Above all it is important that, contrary to the views of the Prosecution, a mere knowledge is by no means sufficient. The connection in this case also must be an intentional one.
In closing this brief legal consideration, may I draw attention to just one more conclusion based on what has been said: It is the principles governing the socalled break in the chain of causation which must be applied. Furthermore no person can be said to have adopted this form of participation, who, although he may have had some objective connection with the planning of a crime, yet personally resisted the project and was only subsequently confronted by a fait accompli when, through the action of a third person which he had not condoned or had actually opposed, the criminal act had thereby been effected.
2. To these legal viewpoints another must be added which concerns the person of the defendant Altstoetter himself. It is the question of which conception of the law did the defendant Altstoetter represent, and did he act in accordance with this conception; for it is from his attitude that it may be concluded whether on principle he was inclined to approve any criminal action, sanction it or even take part in it.
During his examination as witness, the defendant Altstoetter emphasized that he always had represented the idea of the constitutional state, and if you, Your Honors, will read the submitted affidavits, you will notice the repeated statements of the witnesses that the fundamental attitude of the defendant Altstoetter was the principle of the constitutional state. It is significant that not only his many colleagues of the Reich Supreme Court, not only his many collaborators at the Ministry of Justice, but that also those persons who only came in contact with him in his private life, report on this attitude of Altstoetter.
This proves that this conception of the constitutional state completely filled the jurist, the jurist, the judge and the civil servant Altstoetter, that not only officially out also outside his work he apoke of this attitude of his, emphasizing it time and again.
The conception of a constitutional state demands just laws, consonant with the laws of International Law. Altstoetter always acted in accordance with this conception.
a) He always resolutely rejected drafts of unjust laws. In this connection I would again mention the law concerning the treatment of asocial elements (Gemeinschaftsfremdengesetz), to his fight against the decree concerning the liability of the Farty (Parteihaftungsverordnung), and to his attitude against the ordinance for carrying out the 13th provision of the Reich Citizen Law, demanded by the Department VI of the Ministry for the Interior.
In individual cases also, ALTSTOETTER always represented tne principle of the law, and in fact he always accomplished this principle. In this connection I recollect his interference in the rent tribunals in Vienna, where at that time contrary to the existing regulations, Party officials had their say in deciding legal disputes. I refer to the attempt of the NSV to appropriate a home for children in Saxony, which was frustrated by ALTSTOETTER. I recollect so many other single examples which the individual witnesses testified to In their affidavits.
This line of action of ALTSTOETTER shows that he put into practice his conception that a law must be just and applied in a just manner.
b) His wish that the law must be in accordance with International Law, ALTSTOETTER clearly proved by the case of the statute Frenchmen, where he upheld the international regulations, and also by his decree regarding the treatment of illegitimate children in which he expressly stated that the international regulations must be observed at all events.
3. If, on taking into consideration my explanations regarding the participation, one examines the submission of the Prosecution, only two of the exhibits submitted against the defendant ALTSTOETTER need to be gone into, i.e. the minutes on the discussions of the department heads (exhibit 45) and the correspondence with Dr. MESSINER (exhibits Nos. 481 and 484).
a) The minutes on the discussions of the department heads may have been submitted by the Prosecution in proof -- this has been omitted. I now continue on Page 24 under III.
III.
Among other things the Prosecution accused Herr AETSTOETTER of participation in NN matters (Nacht und Nebel) and in proof of this accusation submitted the circular ordinance of 6 March 1943 (exhibit 319, NG269).
1. I need not thoroughly examine the question whether the NN-decree itself violated International Law; this problem has been carefully examined and discussed by several of my colleagues. I myself believe that in this respect the verdict of the IMT is not in accordance with the actual legal position and that, in particular, the execution of this decree by the law authorities was not wrong at all. But whatever the case may be, the defendant ALTSTOETTER did not in the least and on no account commit a criminal offense in carrying out the decree. It was not the function of Department VI, nor did it come within its responsibility, to examine the international and criminal principles of the NN-decree and investigate various points in connection with the order, dated 6 March 1945. Therefore it does not even matter whether ALTSTOETTER knew the Fuchrer-decree; even if he had known it, he could and should have relied on the authenticity of the decree in this respect, all the more so, as the matter had been on the way for a long time. The fact must also be taken into consideration that, at the time when he became a co-signatory of the decree, he had been in charge of Department VI for 6 weeks only, and that there is absolutely no proof that he had been implicated, before or also afterwards, with the decree or its application.
