, and similar procedures.
Consideration will next be given to the first four groups as above set forth. The Tribunal is keenly aware of the danger of incorporating in the judgment as law its own moral convictions or even those of the Anglo-American legal world. This we will not do. We may and do condemn the Diaconic laws and express abhorence at the limitations imposed by the Nazi regime upon freedom of speech and action , but t he question still remains unaswered: "Do those Draconic laws or the decisions rendered under them constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity?"
Concerning the punishment of habitual criminals; we think the answer is clear. In many civilized States statutory provisions require the courts to impose sentences of life imprisonment upon proof of conviction of three or more felonies. We are unable to say in one breath that life imprisonment for habitual criminals is a salutary and reasonable punishment in America in peace times, but that the imposition of the death penalty was a crime against humanity here when the nation was in the throes of war.
The same considerations apply largely in the case of looting. Every nation recognizes the absolute necessity of more stringent inforcement of the criminal law in times of great emergency. Anyone who has seen the utter devastation of the great cities of Germany must realize that the safety of the civilian population demanded that the were-wolves who roamed the streets of the burning cities, robbing the dead and plundering the ruined homes should be severely punished. The same considerations apply, though in a lesser degree, to prosecutions of hoarders and violators of war economy decrees.
Questions of far greater difficulty are involved when we consider the cases involving punishment for undermining military morale. The limitations on freedom of speech which were imposed in the enforcement of these laws are revolting to our sense of justice. A court would have no hesitation in condemning them under any free Constitution, including that of the Weimar Republic, if the limitations were applied in time of peace; but even under the protection of the Constitution of the United States a citizen is not wholly free to attack the Government or to interfere with its military aims in time of war. In the face of a real and present danger, freedom of speech may be somewhat restricted even in America. Can we then say that in the throes of total war and in the presence of impending disaster these officials who enforced these savage laws in a last desperate effort to stave off defeat were guilty of crimes against humanity?
It is persuasively urged that the fact that Germany was waging a criminal war of aggression colors all of these acts with the dye of criminality. To those who planned the war of aggression and who were charged with and were guilty of the crime against the peace as defined in the Charter, this argument is conclusive, but these defendants are not charged with crimes against the peace nor has it been proven here that they knew that the war which they were supporting on the home Court3, Case 3 front was based upon a criminal conspiracy or was per se a violation of international law.
The lying propaganda of Hitler and Goebbels concealed even from many public officials the criminal plans of the inner circle of aggressors. If we should adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a criminal war of aggression every act which would have been legal in a defensive war was illegal in this one, we would be forced to the conclusion that every soldier who marched under orders into occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a criminal and a murderer. The rules of land warfare upon which the prosecution has relied would not be the measure of conduct and the pronouncement of guilt in any case would become a mere formality. In the opinion of the Tribunal the territory occupied and annexed by Germany after September 1939 never became a part of Germany, but for that conclusion we need not rest upon the doctrinethat the invasion was a crime against the peace. Such purported annexations in the course of hostilities while armies are in the field are provisional only, and dependent upon the final successful outcome of the war. If the war succeeds, no one questions the validity of the annexation. If it fails, the attempt to annex becomes abortive. In view of cur clear duty to move with caution in the recently charted field of international affairs, we conclude that the demestic laws and judgments in Germany which limited free speech in the emergency of war cannot be condemned as crimes against humanity merely by invoking the doctine of aggressive war. All of the laws to which we have referred could be and were applied in a discriminatory manner and in the case of many, the Ministry of Justice and the courts enforced them by arbitrary and brutal means, shocking to the conscience of mankind and punishable here. We merely hold that under the particular facts of this case we cannot convict any defendant merely because of the fact, without more, that laws of the first four types were passed or enforced.
A different situation is presented when we consider the cases which Court3, Case 3 fall within types 5, 6, and 7.We will take our afternoon recess of fifteen minutes.
Court No. III, Case No. III.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Harding will continue with the reading of the Opinion.
Treason and High Treason We have expressed the opinion that the purported annexation of territory in the East which occurred in the course of war and while opposing armies were still in the field was invalid and that in point of law such territory never became a part of the Reich, hut merely remained in German military control under belligerent occupancy.
