I had to try to approach somebody who perhaps might have the possibility to talk some sense into Hitler, and that person was Reich Minister Lammers, a man from the group of old civil servants, a man who had a feeling for right and justice, and whom I had frequently assisted in difficult situations. I could be quite open and frank with him; and, therefore, the quite open way in which I talked in my letter was without any pretense. I described the suggestions as entirely impossible. I did so knowing that thereby I was interfering with affairs which had nothing to do with me as far as my department was concerned, for the judiciary only had an outside interest in these affairs. There was a question of compulsory divorce, a question which naturally I answered in the negative; a question which was naturally very important for those whom it concerned, but the importance of which mas not comparable to the great problem which was now my concern. Lammers said I could talk to him, but that conversation never came off, and probably it did not come off because Lammers was away at the HQ. Thus, I had to act on my own initiative, and, as I have said, I could not act in basing myself on legal and ethical considerations becuase that would have amounted to doing nothing. I had to limit myself concerning the agencies in question to acquaint them with the fact that the solution which they intended to apply was not possible. The entire idea and the entire way of thinking concerning that question altogether was based upon the desire to see to it that a further increase of persons of mixed origin, Aryan and Jewish descent, was to be avoided. I used that as my basis, and this is what my proposal amounted to. Certain groups were to be exempted from the solution altogether from the very outset. First, persons of mixed descent of the second degree, that is to say those persons who had only one Jewish grandparent; second, a person of mixed descent of the first degree, that is to say a person who had two Jewish grandparents; of those the people who were not able to propagate; and three, those persons of mixed descent, first degree, whose off-springs under the law were not considered half-Jews. By that proposal, therefore, all persons of mixed descent, second degree, a very large number, and a considerable number of people of mixed descent, first degree, would have been excluded from this measure.
The remaining persons of mixed descent, first degree, for them I suggested that if they were to prefer it, they were to be sterilized rather than deported to Poland. May I draw the attention to this point: The idea of escaping deportation by voluntary sterilization did not originate within myself. That idea originated from the persons of mixed descent themselves. I knew that persons of mixed descent had asked physicians to exempt then from the application of the Nurnberg Laws and had themselves suggested to afford them the possibility of sterilization. In view of that situation in which they found themselves, I thought it justified to revert to the suggestion which these people themselves had made originally, and to afford them an opportunity in that manner to escape deportation to Poland. The Prosecution employed that suggestion of mine to raise charges against me. I believe that if one thinks things out until the last, is not so difficult to recognize that these charges are unfounded. My suggestion, altogether my work in that respect, as I have said before, was not one of the tasks of the judiciary. If I went beyond the limits of my department, one must bear in mind that the charge would only be justified if one took it for granted that I was a model of active National Socialists, and active National Socialist who overcomes every obstacle, even the limitations of his department, and I would assume that everything that has been discussed here so far will show that to assume such an active National Socialist ardor would be complete nonsense. I acted in accordance with my ethical feelings; the only motive for me was the intention to check a development which was fatal for a large number of persons. There are, after all, situations where one can only escape a larger evil by applying a smaller evil. But that somebody who all his life, has thought along the lines of law, found it extremely difficult to make a decision of that kind -- that the Tribunal will understand.
Q Under NG-151, Exhibit 204, Document Book III-H, English text page 38 to 66, the Prosecution has submitted documents concerning the limitations of the legal means for Jews in penal cases.
Please give us an explanation concerning those documents.
A Those documents begin with a letter by Freisler, I believe dated 3 August, 1942. In that letter Freisler tells the agencies in question about a bill concerning the problem we have just mentioned. The reason for his suggestion, he referred to the exigencies of the war; he says that the state of affairs is untenable and that it weakens the defensive will of the German people. Freisler wrote that letter without my knowing anything about it beforehand, but afterwards he told me about it, and he gave me his explanation. This is what he told me. Himmler and his agencies had again and again pointed out that the present state of affairs was an impossibility; only a radical emergency separation of the entire Jewish problem, from the judiciary and transfer to police would be possible. Again here we find -- I shall have to revert to that later. Himmler had also said that the administrative measures against the Jews had advanced so far that it would be nonsense, in particular concerning criminal Jews, to be more lenient; therefore, one had to guard against alloying these criminal Jews who already were under the supervision of the Judiciary such benefits as legal remedies.