If I may use an example, the circumstances of the case will, perhaps, became clearer. If in a factory an engine is being manufactured, involving the collaboration of various departments, each department has to it that the manufacture of parts in their own department has been properly executed according to schedule.
The engine-wheels, to be manufactured by Department VI, must be in strict accordance with the Law of physics. If another department in the factory fails in the correct production of parts to be manufactured by them, the former department does not share the responsibility for this. And if the engine in its entirety, is out of order, then the party which either imperfectly assembled the engine or manufactured the faulty parts, has to bear the responsibility.
Department VI, in dealing with the order dated 6 March 1943, was concerned merely with the two questions relevant to their sphere of tasks and had to investigate, whether the order complied with the actual laws. Department VI, therefore, with reference to the order dated 6 March 1943 has only to investigate -- if I may use here a practical example, whether the engine wheels supplied by them are in accordance with the laws. These wheels had to be produced without any flaws by skilled laboerers. They might be manufactured without knowing the rest of the construction of the engine. Hero we are first concerned with the establishment of wills by NN-prisoners. To know the contents of the NN--decree is of no importance when dealing with or investigating such an order. The same applies to to the regulation of tho personal status, dealt within the decree. According to existing laws, therefore, especially according to the Fuehrer's order No. 1, Department VI could not be informed. And the defendant METTGENBERG and v.
AMMON expressly confirmed in the witness stand that the defendant ALTSTOETTER had not been informed. These facts arc completely in keeping with ministerial customs. As mentioned above, concerning collective orders, individual departments were active merely within their own sphere and are responsible only for their own activity.
This applies above all -- I must stress this fact once more - to the exceptionally secret NN-affairs, the true nature of which was completely unknown outside the criminal departments and even within those departments, with the exception of officials directly involved, section-chiefs only had any knowledge. From GOERING's trial ALTSTOETTER first gained knowledge of the actual existence of the NN-decree and not until this trial did he learn of the share in it attributed to the Ministry of Justice and of the provisions for the execution of the decree by the latter as well as their application by the courts. Affidavits submitted here also agree with his statement.
If the Prosecution asserts that this statement by the defendant seemed improbably, the fact must be mentioned that the witness SUCHOMEL, for instance, learned of the NN-cases only very late and then merely by accident when deputizing for the department chief competent for these matters. Mention must further be made in this connection of the fact that the witness SUCHOMEL, for years, belonged to the department which was in charge on NN affairs. Therefore, I am asking: How could it be possible for the chief of civil affairs to become acquainted with the nature of NN cases if Ministerialdirigent SUCHOMEL, who belonged to the department, which constantly dealt with NN Matters, never learned anything about this matter.
I now interpolate: The Prosecution, the their final plea on Pages 67 and 68 have accused the Defendant Altstoetter, of participation in NN matters. The reasons which they state for this opinion are, however, as I have already presented, not decisive.
Exhibit 310 to which the Prosecutor refer is a letter of the WVHA to the chiefs of all concentration camps giving directives for the case of transfer of NN prisoners.
That the Reich Ministry of Justice at that time is supposed to have had knowledge of this letter and of this directive has neither been asserted nor proved and that in particular Department VI of the Reich Ministry of Justice ever received knowledge therefore is absolutely out of the question. In no case did Altstoetter know of this letter.
The circular decree of the Reich Minister of Justice, Exhibit 319, was addressed to the judicial agencies involved and not to concentration camps. Nor did the circular decree concern any directives to the section of the Ministry of Justice but was addressed to outside field offices. Particularly the agencies concerned with the administration and the execution of punishment were directed in the case of the births and deaths to submit the generally prescribed reports to the Public Registry Office even if NN prisoners were involved. Neither to other agencies nor to the Reich Ministry of Justice were such reports submitted either by penal institutions or by the concentration camps. Consequently, the assumption of the Prosedution that department VI had knowledge of any registries concerning cases of death of NN prisoners in concentration camps is absolutely wrong and fictitious.
With regard to information given by the death and birth register of the Public Registry Offices, the obligation to observe secrecy proscribed that information was to be given only with the approval of the Ministry of Justice; However, a) it is not known to the defendant Altstoetter whether such a case over occurred; and, b) this regulation only applied to prisoners of the Justice administration and did not apply to prisoners who were in concentration camps; and, c) any approval to give such information would have been given in the Reich Ministry of Justice, not by Department VI, but exclusively by Department IV, and consequently an application for such an approval could never have been submitted to Department VI.
