In spite of the fact that the authority for supervision and appointment of judges rested with the numerous states, the German court system was well organized and highly unified before Hitler came to power. The "basis of the court system was the local courts (Amtsgerichte), of which there were over 2,000, which had original jurisdiction over minor civil suits and over the less serious criminal offenses ("delicts")and "contraventions"). Original jurisdiction in the more important civil and criminal cases was exercised by the district courts (Landgerichte), of which there were same 150.
The principal appelate courts in Germany were called the District Courts of Appeal (Oberlandsgerichte). Of these there were 26, or generally one to each state and province. The District Courts of appeal entertained civil appeals from all decisions of the local and district courts, and second criminal appeals from cases originally board in the local courts.
The President of the District Court of Appeals ***arlandesgerichtspraesident) was also the administrative head of all the courts in his district.
The Supreme Court of the Reich (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig formed the apex of the judicial pyramid. It determined Important legal questions, involving the interpretation of Reich laws, and entertained appeals from the decisions of the district courts of appeal and from criminal cases originally heard in the district courts. It was also the court of first and last instance for important treason cases.
The judges of the Reich Supreme Court were appointed by the President of the Reich. The judges of the lower courts were appointed by the respective state governments. Before the advent of National socialism, a judge could not be removed by the government, but only by formal action before a disciplinary court composed of his peers. This security of tenure was guaranteed by Articles 102 and 104 of the Weimar Constitution.
The impact of Hitler's seizure of power on the German judicial system was swift and drastic. The Enabling Law of 24 March, 1933 authorized the executive to issue decrees with the force of law and provided that the "decree laws" could deviate from the Weimar Constitution, the civil rights provision of which had already been suspended by a decree of 28 February, 1933. For practical purposes, therefore, legislative and executive powers were merged in Hitler's cabinet, and the Constitution was robbed of all practical effect.
In 1934, the administration of justice was taken entirely out of the hands of the German states and was concentrated exclusively in the Government of the Reich. The first law for the transfer of t he administration of justice to t ho Reich was proclaimed 16 February, 1934; it provided that thereafter all courts should pronounce judgment in the name of the German people, vested in the President of the Reich all clemency po wors formerly held by the states, and authorized the Reich Minister of Justice to issue regulations for the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich.
This general directive was put into execution by the second and third laws for the transfer of the administration of justice to the Reich, promulgated in December 1934 and January 1935 respectively. The Justice Ministries of the several states were thereby abolished, and all their functions and powers were concentrated in the Reich Ministry of Justice, which became the supreme judicial authority, under Hitler, in the Reich. Hitler had already proclaimed himself the "supreme law lord of the German people" in his speech to the Reichstag defending the killings which occurred during the suppression of the Roehm putsch. The centralization of the German administration of justice brought about of course, a great increase in the scope and functions of the Reich Ministry of Justice. Its more important divisions are shown in the composite chart on the wall of the courtroom; a more detailed chart of the Ministry alone is included in the expository brief.
For the first eight years of the Hitler regime, the Minister of Justice was Franz Guertner, who had taken this office under the von Papen cabinet and retained it until his death in January, 1941. Under Guertner, the two principal officials were the defendant Schlegelberger and Roland Freisler, each with the title of Under-Secretary (Staatssekretar). Schlegelberger took charge of the Ministry from Guertner's death until August 1942, but throughout that period he was "Acting Minister" and was never officially given cabinet rank. In August 1942, Dr. Georg Thierack, then President of the People's Court, was appointed Reich Minister and the People's Court appointed the defendant Rothenberger, but in January 1944, Rothenberger was put on the retired list and replaced by the defendant Klemm.
Besides the defendants Schlegelberger, Rothenberger and Klemm, four of the other defendants held high office in the Ministry of Justice, and still others served in the Ministry at various times during their careers.
The defendant Klemm, as well as being the Under-Secretary, headed Division II of the Ministry, which concerned itself with legal education and training. The defendants von Ammon and Mettgenberg, as well as the deceased Westphal, were officials of Divisions III and IV, which were ultimately merged, and which governed virtually all questions of criminal legislation and procedure, and prosecutions. The defendant Altstotter headed Division VI, which dealt with civil law and procedure. The defendant Engert, after having served on the People's. Court, became the head of Division V --- Penal Institutions --- and of Division XV, first created in 1942, and dissolved in 1944. Division XV concerned itself with the secret transfer of certain classes of persons from ordinary prisons to the Gestapo. The Ministry of Justice controlled a variety of other judicial institutions, including various Special Courts and the examining office for candidates fer admission and qualification of judges and lawyers. It controlled the academy for German Law and various other associations of attorneys, as well as a special training came for the Nazi indoctrination of young attorneys. most important of all, it supervised and administered the entire court system from the Reich Supreme Court clear down to the local courts. This function included the assignment, transfer, and promotion of all judges.