Himmler's endeavor to transfer Jewish affairs to the police was too much even for Freisler. Perhaps he was also particularly proud of his paternity of the ordinance concerning Poles and Jews which he considered his own sphere. Therefore, so he told me -- and I believed him -- in all circumstances he wanted to adhere to the competence of the courts, but he then convinced himself that somehow or other he had to make a concession because otherwise events would move without us.
Furthermore, we of the administration of justice, particularly in the incorporated Eastern territories, suffered from a severe lack of judges, and we could only master that difficulty if we exempted a number of judges from service in the armed forces. If Freisler and we had refused consistently to comply with Himmler's wishes, it would have been easy for Himmler to get Hitler to agree to cancel such exemptions from service with the armed forces, and thus the administration of justice in the Eastern territories would have come to an end altogether. In order to avoid those dangers, Freisler believed that he had found a way out in limiting legal remedies and thereby to start out on a way which we later on inside Germany in cases against Germans had to take on account of the lack of judges. That is why he made the suggestion. I could not altogether deny the reasonableness of Freisler's arguments, but I attached importance to the fact that this new regulation was to be final and was to appear as such to the outside world too. That might strengthen out position towards the opposing forces and, there fore, in the letter I wrote afterwards, I discussed the question of whether Jews are able to take an oath, and I included that question in my draft so as to make that draft more wellsounded and complete. In itself this question of the oath was important, for under German law it is the duty of the judge to attach equal weight to statements made under oath and one made while the person was not under oath.
There again we were faced with the case where something which in was immaterial but a concession which to tho outside world, nevertheless, seemed important had to be made in order to pacity Party circles.
If one wants to evaluate such a procedure, one must bear in mind that Thierack one month later did find a final and comprehensive solution. He dropped my suggestion and transferred the Jews to the police.
Q The Prosecution also submitted Document NG-589, Exhibit 372, Document Book V-D, English text, page 264 to 268, a document which concerns a curtailment of the Poor Law privileges of the Jews. Was that ruling made at your suggestion?
A No. I only heard about that ruling here when the document book was submitted. At every Ministry certain matters which are not of much importance are dealt with quite independently by departments which are below the under secretary or the minister. It is altogether out of the question that an under secretary or minister deals with everything personally. He would even misunderstand his function if he were to do so. Those matters, for example, tho question of the Poor Law, fell within the competence of the then under secretariat Hueber, who signed the ordinance.
As I said, I only heard about it here, but I should like to add that the institution of the Poor Law was created so a s to enable poor persons to conduct civil litigations. The granting of poor law privileges does not mean that the person to whom it is granted can conduct proceedings free of costs, but it only exempts him from payment in advance. He is still under an obligation to pay.
The Poor Law institution, therefore, so to speak, is an institution of government welfare. For a long time before Hueber ordered it, government financial support of Jews had been stopped, and they had been referred to their own Jewish welfare organizations. The uncurtailed provisions governing the Poor Law, therefore, were not in accordance with the line otherwise observed, and Hueber refers to that when he considers the old ordinance as outmoded.
DR. KUBOSCHOK: I do not know whether the witness's statements were clear enough to elucidate the concept of the Poor Law. I hear that the expression in English has been translated by "Poor Law." That translation might perhaps load to confusion. We are concerned here merely with the question of costs and merely with the exemption of paying costs in advance, and that is the cost of civil litigation.
Q Witness, the Prosecution has also dealt with the loss of citizenship of the Jews in connection with the Ministry of Justice. To what extent did the Ministry of Justice play a part in this?
A That discussion took place on 15 January 1941, that is to say, when Guertner was still alive and before I took over the conduct of affairs. That discussion took place at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and under the chairmanship of a Dirigent of that Ministry, and I add that questions concerning citizenship belong to the sole competence of the Reich Minister of the Interior. The other Ministries sent Referents to such discussions because it was possible that in the course of the discussions their sphere of work might be affected, also. Important, political questions, however, if they were discussed, were not the subject for an opinion to be given by the other Ministries; but I ask you to note that my very keen representative of the Ministry of Justice made the only suggestion for lenience that was made to the Ministry of the Interior. It concerned the exception to be made for Jews who lived in a so-called privileged mixed marriage, which he expressly made the subject of an agreement. As I said, that discussion took place before I took over the conduct of affairs, and apparently the whole matter was not followed up any further. Only in November of the same year -- that discussion had been in January -- the Reich Minister of the Interior by his own competence on the bases of the Reich Citizen's Law issued an ordinance.