It is also incorrect that Exhibit 319 clearly shows that the NN prisoners involved foreigners, that is, foreign civilians. This is clearly shown from the portion which is quoted by the Prosecution on Page 67 literally whereby, however, by omitting the words "and the Occupation Power" it may perhaps have distorted the picture. Moreover, there cannot be the smallest doubt on this point. Also foreigners may be Brought before internal courts of justice without violating international law.
The assumption of the Prosecution that ALTSTOETTER participated in NN-affairs, and in a criminal manner at that, is therefore erroneous. If one wanted to infer this from the assistance given to the decree dated 6 March, then the clergymen, for instance, preparing condemned NN-prisoners for their last hour, would consistently and all the more have to be considered as participants in the crime assumed; for there can be no doubt that the clergyman who has spent his last hours with the condemned NN-prisoner was as a matter of course better informed on NN-matters as such by the condemned prisoners, than AETSTOETTER could even be. But both only have done what was really humane. One interceded for the right of the condemned prisoner to make his will, that his death was duly reported to the registrar's office and the other one prepared the condemned for death. Therefore in both cases there is no direct connection between the function and the persons performing this function and the carrying out of the action constituting the case, which is considered as criminal by the Prosecution.
Therefore from whichever angle one views the question of a punishable offence in NN--matters on the part of the defendant ALTSTOETTER, the result always remains the same: In this respect ALTSTOETTER is not guilty.
IV A further point of the indictment deals with the accusation of ALTSTCETTER's cooperation in depriving the Jews of their citizenship and with the confiscation of their property by the Reich, also that Jewish property in case of death lapsed to the Reich without compensation of Jewish heirs.
Here, too, the Prosecution is mistaken.
1. ALTSTOETTER had nothing to do with the legislation in connection with the expatriation of the Jews or Poles, their deportation and the confiscation of property, or with the execution of this legislation.
Document Exhibit 204, submitted by the Prosecution itself, if a refutation of the assumption that Dept. VI of the Reich Ministry of Justice had been participating in publishing the 13th ordinance of the Reich citizenship law, dated 1 July 1943, This has been proved not only by the defendant ALTSTOETTER's statements. On the contrary, it follows from the document itself and above all it has been proved by all pertinent affidavits that Dept. VI had no connection with this decree. This clearly fallows also from Dr. BREITHAUPT's statement, reporting on a conversation between him and the competent official in charge of Dept. VI in the course of which the latter stressed the fact that Dept. VI had not been cooperating in the issue of the decree.
The same has been declared under oath by Dr. STAGEL, who being Referent, was bound to have shared in the issue of the decree, had Dept. VI been participating in it.
In the course of the year 1944, Dept. VI was required to publish a provision for execution of the 13th ordinance of the Reich citizenship law but, as I have already explained, ALTSTOETTER opposed this demand. Following internal negotiation which the official in charge, the late Ministerialdirigent Dr. HESEE, held, with the Ministry of the Interior, by ALTSTOETTERS's request.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
the publication of this decree already signed by the Minister, could be prevented.
During his examination the defendant has been questioned whether the courts within his official control applied the 13th decree of the Reich citizenship law in their administration of justice, Relevant to this the following must be stated:
a) The decree was published during the summer of 1943.
Many months, often years elapsed until the courts and especially the courts of appeal or supreme court (the Reichsgericht) attended to this question. Cases of this kind could hardly occur. And even if they had occurred, defendant ALTSTOETTER, always advocating judicial independence, had no possibility of influencing the judges in any way; in that case he would have committed the very offense which, in this trial, is laid to the charge of the authorities in official control of the judges in criminal courts.
But he never issued any directive to the effect that the courts were to apply the decree dated 1 July 1943 and also never made any reference to this effect.
b) The right of succession could be established in lawsuits even after the decree of I July 1943 and as before prebate could be granted by Probate Courts.
b) Noelawsuit is known where a Jew pleaded the invalidity of the 13th provision for execution of the law, The defendant ALTSTOETTER certainly had no knowledge of such a lawsuit and therefore does not know whether and how a court passed judgment. It is unnecessary to discuss in this connection whether such a lawsuit could be held at all before a civil court, whether in this case the administrative courts would not have been the really competent authorities when property had been seized by the police. These questions of competency are so involved even for German jurists that, in most cases, only specially competent judicial experts could supply a satisfactory answer in this case.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
The defendant knows of one isolated case dealing with the 13th provision for execution of the law. Here the Supreme Court (the Reichsgericht) decided in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant approved of this decision. (Compare Al.-exhibit 1, Al-document 23, Al.-Document Book I, page 59).
