* * * * * * * * * * "Section 10.
--For the defendant who has not yet chosen counsel, counsel has to be appointed at the time when the date for the trial is fixed.
"Section 11.--A preliminary court investigation will not take place. * * * "Section 12.
-* * *(4) The term of the summons (Section 217 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is three days. It can be shortened to 24 hours. (1933 RGBl, I, page 136).
"Section 13.--The special court dan refuse any offer of evidence, if the court has come to the conviction that the evidence is not necessary for clearing up the case.
"Section 14.--The special court has to pass sentence even if the trial results in showing the act, of which the defendant is accused, as not being under the jurisdiction of the special court. This does not apply if the act constitutes a crime or offense under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the courts of appeal; in this case the special court has to proceed according to Section 270, paragraphs 1, 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
"Section 16. (l) There is no legal appeal against decisions of the special courts.
"(2) Applications for a reopening of the trial are to be decided upon by the Criminal Chamber of the District Court. The reopening of the trial in favor of the defendant will also take place if there are circumstances which point to the necessity of re-examining the case in the ordinary procedure. The stipulation of Section 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains unaffected. If the application for the reopening of the trial is justified, the trial will be ordered to take place before the competent ordinary court." (1933 RGBl, I., page 136).
Special courts were also vested with jurisdiction under the Law for the Protection against Violent Political Acts of 4 April 1933 under which the death penalty was authorized. (1933 RGBl., I, page 162).
On 1 September 1939 the special courts were given jurisdiction under the Law concerning Listeners to Foreign Radio Broadcasts, and the death sentence was authorized in certain cases. (1939 RGBl, I, page 1683). On 5 September 1939 jurisdiction of the special court was extended to cases of looting, and the death sentence was authorized. Jurisdiction was also extended to cases of criminal acts exploiting the extraordinary conditions caused by the war.
That act further provided:
"In all trials by special Courts the verdict must be pronounced at once without observation of time limitations if the perpetrator is caught red-handed or if guilt is otherwise obvious." (RGB1, I, page 1679).
On 21 February 1940 the special courts were expressly given jurisdicton concerning:
"1. Crime and offenses committed under the Law of 20 December 1934 concerning treacherous attacks against State and Party, and concerning protection of Party uniforms:
"2. Crimes under Section 239a of the Reich Criminal Code and under the law of 22 June 1938 concerning highway robbery by means of highway traps;
"3. Crimes under the decree concerning extraordinary measures in regard to radio;
"4. Crimes and offenses under the War Economy Decree of 4 September 1939;
"5. Crimes under Section 1 of the decree of 5 September 1939 against public enemies;
"6. Crimes under Sections 1 and 2 of the decree of 5 December 1939 against violent criminals." (1940. RGBL. I, page 405).
The decree further provided:
"1. The special court also has jurisdiction over other crimes and offenses, if the prosecution is of the opinion that immediate sentencing by the special court is indicated by the gravity or the outrageousness of the act, on account of the thereby aroused Public sentiment or in consideration of serious threat to public order or security," (Article 14, supra).
"1. In all proceedings before a special court the sentence must be passed immediately without observation of any reprieves, if the delinquent was caught in the very act or if his guilt is selfevident otherwise.
"2. In all other cases the term of summons shall be 24 hours. (Articles 217, 218 of the Reich Code of Criminal Procedure (Reichsstrafprocessordnung)". (Article 23: paragraphs 1, 2, supra).
"1. The special court must hand down a decision in a case, even if the trial shows that the act with which the accused is changed is of such a. nature that the special court is not competent to deal with it. If however, the trial shows that the act comes under the jurisdiction of the People's Court, the special court refers the matter to the latter court, by decision; Article 270, Section 2, of the Reich Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable accordingly."
(Article 25, Section 1, supra).
"1. There is no legal appeal against a decision of the special court." (Article 26, paragraph 1, supra).
"The Chief Public Prosecutor may lodge a. petition for nullification with the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) against a final judgment of a judge of the criminal court of the special court, within one year from the date of its becoming final, if the judgment is not justified because of its erroneous application of law on the established facts. (Article 34, supra).
