Transcript for NMT 3: Justice Case

Q. Among the 300 verdicts of which you have said that you examined here, did you have any acquittals among them?

A. There were only about one or two acquittals but when I was the presiding judge there was a relative large number of acquittals. In view of the fact that the Prosecution prepared their indictments very thoroughly, that is a sign that we set very high standards as far as proof of guilt was concerned. Statistics for the year 1944 show and I remember that, that during that year acquittals amounted to twenty per-cent.

Q. I included a few examples in my document book I. They are Exhibits 24 to 28.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q. May I ask a question please? I don't understand the relationship of the 300 cases you have examined to the six or seven hundred cases you spoke of, over which you were the presiding judge. Were the 300 cases included within the 600 or 700 cases of which you spoke?

A. Oh, yes, they are included.

Q. But you said there were only one or two acquittals in the 300 cases. I am merely trying to understand. I am not criticizing. I am trying to understand your testimony.

A. Yes, Your honor, among those 300 verdicts which I re-examined here during the time of this trial, verdicts which were made available to me by the Prosecution, I do and only one or two acquittals. The other acquittals might have been lost or cannot be found.

Q. I was wondering how it could be that the percentage of acquittals in 300 cases which you have examined here is less than one per-cent, according to your statement, whereas your last figure for the total percentage of acquittals ran up to - what was it? twenty per-cent, such a matter?

A. That twenty per-cent, Your Honor, refers to all the cases which we tried in 1944.

Q. You and the other courts together?

A. And those acquittals did not occur only when I was the presiding judge.

Q. The 300 cases are cases in which you were in, you were in the 300 cases?

A. Yes, yes, Your Honor, when I was the presiding judge.

DR. SCHUBERT: Your Honor, by way of explanation, I should like to say that these five cases where there were acquittals and where Oeschey was the presiding judge, and about which I discovered the facts, and about which I introduced affidavits in my document book, now what I want to say is that these five cases are not among the 300 files which the defendant was able to scrutinize here.

BY DR. SCHUBERT:

Q. Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal whether those 300 cases which you were able to examine, did contain the cases of the prosecution or is that a special list?

A. No, no, that included cases by the Prosecution.

Q. Were there nullity pleas made very often in connection with your verdicts?

A. I estimate that there was a nullity plea made in connection with ten or twelve of my verdicts.

Q. And what about the re-opening of a trial?

A. The re-opening of a trial was a very rare occurrence. I remember here in particular one case where a Czech had been sentenced for an offense against the malicious acts law by the special court. That case was re-tried because it had been found afterwards that one of the witnesses had committed perjury. The Czech was acquitted without an oral trial and damages were awarded to him in full.

Q. The Prosecution also charged you with having placed your legal practice in the service of a program for the extermination of certain groups of people and with having been guided by the Nazi doctrines on biological and racial selection. I am referring to the Meyer affidavit, Exhibit 226. What do you have to say about that?

A. I never came across any penal law which would have enabled me to follow any such tendency nor did I ever assume one could apply such a point of view in awarding sentences. If I had been guided by such inclinations I would have been so in cases where people were tried, who above all could have been taken as victims of the alleged Nazi doctrine of such biological and racial extermination. I remember the case of a Jew whose name was Schoenbaum. He was indicted for a malicious remark, which, view objectively, could quite definitely have been judged an offense against the undermining law. If I had wanted to exterminate Schoenbaum simply because he was a Jew, I would have done so, but actually we sentenced Schoenbaum under Article I of the malicious acts law, which was the mildest law one could apply, and he was sentenced to a prison term. The matter was even more critical in the case of a Jewess, whose name I cannot recall. She had tried to transfer her money to Switzerland. As far as I remember she was tried under Article IV of the Public Enemy Law. We understood all together the motives of that Jewess, and although the case was considered to be very serious, we did not pass the death sentence. That is all together incompatible with the tendency of exterminating Jews with which I have been charged. There was also a fifty per-cent Jew, whom I had tried. He had participated in severe cases of robbery: it is a case with which we shall deal further have, as the Treiburg-Lerrer Case. In view of the fact that the defendant was very young we refrained from passing the death sentence on him. I tried at least two gypsies, one was a receiver for stolen goods, he was connected with a gang of thieves, which I think was the most dangerous in Nurnberg during the war. The other gypsy had forged a large number of clothing coupons and had sent them to the economic office. The latter was sentenced to one year an six months in a penitentiary and the other gipsy who had received stolen goods was sentenced to three years in a penitentiary, that is to say, in fixing the sentence we did in no way take into Page 5 account the racial qualifications of the defendants.

