Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, against Josef Altstoetter, et al, defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 19 March 1947, 0930-1630, Justice Marshall presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. The Honorable Judge of Military Tribunal III. God save the United States of American and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will please ascertain whether all defendants are present.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all the defendants are present in the courtroom with the exception of defendants Rothaug and Eng who are absent due to illness.
THE PRESIDENT: Proper notation will be made in the notes.
You may proceed with the cross-examination, Dr. Schilf.
DR. SCHILF: Counsel for the defendants Klemmaand Mettgenberg. With the approval of the Tribunal, I should now like to begin cross-examining witness on behalf of the defendants Klemm and Mettgenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q Witness, yesterday you gave us a report saying that in 1935, you left the German administration and that in 1941 you did war work again in the administration. You said in 1931 you left because you considered y work to be intolerable. Would you please give us the reasons why in 1933 y were retired? My second question is why, in 1941, did the Party object to your working further?
A In 1935, I left the Ministry of the Interior in virtue of the 1a for the restoration of the service act and there was no special reason sta in the letter. I was told the reason was that as an official in the Administration, I was considered impossible. I was not a member of the Party and had revised to join the NS Jurist's League. That League changed its name but I do not remember exactly on what date. That would have been the proper reason. I was never told any details.
Q Did you ever belong to another party?
A Yes. I was a member of the Social Democrat Party.
Q Don't you think that was the main reason? The fact that you were a member of the party was the main reason, is that right?
A Yes. I am sure that played a part too. Another material reason that I was the head of the examining office for literature, the purity of literature. I frequently had to reject applications by the Minister; before 1933, I was attacked in the National Socialist Press.
Q May I ask you this: Did you belong to the Republican Judges' League?
A Yes. I did.
Q Would you please, briefly, explain to the Court that League and its aims?
A The aim of the Republican's Research League was to uphold among jurists the ideas of the Weimar Republic and true democracy, to exercise criticism against judgments, passed by judges of a reactionary mentality j the years of the Republic, which showed quite evidently a political tenden And we tried to explain that in a legal manner.
Q That is sufficient as a general statement. Now as to my second question, I should like to know about this. In 1941, you again had difficulties because the Party would no longer have you in the Prussian Interior Administration.
A Yes. I was personally told that the Ministry of the Interior had received a letter from the Braunes Haus in Munich saying that my employment during the war was no longer desirable. I had been compelled to accept the position by an order at the beginning of the war. The reasons were, the fi** vice-president Scholz in Berlin told me, my complete non-observance of the Party organizations. He said he would try to counteract the party objection so he could keep me in my position, but I was not interested in that. He asked me if at least I were a member of the NSV. Then shrugging his shoulder he gave up when I had to say no to that as well.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness should be admonished to speak little slowly.
Q Do you think that on account of your membership in the Social Democrat Party and the Republican Judges' League, you had further disadvantages apart from the fact that you were retired from the Administrative service in 1935?
A I cannot state any further disadvantages.
Q According to what you told us yesterday about your professional career, I suppose it is correct that you left the Administration of Just 1930, and that in 1945 you rejoined?
A That is correct.
Q That means that basically, the things you told us yesterday were observed by you outside the Administration of Justice, that is to say, that conclusions you drew yesterday, the views you gave yesterday, were arrive at on account of the things you saw outside the Administration of Justice.
A Even when I was no longer active in the Administration of Justice I observed the developments of the Administration of Justice during the Third Reich. I also observed the developments of culture under the Third Reich. I followed both consistently and in detail. I studied the Law Cazo and German Justice because I observed the slow degeneration as an adversary of the National Socialist Terror Rule. I talked to friends of the mine who were judges and attorneys-at-law-about the experiences they were having read newspapers and collected clippings concerning the administration of I also collected clippings concerning other fields of public life. I cold such clippings which appeared significant to me regarding the development the National Socialist rule. I intend these to be a foundation for a book which I intended to write later. This collection was lost in my Berlin he I do not know whether it is still in existence because I have not seen my for two and one-half years.
Q The basis for your judgment was therefore essentially the fact that yon followed the laws and publications of German Law and your discussions with judges. Do you believe, Mr. President, that this is a basis from which one could judge the inner events and the administration of justice at the Reich Ministry?