"1. The petition for nullification must be submitted in writing to the Supreme Court. This court will decide thereon by judgment based on a. trial. With the consent of the Chief Public Prosecutor it can also reach a decision without trial.
"2. The Supreme Court may order a postponement or an interruption of the execution. It may order arrest or internment even prior to the decision on the petition for nullification. The Criminal Senate (Strafsenat) composed of three members including the prosident, will decide thereon without a trial, with reservations as to the reflations of Article 124, Section 3 of the Reich Code of Criminal Procedure." (Article 35, paragraphs 1, 2, supra). (1940 RGBL. I, page 405).
The speed with which the special courts acted is of significance. In view of the congested dockets of the special courts, Freisler, acting for the Minister of Justice, ordered. "A special court is, as a rule, to be considered overloaded if a monthly average of more than forty new indictments has been filed with it."
On 4 December 1941, in the law against Poles and. Jews, supra, it was provided:
"IV. The State Prosecutor shall prosecute a Pole or a Jew if he considers that punishment is in the public interest.
"V. (l) Poles and Jews shall be tried by a special court or by the district judge.
"VI. (l) Every sentence will be enforced without delay. The State Prosecutor may, however, appeal from the sentence of a district judge to the court of appeal. The appeal has to be lodged within two weeks.
"(2) The right to lodge complaints which are to be heard by the court of appeal is reserved exclusively to the State Prosecutor.
"VII. Poles and. Jews cannot challenge a German judge on account of alleged partiality.
"VIII. * * * (2) During the preliminary inquiry, the State Prosecutor may order the arrest and. any other coercive measures permissible.
"IX. Poles and Jews are not sworn in as witnesses in criminal proceedings. If the unsworn deposition made by them before the court is found false, the provisions as prescribed for perjury and false statements shall be applied accordingly.
"X. (l) Only the State Prosecutor may apply for the reopening of a case. In a case tried before a special court, the decision concerning an application for the reopening of the proceedings rests with this court.
"(2) The right to lodge a plea of nullity rests with the State Prosecutor-General. The decision on the plea rests with the court of appeal. "XI. Poles and Jews are not entitled to act as prosecutors either in a principal or a. subsidiary capacity.
"XII. The court and the State Prosecutor shall conduct proceedings within their discretion and according to the principles of the German Law of Procedure. They may. however, deviate from the provisions of the German law on the organization of courts and on criminal procedure, whenever this nay appear to them advisable for the rapid and more efficient conduct of proceedings.
"XV. Within the meaning of this Decree, the term 'poles' includes 'Schutzangehoerige* or those who are stateless." (1941 RGBL. I, page 759).
summary and severe as the military situation became progressively more critical.
A major development in the Nazification of the judicial system appears in the establishment of the "People's Court" which was subdivided into a. number of senates or departments. We quote:
"When the Supreme Court acquitted three of the four defendants charged with complicity in the Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction in cases of treason was thereafter taken away and given to a newlyestablished People's Court consisting of two judges and five officials of the Party". (IMT Judgment, page 179).
The Act of 24 April 1934 which established the highly flexible definitions of high treason also provided, new judicial machinery for enforcement.
"Section 1. (A tide III) (l) For the trial of cases of high treason the People's Court is established.
"(2) Decisions of the People's Court are made by five members during the trial, by three members outside the trial. This includes the president. The president and one further member must be qualified judges. Several senates may be established." (1934 RGBL. I, page 341.
In Section 3 of Article III it is provided that "the People's Court is competent for the investigation and decision in the first and last instance in cases of high treason * * *", and in other specified cases.
"Article III. Section 3. (2) The People's Court is also competent in such cases where crimes or offenses subject to its competence constitute at the same time another punishable act.
"(3) If another punishable act is in factual connection with a crime or offense subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court, the trial against the perpetrators and participants of the other punishable act may be brought before the People's Court by way of combination of the respective cases."
"Section 5. (2) Against the decisions of the People's Court no appeal is permitted."
On 1 December 1936, the jurisdiction of the People's Court was extended to include violation of the law against economic sab tage. (Supra).
On 14 April 1939. the system was extended to Bohemia and Moravia.