The centralization of judicial administration in the Reich Ministry of Justice did not at first have any pronounced affect upon the structure of the regular court system. The established hierarchy of courts --local courts, district courts, district courts of appeal, and the Reich Supreme Court continued in effect. The most important development in the early years of the Third Reich was the creation of extraordinary and Special Courts, which increasingly out into the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Under the impact of war, however, the system of regular courts was substantially altered, although its general outlines remained the same. These alterations were intended for economy and expedition, and to reduce the number of judicial personnel.
This was accomplished chiefly in two ways: by reduction in the number of judges required to hear particular kinds of cases, and by drastic curtailment of the right of appeal.
Many of these changes were made at the outbreak of war in 1939. Thereafter, all cases in the local courts and all civil cases in the district courts were heard by one judge only; criminal cases in the district court were heard by three judges, but the President of the court could hear such cases alone if the issues were simple. Criminal cases heard by the local courts could be appealed only as far as the district courts; civil cases heard in the local courts could be appealed directly to the district court of appeals, by-passing the district court.
Further drastic curtailments of the right of appeal occurred in 1944 and 1945. In general, appeal could only be taken by permission of the court which heard the case, and permission was ranted only to settle legal questions of fundamental importance. The judicial functions of the district courts of appeal were almost, if not entirely, eliminated, although their supervisory administrative functions continued.
The most crucial and radical change in the judicial system under the Third Reich, however, was the establishment of various extraordinary courts. These irregular tribunals permeated the entire judicial structure, and eventually took over all judicial business which touched political issues or related to the war.
Within a matter of weeks after the seizure of power, by a decree of 21 march, 1933 "Special Courts" (Sendergerichte) were established. One Special Court was set up within the district of each d strict court of appeal. Each court was opposed of three judges drawn from the judges of the partner district. They were given jurisdiction over off me is described in the emergency decree of 28 February, 1933, which included Inciting to disobedience of government orders, crimes in the nature of sabotage, and acts "contrary to the public welfare." There were drastic provisions for the expedition of proceedings before the Special Courts, and no appeal whatsoever lay from their decisions.
A few weeks later, special military courts, which had been abolished by the Weimar Constitution, were re-established and riven jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the Armed forces. In July, 1933, special "hereditary health courts" more generally known as "sterilization courts", were established at the scats cf the local courts, with special appellate "hereditary health courts" above them.
But the most notorious Nazi judicial innovation was the so-called "People's Court" (Volksgerichtshof), established by the decree of 24 April, 1934, after the Reich Supreme Court's acquittal of the defendants in the Reichstag fire trial. The People's Court replaced the Supreme Court as the court of first and last instance for most treason cases.
The People's Court sat in divisions, or "senates", of five members each. Two of the five had to be qualified judges; the other three were trusted Nazi laymen selected from high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and SS, or from t he Party hierarchy. They were appointed for five-year terms by Hitler, on the recommendation of the minister of Justice. Six "senates" were established, each of which heard cases from a particular geographical section cf Germany. In 1940 a "Special Senate" was established to re-try cases where, in the judgment of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Reich, an inadequate punishment had been imposed.
As time went on, the concept of "treason" was much enlarged by a variety of Nazi decrees, and both the Special Courts and the People's Court were given jurisdiction be try a great variety of offenses. In 1936, for example, the snuggling of property out of Germany was proclaimed an offense against the rational economy, and the People's Court was given jurisdiction over such cases. In 1940, a new decree undefined the jurisdiction of the special Courts and people Court and all soris of offenses such as avasiom of conscription and listening to foreign broadcasting stations were brought within their preview.
Toward the end of the war, by a decree cf February, 1943 emergency civil courts martial (Standegerichte) were set up in areas "managed by the approaching enemy." Each consisted of three members appointed by the Reich Defense Commissar (usually the gauleiter) of the district; the President was a professional judge, who sat with one associate judge from the Nazi party, and one from the Wehrmacht or SS.
These courts martial could only condemn the accused to death, acquit him, or transfer the case to a regular tribunal.