A I believe so, because the text of the laws, the proclamations which were made in the National Socialist phraseology which spoke for itself, they gave everybody who knew how to read a clear picture on the active events# In particular, it was possible for the reader to read between the lines, and if he like myself since 1923 observed National Socialism, considering it a terrible danger for the German people. Until 1933, I wrote political essays and gave my views on National Socialism, and very early on I read the book "My Struggle" (Mein Kampf) which unfortunately as I know from conversations and in fact heard very often, was not done by many jurists, particularly judges who belonged to the Party since 1933. Frequently, nowadays, I hear from judges concerning the status of the Denazification matters, and they have given me the answer that they never read "My Struggle" (Mein Kampf). That is, they who were judges -that is human beings who are not under obligation to form an independent judgement and to come to an assessment of affairs--these men never examined the so-called spiritual foundation of the movement.
Q Witness, what you told us concerns the general political development. My question concerning the difference in your judgment referred more to the technical matters of administration. I intended to ask you whether you think that, after having been outside the administration of justice for 15 years as an observer and as a critical observer, and you wore not within the administration, whother in that position you think you had a rcliablo basis for your judgment of the inner events of technical administration concerning orders, decroos, etc. Don't you think that these who were insic.o Mio administration have a different basis for thoir judgments 'ken those who wore outside?
A I believe that I have already answered your question for I told you that I learned from the text of the laws, from the preambles, and from the statements in the Deutsche Justiz (German Justice) that from all that, I was able quite well to form a picture of inner events as well. It may be correct that persons, who during the Third Reich were active in tho administration of justice, had more manifold insight and experiences, but I do not think that thoir experiences were different or could have been different from those which I, through careful observation of this development had.
Q Mr. President, yesterday you said that after your dismissal in 1955, you went in for witting. May I ask you whether that work was of a legal nature?
A That was literary work.
Q That did not deal with jurisprudence and legislature?
A No, the publications which I might have intended to make in that field, I would never have been allowed to have printed.
Q I possibly put this question to see whether the observations of the term from 1930 to 1935 were also laid down in your writings.
A My answer is "No," because literary activity in that sphere, on account of my views, would have been impossible for me.
Q Mr. President, in 1935 you were retired compulsorily?
A Yes.
Q In 1934, I will quote the law: Reich Law Gazette, 1934, Part I, Page 785. The Act is published both for the Civil Servants and those in service on 20 August 1934. This law contains a form of oath, which in principle, had to be taken by every civil servant and by every soldier. It says, *I swear to Adolf Hitler, and among other things, obedience to the laws." I wanted to ask you, and of course it is obvious because you were dismissed in 1935, whether you over swore that civil servant oath?
A I did swear that oath, just as of that time Jewish civil servants swore it too. The oath was sworn to a person who for their part had made an oath on the Weimar Constitution, with the thought in the back of their mind that at the first opportunity, even though apparently in a legal way, he would remove that Constitution. I discussed this with my Jewish colleagues who also were forced to swear that oath, and it must be understood in that sense.
Q I have a request to time German translator. Would she read the form of the oath from the Reich Law Gazette, to inform the Tribunal on it.
INTERPRETER: "I swear that I shall be obedient to the leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler; that I shall be loyal to him; that I will observe the laws; and that I will conscientiously fulfill my official duties; so help me God."
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q Witness, you said just now that you and your Jewish colleagues had been forced to swear that oath, if I understand you correctly.
A Yes.
Q Was there no possibility to evade that oath?
A There was the possibility to refuse the oath with all the consequence which the Third Reich had in store for such occasions.
Q I don't know whether the Tribunal understands what possibilities you were having in mind.
A One would have had to count with being moved to a concentration camp and one would have had to count quite definitely on persecution.
Q Wasn't there a possibility to resign first voluntarily? That is to say, to ask to resign. It is known that the oath would have to be sworn by the various officials in various departments. Could one not in order to avoid the oath, have resigned voluntarily first? Do you bolieve that possibility existed?
A It may be possible. In that case too, grave consequences had to ho feared in keeping with the spirit of National Socialism.
Q Witness, I suppose I may now draw the conclusion that if you had no been retired compulsorily, you fool that in that case you would have remain a civil servant?