We quote:
"2. Furthermore, the Supreme Reich Court and the People's Court will carry out jurisdiction for the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia." (1939 RGBL. I, page 752).
The extent of jurisdiction was defined as follows:
"Section 5. (l) German nationals are subject to German jurisdiction in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
"(2) Persons who are not German nationals are subject to German jurisdiction for offenses:
"1. to which German criminal law applies, "2. if they arc prosecuted under a private action provided the action has been brought by a German national.
"Section 7. German jurisdiction in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia excludes jurisdiction by the courts of the Protectorate unless otherwise provided.
"Section 8. The German courts in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia administer justice in the name of the German people" (1939 RGBL. I, page 752.)
By the law of 16 September 1939. provision was made for extraordinary appeal against final judgments. We quote in part:
"A tide 2, Section 3 (l). Against legally valid sentences in criminal proceedings the Senior Reich Prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court can file an appeal within one year after they have been pronounced, if, because of serious misgiving concerning the justness of the sentence, he considers a new trial and a new decision in the cases necessary.
"(2) On the basis of the appeal, the Special Penal Senate of the Reich Supreme Court will try the cases a second time.
"(3) If the first sentence was passed by the People's Court, the appeal is to be filed by the Senior Reich Prosecutor at the People's Court, and the second trial is to be held, by the Special Senate of the People's Court. The same applies to the sentences of courts of appeal in cases which the Senior Reich Prosecutor at the People's Court had transferred to the Public Prosecutor attached to the court of appeals, or which the People's Court had transferred for trial and sentencing to the courts of appeal.
"Section 5. (l) The Special Senate of the People's Court consists of the president and of four members." (1939 RGRL. I, name 1841).
On the 21 February 1940 the jurisdiction of the People's Court was redefined and again extended to cover high treason, treason, severe cases of damaging war material, failure to report an intended crime, crimes under Section 5 (l) of the Decree of 28 February 1933 concerning protection of people and State; crimes of economic sabotage, crime of undermining German defensive strength, and others.
On 6 May 1940 a broad decree was issued concerning the jurisdiction of German courts for the "territory of the Greater German Reich".
That decree provided:
"German criminal law will be applied to the crime of a German national no matter whether it is committed in Germany or abroad. For a crime committed abroad, which according to the laws of the place of commitment is not punishable, German criminal law will not be applied, unless such action would constitute a crime according to the sound sentiment for justice of the German people on account of the particular conditions prevailing at the place of commitment," (1940 RGBL. I, page 754, Article 1, paragraph 3).
"Paragraph 4. -- German criminal law will be applied also in case of crimes committed by a foreigner in Germany.
"German criminal law will be applied to crimes committed by a foreigner abroad, if they are punishable according to the Penal Code of the territory where they are committed, or if such territory is not subject to any jurisdiction and if "1. the criminal has obtained German nationality after the crime, or "2. the crime is directed against the German people or a German national, or "3. the criminal is apprehended in Germany and is not extradited, although the nature of his crime would permit an extradition.
"German criminal law will be replied to the following crimes committed by a foreigner abroad, independently of the laws of the place of commitment:
"1. Crimes committed while holding a German governmental office, as a German soldier or as a member of the Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst) or committed against a holder of a German office or the State or the Party, against a German soldier or a member of the Reich Labor Service, while on duty or relating to his duty;
"2. Actions constituting treason or high treason against Germany", and in other special cases.
Certain additional provisions intimately affecting the rights of accused persons deserve special mention.
"Section 10. For the defendant, who has not yet chosen counsel, counsel has to be appointed at the time when the date for the trial is fixed.
"Section 11. A preliminary court investigation will not take place. * * *". (1933 RGB1. I, page 136) By a decree of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack, on 13 December 1944, it was provided:
"Article I, paragraph 12. Limited admittance of defense counsel. (1) In any one criminal case, several lawyers or professional representatives may not act side by side as chosen counsel for one defendant.