On 27 October 1939 the Polish Ambassador at Washington informed the Secretary of State that the German Reich had decreed the annexation of part of the territory of the Polish Republic. In acknowledging the receipt of this information, Secretary Hull stated that he had "taken note of the Polish Government's declaration that it considers this act as illegal and therefore null and void." (Department of State Bulletin, 4 November 1939, page 458; Hyde, International Law, Vol. 1 (2d ed.), page 391). The foregoing fact alone demonstrates that the Polish Government was still in existence and was recognized by the Government of the United States. Sir Arnold D. McNair expressed a principle which we believe to be incontestable in the following words:
"A purported incorporation of occupied territory by a military occupant into his own kingdom during the war is illegal and ought not to receive any recognition. * * *" (Legal Facts of bar (2d ed.), (Cambridge, 1944), page 320, Note).
We recognize that in territory under belligerent occupation the military authorities of the occupant may, under the laws of customs of war, punish local residents who engage in Fifth Column activities hostile to the occupant. It must be conceded that the right to punish such activities depends upon the specific acts charged and not upon the name by which these acts are described. It must also be conceded that Poles who voluntarily entered the Alt Reich could, under the laws of war, Court No. III, Case No. III.
be punished for the violation of non-discriminatory German penal statutes.
These considerations, however, do not justify the action of the Reich prosecutors who in numerous cases charged Poles with high treason under the following circumstances: Poles were charged with attempting to escape from the Reich. The indictments in these cases alleged that the defendants were guilty of attempting, by violence or threat of violence, to detach from the Reich territory belonging to the Reich, contrary to the express provisions of Section 80 of the law of 24 April 1934. The territory which defendants were charged with attempting to detach from the Reich consisted of portions of Poland, which the Reich had illegally attempted to annex. If the theory of the German prosecutors in these cases were carried to its logical conclusion it would mean that every Polish soldier from the occupied territories fighting for the restoration to Poland of territory belonging to it would be guilty of high treason against the Reich and on capture, could be shot. The theory of the Reich prosecutors carries with it its own refutation.
Prosecution in these cases represented an unwarrantable extention of the concept of high treason, which constituted in our opinion a war crime and a crime against humanity. The wrong done in such prosecutions was not merely in misnaming the offense of attempting to escape from the Reich; the wrong was in falsely naming the act high treason and thereby invoking the death penalty for a minor offense.
Membership in Criminal Organizations
C.C. Law 10 provides:
"(1) Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:
* * * * * * * * * * "(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal."
(Article II, Section I (d)).
Article 9 of the Charter provides:
"At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of Court No. III, Case No. III.
which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization."
Article 10 is as follows:
"In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military, or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not he questioned." (IMT Charter, Articles 9 and 10).
Concerning the effect of the last quoted section, we quote from the opinion of the IMT in the case of United States, et al., vs. Goering, et al., as follows:
"Article 10 of the Charter makes claim that the declaration of criminality against an accused organization is final and cannot be challenged in any subsequent criminal proceeding against a member of the organization." (IMT Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume I, page 255).
We quote further from the opinion in that case:
"In effect, therefore, a member of an organization which the Tribunal has declared to be criminal may be subsequently convicted of the crime of membership and be punished for that crime by death. This is not to assume that international or military courts which will try these individuals will not exercise appropriate standards of justice. This is a far reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly safeguarded, may produce great injustice. * * * "A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes.
There must be a group bound together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used in connection with Court No. III, Case No. III.
the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the organization. Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations." (IMT Judgment, Volume I, pages 255-256.)
The Tribunal in that case recommended uniformity of treatment so far as practicable in the administration of this law, recognizing, however, that discretion in sentencing is vested in the courts. Certain groups of the Leadership Corps, the SS, the Gestapo, the SD, were declared to be criminal organizations by the Judgment of the first International Military Tribunal. The test to be applied in determining the guilt of individual members of a criminal organization is repeatedly stated in the opinion of the first International Military Tribunal. The test is as follows: those members of an organization which has been declared criminal "who became or remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or who were personally implicated as members of the organization in the commission of such crimes" are declared punishable.
Certain categories of the Leadership Corps are defined in the first International Military Tribunal Judgment as criminal organizations. We quote:
"The Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the Ortsgruppenleiters participated, to one degree or another, in these criminal programs. The Reichsleitung as the staff organization of the Party is also responsible for these Court No. III, Case No. III.
criminal programs as well as the heads of the various staff organizations of the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters. The decision of the Tribunal on these staff organizations includes only the Amtsleiters who were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung, Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other staff officers and Party organizations attached to the leadership Corps other than the Amtsleiters referred to above, the Tribunal will follow the suggestion of the Prosecution in excluding them from the declaration." (Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume I, page 261).