Thierack was President of the People's Court prior to his appointment as Reich Minister of Justice. He was then succeeded by Freisler, the former Under-Secretary of the ministry of Justice, who remained as President until nearly the end of the war, when he was killed in an air raid. The defendant Engert was Vice-President of the People's Court prior to his transfer to the Ministry of Justice in 1942. The defendant Webelung was President of the Fourth Senate of the people's Court. The defendant Petersen, the only non-lawyer in the Pock, was a general of the SA, who sat as a lay judge on many occasions in the First and Special Senates of the People's Court.
Three of the defendants were judges of the Special Courts. The defendant Cuhorst was President of the Special Court in Stuttgart, and the defendant Rothaug was President of the special Court in Nurnberg. The defendant Ooschey also sat on the Special Court In Nurnberg, and succeeded Rothaug as its President when the latter came a public Prosecutor.
Oeschey was also president of the emergency civil court martial at Nurnberg.
The prosecution of criminal offences, under the Third Ref was handled by a special group of state attorneys (Staatsanwaltschaft) directed by the ministry of Justice. Increasingly under the Third Reich there was interchange of personnel among judges and prosecutors.
The defendant Rothaug, for example, left the bench of the Special Court at Nurnberg to become a Senior Public Prosecutor of the Reich (Reichsanwalt). The defendant Barnickel also held this title. The defendant Joel, in 1343, left the Ministry of Justice and became the Public Prosecutor-General of the district court of appeals for Westphalia, at Hamm.
The most important prosecutor among these defendants, however, was Ernst Lautz, Chief Public Prosecutor of the Reich (Oberreichsanwalt). In this capacity, Lautz prosecuted any important cases before the People's Court.
I turn now to an examination of the means by which the defendants and their colleagues seized control of Germany's judicial machinery and turned it into a fearsome weapon for the commission of the crimes charged in the indictment.
The destruction of law in Germany was, of course, part and parcel of the establishment of the Third Reich dictatorship. Initially, the dictatorship arose out of the decrees in the early part of 1933 which suspended the Constitutional guaranties of freedom, and vested Hitler's cabinet with legislative power, unrestrained by Constitutional limitations These early decrees put an end to lair as we know it in a democracy.
But much more had to be accomplished in order to achieve a dictatorship of the proportions envisaged b the authors of the Third. Reich. Freedom of the ballot had to be suppressed so that a false veneer of electoral approval could be spread over the Nazi edifice. The civil service had to be purged of dissident officials. An ubiquitous and ruthless police system had to be created.
A multitude of other measures were necessary. But, above all, law and justice had to be utterly stamped out.
At first blush, the reason for his may not appear. The Nazi cabinet could decree any law it wanted to with the flourish of a pen. The courts, unless they were bold enough to deny the very basis of Hitler's authority, which they did not do, were bound to punish violations of these laws. was this not enough for even Hitler's purposes?
The answer is two-fold. Particularly in the early years of the Third Reich, Hitler's government pursued aims and employed methods which it did not, at that time, see fit to authorize by formal, public legislation. The regime was not yet strong enough, externally or internally, to face the storm of disapproval which such legislation would have encountered. The Nazi government thought it wise to pursue these aims and employ these methods outside of, and often in violation of, the letter and spirit of the law. And it did not wish to be embarrassed or obstructed by an independent judiciary respectful only to the law. The outcome of the Reichstag fire trial, for example, was highly embarrassing and promptly bore sinister fruit in the creation of the People a Court.
But there was another and much more fundamental reason. The ideology of the Third Reich was totally incompatible with the spirit of the law. It could not live under law, and the law could not live under it. To take but one example: even under stringent anti-Jewish legislation, there were bound to be situations where an over greedy German in a civil suit, or an over-zealous police official in a criminal case, had erroneously haled a Jew into court. In other words, even under Nazi legislation, there were bound to be cases when the Jew was legally right. Yet, it was unthinkable that a German court should exalt the Jew and discredit the German with a decision in favor of the Jew. Such perplexing problems could be dealt with only by courts which were not true courts at all, and which could be trusted to suppress the law and to render an ideological judgment or, as was done later, by declaring the Jew to be an animal beyond the judicial pale entirely who could not, any more than a wrongfully beaten dog, ask judicial intervention or protection.
This sort of problem was far more delicate in the case of the Poles, whom the Nazis chose toregard as less than human but more than Jewish. Later on in this case, we will, I think, derive some macabre humor from the documentary spectacle which some of those defendants made of themselves in vainly wrestling with the insoluble problem of how to achieve a. certain amount of legal order and stability in occupied Poland, without at the same time giving the Poles any true law on which they could rely.