"(2) The rules about obligatory representation by defense counsel do not apply. The presiding judge appoints a defense counsel for the whole or part of the proceedings if the difficulty of the material or legal problems require assistance by a defense counsel, or 11 the defendant, in due consideration of his personality, is unable to defend himself personally." (1944 RGBl. I, page 339) On 16 February 1934 it was provided that:
"Article 2. The President of the Reich has the prerogatives for nulle prosequi and clemency formerly held by the States. Ammesties can be promulgated only by Reich law." (1934 RGBl, I, page 91) This centralization of the clemency powers marks a radical departure from the system which prevailed prior to 1933 and was the means by which the will of Hitler became a dominating force in the Ministry of Justice and in the courts.
Other provisions are as follows:
"Even if the judgment has been contested only by the defendant or his legal representative, or by the prosecution in his favor, it can be changed against the interests of the defendant. (article 358, Law of 28 June 1935; 1935 RGBl, I, page 844) "In penal matters for which the People's Court, the Superior District Court, or the Court of assizes are competent, pre-examination is conducted upon application of the prosecution, if, after due consideration, the prosecution thinks it necessary.
"In other penal matters as well, pre-examination takes place on application of the prosecution. The prosecution should make such an application only if unusual circumstances make it necessary to have a judge conduct such pre-examination."
(Law of 28 June 1935; 1935 RGBl. 1, page 844) An illuminating comment on the law is made by a German text writer:
"A criminal case on which verdict has been passed must not again become the subject of another criminal proceeding. This exclusive effect pertains to the subject of the case both as regards the crime and the criminal * * * According to the findings of the German Supreme Court and to the prevailing theory in accord with these findings, the effect of ne bis in idem includes the history of the case submitted to the court for verdict.
* * * This theory, however, leads to unbearable, consequences. In order to avoid these unbearable consequences some courts, recently, have permitted the breach of the principle against double jeopardy in exceptional cases where jeopardy of a second trial is necessitated by the sound sense of justice." * * * - German Criminal Procedure, by Heinrich Henkel, (Hamburg 1943) On 21 March 1942 Adolph Hitler promulgated a decree regarding the simplification of the administration of justice.
We quote the following excerpts:
"In penal cases, * * * the formal opening of the main proceeding must be eliminated. * * * " (Section I) "Indictments and judicial decisions must be more tersely written by restricting them to the absolutely necessary."
(Section II) "The cooperation of professional associate judges in judicial decisions must be restricted."
(Section III) "I commission the Reich Minister of Justice, in agreement with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and with the Chief of the Party Chancellory, to issue the legal provisions necessary for the execution of this decree.
I empower the Reich Minister of Justice to make the necessary administrative provisions and to decide any doubtful questions by administrative means." (article VI) On 31 August 1942 a decree was issued by the defendant Schlegelberger as Reich Minister of Justice in charge of the Ministry:
"Article 4. * * * Decisions by the Criminal Court, the Special Court, and the Criminal Senate of the circuit courts of appeal may be made solely by the president or his regular deputy, if he considers the cooperation of his associates dispensable in view of the simplicity of the nature and the legal status of the case, and if the public prosecutor agrees.
"Article 5. Main proceeding without public prosecutor: In the proceeding before the district judge, the public prosecutor may renounce his participation in the main proceeding.
"article 7 (2). The validity of an objection is decided on by the president of the deciding court. The admissibility of an appeal is decided on by the president of the court of appeal (Berufungsstrafkammer); he is also authorized to bring about a decision of the court. These decisions are not subject to any proof, and are incontestable."
"article 7 (3). Further objections will not be admitted."
We have already quoted at length from the Decree of 4 December 1941 concerning the organization of criminal jurisdiction against Poles and Jews in the incorporated Eastern territories. That decree also contained provisions for the establishment of martial law from which we quote:
"Article XIII (1). Subject to the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Reich Minister of Justice, the Reich Governor may, until further notice, enforce martial law in the incorporated Eastern territories, either in the whole area under his jurisdiction or in parts thereof, upon Roles and Jews guilty of grave excesses against the Germans or of other offenses which seriously endanger the German work of reconstruction.
"(2) The courts established under martial law impose the death sentence. They nay, however, dispense with punishment and refer the case to the Secret State Police (Gestapo)."
