A. In connection with the surge of National Socialism toward power, a sort of public insecurity existed which one could consider a period of danger in the sense of that article.
Q. That is to say for a year and a half, the conclusion would be that it covered the year and a half, the time from October 1931 until March 1933?
A Well, yes, the Government Schleicher.
Q. Excuse me. I mean only the Enabling Act covered the danger period, and for the time of danger, the establishment of special courts was common.
A. Legally, it was not limited, however.
Q. You have already said it was not legally limited. Because it was not limited was the reason I put the question. Could one consider this an acceptance, a legal acceptance? We agree that this question cannot be decided here, but I want to ask you whether it is known to you, that before 1931, during the period of the Weimar Republic, repeatedly special courts had been established?
A. It is brown to me that during the time of inflation and economic insecurity, there were so-called userers courts which, however, were dissolved immediately after stabilization in April 1942. They were established with all legal guarantees existing in orderly courts, in the regular courts.
Q. The question is, is it known to you that also after 1924, in the different states, Laender, there were special courts for criminal actions? For example, I cite Bavaria.
A. Yes. That is known to me.
Q. After the period of inflation -
A. Yes. Bavaria. I believe it was the Bavarian People's court. I am not quite sure of that.
Q. In other words, You make the concession that before 1931 special courts in the various states did exist?
A. Yes. but they were always of a transitory nature. The Parliaments were opposed to these courts. They continuously demanded that they should be dissolved. Finally they succeeded. During the time of National Socialism, as is well known, there was no control, and no super vision by Parliament or democratic organizations. There was no parties against the growing number of special courts. That is a fundamental difference.
Q. If we start from the assumption that the legal acceptance of special courts would be justified in Germany, would it be a point of argument for this assumption if I would put to you several names which were mentioned which have signed that decree as members of the Reich Government? The democratic ideology of those men is beyond doubt. I ask you to explain this to the Tribunal. I read only a few of these names. It is known to you that Reich Chancellor, at that time, was Dr. Bruening. The Deputy Reich Chancellor was Dr. Dietrich. To my knowledge he is now in the British Zone or in the Laenderrat, the State Council. Another signatory is Dr. Stegewald. And another one is Dr. Wirth. I do not wish to read any more names. The mentioning of these names may speak for the assumption that under the Weimar Republic, it would have been possible to establish a principle to the offect that the establishment of special courts can be justified, legally justified.
A. To that I wish to state that already yesterday I quoted the commentary by Gerhard Ansehuetz concerning this question according to which it is possible that the Reich Constitution does not exclude the establishment of special courts, but that the reduction of importance of the regular jurisdiction, as far as importance is concerned, not in figures, was not covered by the Constitution.
That the names Stegewald, Wirth and Dietrich are found under this Enabling Action is correct, I believe, however, that I may say that the fact that the Government Bruening did go as far as making this instrument for danger periods, they did not make use of it. That also can be explained by the fact that personalities suck as Wirth, Stegewald were members of that government.
Q. I always consider it important, witness, to discuss this matter as far as formality is concerned; that they did not make any use of it is known. I should like to discuss with you whether there was the possibility of a legal justification for the formation of special courts on the basis of the entire development, on the basis of the Enabling Acts and so on, as legally acceptable and reason for that. I have mentioned these names.
A. The possibility may exist. And as I have to state again, it is also mentioned in Anschuetz' commentary, I believe this was already covered by what I said yesterday.
Q. In summarizing, I just want to put to you the following. It is Law Number 11 of the Control Council concerning the removal of certain regulations of the German Penal Code.
This is called a so-called Penal Legal Constitution of 1946. You know about that, do you not
A Yes.
A For the benefit of the members of the high Tribunal, I should like to state that this Constitution of Penal Legislation of 1946 was published in the Bavarian Legal Gazette of 1946, 15 June, Number 8. I should like to read Paragraph 15 of that Constitution for Penal Legislation.
"Before regular courts should be brought all civil litigations and penal cases for which there exists neither the competence; of administrative authorities nor administrative courts-A" and now comes the decisive point--" but for which special courts have been established or admitted by Reich Law".
