In this respect, too, there is no difference between those gentlemen in America and Europe, In America, the adjudicating judge would hardly be interested to learn that one of them probably was a Balt, the other one probably a Hungarian. One of them had already broken jail in Oran, Africa, as my client testified in the witness stand.
These are the people whom the Prosecution pictures as harmless people only feeling some hunger.
In the Englert case it has been established through the affidavit of Eckert, (Cuhorst Exh. C No. 46, Doc. No. 46) that, contrary to the statement on oath of witness Eberhard Schwarz, my client did not preside over the case.
In the Leszinsky case, the witness Eberhard Schwarz, in answer to my question in cross-examination, who had presided, answered; "I don't remember." Tr. page 2299. He hesitated here, in the fact of his former statement under oath to make a deposition whose falseness could possibly be proved. We have never contended - this in order to rectify an error on the part of the Prosecution - that Cuhorst never tried cases on Saturdays, but that he never tried them in Stuttgart. If we were to follow the argumentation of the Prosecution that what he was doing on weekends was fashioned by his fervent nazism, he would have been much more important for him in Stuttgart to don his brown uniform, to tighten his chinstrap, and to march over hill and dale "Heil-Hitler-ing" and singing the "HorstWessel-song" and thus living a full life. I maintain that Cuhorst used to spend the weekends in the mountains, in the Harpprecht-house, whither he had taken his family out of bomb-endangered Stuttgart.
The Kroupa case gives me the chance to examine these circumstances. This trial against the Polish national Kroupa, on the charge of arson, took place in Stuttgart on a Saturday.
The witness Eberhard Schwarz, according to Transcript, page 2261, did no more than mention the Kroupa case as number 29 on the death sentence list, Exh. No. 252, NG-398, which originated from him. He swore that my client presided over it. I find that this case was discussed neither in direct examination, nor in cross-examination or re-examination, nor in the prosecution affidavit of this witness, introduced before, Exh. No. 209, Doc. No. 485. In another part of my plea, I shall discuss what this so-called death sentence list really means.
The first time the Prosecution ever mentioned the Kroupa case as an incriminating case was in its plea, attributing to it a certain series of criteria whose accuracy will be contested by the Defense. I am by duty bound to protest against such a procedure. This case was not mentioned in the indictment and cannot be made the object of judicial findings."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Brieger, we are under the impression that counsel would like to got their consultation started before five-thirty. We will recess in a moment; we will recess until tomorrow morning at the usual time. May I communicate this information to counsel for both the Prosecution and the Defense. We assume that all of counsel for both sides will be present at the closing of the statements by the defendants tomorrow afternoon, and the Tribunal would be very much pleased if counsel for both Prosecution and the Defense would repair for a moment to the Judges' Chambers adjacent to the Courtroom 600 at the close oi the proceedings tomorrow concerning a matter which has nothing to do with the judicial problems which are before us.
We will recess until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 18 October 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of American Tribunal III in the matter of the United States of America against Josef Alstoetter, et al, defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 18 October 1947, 0930-1630, The Honorable James T. Brand, Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal III. Military Tribunal III is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if the defendants are all present this morning?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of the defendant Petersen, who is absent due to illness.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Petersen was excused yesterday afternoon; I presume that Counsel desires that excuse continue for this morning's session.
DR. DOETZER; (For Dr. Aschenauer and the defendant Ptersen.)
Would you kindly excuse the defendant Petersen. He is ill and I ask that he be excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Will he be able to attend this afternoon
DR. DOETZER: Most probably he will be able to attend this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. DOETZER: Thank you, Your Honor.
DR. BRIEGER: Your Honors, before I continue with my plea for my client Cuhorst, I should like to make an important statement of a technical nature. On account of an agreement which was made between the Prosecution and the Defense, at the beginning of the trial, we all the time have been receiving the transcript in the English language and also the documents in the English language. Consequently we were in a position to have a very excellent translator, a university woman examine these translations for their accuracy.
She has worked on that job for many weeks, I would like to say for months, and now I would like to pass her work to the Tribunal, and I would ask the Tribunal to have those mistakes corrected that she found.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the procedure which was agreed upon was that where there were differences of opinion as to translations, the matter should be submitted to counsel and they would arrive at an understanding as to what was the proper form. This document may be filed; that is as far as we can go this morning.