In short, the very idea of the "law" mas inimical to the ideology of who Third Reich, and it is not surprising that its principal authors recognized this fact at a very early date. In 1930, Hitler himself declared, with reference to a court decision against certain Nazis:
We can assure the judges that, if National Socialism assumes power, then they will be fired without any pension.
Joseph Goebbels expressed the same thought even more bluntly in 1934, after the Nazis were in power:
We were not legal in order to be legal, but in order to rise to power. We rose to power legally in order to gain the possibility of acting illegally.
Later on in this case, the Tribunal mill have offered to it documents which speak at length about the creation of a new, National Socialist system of law. By then, it will be apparent, I believe, that a "National Socialist system of lam" is a preposterous contradiction in terms. It never was an objective of the Third Reich to create any system of law. On the contrary, it was its fundamental purpose to tear down every vestige of law in Germany, and to replace it with a mere bureaucracy which would mete out reward and punishment in accordance with the tyrannical ideology and tactical necessities of the dictatorship. The one-time sage of Nazi jurisprudence, the late Dr. Hans Frank, summed this up aptly in 1934:
National Socialism is the point of departure, the comment and the goal of the legal policies of the Third Reich.
And the defendant Schlegelberger expressed the same thought in 1936:
Accordingly there can be no doubt that now the moral order and Weltanschanng, as recognized in the party program, has to be taken into consideration in the interpretation and application of every norm of the existing law.
We may now retrace some of the steps which the law lords of the Third Reich took to turn the judicial system into a subservient but effective agent of the regime. Some of these we have already noted. The centralization of the administration of justice in the Reich government, the vesting of overall authority in the Reich Ministry of Justice, and the creation of extraordinary courts, were essential steps in the process. Standing alone, these acts might have been unobjectionable, though the creation of special courts was expressly prohibited by Article 105 of the Weimar Constitution. But these first moves wore only the prelude to a series of deadly thrusts at the vitals of the judicial system. The early history of this organized attack on the fundamentals of law is summarized in the decision of the International Military Tribunal:
Similarly, the judiciary was subjected to control. Judges were removed from the bench for political or racial reasons. They were spied upon are made subject to the strongest pressure to join the Nazi Party as an alternative to being dismissed. When the Supreme Court acquitted three of the four defendants charged with complicity in the Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction in eases if treason, was thereafter taken over and given to a newly established "People's Court" consisting of two judges and five officials of the party. Special courts were set up to try political crimes and only party members were appointed as judges. Persons were arrested by tho SS for political reasons, and detained in prisons and concentration camps 3 and the judges were without power to intervene in any way. Pardons were granted to members of the Party who had been sentenced by the judges for proved offenses.
In 1935; several officials of tie Hohenstein concentration camp were convicted of inflicting brutal treatment on the inmates. High Nazi officials tried to influence the Court, and after the officials had been convicted, Hitler pardoned them all. In 1942, "judges" letters were sent out to all German judges by the Government, instructing them as to the "general lines" that they must follow.
The destruction of the judicial process continued throughout the era oi the third Reich. The period from the beginning of the new regime in 1933 until the outbreak of the war was characterized by the rise of special tribunals, and the steady decrease of procedural guaranties, niter 1939; the war accelerated the conversion of criminal justice into dictatorial administrative procedure until, at the end of the war, all resemblance to legal process had vanished. We turn now to an examination of the particular steps in the process.
Immediately after the seizure of power, the Nazis struck hard at the independence and integrity of the judiciary by dismissing or demanding politically unreliable judges and officials of the ministry of Justice. The temporary decree of 7 April, 1933, under which this was done, provided that:
Officials, whose former political activity docs not offer a guarantee that they, at all times without reservation, act in the interest of the national state, can be dismissed from service. For a period of three months after dismissal, they are accorded their former salary. From this time on, they receive 3/4 of their pension and corresponding survivor's benefits.
In 1937, similar language was embodied in permanent legislation in the Civil Service Act. The result of these measures was the elimination of all Jews and part-Jews, Social Democrats, and other opponents of the Nazi regime, from the bench and from the staff of the Ministry cf Justice.