A final step in the development of summary criminal procedure was taken on 15 February 1945 by a decree of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. The decree provided "II.
1. The court martial consists of a judge of a criminal court as president and of a member of the political leader corps, or of a leader of another structural division of the NSDAP and an officer of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS, or the police, as associate judges. * * * "III.
1. The courts martial have jurisdiction for all kinds of crimes endangering the German fighting power or undermining the people's deiensive strength.* * * "IV.
1. The sentence of the court martial will be either death, acquittal, or commitment to the regular court. The consent of the Reich Defense Commissar is required. He gives orders for the time, place, and kind of execution. * * * " (1945 RGBl. I, page 30) Pursuant to a decree of the Fuehrer of 16 March 1939, the defendant Schlegelberger, as Reich Minister of Justice in charge, together with the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of the Armed Forces, Keitel, issued a decree which reads in part as follows:
"Section 1. In case of direct attack by a nonGerman citizen against the SS or the German Police or against any of their members, the Reich leader of the SS and the Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior may establish the jurisdiction of a combined SS Court and Police Court, by declaring that special interests of parts of the SS or of the Police require that judgment be given by an SS and Police Court.
"This declaration shall be sent to the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. The SS and Police Court, which shall have jurisdiction in individual cases, shall be specified by the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
"Section 2. If the offense directly injures the interests of the armed forces, the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces shall reach an agreement as to whether the case shall be prosecuted by an SS and Police Court or by a military court." (1942 RGB1. I, page 475) "Article II.
Exemption of the Reich Court from being bound to precedent sentence: The Reich Court as the highest German Tribunal must consider it its duty to effect an interpretation of the law which takes into account the change of ideology and of legal concepts which the new State has brought about.
In order to be able to accomplish this task without having to show consideration for the jurisdiction of the past brought about by other ideology and other legal concepts, it is ruled as follows:
"When a decision is made about a legal question, the Reich Court can deviate from a decision laid down before this law went into effect." (Law of 28 June 1935; 1935 RGB1. I, page 844)
THE PRESIDENT: The reading will be continued by Judge Brand.
(Reading):
The Law in Action We pass now from the foregoing incomplete summary of Nazi legislation to a consideration of the law in action, and of the influence of the "Fuehrer principle" as it affected the officials of the Ministry of Justice, prosecutors, and judges.
Two basic principles controlled conduct within the Ministry of Justice. The first concerned the absolute power of Hitler in person or by delegated authority to enact, enforce, and adjudicate law. The second concerned the incontestability of such law. Both principles were expounded by the learned Professor Jahrreiss a witness for all of the defendants. Concerning the first principle, Dr. Jahrreiss said:
"If now in the European meaning one asks about legal restrictions, and first of all one asks about restrictions of the German law, one will have to say that restrictions under German law did not exist for Hitler.
He was legibus solutus in the same meaning in which Louis XIV claimed that for himself in France. Anybody who said something different expresses a wish that does not describe the actual legal facts."
Concerning the second principle, Jahrreiss supported the opinion of Gerhard Anschuetz, "Crown Jurist of the Weimar Republic", who holds that if German laws were enacted by regular procedure, judicial authorities were with out power to challenge them on Constitutional of ethical grounds. Under the Nazi system, and even prior thereto, German judges were also bound to apply German law even when in violation of the principles of internation law.
As stated by Professor Jahrreiss:
"To express it differently, whether the law has been passed by the State in such a way that it was inconsistent with international law on purpose or not, that could not play any part at all; and that was the legal state of affairs, regrettable as it may be."
This, however, is not to deny the superior authority of international law. Again we quote a statement of extra ordinary candor by Professor Jahrreiss:
"On the other hand, certainly there were legal restrictions for Hitler under international law. * * * He was bound by international law. Therefore, he could commit acts violating international law. Therefore, he could issue orders violating international law to the Germans."
The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence presented by the defendants themselves is clear: In German legal theory Hitler's law was a shield to those who acted under it, but before a Tribunal authorized to enforce international law, Hitler's decrees were a protection neither to the Fuehrer himself nor to his subordinates, if in violation of the law of the community of nations.