DR. BRIEGER: Your Honor, during the past few days I had no opportunity to take care of the matter, but I shall make up for it now and as soon as possible I shall make contact with Mr. La Follette.
For your information I have passed to the Tribunal an index for my plea. I had no time to translate it into English, and now I shall like to read it out because it shows the layout of my plea. So as to avoid the Tribunal thinking that I want to waste their time, I should like to say right now that a large portion of my plea I only want to have made part of the record, but I don't want to read it all; I only want to read a fraction of it. I intend to read out points which were touched upon and which were made topical and important by the Prosecution's plea.
Now, I am going to read my index.
1. The charges of the Prosecution, page 2.
2. The cases in general, page 6.
3. Cases of Foreigners, page 9.
4. Cases of alleged religious persecution, page 24.
5. Critical evaluations, 29-A. A. Prosecution witnesses, B. How the Prosecution affidavits came about, page 29-A.
6. Basic significance of the cases in favor of the defendants, page 30.
7. Such cases in detail. A. Foreigners' cases.
8. Political cases of Germans, page 34.
8. The cases of the penal senate, which were considered incriminating, page 41.
9. Basic statements about Cuhorst as a presiding judge of the special court. A. The principle of voting, page 42. B. Handling of procedural matters on the part of Cuhorst page 43.
10. Trial Brief of the Prosecution, 16 July, 1947, page 46.
11. Control Council Law No. 10, page 19. Responsibility of the judges, page 50. These two subjects have the heading, Control Council Law No. 10.
12. Count IV.
With reference to the statements which I read out yesterday, I should like to make one correction on page 9 of my transcript, line four from the bottom. Instead of already between the 20th and the 25th of July, it should say only between the 20th and the 25th of July.
I shall now continue where I left off yesterday. I come to the Kroupa case and that is where I continue now.
I beg your pardon; I think there is something else I have to say first. On page 9 in connection with the Pitra case I said yesterday -- I am referring to the third line from the bottom -- "In this case the witness Eberhard Schwarz". It should say, transcript page 2273 etc.
Now, I am going to continue where I left off yesterday.
The first time the Prosecution over mentioned the Krupa case as an incriminating case was in its plea, attributing to it a certain series of criteria whoso accuracy will bo contested by the Defense. I am by duty bound to protest against such a procedure. This case was not mentioned in the indictment and cannot be made the object of judicial findings. I could not make investigations any more nor introduce evidence.
The witness, Azesdorfer, testified, Tr. page 84, 18, 53, 54, that the same Saturday Krupa was tried, my client tried the Mueller murder case at a place 120 kms south of Stuttgart, Azesdorfer being the investigating judge, my client the author of the verdict. Those cases show that the witness Eberhard Schwarz has been grossly mistaken in his testimony to the detriment of my client several times.
This is what I have to add to the Prosecution plea on page , My client never said that Krupa had been tried by him. When discussing the death sentence list of Schwarz's, my client only said in the witness stand that the Krupa case, Case No. 29 of the Cuhorst list, or Case 11 on Schwarz' list had, as far as he could remember, been a murder case. Next, my client still on the witness stand, subsequently stated that several other cases, such as the Englert and Schmitt cases, had been tried by the People's Court, that is to say they were tried by the People's Court and not by Cuhorst. He declared, that he was a victim of the same deception as the witness Rimelin. The actual facts of the case were never discussed or offered. The only details of the case that my client remembers is the fact that it was not his case.
Only the case Pfaudt may be attached to the cases of Engler, Leszinski and Kroupa.
Eberhard Schwarz stated again under oath that my client had been the chairman in that case -- I will give the transcript page later -- while the defense counsel for Pfaudt -- I will give the exhibit number later -- had shown that, in accordance with his notes, not my client had been the chairman but one of his deputies.
