Before I go into the charges against Milch for his participation in the so-called slave labor program, I must make a few fundamental statements. I shall begin by examining the question as to what extent the Hague Convention on land warfare and the Geneva Convention of 1929 were valid for the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. By the statements of witness von Neurath it has been confirmed that the U.S.S.R. in 1919 specifically withdrew from the Hague Convention on land warfare as well as the former Geneva Convention. Jurists will not dispute the fact that a formal withdrawal from agreements is of greater importance in the relations between states than the act of joining such a convention.
Even if one were of the opinion that the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention represented merely the codification of already existing international law, so that also the state that did not join the conventions would be bound to this already existing international law in all details, even in such a case the expressly stated withdrawal from such a convention must mean also a withdrawal from the natural international law. If this were not the case, the withdrawal from such conventions would be an act without meaning which so intelligence politicians as those to be found in the USSR would never undertake. Nor is this conception of mine contradicted by the expert opinion offered in the first Nuernberg trial (Canaris Document No. EC-338) because this expert opinion is only concerned with the order of Hitler and Keitel regarding the killing and cruel treatment of prisoners. It is of course clear that inhumane acts do not become permissible even though withdrawing from a convention. What we must examine here, however, is purely the question whether or nor, and for what activities, such prisoners of war may be used. Detailed regulations of international law, which in themselves do not contain atrocities, can, in my opinion, be nullified by expressly withdrawing from a convention codifying existing international law. Finally, we wish to draw the attention to Article 82, Paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1929 which contains the following regulation: "If in wartime one of the belligerents is not a member of the convention the regulations of this convention remain valid, nevertheless, for the belligerents who have signed the convention." This does not mean that the signatories are bound to the Geneva Convention also with regard to the treatment of soldiers of a non-signatory power, but only with regard to soldiers of the signatories who are at war. Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention, therefore, states that with regard to the relations of nonsignatories the convention is not valid. The regulation was made so that it should not be thought that if a non-signatory participated in the war the Geneva Convention would not apply to that war.
That my opinion was shared by the USSR becomes clear beyond doubt from Exhibit Mi 49 presented by me, which contains the decision of the Council of the Peoples Commissioners of the USSR of 1 July 1941.
This decision does not mention any limitation with regard to the use of prisoners of war for labor except for the regulations under Number 25. According to this, prisoners of war may not be used as workers in the battle zone, nor for the personal needs of the administrations, or by other prisoners of war (orderly services). Exhibit Mi 51 concerning employment of German women prisoners of war in Russia also reveals the same conception of the USSR.
The objections that not Russia's conception but that of the United States of America matters here is not justified. Existing regulations between two states can only be judged on the legal relations valid for those two states. If both states regulate a given question in agreement with conclusive acts in the same way, that regulation becomes international law valid for the relations of those two states and must be taken into consideration by all other states. It is the right of sovereign states to regulate their relations as they wish. Other states have no right to interfere in the right of sovereignty and they must acquiesce in the legal conception existing between those two states regarding any issue concerning their citizens. Therefore, legal opinions of another state must not be taken as a basis for the judging of actions which occurred between the nationals of these two states.
As in Milch's sphere of competency Russian prisoners of war were used neither at the from nor as orderlies, he cannot be found guilty so far as the treatment of Russian prisoners of war is concerned.
All this also applies to the treatment of the Russian civilian population whose rights could have been cared for by the Hague Convention for Land Warfare alone. Here, too, Russia's express withdrawal from the convention is of great importance.
In my opinion it cannot be argued that Germany attacked Russia and that, for that reason, employment of the civilian population would be illegal even if this were not illegal in itself. That alone would mean that Germany would be bound to the regulations and that Russia was not.
From the point of view of international law this is an impossible situation. For two belligerent states there cannot be a different international law.