A In reply, I can only state that through my actions and through my political attitude, I provoked that compulsory dismissal. I talked with the two Jewish colleagues, the Government Councilor Kaiser and Government Councilor Bloch. I associated with them almost exclusively. By way of demonstration: every day I was seen together with them. I had my lunch with them, and thus just as in 1941 where again my attitude brought about what happened, so at that time I gave cause for that pensioning off.
The Vice President of the Police, at that time Bobol, told me in 1936 that I would try to keep me; I refused.
Q. Without any criticism, may I refer to something that at first appeal to be a contradiction to me; earlier you said that when you left in 1935, if I understand your rightly, your superior officer told you that he would like to try and keep you and that he asked you -
A. No, that was in 1941; that is a misunderstanding.
Q. I see.
A. This attempt in 1935 was made in the conversation to keep me.
Q. If that attempt had succeeded, would you have remained in your position for sometime; would you have been so inclined? I don't know the reasons of couse, but would you have been inclined to hold your position?
A. No, I no longer had that inclination, but at that time my two friends on account of the Nurnberg laws were dismissed with me.
Q. Now, going over to quite a different complex of questions; in tnis cross examination I will keep to the same order in which you told us the developments yesterday. Yesterday you described to us how the administration of justice was centralized, and if I understood you correctly, you had a critical view of that development. Any way you spoke as if that centralization meant an undermining of justice, that centralization began such an undermining. Am I correct in that assumption?
A. Centralization of the administration of justice which prior to the advent of National Socialism was already being attempted, and which earlier on perhaps in the interest of uniformity of the administration of justice in a constitutional state like that might have been welcomed, but this centralization at the moment when the central power in Germany was in the h* of the National Socialists, it became a danger and it was shown that contra igation, the penetration of the administration of justice with the National Socialist tendencies; that centralization was facilitated by these ideas. It does not matter that any aim which one desires to achieve is achieved, * what matters is now and in what circumstances such an aim is achieved. In 1935 the so-called Verreichlighung, the centralization of administration of justice was a danger for the Rechts Staat, the constitutional state, against which the National Socialism was sold with distrust and it had the tendency to undermine it.
During the first Numberg trial, Hans Frank stated that Hitler had great distrust as far as the judges were concerned, and that the judges and their aims were a thorn in the flash to him. Here is a statement which I want to comment on, it is from a newspaper I cut; and it is a statement by Hans Frank; Adolph Hitler considered the jurists a disturbance and incompetent; he was against them just as altogether he did not recognize formal orders.
Q. Again I should like to say that is more a consideration of general political nature and not a criticism of justice, but it is only a criticism of Hitler's leadership.
A. That only concerns half of what I said. Under the rule of National Socialism everything was politically penetrated by the National Socialist ideology, and the centralization of the administration of justice in 1935 was intensified in 1935 because the fight with the political attitude of National Socialism and the undermining of the old principles promoted that. Therefore the word "political" only applies to the background of my criticism of that centralization.
Q. The criticism, if I understand correctly, refers to the fact that by the centralization, justice became a tool of Hitler's policy.
A. Yes, that is absolutely correct.
Q. When you quoted Hans Frank you want to say that his judgment was right: would you say that?
A. Yes, that is what I want to say. When you read Mein Kampf, my strug you see that his judgment is right.
Q. I should like to have you differentiate between your criticism of the political aims and the talk which Hitler already said for himself, and your own criticism of the administration of justice concerning the several persons who were active in the administration; to explain my question, whether your statements referred more to Hitler's intents than to the institutions of the ministry of justice and jurists as such.
A. Again I can only say I believe that I have already expressed that quite clearly that the civil servants in the ministry of justice and the jurists in general, by that centralization, were delivered to Hitler; and later on the development proved to what extent, some unwillingly, became gradually the victim to the influence, to the bad influence of National Socialism.
Q. The problem of centralization is acute, and as you told us earlier that you were a member of the SPD; you will admit that the SPD, at least along with the political line concerning the reconstruction of Germany, represented centralized ideas.
A. That is correct, and I have already stated that what matters is not the abstract aim, but what matters is how that aim is achieved, and what matters or the circumstances in which such an aim is achieved.
A. We will assume we have a political case in 1933. The SFD came to power perhaps inside of a coalition government; it became so strong that it could put into effect its political aims, including the centralization of the administration. Of course, I am not discussing methods here. Do you think that in that case too, as far as centralization of justice, would have been part of their political program?