Do you believe, Mr. Witness, that Paragraph 13, within the framework of the Control Council Legislation, would not give a very good parallel concerning special courts? They speak about special courts there. It is mentioned they could be appointed or admitted to handle these cases under certain circumstance That would serve as an additional argument for the assumption that German law provides for the possibility and the acceptance of special courts and provides a legal basis for it.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I would like to object to this question, Your Honor. I object to this question for the obvious reason that the legislation referred to is in an entirely different context. It is legislation proposed by four occupying powers. The word "special" is used. It seems to me to be very clear that the word "special" as used in this Control Council Law 11, can furnish no identification of a system of courts comparable to the special courts which existed prior to 1933 or subsequent thereto. For that reason the witness is being asked concerning a comparison with courts about which the evidence produced clearly shows it is impossible to make such a comparison. It is not within the range of the witness's testimony either under chief or under previous cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: It is the view of the Tribunal that there is a wide latitude given to cross-examination. While it may be argued that this comparison is far-fetched, in the broad view of the cross-examination, we will not limit it at this time.
Q May I ask, Mr. President, that you answer my question? The question, if I may briefly repeat it is this: Does not the text of this speak for the assumption that in Germany the acceptance by custom of such courts can be assumed?
A This paragraph 15 was copied from the law--the Constitution of jurisdiction in Germany. It was the purpose of this Constitution to provide for the judges, as quickly as possible, a somewhat purified text of the Constitution of German Jurisdiction, and to put it at their disposal It is a temporary text--such as I have been told several times--it is a sort of temporary text for the time being, so that after eliminating National Socialist ideas, it can still be applied. There can be found various passages which permit this assumption, when these texts were revised, that certain points have been overlooked which still should have been eliminated. For instance, the reason for arrest introduced by the National Socialists--the reason being the concern that the defendant, when released, would commit additional criminal actions--a regulation which I might consider non-Socialist one, and I think it should be removed, and it will be removed.
Q But, witness-
A May I finish my trend of thought? It is possible that here also, in Paragraph 13, a similar procedure is responsible for the fact that there is a possibility. As for the question of the legal acceptance, I can only point to the passage from Gerhard Anschuetz' Commentary, from which I have already quoted, according to which the German Reich Constitution of Weimar provides--or rather does not exclude--special courts.
Q May I add to your statements about your opinion that now it is valid as law. Paragraph 13, which I have quoted, which covers the territory of the United States Zone is valid.
A Yes.
Q You have frequently quoted Anschuetz' Commentary to the Reich Constitution, and in particular the fact that Gerhard Anschuetz is alleged to have stated--we don't have the text here-that the special courts in his opinion-- May I interrupt for a moment? One of my colleagues just gave me Anschuetz' Commentary. It is the Third Edition, 1929.
May I quote the title? "The Constitution of the German Reich of the 11 August 1919, known under the name Weimar Constitution. Commentary By Gerhard Anschuetz, Professor of Law at Heidelberg." The edition which I have before me was published in 1929; that is to say, before the decree, the Enabling Act of the 6 of October 1931. As far as I am instructed, there exists a fourth edition which will probably contain the decree of the 6 of October 1931 and a Commentary here too. And in consideration of the fact that this edition does not take care of this decree I will not quote anything. I should really like to ask the witness since he accepts the opinion of Gerhard Anschuetz and his Commentary, whether there were any other opinions--any possibility or another opinion--or whether Gernard Anschuetz', so to say, opinion would be as important as the decision of the Reich Court?
AAs in all fundamental questions of this kind, as is very well-known there is always the possibility of an opposite opinion which can be based on good arguments. However, I do not know of any opinion within the legal field which would approve of the taking over of regular jurisdiction by special courts, which would state that this would be compatible with the Constitution of the Reich, meaning the Weimar Constitution.
Q Concerning jurisdiction of special courts, you mentioned yesterday the decree of the 9. 8. 1932. That is the decree which the Cabinet Papen has issued. Again on the basis of the Enabling Act, the decree of the 31 of October 1931, as example, the fact that this decree was in conformity with the previously mentioned decree in making possible a retrial before a regular court, and if my impression is correct, you have also said that this decree, paragraph 17 of it, gave the defendant a very extensive right and privilege which was denied by the Nazi decree. Will you please toll me if I have repeated that correctly.
A I have said that Paragraph 17 reserves for the defendant, under certain circumstances, the right of a retrial before a regular court; that therefore, here the regular court still stands in the background--that is, behind these special courts.