In the so-called Skowron Case, Case No. 32, evidence could be established with a little more certainty. Exh. No. 465 does not exclusively consist of the original charges of the witness Rimelin but also of the summons for the official defense counsel for the two defendants Dulie and Skowron (Exh. Cuhorst No. 12 Doc. C No. 6) for whom the prosecution intended to apply for the death penalty, and actually did apply for. The time for answering the summons was 13 days. The following witnesses have testified in this matters: The witness Wizigmann, defense counsel for Potschivalik -- I will give the transcript page later -I further refer to the affidavit of a prosecutor who participated in this case Exh. C. No. 125 Doc.No. 124 and the affidavits of the office clerk Rieder, Exh. C. No. 59 and 131.
Skworon, a Pole, was the leader of a gang of thieves consisting of several foreigners. The lesser infractions of which he was accused, also in accordance with the penal provisions referring to Poles, wore already not considered by the court anymore when the defense counsel was summoned. The sentences proposed against all defendants were based upon the same law and the sentences against the defendants Skowron and Dulie were pronounced, based upon the same provisions, it was neither appropriate nor legally necessary to apply the so-called penal provisions referring to Poles.
That Skowron, as principal, received the most severe punishment is in accordance with the undisputed facts of the crime and in accordance with the jurisdiction generally applied by the Reich Supreme Court.
Significant for my clients is the acquittal of the third foreigner who was willfully incriminated only by Skowron, and the recommendation of a clemency plea for Skowron, for whom my client had sympathy, in spite of the fact that he was dangerous and corrupt. It is furthermore significant that the order to handcuff Potschivalik had to be issued by my client since Potschivalik attacked Skowron during the session in court because he felt that he had been unjustly incriminated. Dr. Wizigmann, the defense counsel for Potschivalik testified before this Tribunal that from there on ho had very little hope for the fate of his client and that he was so much more surprised about the acquittal by the court.
In compliance with a previous ruling by the court, the entire unread final plea for Dr. Guenther Joel is to be made a part of the transcript.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT Military Tribunal Nuernberg - Case III Final Plea for Dr. Guenther JOEL in the case of the United States of America against ALTSTOETTER and others Dr. Carl H a e n s Defense Counsel of the Defendant Dr. J 0 E L Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel About the Arrangements of My Arguments First of all I shall discuss the accusations against Guenther Joel, inasmuch as they are connected with his activities as Magisterial Referent (II) and as General Public Prosecutor (III). Before that I shall refer briefly to the law to bo applied.
(I). I shall then discuss the question whether ho is to be considered a member of a criminal organization (IV).
In order not to confuse the discussion by mentioning quotations and source material used, I have compiled all these quotations and sources in an appendix which I shall present to the Tribunal and to which I shall refer only by stating the current numbers.
I.
The Law to be applied The Public Prosecutor finished his opening speech, which he made on 5 March, with the following words (Annex):"Therefore, the true significance of this trial exceeds the mere question of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
This trial applies to the conceptions of morals of the civilized world and therefore puts the people of the world under the obligation to recognize the standards applied in this case as gauge. Although this court was constituted as an international one, it is American. The obligations which arise from this procedure are therefore binding, especially for the United States."
Without incurring the blame that I twist the words of the Public Prosecutor, I should like to switch the next to last sentence and say.
"Although this is an American court, it was constituted as an international one."
Dr. Carl Haensel Final Plea Guenther Joel Its task to administer justice internationally should have been fulfilled by an international court.
"The United States cannot avoid this responsibility." continued the public Prosecutor (Annex, Note 2).
"In Nuernberg we can only carry out a fraction of it. Nuernberg must become a symbol not the symbol of revenge or of self-satisfied complacency, but that of peace and understanding among the nations and people."
Those are noble and fine words and they indicate unmistakably that the law which is the basis of those proceedings is international law.
Regulation No. 47 of the British Military Government, which was enforced on 30 August 1946, transfers the jurisdiction concerning crimes against humanity (Art. II, 1c) to the German courts, if the crime was committed against German nationals or stateless persons.