In like manner certain categories of the SD were defined as criminal organizations. Again, we quote:
"In dealing with the SD the Tribunal includes Amter III, VI, and VII of the RSHA, and all other members of the SD, including all local representatives and agents, honorary or otherwise, whether they were technically members of the SS or not, but not including honorary informers who were not members of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who were transferred to the SD." (Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume I, pages 267-268).
In like manner certain categories of the SS were declared to constitute criminal organizations:
"In dealing with the SS the Tribunal includes all persons who had been officially accepted as members of the SS including the members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members of the SS Totenkopf Verbaende, and the members of any of the different police forces who were members of the SS. The Tribunal does not include the so-called SS riding units." (Trial of the Major War Criminals, Volume I, page 273).
Court No. III, Case No. III.
C. C. Law 10 provides that we are bound by the findings as to the criminal nature of these groups or organizations. However, it should be added that the criminality of these groups and organizations is also established by the evidence which has been received in the pending case. Certain of the defendants are charged in the indictment with membership in the following groups or organizations which have been declared and are now found to be criminal, to wit: The Leadership Corps, the SD, and the SS. In passing upon these charges against the respective defendants, the Tribunal will apply the tests of criminality set forth above.
JUDGE BLAIR: Judge Blair continuing with the reading of the Opinion:
Court No. III, Case No. III.
Crimes Under the Night and Fog Decree Paragraph 13 of Chunt II of the indictment charges in substance that the Ministry of Justice participated with the OKW and the Gestapo in the execution of the Hitler decree of "Night and Fog" (Nacht und Nebel) whereby civilians of occupied countries accused of alleged crimes in resistance activities against German occupying forces were spirited away for secret trial by special courts of the Ministry of Justice within the Reich; that the victim's whereabouts, trials, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret, thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victim's relatives and associates and barring recourse to evidence, witnesses, or counsel for defense.
If the accused was acquitted, or if convicted, after serving his sentence, he was handed over to the Gestapo for "protective custody" for the duration of the war. These proceedings resulted in the torture, ill treatment, and murder of thousands of persons. These crimes and offenses are alleged to be war crimes in violation of certain established international rules and customs of warfare and as recognized in Control Council Law No. 10.
Paragraph 25 of Count III of the indictment incorporates by reference paragraph 13 of Count II of the indictment and alleges that the same acts, offenses, and crimes are crimes against humanity as defined by Allied Control Council Law No. 10. The same facts were introduced to prove both the war crimes and crimes against humanity and the evidence will be so considered by us.
Paragraph 13 of Count II of the indictment which particularly describes the Hitler NN plan or scheme, charges the defendants Altstoetter, von Ammon, Engert, Joel, Klemm, Mettgenberg, and Schlegelberger with "special responsibility for and participation in these crimes", which are alleged to be war crimes.
Paragraph 8 of Count II of the indictment charges all of the defendants with having committed the war crimes set forth in paragraphs 9 to 18 inclusive of Count II, in that they were principals in, Court No. III, Case No. III.
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving the commission of atrocities and offenses against persons, including but not limited to murder, illegal imprisonment, brutalities, atrocities, transportation of civilians, and other inhumane acts which were set out in paragraphs 9 to 18 inclusive of the indictment as war crimes against the civilian population in occupied territories.
Paragraph 20 of Count III of the indictment charges all of the defendants with having committed the same acts as contained in paragraph 8 of Count II as being crimes against humanity. Paragraphs 21 to 30 inclusive of Count III refer to and adopt the facts alleged in paragraphs 9 to 18 inclusive of Count II, and thus all defendants are charged with having committed crimes against humanity upon the same allegations of facts as are contained in paragraphs 9 to 18 inclusive of Count II.
In the foregoing manner all of the defendants are charged with having participated in the execution of carrying out of the Hitler NN decree and procedure either as war crimes or as crimes against humanity, and all defendants are charged with having committed numerous other acts which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity against the civilian population of occupied countries during the war period between 1 September 1939 and April 1945.