Substantive criminal lav during this period was radically affected by the introduction of tho author itarian ideology of Third Reich, and the concept of the original as the enemy of the nation. The prime purpose of the new criminal provisions was to make the new,holders of power secure against all competition or attack. The Decree for the Protection of the German People immediately never-endeng_ stream of legislation intended to protect the persons, institutions, and. symbols of the Third Reich against all attacks of political enemies. The I field for the application of treason and high treason was vastly enlarged. by investing the most preparatory and auxillwtory acts with the character of treason. The range of application of the death penalty, in the past restricted to murder and some cases of homicide, was greatly widened, hand in hand with the sharpening of penalties and the extension of the scope of punishable atrocities went the attempt to widen the scope of German criminal jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits. The nova "race defilement" prohibitions, for example, were male applicable to offences committed abroad.
Examples of such draconic and tyrannical decrees arc legion. The decree of 24 April 1934 provided that the death penalty, or hard labor for life, or hard labor for two yours or more, should be inflicted:
1. If the act aimed at establishing or maintaining an organized combination for the preparation of high treason; or 2. If the act was directed toward making the Armed Forces or Police unfit for the execution of their duty to protect the stability of the German Reich from internal or external attacks; or 3. If the act was directed toward influencing the masses by making or distributing writings, recordings and pictures, or by the installation of wireless, telegraph, or telephone; or 4. If the act was committed abroad or was committed in such a manner that the perpetrator undertook to import writings, recordings or pictures from abroad for the purpose of distribution within the country.
Four years later, by August 1938, this tendency had progressed to a point where the following acts were all made punishable by death:
1. Whoever openly solicits or incites others to evade the fulfillment of compulsory military service in the German or an allied armed force, or otherwise openly seeks to paralyze or undermine the will of the German people or a.n allied nation to self-assertion by bearing arms;
2. Whoever undertakes to induce a soldier or conscriptee in the reserves to disobedience, opposition or violence against a superior, or to desertion or illegal absence or otherwise to undermine the discipline of the German or an allied military force; and 3. Whoever undertakes to cause himself or another to avoid the fulfillment of military service entirely, or to a limited extent, or temporarily by means of selfmultilation, or by means designed to deceive or by other methods.
But the Nazi jurists were not content to sharpen the letter of the laws; they subverted the spirit and method of interpretation of the criminal law in order to enable the courts to impose punishment, outside the law, in accordance with the political indology of the regime. Thus in June, 1935, Article 2 of the renal Code was amended to read as fellows:
Whoever commits an act which the law declares as punishable or which deserves punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law or the sound concept of the people, shall be punished. If no specific penal law can be directly applied to this act, then it shall be punished according to the law whose underlying spirit can be most readily applied to the act.
At the same time, the following articles were added to the Code of criminal Procedure:
ARTICLE 170a - If an act deserves punishment according to the common sense of the people, but is not declared punishable in the code, the prosecution must investigate whether the underlying principle of a penal law can be applied to the act and whether justice can be helped to triumph by the proper application of this penal law.
THE PRESIDENT: Because of electrical difficulties, it might be well to take the recess at this time. We will take a recess of 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
ARTICLE 267a - If the main proceedings show that the defendant committed an act which deserves punishment according to the common sense of the people, but which is not declared punishable by the law, then the court must investigate whether the underlying principle of a penal law applies to this act and whether justice can be helped to triumph by the proper application of this penal law.
And, simultaneously, the Reich Supreme Court was ordered at this same time to set aside its prior decisions in order to bring the law into conformance with the ideology of the Third Reich. The decree is as follows:
The Reich Supreme Court, as the highest German Tribunal, must consider it its duty to effect an interpretation of the law which takes into account the change of ideology and of legal concepts which the new State has brought about. In order to be able to accomplish this task without having to show consideration for the decisions of the past brought about by other ideology and other legal concepts, it is ruled as follows: when a decision is made about a legal question, the Reich Court can deviate from a decision laid down before this law went into effect.
This tyrannical doctrine of "punishment by analogy" was given a sugar coating by Dr. Hans Frank:
In the future, criminal behavior, even if it docs not fail under formal penal precepts, will receive the deserved punishment if such behavior is considered punishable according to the healthy feelings of the people.
But once again, Joseph Goebbels was shameless enough to state the doctrine with complete frankness:
"While making his decisions the judge is to proceed less from the law than from the basic idea that the offender is to be eliminated from the community. During a war it is not so much a matter of whether a judgment is just or unjust but only whether the decision is expedient.
The stat must protect itself in the most efficient way and wipe them out entirely.... One must not proceed from the law, but from the resolution that the man must be wiped out."