According to this regulation, a German judge may apply the German Penal Code; he may also assimilate the German legal scope to that of Law No. 10; he may not, however, apply either the statute of limitation (Verjaehrungs) or the amnesty regulation (Amnestieverschriften) issued under Hitler, Such procedure as described is a transformation (Note 3. This procedure demonstrates that the law of Lex 10 before its transformation into the German law was purely international law. Lex 10 itself, in its Article III, Id, last sentence, provides for such a transformation possibility. As for the rest, in order to demonstrate the international nature of the facts laid down in Lex 10, I should like to refer to my trial brief about conspiracy, dated 30 June, and to the one about knowledge of conspiracy, dated 3 August 1947.
The regulations stated under cipher II, 2 b,c, d Court III Case III Final Flea Guenther Joel and c of the Control Council Law concerning participation, arc also international law.
We are not interested in subparagraph f.
Cipher II, 2 begins by laying down a norm from the sphere of the laws that provide which of the penal codes of various States are applicable, thus laying down a norm of the international criminal law in the customary sense, meaning not only Germans but also every foreigner is subject to the law, regardless of his "capacity"; translated into German as "Eigenschaft" in the translation now in use, it could however, also be "Stellung". The customary exemptions from the penal law for heads of States, the immunity of delegates, international reasons for exemption---- the so-called exterritoriality-- are said to be abolished.
Subsections a and b list guilt (Taeterschaft) and complicity (Teilnahme)---- instigation (Anstiftung) or aiding and abetting (Beihilfe) --- which are obviously related to the principles developed in international penal law; also, connivance (Beguenstigung) is mentioned, which is listed in the German Penal Code under paragraph 257 of the Special Part and not in the general one.
According to subsection c those persons shall be punished who "took a consenting part therein"-- "wer durch seine Zustimmang daran teilgenommen hat," The word "therein" refers to one of the crimes listed under cipher 1. "Took consenting part" is a diplomatic formulation which was chosen by statesmen. The Moscow Declaration, on 1 November 1943, for the first time establishes the responsibility of the German officers, soldiers and members of the Nazi Party "who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part" (Anm.4). "die fuer die obigen Grausamkoiten verantwortlich sind. oder an ihnen zustimmend teilgchabt haben."
Court III Case III Final-Plea Guenther Joel President Roosevelt, in his declaration on 24 March 1944, repeats the threat "that nobody taking part in those barbaric measures shall escape punishment."
(Note 5).
As a matter of fact, "consent" cannot be regarded relevant because it is a fact as shown by internal evidence (innerer Tatbostand). Only "mens rea" and "actus reus" together arc a punishable offense. It is therefore required that "consent" find realization in the "take part", that is to say, in intended participation. Not every kind of participation, as used in every-day language, actually means participation in the sense of punishable. Only those who, by taking part, helped to bring about a successful outcome, can be called, participants in accordance with the penal law (Note 6).
The international agreement of the victors to make those responsible who "took consenting part" in the war crimes is, therefore, only a general instruction for the judges, who adjudicate according to these agreements not to leave those unpunished who "took consenting part" in the criminal offenses against international law. The agreement excludes from punishment those who got entangled in offenses which became historical events, without their inner consent or without having approved them in their heart. Therefore, neither the objective "taking part" nor the subjective "consent" is sufficient, but both suppositions must be on hand at the same time.
The word "planning" which appears under letter d brings to mind the conspiracy definition in Art. II, 1, letteraa. According to paragraph 1, letter d, he is punishable "who was connected with the planning or the execution of a crime (as listed under cipher 1)." There is, however, a great Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel difference between a common plan and "having something to do with the planning of a crime". At any rate, both definitions cannot be regarded as equivalent; they do not have the same meaning.
Conspiracy means the agreement in the execution of the crime described -- in a fact in itself; participation in the planning, on the other hand, involves a form of participation. We are used to describing planning as attempt.
The English jurisprudence mostly speaks of "attempts". This description is expressed in other words in Lex 10, Art. II, 2 d by "participation in the planning" (Teilnahme an der Planung).
Planning is of importance mostly if there are several accomplices. Often the English literature does not clearly differentiate between the planning as independent fact and the planning as first stop toward the attempt. Bishop even says:
"The act of conspiring, and the specific intent to accomplish what constitutes a substantive crime, are in combination a criminal attempt, and it is the professional usage to term it conspiracy. It follows the same rules and is subject to the same limitations as other attempts."