A. That is possible, but as you said yourself, what matters are the motives; that is the essential things.
Q. But we must, and that is difficult today, we must try and make ourselves a picture of the position at that time. Some of the jurists who too part in the centralization-- don't you think that some of them acted in goes faith and at that time did not realize the violent methods of terror of National Socialism? And until 1935, that was the date when you left, don't you think that until that date they believed that centralization, which was the aim of their political party, was a good aim, or could be a good aim; that only today, or any how after 1935 when the legal authority was conclude that those people only realized afterwards the effect of that centralization measure; whether the officials until 1935 who took an active part in the achieving of that aim still night have acted in good faith. I should like have you give mo your view on that question.
A The whole extent of that terrible development until 1945, in all details could not be foreseen by the civil servants at that time; but already there were the special courts, the People's Court. The supreme Reich court in the first instance had been eliminated by National Socialism. The outline of the development were indicated quite clearly. Yesterday I said that perhaps quite a few people, at that time, believed they might by coo* tion be able to avoid a worse development, but they had a certain amount of clear foresight, they were bound to realize the direction in which develop ments were moving. I think that the civil servants in the Reich Ministry were familiar with Hitler' s writings and with his intentions. If they w* not familiar with them it would be even more a responsibility on their par*
Q I think, Mr. President, your answer was to general. Just because left in 1935 -- in 1935 the centralization was concluded, and I would like you to tell us whether in 1935 a large number of jurists and civil servants considered the centralization such a good thing, just as the National Socialist Party considered centralization of the administration a great th* and made it a part of their own program?
A I can only say that anybody who is sad with achieving the aim as s* and does not care about the circumstances in which it was achieved and do not consider the danger involved in the circumstances, that such a person might easily have counted the achievement of the aim as such; but I have already said that after special courts had been set up everybody with a mind was bound to realize at that date centralization would, at least, means that it would become easier for National Socialism to be realized.
Q You give as the main reason for the critical judgement the special courts. Yesterday you told us something on that point. Now, I should like to put various things to you on the question of special courts. The legal' basis as you quoted yesterday, contained in the order of 31 March 1933, R* Law Gazette, volume I, page 136 - If I understood you correctly, yesterday you said that special courts were removed from the ordinary courts; you say that the special courts had made the ordinary courts part of itself, and that eventually the special courts far outnumbered the ordinary courts. I only want to make certain that my summary just now is the correct versi** your views.
A It is right so far, only I did not speak of figures or numbers of special courts, but the growth of special courts was particularly signifi****
Q Was that in 1935?
A No, the development increased in that direction after 1935.
Q Furthermore, if I understood you correctly, you wish to draw the conclusion, and you quoted Anschuetz that the special courts were not e* ordinary courts, but according to Anschuetz it was contradictory to law the special courts should curtail the works of ordinary courts. Yester also pointed out that the special courts already before the Nazi accessi to power were created by the 3rd emergency order of 8 October 1931?
A The legal basis.
Q But you pointed out that that order followed after the accession power in 1933, but those two things show fundamental differences.
A Yes -
Q Therefore, unfortunately, I want to prove the contrary. Therefore unfortunately, we must compare these two orders and must read through them. First of all, I do not know whether your text contains the complete text of that order. If it is not contained in that volume in front of you, have the Reich Law Gazette with me here.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I did not get the citation, I am sorry.
DR. SCHILF: Reich Law Gazette, volume I, page 136, order of the R Government concerning the establishment of special courts.
MR. La FOLLETTE: What year, please?
DR. SCHILF: 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: That is known as the law of March 31, 1933, is it
DR. SCHILF: 21 March 1933.
DR. BEHL (Witness): The text is not contained in this.
DR. SCHILF: The preamble to the act states the following -
MR. LA FOLLETTE: The text is in full, I believe, in Exhibit 113; * 4. If Dr. Schilf has no objections we can furnish it to the witness so can have it in English.
Let me give him this and -- If I understand I Schilf he is referring only to the preamble; is that correct?
DR. SCHILF: I only wish to read the preamble, and the text which the Court has begins with paragraph 1, but unfortunately the preamble is no. * there.
THE PRESIDENT: What page of Exhibit 113?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: It is on page 4, Your Honor. Dr. Schilf says he reading only the preamble, and the preamble is not in the text.