Moreover, the validity of the regulations laid down in the Hague Convention for Land Warfare can be canceled by a special factor which precludes lawlessness. In all codes of law of the civilized world the law of so-called emergency situations exists. This conception of law must also be applied to international law. That Germany was in an emergency situation in that sense that the use of the civilian population for labor in the occupied territories was only caused by the emergency situation, I have shown in detail a little while ago. Modern war means total war and as such has suspended, in several points, international law as it existed up to now. It is uncontested that according to the Hague Convention for Land Warfare actions of combat against the civilian population are forbidden. Moder air warfare, having as its aim total annihilation of armament and production of the enemy, brought with it to a great extent warfare against the civilian population without any of the belligerents regarding such combat actions as forbidden according to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. This also applies to the total blockade of a country which aims at starving the population of that country. These comprehensive ways of waging war which hit all classes of the population permit, in my opinion, to a state which is at war, especially on account of the fact that its civilian population is brought into the strife, to use for its purposes labor from occupied countries so as to maintain its production and armament.
Concerning the relations of the other nations involved in the war there is no doubt that for the above the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention of 1929 are valid. But it is just as clear that it is left to the nations to change and abolish these regulations by special agreements between one another. A good example here is the Armistice Treaty signed in 1944 between the Russian and Roumanian governments according to which Roumania had to pledge itself to put at the dis posal of Russia a large number of people for reconstruction purposes.
Complying with this agreement, in January 1945 many thousand members of the Roumanian state were deported to Russia by compulsion and against their will. This case shows what, in such matters, may be legal and valid. Moreover, that agreement was made under some force of bayonets, as in all history is usually the case with every treaty between a conquered and conquering state. The Exhibit Mi 47 proves that in the case of Germany the Control Council (see Section VI, Number 19, of the Proclamation No. 2) imposed on the German authorities even without a treaty, simply based on unilateral orders, the same obligation, i.e., to put at disposal labor for personal services inside and outside Germany. That such orders could naturally only be fulfilled by the German authorities by means of a labor service law will not be contested by anybody.
These one-sided orders given by the victor to the vanquished, whether they be issued on the basis of an armistice brought about by force of arms or on the basis of command or law following the unconditional surrender of a state, are not contrary to law.
It should, therefore, be stated that the rules of the Hague Land Warfare regulations can be suspended between two states. I have given proof for the fact that there were between Germany and France agreements whereby the French population had to make themselves available for work in Germany, first, by volunteering, and later, on the basis of a law for compulsory labor issued by the French government. No restrictions were laid down to what extent and for what purpose these people were to be employed.
The objection has been raised that the Vichy government was a government of traitors, but it was that government which concluded the armistice with Germany, and throughout the war all Frenchmen, including those in De Gaulle's camp, would raise passionate protests when they thought that one of its articles had been violated. Thus, they all acknowledged that an armistice could be concluded, and was concluded. Once you acknowledge the existence of an armistice agreement, you cannot, logically or legally, deny the legality of the government which has concluded the armistice.
You must eat your cake as it is and you must not pick out the plums alone.
As for the situation in Holland and Belgium, both those countries surrendered unconditionally.
According to international law Germany was, therefore, in a position in its dealings with the authorities of these countries to regulate the labor commitments of the civilian population unilaterally in the same manner as this has now been handled in regard to the German population by the Control Council.
As far as Poland is concerned, that country, on the basis of the partitioning agreement between Russia and Germany, had lost its sovereignty. That such partitioning agreements can abrogate the existence of a state has already been historically proven by the former partitioning agreements of the bordering countries in regard to the Polish state. Moreover, the agreements concluded between the victorious nations after this war have abrogated the sovereignty of the German state over very large areas in the East and thus have created new sovereignty for the population of these territories.
Germany released the Polish prisoners of war and could at any time issue legal labor directives as regards the Polish civilian population since the latter were under German sovereignty. So far as the Italian prisoners of war are concerned, the evidence has shown that the Mussolini government, which at the time was the covenant government in that part of Italy not occupied by the allied forces, made then available for work in the armament industry, especially after Germany had to manufacture armaments for Mussolini's Italy.