Q. The charge of extermination is made also in connection with your legal practice, concerning dangerous habitual criminals. Please comment on this matter quite briefly.

A. In that respect that charge is all together unjustified. By a law of 1933, the wording of which is based on a draft made in 1927, we in Germany started to fight habitual criminals. That started with making the penalties more severe and by ordering safety custody. During war time this fight was also made more severe as by the law of the 4 of September 1941, the death sentence for habitual criminals was introduced, if either the need for just a tone mentor the need to protect the people made the death sentence necessary. But not every habitual criminal was sentenced to death. The principles which guided us in deciding whether the death sentence or safety custody was to be ordered were based on the fact of whether the habitual criminal had to be considered incorrigible or whether there was still a hope that the might be brought to a reformed or less criminal life.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Schubert, you are conducting your examination in an orderly fashion anD we appreciate that. I wanted to suggest to you only that as to this matter of the dangerous habitual criminal, I think it may be treated very briefly in view of the testimony we have already had. I am sure everyone realizes that the previous record of a habitual convict, habitual criminal is a proper matter for consideration in sentencing. The procedure in different countries differs somewhat but the principle is recognized everywhere. We understand that.

BY DR. SCHUBERT:

Q. We can now finish with this subject, witness, but I should like to discuss one point briefly. You have also been charged with always having taken up a point of view less favorable to the defendant when it came to deciding whether he was fully responsible before the law or whether his responsibility was reduced.

This is a question which we have dealt with here before, but would you say a little more about it and give us briefly some examples?

A. Well, that question has been discussed at length here. In particular it has been made quite clear that in the case of a considerably reduced responsibility it was at the discretion of the Court whether a more lenient sentence was to be passed or not. I always adhered to the principle which had been established in a number of decisions by the Reich Supreme Court and I can give an assurance that in the greatest majority of cases of reduced responsibility, we did make use of the possibility to pass a more lenient sentence. We refrained from making us of that opportunity only in cases where such reduced responsibility made the offender particularly dangerous.

Q. Witness, please be more brief. I only asked you for a few examples.

A. From the files which I have scrutinized I found that there were five verdicts passed on offenders who had committed very serious offenses, and in those cases, article 51, section 2, was applied which allowed reduced responsibility. One defendant had repeatedly stolen baby carriages from which were standing outside a doctor's house--valuable articles, in this case it was money. Although the expert said that she was feeble minded only to a very minor extent, that is to say her responsibility was not considerably reduced, yet that slight degree of feeble mindedness was taken into consideration and a more lenient sentence was passed.

In the Geitner case where a man had committed a repeated offense of theft stealing from bomb damaged houses, only a mild one year penitentiary sentence was passed because of the expert opinion of the physician.

Q. Witness, you have told us about two cases, and in the other three cases, what are they?

A. All of the circumstances are the same in the other three cases, but these are only a very few cases out of a large number of cases.

Q. Charges are made against you, particularly in connection with the sentences you passed on foreigners and again the Poles are mentioned. It would take too much time to quote from the Prosecution affidavits. Please will you tell us something quite briefly about your legal practice in the case of foreigners.

A. The statements in these affidavits concerning the sentences passed by me on foreigners are all together unfounded. I treated foreigners no differently from the way I treated Germans and I never sentenced a foreigner to a more severe penalty simply because he was a foreigner nor did the law ever enable me to do so.

Q. The witness Bauemler described BY JUDGE HARDING:

Q. I would like to ask a question on that point. Why under the law as pertains to Poles was it possible to pass a more severe sentence?

A. In the case of Poles, when the law against the Poles was applied, the penalty was passed according to the provisions of the law, that is to say, in the case of Poles, the majority of offenses committed by the Poles, the sentence was within the scope of the penalties provided by the general German laws.

Q. Then the law against Jews and Poles provided specific sentences for both Jews and Poles which were different from those provided against the Germans?