In German legal theory, Hitler was not only the Supreme Legislator, he was also the Supreme Judge. On 26 April 1942 Hitler addressed the Reichstag in part as follows:
"I do expect one thing: That the nation gives me the right to intervene immediately and to take action myself wherever a person has failed to render unqualified obedience. * * * " "I therefore ask the German Reichstag to confirm expressly that I have the legal right to keep everybody to his duty Court No. III, Case No. III.
and to cashier or remove from office or position without regard for his person or his established rights, whoever, in my view and according to my considered opinion, has failed to do his duty."
" * * * From now on, I shall intervene in those cases and remove from office those judges who evidently to hot under stand the demand of the hour."
On the same day the Greater German Reichstag resolved in part as follows:
"* * * the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve to further or achieve victory. Therefore without being bound by existing legal regulations -- in his capacity as leader of the nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, governmental chief and supreme executive chief, as supreme justice, and leader of the Party -the Fuehrer must be in a position to force with all means at his disposal every German, if necessary, whether he be common soldier or officer, low or high official or judge, leading or subordinate official of the Party, worker or employee, to fulfill his duties. In case of violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled after conscientious examination, regardless of so-called welldeserved rights, to mete out due punishment, and to remove the offender from his post, rank and position, without introducing prescribed procedures."
The assumption by Hitler of supreme governmental power in all departments did not represent a new development based on the emergency of war. The declaration of the Reichstag was only an echo of Hitler's declaration of 13 July 1934. After the mass murders of that date (the Roehm purge) which was committed by Hitler's express orders, he said:
"Whenever someone reproaches me with not having used ordinary court for their sentencing, I can only say: 'In this hour I am responsible for the fate of the German nation and hence the supreme law lord of the German people'."
The conception of Hitler as the Supreme Judge was supported by the defendant Rothenberger. We quote:
"However, something entirely different has occurred; with the Fuehrer a man has risen within the German people who awakens the oldest, long forgotten times. Here is a man who in his position represents the ideal of the judge in its perfect sense, and the German people elected him for their judge--first of all, of course, as 'judge' over their fate in general, but also as 'supreme magistrate and judge'."
In the same document the defendant Rothenberger expounded the National Socialist theory of judicial independence. He said:
"Upon the fact that the judge can use his own discretion is found the magic of the word 'judge'."
He asserted that "every private end Party official must abstain from all interference or influence upon the judgment", but this statement appears to be mere window-dressing, for after his assertion that a judge "must judge like the Fuehrer", he said:
"In order to guarantee this, a direct liaison officer without any intermediate agency must be established between the Fuehrer and the German judge, that is, also in the form of a judge, the supreme judge in Germany, the 'Judge of the Fuehrer'. He is to convey to the German judge the will of the Fuehrer by authentic explanation of the laws and regulations. At the same time he must upon the request of the judge give binding information in current trials concerning fundamental political, economic, or legal problems which cannot be surveyed by the individual judge."
Thus it becomes clear that the Nazi theory of the judicial independence was based upon the supreme independence of the Fuehrer, which was to be channelized through the proposed liaison officer from Fuehrer to judge.
On 13 November 1934, Goering, in an address before the Academy for German Law, expressed similar sentiments concerning the position of Hitler.
"Gentlemen, for the German nation this matter was settled by the words of the judge in this hour, the Fuehrer, who stated that in this hour of uttermost danger he alone, the Fuehrer elected by the people, was the supreme and only judge of the German nation."
The defendant Schlegelberger, on 10 March 1936, said:
"It should be emphasized, however, that in the sphere of the law, also, it is the Fuehrer and he alone who sets the pace of development."
To the same effect we quote Reich Minister of Justice Dr. Thierack, who, on 5 January 1943, said:
"So also with us the conviction has grown in these ten years in which the Fuehrer was led the German people that the Fuehrer is the Chief Justice and the Supreme Judge of the German people."
On 17 February 1943 the defendant Under-Secretary Dr. Rothenberger summed up his legal philosophy with the words:
"The judge is on principle bound by the law. The laws are the orders of the Fuehrer."