Testimony of Vorwald. Here it should also be mentioned that Milch's opinion that Italian prisoners of war who fled from a transport should be shot does not mean a cruelty. All countries of the world have prisoners shot who attempt to escape, as proved by me in Exhibit MI 26. So far as the civilian population of other southeastern states are concerned, they were only recruited and employed as free workers based on approval by the legally existing governments of these countries.
In addition, it is interesting to point out that the agreement between France and Germany, according to which France was supposed to allocate French civilians for the labor commitment in exchange for the release of prisoners of war, had a parallel in the discussion of the question regarding the fate of German prisoners of war still in allied countries. In France, in particular, the request has been made to make possible the release of German prisoners of war by making available German civilians as workers in Place of the prisoners of war. This, too, is evidence to the effect that such an agreement is not contrary to international law.
That, Your Honors, is the legal position as I must present it.
May I propose, Your Honors, to recess now. Otherwise I would have to interrupt a long passage.
THE PRESIDENT: We will now take a recess.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal is in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Tribunal 2 is again in session.
DR. BERGOLD: In regard to the question of guilt, a special point has still to be considered. All legal theories consider that the defendant is not liable for punishment if after careful consideration and careful inquiries he has gained the conviction that his action was permissible. It has been shown that in Germany prisoners of war and foreign civilians were being employed within the war production even at the time when Milch had not yet taken over the office of the GL. In other words, he was already confronted with the situation, the exploitation of which he is being reproached for today.
The testimony of the witness Vorwald and that of the defendant himself showed that Milch made inquiries from the competent authority as to whether the employment of prisoners of war and foreign civilians which he found in existence was admissible under the then prevailing regulation. He has testified here that he received an affirmative answer. Furthermore, he testified that the admissibility of the utilization of foreign civilian workers was discussed soon after the first World War in an investigation staff committee of the German Reichstag. The chairman of that investigation committee was Prof. Dr. Schucking, a legal authority of repute, who had become known throughout the world as a passionate champion of pacifism and democracy. This committee, as the defendant gathered from the discussions held at the time, could not and did not find that employment of foreign civilian workers in armament industry was inadmissible.
Impressed by his earlier experience, the defendant has the right to believe the information given to him by his superior office that employment of foreign manpower and of prisoners of war was admissible. Moreover, this information was not issued without reason. The reasons given for it were rather in accordance with the reasons which I have described in detail above. How should Milch, who is not a legal expert, who as a layman did not understand anything about applicable international law, how could he form a different opinion?
It is the right of every citizen to believe the legal information supplied by his superior and the concomitant authorities, for no one can impose upon a citizen the duty to undertake on his own accord an examination of the legal questions involved. In a modern state this would result in an untenable situation whereby everyone of the citizens would acquire his own conception of the law.
Dissenting opinions from abroad Milch was not in a position to hear since he was not allowed to read foreign newspapers nor listen to foreign broadcasts, nor did he do so.
He acted in good faith, and this has to be considered in his favor today, the more since he knew and may well assume that these measures were only temporary, and were brought about irresistibly by the necessities of war.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt you a minute. Is it a principle of the German Law that ignorance of the law is an excuse for its breach? Is it a principle of the German Law -- can you hear me now?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes. Excuse me.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you hear me now?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a principle of the German Law that ignorance of the law is an excuse for violating it?
DR. BERGOLD: It is a principle inasmuch as if somebody has been misled by his superiors on the significance of the law. Everybody must inquire of what the law is, but if his superior authorities had given him certain information, he can rely on that.
THE PRESIDENT: Suppose a person is advised by his own counsel as to the law, and counsel is wrong, does that excuse the client?
DR. BERGOLD: The client's lawyer is not considered to be a sufficient authority, it must be a governmental authority.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, suppose a high government official, a man in high authority who was not a lawyer advised his subordinate as to his legal rights and duties, and that advice was wrong?