Sayre, however, be referring to the existing theory, objects it as false (Note 7): Conspiracy is a delict which had boon committed long since, before the offense was so near to its execution that it could have been punished as attempt.
The international standard of punishment was never formulated as exactly as our codified regulations. It indicates the guiding principles, gives the direction according to which the judge has to maintain his attitude. The directions under subsection d are to be interpreted in such Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel way that apart from punishing the accomplices as listed under a - c in the widest sense, also the act of the attempt itself is to be punished, not limited by casuistry, but to the widest extent, if the execution of a crime was already realized (Par.
4-3 of the German Penal Code). The Anglo-Saxon application of the law is quite similar to our application. It is, however, often -- to quote General Taylor -- a hair-splitting (Note 8), whether the preparatory action is already "sufficiently proximate to be an attempt" or is "mere preparation" (Note 9). International law, however, demands wide scope and generosity, clear results, no half-and-half results, strong lines, which can bo recognized even from afar, and no vaguenesses.
Subtle hair splittings must be excluded if only for the reason that they cannot be translated in all their fineness. To be sure, whoever is working for the community of the nations has no need to speak Esperanto. Esperanto would correspond to an electic method of mixing standards, incapable of execution. Whoever deals with international law has to talk and before this must learn to think in simple sentences which are understandable to foreign ears also. That the real meaning of the English expression "connected with plans" of Section II, 2, subsection d, is something absolutely different from the legal definition of "conspiracy" of Section II, 1, subsection a, or of Section VI, subsection a, of the statute "participation in a common plan or conspiracy" is shown by the French translation. Section VI, subsection a, is translated here by "complot pour commottre l'unquelque des crimes" and Law 10, Section II, subsection d, with "a participe a des plans ou a des entreprisos." This French wording meets the Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel experimental character of this statute.
The diction of international law which is completely alienated from our severe formulation of facts is demonstrated in the clearest manner by subsection c, which says that ho is punishable who "has been a member of an organization or group connected with the committing of the crime." From a comparison of the subsections a to c, the gradual construction will be seen at once. Concentric circles are drawn around the main offense, circles which are always farther from the nucleus of the dead and are losing in intensity, exactness and strong coloring, but are becoming larger and larger at the same time. Circle a included those who had been in connection with plans or with the carrying out; circle c, those who had only been members of an organization or group which had been connected with the committing of the crime. planning has been discarded here and has obviously been amalgamated with the expression of organization or group. The subsections a to c, therefore, arc not mere specifications, each part of which is independent and excludes the other, but they are a gradual conduction into a collective meaning which must be tackled from a central point.
Were Law 10 approached with the usual interpretation of the continental jurist, subsection a in combination with Section II, I, subsection d -- membership in criminal organizations -- would result in the following picture:
According to the judgment of the IMT, the SS had been employed for tasks which, under the statute, were criminal (Note 10). The SS, therefore, was connected with crimes as mentioned in Law 10, Section II. Every Ss man would have to be punished, therefore, under subsection c of Section II, 2. But under the statute on membership in criminal Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel organizations (Section II, Id) only he may be punished who was a member having full knowledge of the criminal aims (judgment of the IMT). Subsection c then would be contradictory to the main law in the essential point, and that would make no sense.
One arrives at a reasonable conception only by taking, as a first step, the law concerning the membership in criminal organizations not as an independent fact which is not part of the present legal system, and by interpreting the knowledge requested by this law in a purely logical manner. I therefore have suggested to construe this law as conspiracy under international law, and thus to interpret this rather intractable conception of knowledge as the intent to further the known criminal goals. Knowledge then will mean not a simple "having heard about it", but the real activity of the will, a union for criminal purpose. These facts have been clearly outlined as written international law by Law 10 and by the judgment of the IMT. The objections connected with the indefinite outlines of conspiracy under the common law could not be raised against this interpretation. Only this conception of conspiracy, connected with war crimes and crimes against humanity, which had no foundation in Law 10, had been rejected by the Nuernberg Military Tribunals (Note 11). Even when the Section II 2 c is applied, the principle of international law should be introduced in addition; namely, that every guilt must be a personal one and that nobody must bo punished who is innocent in this point. From the conception of the organization or group in connection with the crimes at issue we must infer, therefore, that a membership is not punishable already when the member received knowledge of the connection with such crimes of Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel members of this organization from hearsay, but only if his own membership is an act of the intent to participate and to support an organization which has to do with the crimes mentioned.