A. An exception, or rather exceptions in the cases of Poles were these: Article I of the law against Poles enumerated the number of prerequisites which only Poles could fulfill. Concerning the other offenses of Poles which did not come under Article I, the general German law, had to be applied, but instead of a prison term, a term in a penal camp was passed and in the case of a penitentiary sentence a term in a more severe penal camp was ordered and in particularly serious cases the death sentence could be passed.

Q. Did you try any of these cases in which the death sentence, where the death sentence was passed.

A. The particularly serious grade, you mean because a particularly serious case had occurred?

Q. Involving a Pole?

A. For that reason, no.

Court No. III, Case No. III.

JUDGE HARDING: Did you try any sentences where this law against Poles was applied and the death sentence was decided upon?

THE WITNESS: I do not remember any such verdict, but I do remember two verdicts where the death sentence was passed on the basis of the law against violent criminals.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you try any cases under Article I of the law against Poles and Jews to which you referred and which defined crimes which could only be committed by a Pole or a Jew?

THE WITNESS: One is the Kaminska Case which we have to discuss further here. In that case the Prosecution had filed its indictment under Article I of the law against Poles but the Kaminska woman was not sentenced under the provisions of Article I. She was sentenced under the law against violent criminals. I cannot remember any other case under Article of the law against Poles as I had them very infrequently and I think I am quite sure that I did not sentence any Polish case under that provision.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Article III, as you know, relates to the type of institution in which convicted Poles are to be confined.

THE WITNESS: I am sorry, your Honor, I didn't get the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Article III of the law against Poles and Jews relates to the character of the place in which Poles who have been convicted are to be confined or imprisoned. When a Pole was convicted under the general criminal laws, not the law against Poles and Jews, you complied with the provisions of Article III as to the type of imprisonment which he was to have, did you not?

THE WITNESS: Yes, naturally.

JUDGE HARDING: Did you ever try a case against a Pole who, because of his age, would have been a German juvenile and come under the provisions for juveniles as to Germans?

THE WITNESS: No.

JUDGE HARDING: You never tried a case where there was a Pole who was of such an age that he would have come under the German juvenile law if he had been of the German race?

THE WITNESS: I never tried a case of that type.

BY DR. SCHUBERT:

Q. Witness, the witness Kern - Prosecution Exhibit 230 - says that you had been a notorious hater of Poles and he mentions the Kwasnik Case - Karl Kwasnik. Do you remember that case?

A. I don't remember that I played any part in the decision of that case. The details which have been mentioned at the trial here were altogether new to me. Therefore, I think it is out of the question that I ever knew anything about that case or that I tried it. The facts of the case are unusual. It was a case of an abortion with horse urine and as my memory is as a rule very reliable, I think I would remember this case or at least I think I would have remembered it again now when it was discussed here. Therefore, I think that the witness Kern made a mistake in connection me with this case.

Q. The witness Eichinger - Prosecution Exhibit 227 mentions two cases on which he bases his view about your inclination to exterminate foreigners. The first is the case of a young Frenchman. Can you remember that case?

A. I remember the case and I am quite particularly certain I can say that the name of that Frenchman was Blondel - B-l-o-n-d-e-l-. The case which I remember was the case of a main defendant having, sometimes alone and sometimes in company of others, committed burglaries in garden houses and weekend cottages and in almost all cases he had done so while exploiting the blackout.

The main defendant had left his place of work and was leading a lazy life. He was making his living exclusively by theft. He went on with his thieveries for several months and the population of Nurnberg was rather upset about his doings. He stole everything that was at all movable. The damage was very considerable.

Among the stolen goods there were articles which had been stored to protect them from air raid danger and it was a particularly serious case under Article II of the Public Enemy Law and that according to the extent and to the motives of the offense and in particular because of the great number of burglaries committed.

Q. The second case which Eichinger mentions is that of a Pole who, by the special court when you were the presiding judge, is supposed to have been sentenced to death for threatening somebody with a hoe. What do you have to say about that?

A. A case such as the witness Eichinger has described it, I never tried. That account of the witness Eichinger is so vague that I, myself, cannot recognize any punishable offense. The way he describes that case cannot be true if proceedings were instituted at all.