DR. BERGOLD: That would mean that there would be an excusable error, an excusable legal error.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean then, and it is your position that if Goering, for example, had told Milch that it was his legal right to go out and shoot a person without a hearing, or a trial, that Milch would be justified legally in doing that?
DR. BERGOLD: I did not get it, Your Honor. Would you repeat it, please.
THE PRESIDENT: If, for example, Goering, who was a person in high authority, advised Milch that he had the legal right to go out and shoot a person, that would be justification for Milch doing so, legally?
DR. BERGOLD: No, because the question of whether you can commit a murder or not is settled for everybody, but the point as to whether the employment of foreigners was admissible under the International Law, that this is a very tricky legal point, and there, of course, there is a difference.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that every one is supposed to know that he cannot shoot a man.
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, everybody knows that.
THE PRESIDENT: But everyone is not supposed to know that he can force a man to unwilling labor?
DR. BERGOLD: No, he is not obliged to know that. That is why Milch applied to receive this information about International Law.
THE PRESIDENT: You make a distinction between homicide and slavery?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I make a difference not, perhaps, in this exact example, but I make a difference between the natural knowledge of law, which everybody has, and special questions and special knowledge not shared by everybody in the State. The point whether you can kill or steal is common knowledge, but the question whether International Law permits the employment is not something which everybody knows. This question was only what specialists and legal experts can decide, and, if any man concerned tries to receive information whether this is permissible, and obtains that information from a specialist of a governmental department who says, yes, then it does not become permissible in itself, but then we have what is known as an excusable legal error.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you take the same position as to enforced civilian labor?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, on the question if it is permitted at all to employ someone, foreign workers or prisoners of war.
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to get this straightened out.
DR. BERGOLD: There are a number of other difficult legal points which I need not go into here. This is certainly an example of what occupies us here.
THE PRESIDENT: That is true. I want to get your position perfectly clear. I think it is -
DR. BERGOLD: Let's assume, for example, the question in any foreign country which you occupy you may issue occupation money; let's assume that was punishable according to some International regulation, which would be difficult to interpret, and a layman is not in a position to know that. Supposing the Government-General of an occupied country, for instance, applies to tho Reichsbank, with the question what is permitted, then the government would know and the occupied country would then concede to the regime a knowledge of which it is not guilty.
THE PRESIDENT: No, that theory of law becomes a very uncertain guide, does it not? It depends upon interpretation of not the lawyers, nor the professors, but of high government officials, they make the law.
DR. BERGOLD: No, my client tries to receive information from, so far as your point is concerned, let's say, the legal department, or from the Ministry which has its legal department, or of both the Reich-air Ministry and also the Wehrmacht itself, or from the head legal experts who were specially trained, and I draw your attention -
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Then the head legal experts make the law as far as the defendant is concerned?
DR. BERGOLD: No, no, he did not make the law but he tried to, and that is, of course , the legal error that -
THE PRESIDENT: He makes the law by which the defendant may govern himself?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, for this special case, as long as he does not hear an opinion to the contrary, let's assume.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, what happens after he does hear the opinion to the contrary, then which law does he abide by?
DR. BERGOLD: In that case he can act no longer at all. If he acts, he acts on what is known as the term applies from the Roman Law, that is, to say, "Eventual delus," an evil intention in the case of his being opposed by the law. I assume that the term "Eventual delus" is known to your country, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Supposing that he gets two conflicting opinions from the legal ministry, or one of the legal advisers in a high place tells him he may do a thing, and another in an equally high place says he may not, how does that solve the dilemma?
DR. BERGOLD: In that case he must not commit the act, because his attention has been drawn to the difference in the legal opinions, and that is where we have the "Eventual delus". If he does not depend on it, and does it on his own risk, then with that risk he made a wrong.
THE PRESIDENT: I am frank to say that this is a new and startling legal theory. Did you understand that?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I understood.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have your position.