Q That was Paragraph 17 of the decree of the 9 August 1932? If I understand you correctly, you want to state that the Nazi decree did not provide t hat privilege for the defendant?
A Not in that form.
Q Now, may I ask you, Mr. Witness, you have the text in front of you, haven't you?
A Not of 1933.
Q The decree of the 21 March 1933, could that be handed to the witness?
(Witness is offered the decree)
This decree, that is from the 21 March 1933, in Paragraph 16, which I should like to read--and if I may be permitted to suggest, I would like to ask the witness, if after I have read Paragraph 16 of this decree, that he may read Paragraph 17 of the decree of August 1932 in order to have a basis for comparison. I read Paragraph 16: "There is no legal opinion against decisions of the special courts. Section ": Application for a reopening of a trial are to be decided upon by this criminal chamber of the district court (Straf-Kammer.)" Here I have to include some explanation. The Straf-Kammer is the so-called public court. That is the chamber within the district court to which also the special court is attached. The special Straf-Kammer, criminal chamber, means therefore the regular court as opposed to the special courts.
May I continue with my quotation? "The reopening of the trial in favor of the defendant will also take place if there are circumstances which point to the necessity of re-examining the case in the ordinary procedure." And here again I should like to make an addition. Mention is made of ordinary procedure as against special procedure. I do not need to read the next sentence. It's purely technical.
The next one reads: "If the application for the reopening of the trial is justified, tho trial will be ordered to take place before the competent ordinary court." That means that in the case of a reopening of the trial, the ordinary court--the criminal chamber of the district court--is competent to decide and to try the case. Then follows the additional legal remedy, that is, the examination by a higher court.
May I ask now, as the witness yesterday has stated particularly that this regulation, Paragraph 17 of the decree of August 1932, had given that right to the defendant, but as he has stated before, the Nazi decree had limited that right. May I ask the witness, therefore, to read the text of the decree of the 9.8.
A. I do not have the text here, but I admit that in this text the retrial, the reopening of the trial, has been regulated, provided in the same manner * in this first decree for special courts. Yesterday when I made this comparison I did not consider the special courts on the basis of this decree to the compared with the special courts of 1933. I had in mind the development of the special courts from 1933 on until 1940 and I described that; and the final version of the decree concerning special courts does not -- you do not find anything about the reopening of the trial. I did not mean to point to the first decree particularly.
Q. May I point out first, witness, we are somewhat limited by the medium of translation; there was another error yesterday when you stated that the decree of the 9th of August, 1932 gave that right to the defendant, but the special courts regulations as soon as the Nazis had come to power did not.
A. Yes, that I stated, and that was the very first regulation of the Nazi, concerning special courts and there it is not so.
Q. Could you toll me, witness, in your opinion, when or where was this regulation omitted?
A. The final decision about special courts can be found in the regulation concerning competence of the 21st of February, 1940. Here we don't find, a regulation which would be in accordance with paragraph 16 which we have just read.
Q. May I point out that the regulation concerning special courts of the 21st of March, 1933 has been published in a new version, in the form of the regulation of which we have just quoted, in February 21, 1940; that is the Reich Legal Gazette Blatt, Part I, page 405, of 1940, and if we look at this regulation which we have mentioned, of which you say that such a provision is no more contained, then I hope you don't mind, witness, if I prove to you the contrary. In paragraph 26 of that decree, paragraph 6, Section II, we find literally word for word the same as in the decree of March, 1933.
A. That is incorrect because I will read it now. The reopening of the trial takes place also if special circumstances prevail which would inquire an additional trial before the special court.
Q. May I read my text, please, now?
A. I don't know if you have the same book.
Q. That is the same commentary which you have, isn't it? 11?
A. 12th Edition.
Q. Then we have to start from the beginning; may I ask you to examine, witness, whether you have the decree of the 21st February, 1940, 21 February 1940, Reich Legal Gazette Blatt, Part I, page 405, paragraph 26, Section II. Applications regarding reopening of trial are decided by the criminal chamber court; the reopening in favor of the defendant takes place also when circumstances prevail which make it desirable to reexamine the case in regular proceedings. In case the application for reopening of the trial is justified, then the main trial has to take place before the competent ordinary court. This can be found in the regulations of the 21st of February, 1930.