Q. The witness Lips - Prosecution Affidavit, Exhibit 228 - mentioned another case of a Pole. This Pole is supposed to have been sentenced to death by the special court, with you as presiding judge, for having defended himself against illtreatment by his employer. Do you remember that case?

A. Yes, I remember it. The facts were the following: The Pole was employed as a farmhand with a farmer. I can't remember the place where he worked. To begin with, his employer had been satisfied with his work but later on the Pole became unruly.

He refused to carry out the work he was told to do. He made offensive and insulting remarks to the farmer and there had been quite a number of arguments and clashes between him and the farmer.

Once again his employer criticized his performance and there was an argument. In the course of that argument the Pole used extremely rude language. The farmer slapped his face; whereupon the Pole took up a dung fork and the farmer, who was unarmed, was afraid that the Pole might attack him and ran away. All the same, the Pole ran after him, overtook him, and threw him down on the ground with that fork. The farmer sustained injuries which were dangerous to life. He spent months on the sick bed. He did not die in the end but he remained lame. That offense by the Pole was considered a violent crime under Article I of the law against violent criminals and he was sentenced to death.

DR. SCHUBERG: That testimony by this witness was corroborated in its essential points by the witness Lutz here, transcript Page 3705.

BY DR. SCHUBERT:

Q. Witness, were trials of foreigners conducted in the same way in which the trials of Germans were conducted? Were the facts investigated as thoroughly as they were in the cases of German defendants?

A. Yes. It was done in exactly the same way. In the case of foreigners, too, and also in the case of Poles proceedings were entirely in accordance with the German Penal Code of Procedure.

Q. At the special court did you observe particular points of view from which you dealt with crimes against the Malicious Acts Law?

A. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you postpone your answer until after the recess? Fifteen minutes recess.

(A recess was taken.)

THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.

BY DR. SCHUBERT:

Q. Witness, we had been discussing cases of foreigners, and you wanted to say something about the jurisdiction of the special courts.

A. It was the constant jurisdiction of the special court that malicious acts committed by foreigners should be dealt with considerably more leniently than in the case of Germans. I myself found a great many of such cases among the three hundred files of which I checked when this procedure was followed.

Q. Did you frequently act as a judge in criminal cases against Poles?

A. No, very seldom. The reason was that these Polish criminal cases were almost exclusively dealt with in the rural, i. e. outside local court districts because there it was that the Poles worked as agricultural workers. Until the autumn of 1943, as I explained yesterday, I did not travel very much because of my party offices. For practical purposes I was relieved of all sessions that took place outside; I was called in very seldom only. Further-more from January 1943 Poles were no longer turned over to the Justice Administration. As for 1943 almost only such Polish cases were dealt with by us which had been pending. Cases which did not actually occur in 1943 were not turned over to our administration. Apart from the Polish cases described here, I can recall two specific cases, one of which occurred before the issuance of the Polish circular decree. He had been charged under paragraph 1 of the decree about acts of violence because he had, if I remember rightly, hit his employer, a farmer, with the stem of his fork, his pitchfork, rather badly. But the Pole was in a position to prove that he had been provoked by the unfair treatment which the farmer had meted out to him and he was then only sentenced for dangerous assault to a term in prison. The other case I still recall was the case of a female Pole. She had been indicted because she was alleged to have caused black-slaughtering of a cow by putting poison in the fodder. This was an extremely long-winded trial, and the Polish woman was acquitted because there was not sufficient evidence available that she had deliberately put this poisoning stuff into the fodder.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the disposition of the criminal cases against Poles after the time in 1933 to which you refer?

JUDGE BLAIR: 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: 1943. You said they didn't come to your court after the time in 1943. What was done with those Polish cases after that time?

A. As far as I know, these Poles were handed over to the Police after 1943--with the exception of those cases which had been brought to our notice previously, either from the prosecution or the court itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know under what law or decree that was done?

A. I am afraid I do not know that, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: It was a separate--it was a different provision from the one which related to Jews; was it not?

A. Yes, certainly.

DR. SCHUBERT: If the Tribunal please, I have now dealt with the general questions touching on this defendant. I shall now come to the various cases which the Prosecution has quoted. I want to ask the Court's permission, for a brief period of time, to interrupt the examination of the defendant as a witness and to submit now my Document Book II, which, for the larger part, contains general principles which were of judicial importance and I shall then immediately continue with the examination of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: These are the first documents you have presented, are they not? Have you introduced your Document Book I before?