Q. Between the order of 6 October 1931 and the order promulgated later on 9 August 1932, there is a fundamental "difference between the two?
A. We can't talk about differences the because it mainly concerns the first.
Q. I should like to read the preamble to the law. It reads as follows:
THE PRESIDENT: Please read it slowly.
Q. Pursuant to Chapter of Part 6 of the Third Decree of the Reich President to safeguard economy and finances and to combat political excesses." That is the heading of this order which is rather long. "As of 6 October 1931, Reich President, Part 1, pages 537 the following is decreed:-"Witness, you will admit that the constitutional and legal basis of the law of 21 March 1933 is the same as that of this order, and is not an independent emergency decree in the sense of Art. 18, Part 2 of the Weimar Constitution. This order according to the preamble is based on the Bruening Decree. If I read it clearly I think you will agree with me. To clarify the natter I should like to quote from the Reich Law Gazette, 1931, the order which is mentioned in the preamble. "Reich Law Gazette, 1931, page 537. The Decree of 6 October 1931, page 537." The order starts on page 537. It is a very long and the little of interest here is to be found on page 565. "Chapter 2, Special Courts." I will read slowly. "Chapter 2." Headed "Special Courts." I should like to draw the Courts' attention to the fact that the Tribunal evidently has no copy of the text now I am going to read. I shall try to have read particularly slowly. Perhaps the gentlemen of the prosecution have a copy?
MR. LA FOLLETTE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: From what pages of the Reich Law Gazette are you now reading?
MR. SCHILF: The year is 1931, the page is 565. This order lays down, among other things, the following: "The Reich Government is empowered to draw the judgment of certain punishable actw in area * in which there is a need to establish Special Courts. The Reich Government is furthermore empowered to issue directives on the composition of the Special Courts on their competency and on their way of procedure." That is the legal basis which is referred to in the order of 31 March 1933 and followed this order and which was done for this order. The Hitler Regime evidently intentionally issued no emergency laws of its own for that order -that is, the law of the Weimar Construction issued in 1931 but it based the establishment of its special Courts on that law. Is that complete and correct?
A. Formally it is correct according to the text you read which I have not in front of me at the moment. The emergency decree of the Bruening Government by virtue of Art. 48 of the Reich Constitution was used because the situation became more and more uncertain from 1931 onward due to National Socialistic activities and the National Socialists had that emergency order in view all of the time and that authorization was laid down so that in case of danger the Special Courts could immediately go into action but these Special Courts were only intended for a temporary period of danger and were not intended to become a basis of the Government. In effect, the Bruening Government in spite of the increasing unrest among the public did not use that authorization. In the Papen Government, which was the pacemaker for National Socialism - I can give you an example for that. It was only the Papen Government which under the signature of the Minister of Justice Guertner, who became Hitler's Reichsminister of Justice, made use of the authorization.
The Special Courts by the Government Schleicher after four weeks, or at the end of 1932 was stopped again. The transitional character of this institution of the Special Courts before the Third Reich -- is that clearly evident? As I said, I would give an example for the fact that the Papen Government must be considered the pace-maker for National Socialism. Under the Papen Government National Socialist officials male the decisions and their admission. They, as I found in one case, had instruction to watch their colleagues and to report on them.
Q. Witness, you said that formerly the order of 23 March 1933 was probably promulgated and was based on the constitutional foundation of the Weimar Constitution because the legal basis of the order itself was that of the constitution. I don't know whether when you speak of legal foundation of the law whether there is anything but a formal consideration, that , is, the formal meaning of constitutional. I should like to ask you, therefore, to tell me whether outside of that was there any formal correctness, that is, any material incorrectness -- substantive incorrectness.
A Not a material incorrectness; a substantive incorrectness, rather. But the tendency, proved by the later development to use the special courts contrary to the meaning of the Bruening decree and to make them a permanent institution, was to incorporate ordinary courts, ordinary jurisdictions, into special jurisdictions.
Q You say, quite rightly, that only the later developments and experiences give a picture of this. In the course of our conversation I stressed the year 1935 as the date. Do you think that in 1935 already the things which we heard about later could have been recognized?
A I do think so, because in the meantime the institution of the special courts had not been stopped, but further institution had been added, in particular, the People's Court, which was bound up with the tendency of developing this form of jurisdiction and which, in fact, shows that tendency very clearly. The People's Court-
Q (Interposing) I beg your pardon, Mr. President. He only want to discuss the special courts.