To sum up, therefore, it must be kept in mind that section VI during the time spent by ALTSTOETTER in that service, did not participate in the legislation dealing with the confiscation of Jewish property and that also during this period, no legal provisions were made public with regard to the exclusion of Jewish rights of succession. But Section VI had nothing to do with the execution, of the laws concerning Jews.
2. The documents referring to racial matters have apparently been submitted in order to prove the defendant ALTSTOETTER's antisemitic attitude.
I am grateful to the Prosecution for submitting these documents; contrary to their interpretation these document, far from being evidence against ALTSTOETTER, are a proof in his favor. I need not state the facts of the case again. It has been stated in detail by a number of affidavits. In particular, Dr STAGEL, late officer in charge of these questions at the Ministry of Justice, has clarified in his explanations the essence of racial matters according to German law, He also arrived at the conclusion that the decrees, as they appear in the documents, should have a favorable effect for the Jews in this matter. It is sufficient to mention here that these questions of racial matters were no invention of the Third Reich and that here not purely Jewish matters were involved, but that proceedings involving racial problems had their foundation already in the civil code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch) as well as in the code of civil procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) in force under the Kaiser as well as under the Weimar Republic. Proceedings involving racial problems were therefore not just "a procedure for the purpose of carrying out the Nuernberg-laws", but purely civil lawsuits with the right of action to establish "that the defendant Court No. III, Case No. 3.is not the legitimate or the Illegitimate father of the plaintiff". The question, whether the plaintiff had 50%, 25% or 12 1/2% of Jewish blood did not enter into the verdict of such lawsuits and had no bearing on the final judgment.
It is sufficient to stress here once more that ALTSTOETTER's orders, as demonstrated by exhibit 453, could only have a favorable effect for the Jews who might be involved, and that the decree, as can be seen from exhibit 457, referred only to part of the proceedings in racial matters, that is, to only those cases where the Public Prosecutor had to prefer a charge contesting the legitimacy of a marriage.
There is no inherent reason nor has evidence been produced that the decree was intended to place the Jews at a disadvantage. Placing somebody at such a disadvantage is logically inconceivable. For, either the intended lawsuit concerned a person who was really a Jew, then his legal status would not have been affected to his disadvantage, even if the procedure affecting him had not been approved. If, on the other hand, he was not a Jew, the charge preferred by the Prosecution is excluded from the start.
In particular I would like to point out that blood-group tests could not be prevented by the refusal of the police, to furnish Jews from Vienna who had been re-settled as witnesses for comparing purposes, because blood-tests could be made for this purpose. These witnesses were only required, where a heredo-biological opinion was needed. But this was only the case, if the blood-group test did not yield any result, or if father or mother were dead, as in this case of course, no bloodgroup test could be made. If the heredo-biological examination was not carried out, because the police refused, the court had to base its judgment generally on the evidence furnished by the plaintiff for the charge which were of course in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, omission of the heredo-biological examination could in individual cases only be to the advantage of the plaintiff. This has become general knowledge and every German lawyer knows about it.
Court No. III, Case No. 3.
There can be no question of a crime against humanity nor even participation in such a crime in connection with these orders issued by the defendant ALTSTOETTER.
In the following I shall now omit the statements on the position of the racial-political Department and I now continue on Page 32 under V.
"V.
"In connection with the charge brought against German administration of justice of having placed foreigners at a disadvantage as far as their legal status is concerned and, in doing so, violated universal legal principles and binding rules of International Law, the defendant ALTSTOETTER is charged with the decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior dated 5 June 1944 and his own circular decree dated 15 November 1944. These charges are also unfounded.