The difference as against the membership in an organization which has boon declared criminal by the IMT would bo that the membership in another organization could be punished likewise for being a manner of participation. But the evidence concerning this manner of activity of the organization would have to be proved always anew. It must be admitted that there is a good reason for not limiting once and for ail the number of the criminal organizations with some kind of negative legal validity to those which have been condemned by the IMT, but to provide under international law for the possibility that other unions of persons may have or could come into being, whoso members should be prosecuted for unlawful organizing. When solving the question of what is meant by "organization or group" (Organization oder Vereinigung -- "organization ou de tout groups") in subsection c, we must take into consideration that, under the opinion of the judgment of the IMT, forming of groups can only bo assumed of the entry in such organizations or groups is based on an act of will and therefore on voluntariness. Under the meaning of the judgment of the IMT we must ask in addition that the respective union of persons has already become active as a group or organization. To be sure, we should not overlook that the English word of "organization" has a wider meaning than our foreign word "Organization" (Note 12). But the two prerequisites of voluntary membership and of the activity of the group should be met by the English expression likewise.
Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel In spite of a knowledge in the moaning of "having hoard about it", a purely theoretical connection with the deed of another is not sufficient for the assumption of participation as defined in Section II 2. In each of the concentric circles there must bo, in addition to the knowledge and theoretical connection, an activity activated by the will, and this activity must bo obvious to the outsider likewise.
The conception of "being connected" must ask not only for an external connection but also for an internal and directed-bywill connection, and herewith the strict limitation of "knowledge" to definite crimes or at least to a definite group of crimes becomes a condition. The extension as against the continental participation seems to me to lie in the fact that the direct connection is included which docs not make a "condition sine qua non" an essential prerequisite. The main perpetrator in the moaning of subsection a sots up a cause in the sense of the doctrine of causality, and the accessory a condition (subsection b). This differentiation in the field of the theory of causality cannot bo motivated by pure logic because if taken all in all, the conditions of a success arc all equal in value, equivalent in the moaning of Burls (Note 13). We will not bo able to make progress without referring to the subjective part of the matter. When differentiating between the "animus Auctoris" and "animus socii", between the acting in one's own interest and in that of another (Note 14), the literature of our Supreme Court of the Reich is progressing in this direction. The "approval" of subsection c is also an inner act which makes its outward manifestation in the "participation". Success is not a condition, and the attempt is not sufficient. He who has been, in the moaning of subsection d, "connected Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel with the planning" does not sot up a condition; the looking on, the "connection" must, on the other hand, find its expression in the inner participation, in the intent to help.
To be "connected with" is a furthering interest in the wanted success which can remain an attempt. Nevertheless, this looking-on is personal and direct, When it evaporates into indirectness, into the membership in an organization which, on its part, is directly connected through other members, we arrive at the outer circle of these enlarged forms of participation of subsection c. But on this enlarged form of participation also applies the principle that a purely objective being-involved-in-events is not sufficient, be it direct, personal (d) or direct through a community (c), in events which moan the facts of a crime for others. First, there must be existent the own criminal intent, and second, this intent must find its expression in deeds by which the "being involved" is proven. There is no criminal guilt due to an accidental, casual looking-on while others commit a crime, but the defendant must have become conscious of his direct or indirect participation as an expression of his approval or abetting of those crimes; nothing is and about a milder punishment of acts of participation than those passed on the perpetration of the crime. From this fact we are not to infer that his should not be the case. Not on the basis of the general parts of the national criminal code, but on the basis of its mental vision and apparently just perception of the character of the criminal punishment, whether, for instance, this punishment shall punish the endangering of the community or the mentality of the individual or both, whether it is meant for atonement or for deterring, the court passes its decision on whether a milder punishment shall be meted out to the accessory than to the main perpetrate Court III Case III Final Plea Guenther Joel In the quoted statute, the international law advises the court only to punish him and to lot him not go unpunished.