A Yes. You asked me whether, in 1935, it could already be seen that special courts would become a permanent institution. I must point out that there was not only the phrase "special courts", but that there was a further growth of such institutions, a further growth of special jurisdiction, in particular, the institution of the People's Court. And that, too, indicates the tendency that the special courts were intended to be kept on as a permanent institution.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our usual recess at the time for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. SCHILF:
Q Witness, you have pointed out that the third emergency decree of the year 1931 was of a transitory nature. Would you admit that it was the intention at that time, but that it came out different as shown by expert and that until the year 1933, and it is two years later, throughout the two years the transitory nature was maintained?
A It was maintained, but only the Government Papen made use of it, and that only for four months.
Q I should not like to question whether it was made use of, because I consider it important that the formal basis of the decree of the 21st of March, 1933 -- that the formal basis for this decree of 1933 was the one of '31.
A Yes, I admitted that.
Q And that on the basis of what I have read, the Reich government at any time was entitled to establish special courts. That can be seen from the text of Bruening's emergency decree in 1931 to 1933, two years. If you have said before that in the year 1933 the majority of jurists must have recognized it, and '33 to '33, also two years, that they must have recognized it, and that one or another may have had a different opinion than you had- or than we have now in our recollection?
A I again have to point out that although formally an enabling act was there to justify it, the important thing still was whether that enabling act was used. I have to say again, the Government Bruening did not make any use of it. The Government Papen did make use of it, but after four months special courts were dissolved again. Then the National Socialist government also formally on the basis of this emergency decree again made use of it, but did not think for a moment ever to dissolve special courts which were established in places by this enabling act. But in the year 1935, as I have already described, there existed a condition, which I have already described, with permanency for special courts, and further special jurisdiction, exclusion of the supreme Reich court, for instance. The question therefore cannot be answered any different than to point to the actual establishment, the institution of special courts.
Q The institution of special courts was, therefore, at any rate in accordance with the Weimar constitution, wasn't it?
A That I have already answered, yes. Article 48-2.
Q I would like to say Article 48-2 gave the power to the Reich president, but that special courts by that decree, by the decree of 6 October 1931, were established and that this enabling act existed at least until March '33 -- we can say on the basis of law that a certain acceptance would have arisen from that?
A I don t believe that you could consider that because national socialism used, as we have seen, the enabling act of 1931 in order to introduce its special courts.
Q You say the Hitler government on 21 March 1933 did not have to base itself on the acceptance. Could they have done it? Would you answer this question?
A That is difficult to say.
Q I put this question, Mr. President, because it is surprising that the Hitler government on 21 March 1933 based itself on a legal enabling act of the Weimar Constitution, isn't it?
A That comes out of the entire method of national socialism, as far as it was possible to carry on the republican institutions and to utilize them, also the Weimar constitution itself for its own purposes, in the same manner as national socialism altogether has utilized democratic rights and privileges and exploited them in order to seize power apparently legally, under the guise of legality.
Q May I make an objection to that? You say "Apparently legally." If we consider that politically in general terms, that was justified, wasn't it? But if we are concerned here with a decree in the sense of the constitution, the Weimar Constitution, then it is purely a formal question, isn't it? Therefore we cannot say "Apparently." It is quite clear, isn't it, because we are dealing with the law.
A No. National Socialism which in its statements and utterances was always opposed to formalism and pretended to fight against formalism, utilized this formalism as far as it was useful to it.
And in th... same manner here it took advantage of the possibilities which existed in that enabling act based on the Weimar constitution, in order to establish these special courts which later were maintained as permanent courts and received more and more competence and power -- whereas as I have already stated, the meaning of Article 48 and also of the enabling act was to establish a transitory execution for periods of danger.
Q Would you say then because you want to limit it to periods of danger, the establishment of special courts, would you day then that from 6 October 1931 until 21 March 1933 there was such a period of danger and that for that period that enabling act was in force?
AAs I have said already, and I am sorry that I have to repeat it again, in '31 and '32 -
Q Excuse me, witness, I did not want to get started on a technical development. I just wanted to have the answer to the question, because you mentioned it was limited to danger periods, whether you considered the time '31 to '33 a period of danger.