The decree of the Ministry of the Interior is no law, not even an order and concerns the care of illegitimate children of female workers of non-German nationality, who had come into the Reich following the mobilization of labor. This decree states that these workers in case of pregnancy should not be sent back to their country. From this provision it becomes evident, first of all, that until then such workers were sent back to their country. If, from the summer of 194, pregnant women were no longer sent back, it must in any case be considered as a humane action, no matter what internal reasons the Ministry of the Interior had for this measure; anyone having lived in Germany during these times knows that every journey was a tremendous hardship and exertion on account of the overcrowding of trains, the constant airattacks, and the impossibility of finding any sleeping accommodation. A solution had to be found for these questions and the settlement was found in this order by the Ministry of the Interior. No objection can be raised, legally or morally, against the preferential treatment provided for the children of foreign female workers by German fathers or by a father of a kindred race. It is here of importance that "official" Court No. III, Case No. 3.care for the children of these working women only was put into practice when the latter themselves had no possibility to care for the child.
In consideration of this circular order, mention must also be made of the fact that it did not originate with the defendant ALTSTOETTER but that the regulation of these matters was solely controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. The defendant ALTSTOETTER, only by his letter dated 15 November 1945, communicated to the guardianship courts the order of the Ministry of the Interior, published almost 6 months before, as the necessity of informing the guardianship courts had become evident.
In this connection I would still mention that the defendant ALTSTOETTER pointed out in his circular that the international agreements and provisions of International Law were to be observed. Could any other defendant have observed the tenets of International law more closely than has Herr ALTSTOETTER? Who, in the face of these facts, will seriously raise the charge that the stipulations of International Law were disregarded or that the principles of International Law were broken? This applies particularly in view of the expert examination which Professor RAAPE made, and which I have submitted to the Court in documentary form.
From this expert opinion it appears that the state of law which existed before ALTSTOETTER's decree, was not changed, especially not with regard to
a) the personal status of mother and child and
b) the submission of guardianship matters and the carrying through of measures laid down by the guardianship court.
Above all it appears to me of the first importance that according to the state of the law, even after the decree of the Minister of the Interior had been issued and particularly that of ALTSTOETTER, the mother always had the possibility of keeping her child, and if perhaps she herself had no parental rights because she did not have the right of custody, she could always appeal to the guardianship court.
Court No. III,Case No. 3.
Who, in the face of these legal guarantees, which were never rescinded, can be of the opinion that the interests of the mother of the child were prejudiced?
In questioning ALTSTOETTER on this point, the Prosecution asked a question, from which it can be concluded that they are of the opinion that ALTSTOETTER was in some way connected with children's homes or with child welfare. Such a view on the part of the Prosecution would be a mistake and in any case is only comprehensible in the case of one who is not familiar with the conditions prevailing in Germany in this respect. Herr ALTSTOETTER was only responsible for the guardianship courts, and their sole function was to appoint a guardian only if the law required it.
Child welfare as such, the placing of the children in children's homes or in families, intervention possibly necessary in the case of neglect in the care of of the children, all that was the concern of Youth Offices, who were responsible to the Ministry of Interior. Thus what ALTSTOETTER did was merely to give the guardianship courts formal instructions concerning a decree issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior.
As I have already pointed out, ALTSTOETTER gave these instructions in November 1944, thus at a time when there were no longer any incorpor-porated Eastern territories, because these had already been re-conquered by the Russians. For this reason alone therefore, the accusation of having instituted German law in the incorporated Eastern territories cannot be raised. Apart from the fact that in the case of the decree issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior it was not even a question of introducing new laws and regulations, the old German law regarding illegitimate children was still valid in the former Polish and later incorporated Eastern territories, both before and after 1933 and after the incorporation, as it had existed there before 1918. The incorporation of these territories did therefore not bring about any alternation in this respect; the decree concerned itself merely with the application of the laws already existing there.
VI.
1. If in conclusion, Your Honors, I am to consider and estimate the conduct of the defendant ALTSTORTTER as chief of Department VI of the Reich Ministry of Justice, the result can only be that ALTSTOETTER never committed a criminal act of any kind whatsoever, neither did he participate in one. Furthermore, in vindication of his honor and as compensation for his arrest, lasting now more than two years, it must be stated that he has fought like no other for real justice, and that he has courageously and with the force of his whole personality met every attempt to restrict the application of justice or in any way to deviate from it.