DR. SCHUBERT: Yes.

DR. SCHUBERT: The first document in my Document Book II is Document No. 8, which will be Exhibit No. 30. It contains an excerpt-

THE PRESIDENT: It's your Document 8, did you say?

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 8.

THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 30.

DR. SCHUBERT: It's Exhibit 30.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. SCHUBERT: It contains an excerpt from the organizational book of the NSDAP, and I should like to draw the Tribunal's attention particularly to the fact that here the question has been discussed who was competent to appoint the man in charge of an office in the Gauleitung; and the man in charge of a main department (Hauptstelle) in an office of the Gauleiter. I draw attention to page 4 and the chart on page 5.

Then, I come to Document 197, which is Exhibit 31. This document contains an article on the question of the criminal liability of a judge for the application of laws that are in contrast to the general idea of morality. Here I wish to draw the Court's special attention to page 11 where under Roman V, it is especially emphasized that the legal provisions concerning illegal orders does not apply to a judge.

The next document, 24, will be Exhibit 32. This again is an essay about the responsibility of a judge, and I should like to remark that both the essays quoted by me now have been published since the end of the war.

THE PRESIDENT: These Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 are received.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 167 will be Exhibit 33; it is a brief excerpt from a British law book by Salmond and it shows that British legal literature affirms the idea that a judge has no business to examine a law as to its moral implications.

This is followed by Document 169, which will be Exhibit 34. This contains a few excerpts from the German criminal code of procedure. The paragraphs quoted therein are of importance for the various cases.

THE PRESIDENT: Exhibits 33 and 34 are received.

DR. SCHUBERT: The next document is Document No. 186, which will be Exhibit 35. This contains a supplement to the code of criminal procedure as of 1st September, 1939, concerning the right of the court to turn down motions for the submission of evidence in certain cases.

Document No. 120 will be Exhibit 36. It contains circular decrees by the Reich Ministry of Justice concerning special courts.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document No. 156 will be Exhibit 37. It is an excerpt from the Reich Legal Gazette, an ordinance on the appointment of Reich Defense Commissioners. It is important for courts martials as the Reich Defense Commissioners appointed the courts martials.

THE PRESIDENT: It is received.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 26 will be Exhibit 38. It is an excerpt from the Reich Legal Gazette of 1944, concerning the formation of what was called the German Volkssturm, the home guard, and on page 31 we find an ordinance on the status of the members of the home guard, the Volkssturm, which shows that members of that body were to be put on an equal footing with the Wehrmacht. I apologize, the document I have just been talking about was already Document 27, which will be Exhibit 39.

THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit 38 is received.

DR. SCHUBERT: And Document 27 will be Exhibit 39. I beg this document also to be received.

THE PRESIDENT: Received.

DR. SCHUBERT: Both documents are important for the question of the courts martial.

With Document 126 we come for the tasks of the special courts. Document 126 deals with the nullity pleas, and it contains a special point or two, regarding the fact that it is obligatory for the public prosecutor to investigate undisputed verdicts of the special courts on behalf of the defendant.

DR. SCHUBERT: That was Exhibit 40.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 121 is Exhibit 41. Here we have an excerpt from the book "German Criminal Law" which I would like to call the standard work on German Criminal Law in war times. This document informs us about the principles and the motivation of war time criminal law as they were published at the time.

DR. SCHUBERT: Exhibit 41. Document 172 will be Exhibit 42. It deals with the problem of how offenses are be regarded in war time.

The next document is document no. 99 and it will be Exhibit 43. It is an article by the man in charge of the prosecution with the Reich Supreme Court on the legal policy in war time.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 170 is to become Exhibit 44. It is an excerpt from an important German magazine on criminal law. It contains a report on the development of war time criminal law in Italy. Therefrom it becomes clear that in Italy similar decisions and regulations were issued as the German regulations against public enemies as f.i. the prohibition listen to foreign broadcasting stations.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 101 will become Exhibit 45. It contains a report on war time penal law in France, and this shows that a law was issued there according to which crimes committed during the blackout could be punished with death.

The next Exhibit is 46, Document 158. This is the decree against public enemies.