The judiciary was interested in that ordinance only as far as a purely technical question was concerned, namely, transfers in the real estate register, that is, a measure of no material importance. In addition, I would like to draw attention to this point: another document which has been submitted by the prosecution reveals that the Foreign Office had suggested that their foreign holdings should be left to the Jews, and the Ministry of Justice expressly approved that suggestion.
Q. Concerning the last point, I refer to Prosecution Document NG424, Exhibit 369, Document 5-D, page 219-231 of the English text. During the course of the examination of the witness Doebig, the transfer in the real estate register of Jewish real estate which was initialed by the Deputy Gauleiter Holz was discussed. What have you to say about that?
A. In the document which has been submitted is contained the following statement by Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Greiner: "I have no misgivings about the transfer desired by the Party." That statement is inconsistent with the facts.
Q. May I point out that that statement by Amtsgerichtsdirektor Greiner is contained in NG-616, Exhibit 370, Book 5-D, page 228 of the English text. Please continue.
A. Witness Doebig testified that I said to him that the decision as to whether the entry was to be made or not must be left to the judge. Evidentally, the contents of that conversation were imparted incorrectly by Doebig to the subordinate offices or they misunderstood him. Moreover, I would like to say this: Doebig told me that the transfer agreement at ten percent of the value of the real estate of Jews had been forced out of the Jews; he asked for intervention by means of a law or by means of administrative measures. I replied that naturally I could not issue a law in such a hurry, but administrative measures could not be taken either because that would mean interference with the judge's competence. I could not understand why measures were required. Every judge knew that they could not make an entry as a result of a forced agreement. Doebig was to leave the decision to the judges.
That was the only possible answer I could give him, and I would not reply differently today. Since conditions in Nuernberg had been clarified by an investigating commission, a member of which, as representative of the Reich Ministry of Justice, was the co-defendant Dr. Joel, the entries in the real estate register were cancelled at the instigation of the commission. Steps were taken via official channels against the notaries concerned.
Q. According to Document NG-306, Exhibit 60, Document Book 1-B, page III of the English text, there was a connection between the racial political office of the NSDAP and the Reich Ministry of Justice. How can you explain that?
A. That connection is based on the Law for the Safeguarding of the Unity of Party and State of 1 December 1939; according to that, the official agencies must cooperate closely with the agencies of the Party. So as to guarantee that that duty was fulfilled, in the same law the Deputy of the Fuehrer is appointed a member of the Reich Government; the Deputy of the Fuehrer who, as we know, was also the head of the Party under Hitler. In accordance with this legal situation, in 1935, at the request of Guertner, the letter which Reich Minister Hess, that is, the Deputy of the Fuehrer, had written on the propaganda treatment of questions of racial policy of 25 August 1934 was passed on to the Ministry of Justice. It was also in accordance with this situation that in my letter of 6 August 1938, as Deputy for Reich Minister Guertner, it was pointed out that that Ordinance of 25 August 1934 had, in part, been outmoded. My letter merely constitutes an administrative instruction which had become necessary in virtue of the law which have been passed since. For questions which had been settled by the Nuernberg laws, the establishing of a contact with the racial political office was no longer necessary. One had to stop that superfluous procedure. My letter, therefore, constitutes merely a limitation of the connection which had been ordered on 25 August 1934.
Q. I am now starting on a new group of questions. Do you wish me to start on it before the recess?
The prosecution charges you with directing the administration of penal law through the Reich Ministry of Justice. Please state your views.
A. Concerning these questions, we must differentiate between the position of the public prosecutor and that of the judge. The public prosecutor is an administrative agency dependent upon the instructions from his superior agencies. The judge is responsible merely to the law and his own conscience and judgment. The question to what extent and under what prerequisites the prosecutor has to report to his superior agency has been laid down in administrative regulations. The more important the individual question, the higher the agency the opinion of which is requested. It has, therefore, always been a matter of course that the importance of penal cases according to the case itself, or according to the punishment which is to be expected, has to be reported to the higher authority. I notice the suggestion was approved and an instruction was issued, an instruction which, as far as it concerned a matter which was being dealt with at the trial, always had to be interpreted in such a way that the last analysis the public prosecutor had to make his decision dependent on the course of the trial. In 1939 Guertner -- I myself had no part in these matters at the time and I don't know what part Freisler played -- pointed out to the public prosecutor that they should see to it that a great difference between the demand for a sentence of the prosecution and the actual sentence pronounced by the judge be avoided. I am inclined to assume
THE PRESIDENT: It is now 3 o'clock and we will recess for fifteen minutes.