Even where the administration of justice had lost ground he sought to regain it. How impartial and matter of fact ALTSTORTTER was can he seen above all from his policy in dealing with his staff. It is significant that in many affidavits it has been stressed how he never concerned himself with the political attitude of his colleagues in Department VI. Ability alone mattered to him. Otherwise it could not be explained why he appointed as his deputy Ministerialdirigent HESSE, a nonOParty member and definite opponent of National Socialism; it could not be explained why, despite all difficulties, he supported the promotion of officials who were not in the Party; why, according to the affidavit of Director LINTZ, who now holds an important post in the legal administration of the Russian Zone, he protected him by taking him into his own department when he had difficulties in another one, because of his opposition to National Socialism, and above all it could not be explained why he so strongly supported the nomination of the present Bavarian Ministerpraesident EHARD, as Vice-President of the Hereditary Farm Court (Erbhofgericht). In my opinion, only a man who seeks allies in his fight for the freedom of justice would act as did ALTSTOETTER as regards his staff.
2. It would be easy for me to demonstrate by many examples the perpetual, even daily, fight for justice which ALTSTOETTER fought. Besides general facts, many separate instances have already been recorded in the affidavits which have been submitted. Time does not allow for all these separate instances to be mentioned here; nor is there time to further describe ALTSTOETTER's daily fight for justice.
In any case I would not like to do this, because there are no witnesses for many of the fights and struggles, above all ALTSTOETTER's closest colleague, Ministerialrat HESSE, who sharply opposed National Socialism and a further colleague, Ministerialrat REXROTH, who likewise was no Party member. If these two men were still alive, then their testimony alone would give a true picture of ALTSTOETTER's absolutely irreproachable conduct.
Now, however, it was necessary to collect affidavits from all surviving members of the department, and from other colleagues and acquaintances. However, these in their entirety, also show that Herr ALTSTOETTER can no more be accused of a criminal act, participation in it or agreement to it than he can be accused of being even remotely connected with it.
VII.
In count IV of the indictment the Frosecution demands that ALTSTOETTER by punished, because he belonged to the SS and thus to an organization which has been declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. The Prosecution have emphasized this count particularly. I, too, must therefore deal with this accusation in detail.
1. First of all, the question must be examined, whether the defendant ALTSTOETTER belonged to any of those categories within the SS which have been declared criminal, thus, therefore, whether Ehrenfuehrer (honorary leaders) of the SS are to be regarded as members of the SS, and moreover, using the term employed by the Military Tribunal, as "official members". This question must be answered in the negative.
a) In the Document Book ALTSTOETTER No. II, I submitted, as document No. 57, an excerpt from the transcript of the IMT trial. During this trial, one of the judges asked the prosecutor which persons the Prosecution classed as members of the SS, and to this question, the prosecutor replied that they regarded as members of the SS those persons who had taken the SS oath and had been officially treated as members.
Therefore a prerequisite for membership of the SS is the taking of the SS oath. This does not apply in the case of ALTSTOETTER.
b) This view is also represented in the two decrees circulated by the Special Ministries (Sonderministerien) in the American Zone of Occupation, and which I have submitted an exhibit ALTSTOETTER.
These decrees also show that Ehrenfuehrer cannot be regarded as official members of the SS. Rather, the Ehrenfuehrer were the typical "unofficial" members of the SS.
c) Even if these two factors are ignored, it must be accepted that the honorary members of the SS, concerning whom the affidavit by WUNDER gives information, were not official members of the SS within the meaning of the judgment passed by the International Military Tribunal. In any case it would be absurd to regard persons as members of the SS who had never even seen one minute is service in the SS, who had never attended any parade or roll-call of the SS people who had no power to issue orders, who thus were in no way connected with the service and organizational affairs of the SS, nor with its political activities, and therefore also had no opportunity of gaining insight into what happened in the SS.
Added to this, ALTSTOETTER - differing perhaps from the other Ehrenfuehrer of the SS- never once wore uniform, not even on the occasion in spring 1943 when he went to see HIMMLER at the order of his Minister.
It cannot be seriously doubted that ALTSTOETTER held more than an honorary rank in the SS, and this has been admitted by the Prosecution itself in the indictment. He had neither any regular duties there nor any other tasks to fulfil. The most convincing evidence for this is the fact that it has been impossible to submit to the Court any documents proving such activities; although the Prosecution has brought forward ALTSTOETTER's correspondence with members of the SS from his own files. Would it not have become quite clear from this correspondence if ALTSTOETTER had taken any official part in the activities of the SS? The mere remark made in formal note, that this distinction would spur him on in his service for the SS, does not reveal anything. It is nothing more than a phrase to which no particular meaning can be attached, especially coming from a man who has only just returned from the front after three years of military service, I am convinced that the Tribunal itself realizes that Germany was at that time completely ruled by the categorical imperative, Duty.