DR. BERGOLD: I shall continue: His good faith, however, was reinforced by the fact that all the measures against English and American prisoners of war, which are being objected to, were not carried out. That the reasons expressly stated for this were that no agreement except a change in the regulations had been conveyed normally to the British and American prisoners of war. Whoever has the least psychological insight will understand that by observing the Geneva Convention principles towards those two countries must have made it appear to the defendant as applicable towards other countries, all the more as this deviation had been based on presence of other agreements, or the lack of other protective measures.
As far as the question of actual recruiting, and using of manpower is concerned, a differentiation must be made between recruiting, bringing foreign laborers to the country, and their treatment on the whole on the one hand, and on the other hand their employment within Germany the labor assignment.
May it please the Tribunal, the case in chief, and the submitted documents of the Prosecution, especially the documents Exhibits Nos. 13, 14, 14-A, 15, 15-A, and 17 had eliminated any doubt as to the fact that Sauckel alone was competent for the recruiting of foreign laborers and their transport to Germany, and for the treatment of the foreign workers, and that Hitler over and over again confirmed against other attacks, that Speer was the only competent man.
Not one single document has been submitted which would show that Milch participated in the recruiting, transfer to Germany and treatment of the workers. The witnesses Speer, Koerner, Richter, Hertel, Eschonauer, Pendale, Vorwald, as well as Milch himself, have testified under oath that neither they nor the defendant knew anything about all the abuses which have become evident in the sphere of Sauckel's work.
I call your attention to Exhibit MI-3, which reveals how Sauckel always and everywhere emphasized that he took care of the foreign workers to the best of his ability. In this exhibit he makes the assertion that foreign workers have never in the history of the world been treated as well as they were treated by him in this most severe of all wars. The testimony of the witness Schemtler and of Milch has shown that Sauckel had made the same declarations and told the same lies to them also. There is no need for any further statement to the effect that the recruitment and even the forced transport of the workers into the Reich on the basis of an order could have been carried out in an absolutely humane manner and that all these atrocities, murders, and tortures which took place need not have occurred. Such actions are not of necessity connected with such events. The fact that in the East and in France parts of the population were called up and drafted by classes by means of Labor Service decrees could not and did not have to make Milch suspicious. Forced drafting of people occurs in all countries which have a compulsory military service or labor service. Examples of the latter are Germany and Bulgaria. The latter state had ordered service according to each group before the Hitler regime existed, and how could Milch, after all, have found out about the inhuman acts in the recruitment and transport into the Reich and the treatment within the Reich? Obviously, only if he had observed such incidents himself or if complaints reached him through his subordinates or through these foreign workers themselves.
Milch testifies here in a creditable manner that during the entire course of the war he had never observed such conditions. During all these years he made his trips by plane and, in some exceptional cases, by special train; that in this way he could naturally not observe such facts is quite clear.
The witnesses have confirmed that they never reported abuses to him. The only thing he heard were isolated complaints that the food was inadequate at times or that there was a lack of clothing and shoes. In themselves, these were conditions which resulted at the time from the wartime emergency and applied also to the German civilian population. All of the above mentioned witnesses and Milch have, however, confirmed that Milch on his own part immediately ordered that the conditions should be remedied.
These incidents, however, cannot be called inhuman acts or atrocities, cannot be called crimes. The witnesses Pendele, Hertel and Vorwald, as well as the defendant himself, have testified that the foreign workers never brought any complaints to the defendant. They all expressed their happiness. It may be that they were afraid of complaining to Milch. That, however, was not Milch's fault. He had the right to believe the assurances of the persons he questioned, the more so because his conversations with them were carried out in the friendliest, even the most cheerful, manner.