(Thereupon a recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: One matter has come to our attention. The Tribunal desires to suggest to counsel for both sides that in order to avoid even an appearance of irregularity, that it is wise to avoid the delivery of notes to a witness while the witness is on the stand. I trust that counsel will comply with this suggestion.
You may proceed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to state -
THE PRESIDENT: It appears that the Prosecution has not arrived. We will wait a moment for them.
While we are waiting, perhaps another announcement might be made. We were informed this noon that the Presiding Judge in Tribunal II made the suggestion to counsel in that case that the lawyers in that case should confer with the lawyer in this case with the idea of agreeing upon two members from the joint staffs to present the argument for the defense in connection with the issue of conspiracy. We also wish to suggest to counsel for the defense in this case that they confer with the members of the defense staff in the other eases in which the same issue is presented, and attempt to agree upon two members to represent you all in and upon that issue. Possibly joint briefs may be advisable, although I think we should not attempt to control that matter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That has already been done. The counsel of the two Tribunals got together, and two colleagues of mine have designated.
If I may, I would like to take this opportunity to mention another point, about which I was informed by several of the defendants during the recess. The defendants are suffering greatly from the present heat-wave. It would alleviate their condition greatly if they had an opportunity, during the recess, to be brought into a room where they have the possibility of drinking a glass of water. We discussed this question today with the prison officer, and his answer was that technically that is quite possible, but that he would ask for a decision by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely something can be worked out along that line for their convenience. We are not advised as to where they would be taken. Is that matter clear? You suggest that they be taken to some room where they might have water?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there a room available?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That would be arranged by the prison officer. It would, be a room in the vicinity of this courtroom, which is still emply, and where is still empty, and where they could be taken.
THE PRESIDENT: Under such regulations as the prison, officer may make for the manner of carrying out the proposed program of relief, the Court authorizes it to be done.
While we are disposing of minor details, I don't know whether this relates to the language of counsel or to the language of the interpreters, but I call to your attention the fact that we now have document books which are paged and transcript of testimony which is paged. This afternoon the record will show that in the English translation references were made to the English transcript, when I am very sure it was meant to say to the page of the English document book, and it will become very confusing unless counsel for both sides distinguish between the pages of document books and the pages of the transcript of testimony. We now have four thousand pages of testimonial transcript. Counsel has very properly referred, on some occasions, to that transcript, and on others to the document books. You see what I mean?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes indeed, Mr. President; in fact, it is the English translation, and I went to great pains to examine the English test and English translation. The references are made to the English document books -- that is, the document books in the English language -and also to the English transcript.
In order to facilitate it for the court, the figures were given that were needed by the Bench.
THE PRESIDENT: I wasn't trying to place the responsibility.
It will be convenient for you from time to time not only to refer to the document books, but to earlier pages of the transcript of testimony. That is why it is important to keep them separate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Your Honors, I think possibly some confusion might have occurred to the Court, although I believe I got it clearly. There were some references to the transcript of the IMT also.
THE PRESIDENT: I have that.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: Your Honor has those?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. LA FOLLETTE: I thought mine came through clearly otherwise.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q: Witness, we were discussing the guidance of the Administration of Criminal Justice. Please continue with your explanation.
A: Before the recess I had referred to a decree by Guertner which required a constant connection with the courts in order to avoid a discrepancy between the plea of the prosecution and the final verdict. May I continue on this point?
I should like to assume that tin is decree or this order finds its definite reason in the fact that at that time a large number of new laws had been promulgated for which precedence in sentences did not exist and could not exist. Only gradually it was possible, with regard to those laws, to form a firm foundation based upon sentences and opinions of the supreme judicial authority. Frequently, therefore, surprises occurred if the prosecution, in applying the law, had a definitely different position from the opinion of the Tribunal.