A. I think I can clarify this point. This provision by the decree of 29 January, 1943 -
Q. We are not that far yet; we just want to point out that the decree of February, 1940, has the same provisions as the decree of '32 and 1933. Can you grant us this?
A. On the basis of the text which I have here, I cannot.
Q. We will come to the other decree later. May I ask the following: In your statements yesterday concerning special courts privileges, in saying that the special courts limited the right of the defendant, you have stated that was true for the time between 1933 and 1938, 1939 or 1940. This certain period of time, according to your experience and your knowledge of condition a certain period between 1933 and 1940 it could not be concluded that the rig of the defendants were limited. May I ask you to confirm whether I have heard that correctly?
A. During that time in comparison with paragraph 17 of the decree of Papen government they were not limited, but -
Q. May I also state, that this is a contradiction with your opinion as before, after we had an opportunity to see the original text of the decree, we can see that your opinion was not correct as far as the time 1940 or until 1943 is concerned. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the decree of the 29th of May, 1943 was the first which contained a limitation of this right the defendant.
May I ask you if you want to draw this conclusion, to look a this decree of the 29th of May, 1943; you apparently have the text there of 29 May, 1943 -
A. 29 January.
Q. No, there is another one; the third one; there were several decrees. For the simplification of jurisdiction, 29 May, 1943, Reich Legal Gazette Bl page 342, Article 6; can you find that, witness?
A. No, it is not here.
A. Then I shall read it; Article 6, Changes, paragraph 359, and the following version which I shall read has to be applied from there on. "A case which has been terminated by an ordinary verdict can be reopened if new facts or new evidence is submitted, which in connection with evidence previously submitted are designed to: to give cause for acquittal of a defendant, or a much milder penalty, or the discontinuance of the procedure." I do not wish to read point two or three, but I only want to put to you, witness, that by this regulation this decree of the 29th May, 1943, the provisions which we have just discuss and which as you have stated, has been removed, in 1943, that is paragraph 17 of the decree of 1932; paragraph 16 of the decree of 1933; paragraph 26 of the decree of 1940; that it was unnecessary because the reopening of the trial was permitted by this provision.
MR. LaFOLLETTE: We are having some difficulty with the language. My German reading colleague beside me informs me that Dr. Schilf has not read all of this paragraph. I am only acting on the advice of my colleague that it was so left out and ask that the Doctor read the rest of it.
DR. SCHILF: Then it would be advisable if I read of the decree of 29 May 1943, Reichsgesetzblatt, part I, page 324, article 4, article 6, paragraph 359. I shall read it again. In this case it might make the translation difficult because the verb is at the end of the sentence of about two lines.
"A case which has been completed by verdict can be reopened if new facts or evidence is submitted, which together with evidence previously submitted, may make it possible or give cause for the acquittal. In mind of the punishment or in place of the punishment, pleas of the verdict, at the end of the procedure, if they may cause the conviction of a person acquitted a more severe penalty or the discontinuance of the procedure, and, thirdly, in the sentence, difficult decision concerning a measure for security and correction, the reopening of the trial against the interest of the defendant is only admissible if the renewed prosecution is necessary in the interest of the Nation for the protection of the Nation."
Paragraph 359 of the Criminal Code presents now a considerable change compared with the former stipulation because there was a very far reaching possibility, as we have heard and also on the interest of the defendant. And, accordingly it was no more necessary to have special regulations such as in the decree of 1932, paragraph 16; of the decree of 1933, paragraph 26; and of the decree of 1940; it was no more necessary to keep these regulations valid. I ask you, Witness, to tell us your opinion about this question as to whether the differences in conditions really as essential as you stated yesterday to the Tribunal?
A. After the new text of that paragraph, as you have quoted it, a reopening of the trial was possible but not the transfer of a case from a special court to an ordinary court, and so far as a great difference as compared to the provisions of 1932, of the decree of 1932, and also of the decree of 1933, the provisions that such a criminal case now could come before an ordinary court, could not be seen from that paragraph.
Q. In fact, Witness, it would be too far, if we should discuss now all the legal changes. In fact, and from a practical point of view, this would be the task of the defendant as soon as the case is submitted, that a change did not occur, by various legal means, which can be considered extraordinary legal means, and about which we will speak later; but I should not like to go into detail as far as the development is concerned because it would lead us too far from the special courts. You are of the opinion, the year 1943, the provisions which you stated yesterday, were in fact, valid and that only in 1943 a change occurred; is that our opinion?