Now, how could Milch have found out about these incidents? I have already mentioned that he could not obtain knowledge about that from foreign reports, because he did not receive such reports. Thus, it should be established that Milch was not responsible, first, for the directive for the so-called slave labor; secondly, the recruitment of manpower; third, the inhumane acts perpetrated in connection with this, fourth, the transport to Germany, and the crimes connected therewith, and finally, fifth, the treatment of foreign workers in Germany and the atrocities committed in connection therewith. He knew nothing at all about it. He did not commit these crimes; neither as a principal nor as an accomplice. He neither ordered such crimes nor instigated them. He did not take a consenting part in them either. On the contrary, he always eliminated minor abuses and constantly saw to it that the conditions of the foreign workers were ameliorated by special gifts. He was in no way connected in a causative manner with the planning or execution of these crimes, and here I refer you to my earlier legal statement, for he would have had to know about it, that such atrocities, murders, and other inhumane occurred in connection with the recruitment, transfer to Germany and treatment within Germany if he is to be held responsible for them.
Neither did he belong to the organization which was connected with the recruiting, transport and treatment, namely, the Organization Sauckel. If at all, he could be charged only with the exploitation of foreign workers.
No just man who values that name can by virtue of knowledge subsequently acquired condemn the actions which a defendant committed at an earlier time in ignorance of what later became known. Today the whole world is full of the horrors which have been brought to light. It is not true, however, that those horrors were desired by the supreme leadership. That Sauckel acted independently here and that he alone bears the guilt is shown by Exhibit MI-3, in which Sauckel lied to Hitler, saying that workers had never been treated so well as by him.
I do not wish to defend Hitler. As a German, I myself have every reason to raise the most bitter and serious charges against the man whose account of guilt can never be paid up, but here it must be said that Hitler could hardly have included the commission of atrocities and murders in his plan for the foreign workers, for if that had been the case, Sauckel would not have had to lie as he did. Then he would not have had to pretend to his lord and master that he was treating the foreign workers so well. Such lies, such deceit, are practised only by the subordinate who is aware that he has violated instructions and that he can be punished by his superior.
Exhibit MI-32 shows clearly that in two cases Sauckel acted against Hitler's instructions in committing his crimes. Therefore, even Sauckel's labor organization was not created for the purpose of committing atrocities, murders and other inhumane acts. Sauckel and a number of his subordinates made themselves guilty on their own accounts, and as guilty persons they strove to keep their crimes secret and to cover them up. That the defendant cannot be made responsible for these secret acts can hardly be refuted.
I realize that in answer the Prosecution will remind me of all the documents with severe statements by Milch which have been submitted to the Tribunal. This is a serious count of the Indictment, but one can achieve clarity on the complexity of questions thus brought up only if one considers whether Milch made these severe statements only against foreign workers and prisoners of war or whether they were simply a part of his nature.
The witnesses Richter, Foerster, Hertel, Eschenauer, Pandale and Vorwald have confirmed that Milch in his tantrums threatened even his German subordinates, his best workers, with hanging and shooting, and here in this room several men have appeared on the witness stand whom the defendant shot or hanged in words. This clearly shows that the defendant was not one sidedly filled with hatred of the members of foreign nations; besides, this was hardly to be expected in the character of a man who for years energetically worked for peaceful collaboration with other nations and who despised the racial doctrine and the idea of the "master race." Rather, it makes it clear that he uttered such wild expressions only when he was excited, so that his subordinates acquired the habit of laying bets on the number of people who would be shot, when they knew that exciting matters were up for discussion. I read a number of passages to you from the notorious speech before the quartermasters and fleet engineers, in which he raged against those present and against himself in the same terms as he used against the foreigners. And in other documents submitted by the Prosecution one can find such expressions used against Germans, and at that against members of the leading class of the German people and against German workers. All this proves that an unfortunate inclination of Milch is here expressed for which, like a sick person, he cannot be held responsible, especially since he never carried out the punishments which he threatened. All the witnesses whom I have called to the stand from Milch's entourage have testified that he used such terms only in tantrums. These tantrums occurred frequently, and always when he had met with major difficulties in the way of his work to save Germany from complete destruction. He was a sick man. He suffered several very serious accidents, all with severe brain concussions. It is an old experience of medicine that such people are easily excitable, and you must not forget how much this man had on his mind. He was a clairvoyant. He knew that the war was lost for Germany. He realized to what horrors Germany was doomed as a result of the increasingly violent air war. He knew what help was possible in the distress of his people, and he had to stand helplessly by while his shortsighted and perhaps malevolent superiors frustrated hampered and prohibited all his precautions.