The purpose of that decree was to avoid this ambiguity as far as possible, and to reduce these differences to the least possible measure, also concerning the extent of punishment, which depended on the findings of the Court. That quite apparently, as a matter of course, could only be achieved by a conference before the trial. The reports submitted by the prosecution, by the President of the Kammergericht of the 3rd Of January 1942, and, from the same year, by the President of the District Court of Appeals at Hamm, revealed that some misuse had taken place. It is stated there that the prosecutor, after the presentation of evidence -- that is to say, during tire proceedings, had pointed out to the Court what sentence, with the approval of the Ministry, he would demand, and in so doing created the opinion in the Court that he expected that sentence and that penalty.
From this report can be seen that the presidents of the district courts of appeal quite rightly considered this behavior a misuse. The report by the president of the Kammergericht I had not seen until now. I do not know what steps were taken after that report was received by Freisler. Maybe this is a case again, one of these cases, where important matters had been neglected by him.
The report from the president of the district court of appeal at Hamm I remember very clearly. I had made up my mind to put this matter on the agenda of the next meeting of the presidents of the district courts of appeal. These meetings had the express purpose to discuss such questions which had been raised in the reports. Owing to the fact that I left my office soon thereafter, there was no longer any opportunity for me to carry out these intentions.
Q.- The two reports you mentioned were submitted by the prosecution as Exhibits 73 and 74 with the documents NG-505 and 508, Exhibits 71 and 72. The prosecution also charges you with having influenced the jurisdiction of the judges. I ask you to state your position with regard to these documents.
A.- In the course of the examination of today I was compelled on various occasions, to explain to what degree the party intended and tried to wrest various fields from the Administration of Justice and turn these competences over to the police. In July 1941 that question was especially acute because there was an attempt to take away from the administration the prosecution of Jews and Poles. The opposition based its arguments on sentences which revealed a certain ignorance on the part of the judges of conditions of actual life. Under any form of government one has heard complaints about the fact that the judges were far removed from the facts and experiences of daily life. In the old Reichstag there was hardly any debate on matters of justice without these complaints and such complaints naturally during the war and in the course of many changes, the complete changes of all conditions of life and national economy found plenty of nourishment.
It was the duty of the central agency to acquaint the judges with such general points of view and to demonstrate to them what the influence of temporary conditions and recent conditions would have to be upon the policy of criminal law. Apart from that, one had to be vigilant against that danger which I have described that parts of the administration of justice could be wrested from it.
At that time sex crimes of Poles were very frequent. The reason for that could possibly have been that these laborers who had been brought into Germany in many cases came into a living community with the families of the employers, that the husbands were usually at the front, and that the Poles themselves -- that is, the greater part of the Poles themselves-were in Germany without their families. The ground for sex offenses, therefore, was conditioned by these elements and some judges did not recognize that.
In the documents submitted by the prosecution one case is mentioned which was tried before the penal chamber, Lueneburg. It is the case of a sex crime committed by a Polish agricultural laborer. That defendant was granted extenuating circumstances because -- and I quote -- " He did not have the same restraint toward female coworkers as a German agricultural worker would." That opinion apparently was untenable. The Reich supreme court sharply rejected it. It was also very dangerous at the same time because if reasons of that kind had become known to Hitler there would have arisen a new grave danger to the entire administration of justice. Therefore, I saw cause to find a different job for this judge who apparently was not aware of prevailing conditions. Cases of this nature and many others which may not have been quite as wrong but could have made a certain impression gave cause and reason for a type of propaganda which promised a great deal of success and that made me write that letter of 24 July 1941 to the court authorities in the provinces where I pointed out that in the cases of definitely criminal elements a sexual crime as a rule should be considered according to the legal provisions and regulations as a crime to be punished with death.
The actual documentary background for that letter is to be found in the document of the prosecution. Therefrom one can see in what cases the police may have corrected the sentences by the judges and one can not overlook the fact that such frequent interventions on the part of the police to improve on the sentences by the judges -- represented a signal for the much desired event of taking over the power to punish by the police, and the man in charge of the Ministry conscious of his duty, had to take that into account.
Document 508, which my defense counsel has mentioned, is the reproduction of a passage from a Hitler speech concerning the administration of justice -- it was a speech before the Reichstag -- and that concerned in general the necessity of severe punishment in times of war; and, according to my duty, I brought this speech to the attention of the judges.
Q.- The sentence mentioned before, by the penal chamber of Lueneburg, is to be found in Exhibit 70. The establishment of the extraordinary objection and the nullity plea has been discussed. Can you please give us an explanation?
A.- The witness Doebig called the legal instrument of the extraordinary action and the nullity plea a continuation of the principle of legal remedies.