Document No. 157 will be Exhibit 47; it is an excerpt from the German war economy decree.

Document 160 will be Exhibit 48. It is the decree about acts of violence.

Document 155 is Exhibit 49. It contains the paragraph 5 of the special war time penal regulations, as it was called-

THE PRESIDENT: Will you pause just a moment, please. I am getting behind. All right.

DR. SCHUBERT: Could Exhibits 46 to 49 be received?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, all those exhibits are received.

DR. SCHUBERT: The next four documents contain the basis laws of the German war time penal code. Document 78 will be Exhibit 50. It is an excerpt from what is known as the Leipzig Commentary which has been mentioned in this trial before as the leading German commentary on penal law concerning the passing of sentences and particularly concerning the problem of how far judges were bound or had latitude in passing sentences. The excerpt speaks also on the problem of especially grave cases and less grave cases and on extenuating circumstances. The author is Professor Nagler who is a German criminologist of repute.

Document 115 will become Exhibit 51. Again, a document about the meting out of punishment; it is an essay by the chief public prosecutor at the Reich Supreme Court. There I should like to draw the Court's attention to the fact that this article shows how far the Reich Supreme Court in war time, in an increasing measure, interfered with the meting out of punishment even of lower courts, i.e. took the side of increasing the severity of sentences.

Document 187 will be Exhibit 52. It is a decision by the Reich Supreme Court which supports what the chief public prosecutor said in the essay mentioned before. Here, again, the Reich Supreme Court in the question of sentences interfered on the side of increasing the severity.

Document 166 will be Exhibit 53. It is an excerpt from a letter to the judges which has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is the comment by the Reich Minister of Justice concerning sentences.

THE PRESIDENT: These exhibits are received -- 50 to 53, inclusive.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 102 will be Exhibit 54. Again a document about the amount of punishment and sentence. Here we are concerned with by a few affidavits submitted by the Prosecution, namely, whether the expert has any influence on the type of sentence.

DR. SCHUBERT: Then, we come to some documents which I submit within the scope of the general defense. Here we are concerned with documents which deal with the theory of the typical perpetrator. This theory in German penal law was of importance since 1937 or 1938, and in war time it originated from some decisions of the Reich Supreme Court, where the Reich Supreme Court described the type of the perpetration; and from there a general theory of the type of perpetrator grew which became particularly important in the application of the war time penal laws. In the first years the Reich Supreme Court frequently ruled that a perpetrator could only be punished under the severe war time laws if and when he represented the type of the public enemy or the violent criminal for instance.

Document 141 contains a fundamentally important essay by Professor Dahm, Leipzig, and I beg to offer this as Exhibit 55.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 123 will be Exhibit 56. Here we are concerned with the type of public enemy.

Document 82 will be Exhibit 57; it is a decision by the Reich Supreme Court concerning the type of public enemy.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 130 will be Exhibit 58; again, a decision by the Reich Supreme Court about the type of public enemy.

Court No. III, Case No. III.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 169 will be Exhibit 59. This is an interesting decision by the Reich Supreme Court concerning again the type of public enemy. There the Reich Supreme Court points out that the fact that there are no previous convictions and an honorable past need not present the perpetrator to be punished as a public enemy. Document 108 will escome Exhibit 60. It is an excerpt from a book concerning the type of perpetrator, one who is regarded as a violent criminal. Here misgivings are voiced concerning tno theory of the typical perpetrator. Document 68 will become Exhioit 61, again comments on the type of the violent criminal criminal as the perpetrator.

THE PRESIDENT: 59, 60 and 61 are received.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 116 will be Exhibit 62, excerpts from an essay on the type of the habitual criminal.

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 90, excerpt from an essay, the author is Dr. Schwarz who was a judge at the Reich Supreme Court, and he objects to the exaggerated application of the theory of the type of perpetrator. Document 90 is to be Exhibit 65.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't get that last. Document 113?

DR. SCHUBERT: Document 113 will be Exhioit 64; it is an essay by Professor Klee.

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment please. There seems to be a defect in Judge Blair's book, Dr. Schubert. It will have to be corrected later.

DR. SCHUBERT: If Your Honors please, I could give you my copy.

THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead.

DR. SCHUBERT: Thank you, Sir.

Transcript for NMT 3: Justice Case

Defendants