A. Not the provisions itself, but a provision in accordance with it.
Q. Now, we come to a question which again has to do with the special courts. As I have repeated before, you have stated yesterday that the ordinary court, that is, the jurisdiction of the Criminal Chambers had become an exception as far as its importance was concerned because the special courts dealt with more cases than the ordinary courts. Did you see any statistics which would show the participation of the special courts in general jurisdiction?
A. No, I have no statistics.
Q. Do you not remember having read any of those statistics anywhere?
A. No.
Q. Or do you have any other possibilities to estimate the volume and to compare the volume of work of the special courts with that of the ordinary courts?
A. For that period of time, that would only show figures.
Q. I want to find a basis of comparison or rather a basis for your opinion. You have stated that special courts increased to such an extent that they really took the place of the ordinary jurisdiction: however, if we come to figures, then we find that even during the period before 1941-42, there were about 300,000 cases a year, criminal cases a year of which only ten per cent were handled by the special courts. Do you think that purely statistical statement would influence your opinion or change your opinion?
A. No, because all criminal procedures which the National Socialist leadership considered important for them, not petty thievery, minor misdeeds or other unimportant things, everything that was important for then was brought before the special courts; and, I have to emphasize again that with mere figures we could not work.
Q. Not at all?
A. Yes, not at all.
Q. For the question of judging as to how many cases were generally handled, we cannot overlook figures, can we? I am of the opinion if you speak of the importance, you were thinking more about the affect in newspapers or cases which were closer to you, and therefore you have a sort of subjective judgment about the importance of the number of cases handled by the special courts?
A. No, that is not the case. Importance can be found from the provisions and regulations and jurisdictions which can be seen what the special courts were used for, and in judging figures, we have to take into account as is well known when dealing with statistics, tremendous amount of details makes figures appear much larger. Maybe there are 50 or a 100 cases of petty thievery which can be handled by local judges. Their importance is very small compared to one case which may have come before the special courts. In other words, it is an objective measure, not a subjective measure at all; In cases which touched one as an individual are always very few compared to the total volume.
Q. Now, I come to another set of questions; that is, the question of the independence of the judges and the courts. You have told the Tribunal that the independence of the judges was limited. And, you emphasized that, for instance, the education, the training of young jurists had undermined their independence. Now, I ask you if this is correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You have quoted a part from article 102 of the Reich Constitution, also paragraph 1 of the Penal Code, wherein the same word, the independence of the judges is stated, and the fact that they are all subject to the Constitution itself. Is it not true, Witness, that the provisions, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Courts, had been changed after 1933?
A. No formal changes, no. I have already stated that the National Socialist State, at the outside was very careful not to do that, not to change the aspects of the independence of the judges.
Q. Do you know, Witness, are you informed about the fact that the jurisdiction in paragraph 1 of the Judicator Act was still a question that was discussed after 1933. Have you found any decision of that kind?
A. No.
Q You stated that the Nazi Regime only maintained the aspect of the independence of the judges. I should like to show you a decision of the Supreme Reich Court, that is, the official collection of decisions of the Reich Supreme Court, Reich Court, Criminal Cases, Vo. 73, page 399 -- a decision of the 15 December 1939. I will read a few sentences and I will try to speak them as slowly as possible. "Judges may not exceed the limit established by regulations, the limit of punishment, except in cases which are established by law. If there is no such provision a judge rendering the penalty has to remain within the limits established by the law. If the minimum punishment is considered too severe then the maximum penalty might be considered too mild. Above all the right for mercy is not with the ju*** and so far the legal conditions have not changed from the time before 1933. Also the judge of the concept of law and State does not relieve the judge, particularly the penal judge of his obligations to the law." The decisive point is that it is stated that since 1933 there has occurred a change in the concept of law and State, Legislature of the State; that, however, penal judge particularly is bound to the law and that he is expected to observe the law in particularly strong measures. I continue the quotation "On the point of view that the changed concept, the penal laws show flaws our opinion that can only be changed on the basis of the law that has already been done in several cases. So far that has not been done. It is the question of the Legislator to maintain at least, for the time being, the laws in exist" End of quotation. May I ask you, witness, in the case of a decision which has been rendered in 1939 and was published in 1940, the judge, that is, the criminal judge -- that decision could only have strengthened the judge -that he was independent?