This right for legal remedies served to solve the conflict between two maxims, which I found in every law or legal code. The principle that the application of the law to a criminal act should lead to a just verdict is confronted, on the other hand, by the necessity to establish as soon as possible a clearly defined legal status. Or to express it differently, on the one hand there is the principle of justice; on the other hand, the principle of establishing a situation in law, clearly defined. The principle of justice is served by the possibility to appeal to a higher authority to reexamine a sentence. That possibility, however, is brought to limitations by the requirement of establishing a clearly defined situation (Rechtssicherheit). Therefore, there is a time limit set and when legal remedies fail, the necessity becomes even stronger to reestablish that definite situation in law.
If as a consequence of the application of this principle a clearly defined situation in law exists, we speak of the force of the law. The sentence has to be accepted even though it does not fully comply with the requirements of justice. That could be accepted as long as one dealt only with the application of the law which for decades had been applied and proved itself. Sources for errors were small and limited in number. A basic change, however, occurred when the dire necessities of war gave cause for the creation of new laws and the application of old and new law. Owing to the lack of personnel caused by the war, it also had to be put into the hands of judges who in the field of criminal law did not have much definite experience.
The danger now that the principle of justice would be violated increased to the extent that it became necessary to look for new ways.
In order to quote another expression by Doebig, "The right for legal remedy had to be developed further." That this development was not at all based on political considerations has already been emphasized by doebig. To provide the possibility of applying the principle of justice in a wider scope justice itself would have to sacrifice.
An interference with the legal validity of the sentence was then unavoidable. It was tenable if it could be limited to a tolerable extent. That was done with the aid of two measures. First, by a time limitation attached to the new legal remedies. Both the extraordinary objection and the nullification plea can only be applied within one year after the sentence has been in force. It cannot be disputed that that time is very long. But I ask to take into account that long period has its significance only in theory. It is not the length of that time but the fact that a time limit is provided which is important.
In the coarse of proceedings, we have heard of many cases of the practical application of both the extraordinary objection and the nullity plea. Not in a single case, not even approximately, was the entire period of one year applied. In most cases, as a matter of course, immediately after the sentence these measures were applied.
The second safety device is to be seen in the fact that the application of these new legal remedies was put into the hands of a supreme functionary of the administration of Justice, and that was the Reich Chief Prosecutor with the Relchgericht--Reich Supreme Court--and as far as the extraordinary objection is concerned, also the Chief Prosecutor at the Volksgericht--the People's Court.
From the point of view of security within the law, it would have bean quite incompatible if it were permitted to the prosecution or to the defendant to attack sentences in force without having them reexamined by an authority of that kind. Then, of course, also that time limit of one year would have presented a danger.
Q. It has frequently been discussed in the proceedings whether and to what extent the extraordinary objection and the nullity plea were applied in favor of the defendant. Would you please give us an explanation on that point.
A. These new legal instruments for the defendants, as well as for the prosecution, reopen the conflict between justice and the security offered by a clearly defined legal status. It is quite easy to understand that the defendant, whether sincerely or not sincerely considers his being sentenced an injustice. But it is likewise easy to understand if he tries to avoid the danger of more severe punishment in the renewed trial and rather remains satisfied with the established fact of the sentence or if he just accepts the sentence resigned to his fate without making use of the clemency plea. He sees his situation only from his point of view and from that of his own interest. The Prosecution, on the other hand, in examining the question as to whether the principle of justice demands a sacrifice from the security within the law, cannot limit itself to that individual case. The prosecution has to consider the purpose of criminal law and its application to this case and to compare it with its application to other cases. The result is that the use of the extraordinary objection and of the nullity plea was made much more frequently by the prosecution than by the defendant; and that at that time-------
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me. Did you say "made more frequently by the prosecution than by the defense" or "for the prosecution?"
I wanted to understand your statement. Did you say that the nullity plea was used more frequently by the prosecution than by the defense, or for the prosecution rather than for the defense?
THE WITNESS: No. First, Mr. President, I only discussed that the legal remedies were used more frequently by the prosecution. Now I come to the question as to whether they also were used in favor of the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand you now.
THE WITNESS: I believe, therefore, that my previous explanations have also provided the foundation for the answer to that question as to shy the extraordinary objection and the nullity plea were more frequently used against the defendant rather than in favor of the defendant.