In such severe mental distress even a healthy man would become so irritable that he would be subjected to violent outbursts of anger. How much more violent would these outbursts be in the case of the sick defendant. His disstressed soul, dwelling in a suffering body, helplessly exposed to its worries, reacted in this way to relieve the tension.
Many witnesses, in particular the witness Vorwald, have told you that when such excitement occurred the defendant even changed physically, that the back of his face became red and swollen and that afterwards he no longer knew what he had said while he was in such a state. That this testimony, especially that of the witness Verwald, is true, is shown with complete certainty by the incidents between the defendant and Goering on the occasion of the report on the crimes committed by Terboven in Norway on the civilian population., and Exhibit 159 of the Prosecution. The Prosecution with justification bitterly reproached the defendant for failure to protest against this monstrosity. The defendant in his defense was not able to answer that he had really done so. Vorwald has testified that this art of protesting took place in connection with an outburst of anger about precisely that incident, and because the testimony of Vorwald that the defendant did not remember afterwards what had happened during this period of excitement is true, the defendant was not able to carry out a full answer in his own defense because of his excitement. He did not remember. Your Honors, it is clear you have achieved deep insight into the souls of men. Therefore surely you are able to judge that this incident has revealed the truth of what the defendant and his witnesses have told you. Otherwise he would be able to cite his protest as a defense against the charge of the prosecution.
Now, I assume that the Prosecution will object that these fits of rage occurred much too frequently and that they are therefore not a pathological symptom but a normal expression of his character. Your Honors, this can be disputed by a very simple consideration. The so-called G.L. meetings took place twice a week. That means that from the time when the defendant took office there were a total of about 160 meetings. In addition there were 60 meetings of the Central Planning Board.
Finally there were about 30 Jaegerstab meetings, altogether about 250 meetings in which the defendant participated. The meetings lasted many hours. According to my examination the average number of pages of verbatim transcript of the G.L. was about 200 for a single meeting, or about 30,000 - 32,000 pages for the G.L. alone. If one includes the transcripts of other meetings then one comes to figure approximately at least of about 35,000 pages for all the transcripts at a conservative estimate. This is an enormous figure from all these many meetings. From all these many, many pages of transcript, the prosecutor has been able to submit only a very few pages with only very occasional extravagant statements. Therefore it cannot be said that the defendant habitually used such expressions. It is also significant that in the meetings of the General Luftzeugmeister such outbursts occur much more frequently than in the transcripts of the Jaegerstab or the transcripts of the Central Planning Board. In the G.L. meetings the defendant was in his own realm "among us parson's daughters", as the witness Vorwald said. Such outbursts naturally occurred there more often because according to experience a human being can let himself go more easily among his most intimate friends than among his subordinates. Nevertheless the outbursts remained isolated.
Is it not symptomatic that the emotional disturbances of the defendant occurred repeatedly in connection with the same subjects of discussion, for example in the question of the work done by the French industry, the French people, the question of so-called slackers, or the discussion of threatening and inciting remarks made by foreigners. Sometimes several outbursts occurred at brief intervals, one after the other. Why, your Honors? Because the matters that have excited the defendant have not been settled. But this leads us to the question of whether the defendant followed up these wild words with deeds. He never did. It is exactly the fact that as, for example, in the case of the slackers or in the case of the work done by the French industry in France itself, these seemingly malevolent threats so angrily uttered had not been put into effect at all, nevertheless they were made the subject of continuous reproaches for the defendant. Here, your Honors, I ask you to penetrate into the depth of the circumstances with the understanding that characterized a legal person.