A The decision of the Reich Court, yes.
Q And what do you want to distinguish from that, if you say the d** of the Reich Court?
A From others as I should like to explain in detail now. Attempts have been made to limit the freedom of decisions of the judge. Essential elements were before 1942. The Judges' Letters which were published by the Reich Minister of Justice also followed by Lawyers' Letters sometime later and other institutions which gave rise to more concern.
There was the of the Reich Minister of Justice of 13 October 1942 concerning the direction jurisprudence during war-time which is signed by Dr. Rothenberger. In order to understand these measures one has to examine the fact that Hitler - that April 1943 made a speech concerning jurisprudence which the judges considered an insult. At least, many of the judges considered it an insult. On 18 October the then Reich Minister Thierack in the Deutsche Justize, the Military Period Journal of Justice, of 16 October 1942 on page 661, 662, published a part about the re-construction of German jurisprudence. I quote from this speech: "The judge, therefore is not the guardian but the immediate helper of the State's leadership. It is he, who in his field, is responsible to the leadership of the State for the movement of the People's community protecting national values and in moving -- eliminating, the enemies of the National community from it. That he related to the political leader the of national -
Q Witness, since you quote from something from this speech may I quote some on my part?
A When I am through with it. "This point of view must be decided for the judge and a judge who considers this decision will find it much easier now which up to now seems rather difficult. This way of serving his task will bring the judge into immediate connection with the leadership of the State. This close connection must have its effect all of the way down to lowest judge. Each judge has to view the problems which are put to the leadership of the State and has to be familiar with them as far as it is for the judge to know these problems in order to carry out his tasks in service of the People's community in an appropriate manner. Therefrom the purpose and the necessity of a directed jurisdiction. It is one of most difficult questions in the field of jurisprudence. Directed jurisdiction does not mean to bind the judge to the direction of the leadership of the State. The nucleus of the so-called independence of the judge, the word the above mentioned reason should be eliminated from the vocabulary if w** in independent decisions, independent of any directions should remain otherwise there will be no judges.
However, the leadership of the State may and should explain to the judge the general direction which has to maintained if jurisdiction should be able to carry out those particular tasks. Among others the Judges' Letters which I am personally issuing will serve this purpose which are confidential and will be sent to every German judge and Public Prosecutor." End of quotation.
From this speech it can be seen that also as it was a symbol of National Socialism also in other fields it affected the independence of judge and the direction remaining valid, that just the same, it was necessary to give him general instructions -- general directions to lead him, to guide him. The word "guide" and this is mentioned in the decree of 13 August 1942 is actually mentioned there "lenken", - "guide". I had been informed without establishing or the introduction of these Judge Letters, this decree is important, in considering the question as to the independence of the judge apart from directions -- decision of the Reich Court, where then it was really maintained and for beside that **** that decree is important -- is essential. In this decree it is stated that a continuous exchange of directives or rather transmittal of directives from the leadership of the State to the judges has to be maintained in order to give a uniform direction to jurisprudence according to the historic development meaning of the nation for which in the past provisions had not been made -- that all provisions had been made that this should be achieved now. I quote from this decree of the Reich Minister of Justice. Roman Numeral III, paragraph 3: "Most means, however, in view of circumstances, present circumstances to deal with individually important cases" -- these four decisions are before the Tribunal -"Only the judges have to do that who on their part have the necessary connections with the leading personalities in the prosecution office. In consequence of this decree the judges at the District Courts discussed together with the President of the Criminal Chambers, without admitting the associate judges and in the presence of the Chief Prosecutor discussed criminal matters which had not yet been decided and still had to come trial, I personally was told and it was sold to me by a judge that the Presiding Judge of his Criminal Chamber before the trial ever started brought it to the attention of the District Judges how in a discussion of that kind one considered the case and discussed what punishment would be adequate for the case.
This other judge protested and stated that he would prefer to **** his decision only on the basis of the trial itself. Thereupon he was info*** it was pointed out to him that a judgment which would be considerably different from the decision reached in this preliminary discussion could be disagreeable for the judge in question and would have disagreeable consequence. That judge said that he considered these preliminary directions a quite tremendous attempt to influence his independence as a judge.
THE COURT: The time has come for our noon meal. We will therefore recess until 1:30 this afternoon.
(A recess was taken)