The Night and Fog Decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) arose as the plan or scheme of Hitler to combat so-called resistance movements in occupied territories. Its enforcement brought about a systematic rule of violence, brutality, outrage, and terror against the civilian populations of territories overrun and occupied by the Nazi armed forces. The IMT treated the crimes committed under the Night and Fog decree as war crimes and found as follows:
"The territories occupied by Germany were administered in violation of the laws of war. The evidence is quite overwhelming of a systematic rule of violence, Court No. III, Case No. III.
brutality, and terror. On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the directive since known as the "Nacht und Nebel Erlass" (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or the German forces in occupied territories, except where the death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and handed over to the SIPO and SD for trial and punishment in Germany. This decree was signed by the defendant Keitel. After these civilians arrived in Germany, no word of them was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or their relatives; even in cases when they died awaiting trial the families were not informed, the purpose being to create anxiety in the minds of the family of the arrested person. Hitler's purpose in issuing this decree was stated by the defendant Keitel in a covering letter, dated 12 December 1941, to be as follows:
'Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved either by capital punishment or by measures by which the relatives of the criminal and the population do not know the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is transferred to Germany.'
The brutal suppression of all opposition to the German occupation was not confined to severe measures against suspected members of resistance movements themselves, but was also extended to their families."
The Tribunal also found that:
"One of the most notorious means of terrorizing the people in occupied territories was the use of the concentration camps." 10716 Court No. III, Case No. III.
Reference is here made to the detailed description by the IMT Judgment of the manner of operation of concentration camps and to the appalling cruelties and horrors found to have been committed therein. Such concentration camps were used extensively for the NN prisoners in the execution of the Night and Fog decree as will be later shown.
The IMT further found that the manner of arrest and imprisonment of Night and Fog prisoners before they were transferred to Germany was illegal, as follows:
"The local units of the Security Police and SD continued their work in the occupied territories after they had ceased to be an areas of operations. The Security Police and SD engaged in widespread arrests of the civilian population of these occupied countries, imprisoned many of them under inhumane conditions, and subjected them to brutal third degree methods, and sent many of them to concentration camps. Local units of the Security Police and SD were also involved in the shooting of hostages, the imprisonment of relatives, the execution of persons charged as terrorists and saboteurs without a trial, and the enforcement of the 'Nacht und Nebel' decree under which persons charged with a type of offense believed to endanger the security of the occupying forces was either executed within a week or secretly removed to Germany without being permitted to communicate with their family and friends."
The foregoing quotations from the IMT Judgment will suffice to show the illegality and cruelty of the entire NN plan or scheme. The transfer of NN prisoners to Germany and the enforcement of the plan or scheme did not cleanse it of its iniquity or render it legal in any respect.
The evidence herein adduced sustains the foregoing findings and conclusions of the IMI. In fact the same documents, or copies thereof, Court No. III, Case No. III.
referred to and quoted from in the IMT Judgment were introduced in evidence in this case. In addition, a large number of captured documents and oral testimony were introduced showing the origin and purpose of the Night and Fog plan or scheme, and showing without dispute that certain of the defendants with full knowledge of the illegality of the plan or scheme under international law of war and with full knowledge of the intended terrorism, cruelty, and other inhumane principles of the plan or scheme became either a principal, or aided and abetted, or took a consenting part in, or were connected with the execution of the illegal, cruel, and inhumane plan or scheme.
Hitler's decree was signed by Keitel on 7 December 1941 and was enclosed in Keitel's covering letter of 12 December 1941, which was referred to and quoted from in the IMT Judgment. The Hitler decree states that since the opening of the Russian campaign Communist and anti German elements have increased their assaults against the Reich and the occupation power in the occupied territories and that the most severe measures should be directed against these malefactors "to intimidate them". The decree further declares in substance:
1. Criminal acts committed by non-German civilians directed against the Reich or occupation forces endangering their safety or striking power should require the application of the death penalty in principle.
2. Such criminal acts will be tried in occupied territories only when it appears probable that the death sentence will be passed and carried out without delay. Otherwise the offenders will be carried to Germany.
3. Offenders taken to Germany are subject to court martial procedures there only in case that particular military concern should require it. German and foreign agencies will declare upon inquiries of such offenders that the state of the proceedings would not allow further information.
4. Commanders-in-chief in occupied territories and the Court No. III, Case No. III.
justiciaries within their jurisdiction will be held personally responsible for the execution of this decree.
5. The Chief of the OKW will decide in which of the occupied territories this decree will be applied. He is authorized to furnish explanations and further information and to issue directives for its execution.
In addition to the Hitler decree there were also enclosed in Keitel's letter of 12 December 1941 the "First Decree" of directives concerning the prosecution of crimes against the Reich of occupation power in occupied territories under the Hitler decree. This First Decree was signed by Keitel and was marked "Secret".