On the administrative side, the pre-war years were characterized by ever closer collaboration between Himmler's Gestapo and the Reich Ministry of Justice. In February, 1937, Himmler directed that all Gestapo matters be made available to the district public prosecutors. Next month, the Reich Minister of Justice (Guertner) addressed a letter to all the district public prosecutors, calling attention to Himmler's directive and stating:
"In order to have this decree fulfill its purpose and in the interest of the closest possible collaboration between the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the authorities of the Gestapo, I hereby issue this supplementary decree that in future, public prosecutors routinely address ail requests for investigations to be conducted on the basis of reports of political nature received by them directly, to the Local and District Police authorities via the competent State Police Offices. When in cases based on such reports, the necessary interrogations of the accused or the witnesses are procured by the court itself or by the expert of the prosecution, and the police authorities are not at all involved in the proceedings, I request at the State Police Offices be informed of the proceedings as soon as possible."
The German jurists, who collaborated so closely with Himmler's minions, were equally willing to protect "over-zealous Nazis" against the penal consequences of their worst excesses. Late in 1933, a group of stern troopers (Sturmabteilung) committed vicious assaults and tortures on some political prisoners who had been confined in the concentration... camp of Kemna, near Wuppertal in the Ruhr. The description of this outrage by the Reich Minister of Justice reads as follows:
In the camp, some of the prisoners were exposed to the severest mishandling.
In most cases, shortly after their shipment had come in and when they were being interrogated, they would be beaten, partly upon their bare bodies, with rubber-cudgels, horse-whips, sticks, ox lashes and other objects. In many cases they had to lie down over a special caningbench, or were forced down onto it by guards, and their mouths were kept shut or they were gagged with balls of paper, pieces of cloth, bags or similar things, in order to prevent them from screaming. Other members of the guard in the meantime would begin to beat them up. Prisoners who fainted were kicked back to consciousness or had water thrown over them to wake them up and make them stand up again. After this, prisoners who were mistreated were frequently locked up in a small space under the stair-way or in an elevator without being given any medical attention or food and drink. In some cases, the injuries the prisoners received from their beatings made it necessary to transfer them to hospitals.
Several prisoners also were forced to eat unwashed herrings from the barrel, which had also been sprinkled with salt.......When they had finished the herrings, the prisoners, who were naturally suffering from the tormenting thirst, were not allowed to have water brought them.
Proceedings against the storm troop leaders in a disciplinary tribunal of the Nazi party ended in a more reprimand and deprivation of the right to held public office for one year. The files of the ministry of Justice concerning this at airocious episode contain the recommendations of various officials, including the defendant Joel, that criminal proceedings against the perpetrators should be canceled.
This recommendation was adopted and forwarded to Hitler by Minister Guertner, who, for justification, pointed to the circumstances hat the culprits were not experienced concentration camp guards, that the majority of the victims were Communists, that in some cases, the victims had been obstinate and insubordinate, and that Communism had an especially strong hold in the Wuppertal area.
Before the outbreak of war, the main objective of Nazi penal innovations was to suppress internal opposition to the new regine, and to render life intolerable for the Jews. During the early years of the war, the Nazi jurists were largely concerned with legal problems incident to the occupation of Poland, France, and the other nations overrun by the Wehrmacht. The extension of German law to the occupied areas, and the outrages committed thereunder, constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity on a grand scale, which will be described in due course. German criminal law was also applied extensively to acts committed outside the Reich, even when committed by foreigners. Acts committed by a foreigner outside the Reich could even constitute treason against the Reich.
But the war also brought a mass of new criminal legislation within company. This new legislation was influenced by the necessities of war, but also contained matured concepts of National Socialist criminal policy. The principal aim was to guarantee the security of the Nazi regime, and bolster the economic and military strength of Germany, through extremely harsh criminal punishments. The chief weapon was the unsparing and almost indiscriminate use of capital punishment.
Later on, as Germany's military situation worsened, the death penalty became an ordinary sentence for a great variety of offences. The increased severity of air raids resulted in capital punishment or long prison sentences for crimes committed during black-outs, even very miner looting. Economic hardship and shortages of materials were accompanied by laws prescribing penal servitude, or even death, for anyone who destroyed or removed food or other supplies. Toward the end of the war, a desperate attempt was made to cope with the growing defeatism by imposing the death penalty for spreading rumors, listening to foreign broadcasts and even for the most minor derogatory remarks about the Hitler regine or pessimism concerning Germany's chances of military success.
The war brought new and extraordinary procedures, as well as new crimes. Despite all that had been done in pre-war years, the courts wore still handing down some sentences which, in the eyes of Berlin, were too mild, and once such a final judgment had. been given, nothing could be done about it.