"(a) The battleship or aircraft carrier, which is the more effective individually or as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy."
Witness, at that time were such views already expressed or do you have clues that these views were expressed only at a later time?
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A. Of course, the evaluation of single weapons or weapon groups took place with regard to Great Britain. In particular, that the idea or the chain of ideas that aircraft carriers were the best protection for convoys was discussed, I do not remember. That is a problem with which England, in the first place, had to concern herself; and I am sure England did that when she had to make up her mind to postpone the building of battleships, which was taking place at the time, and to replace it with the building of aircraft carriers and to increase this whole production. England probably had to do that during the first months of the war, or at least make up its mind to it.
As far as we know, and what we learned in Germany, it is a fact that the construction of battleships was slowed down approximately early, or towards the middle of 1940.
Q. Thank you. I now pass over to another point -and I inform the interpreters that it is the last section but five, and it starts, "secrecy is the most important requisite for success."
"Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan."
Can you remember that at that time Japan was mentioned at all?
A. No, I don't believe that. Japan at that time, early in 1939, did not play any part whatsoever.
Q. Hitler then continues:
"The break-through in the Maginot Line is still a possibility for Italy and must be studied. The Fuehrer considers that such a break-through is possible."
During this conference, had the subject been mentioned that Italy--and I think it is the prolongation of the Maginot Line--that Italy should break through the extended Maginot Line; or was Italy not mentioned at all in that connection?
A. That this idea was discussed at all, I do not remember. I do not remember it, and I don't believe it true either.
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Q. I now go over to another point; it is the last section but one. "Working; Principles.
"1. No one must be admitted who is not concerned.
"2. No one must know more than it is necessary for him to know.
"3. When must the person concerned know at the latest? No one must know of the matter earlier than it is necessary for him to know of it."
Witness, is it correct that these principles made up the contents of the so-called Basic Fuehrer-Order No. 1 ?
A. Yes, and I believe that it was even verbally that way.
Q. Can you remember that this basic Fuehrer Order, even at that time in May 1939 existed in that form and was reported to us?
A. I do not believe that. It was usual in every military discussion, although the same applied to discussions that were not military, concerning secrecy, that of course at the end or at the beginning of a discussion somebody pointed out that the things that were being discussed were to be kept secret. And that, of course, was probably the case when Hitler made this speech. However I think that the formulation which you just read to me is so sharp, let us say, and so striking compared with secret order No. 1 that in January or February 1940 I would have remembered if this consolidation with the written order would have been so sharp with the oral statements made at that time. I would have remembered that at the time, and of course I would have remembered this today, too.
Q. Witness, you know that the Fuehrer order in the form you see it now was only issued in January 1940,
A. January or February, 1940.
Q. Now a last question, witness, it is stated at the end of the document. At the request of Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer decrees that: a, the various services shall determine what construction is to be undertaken; b, there shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding program; c, the armament programs are to be considered with regard to 1943 or 1944. Can you remember that Goering made such a request at that time?
A. I cannot remember such a request made by Goering. However, I know that early in 1933 the navy, namely, under Rear Admiral Raeder, put such a request to the Fuehrer. I believe that this request by Raeder was in connection with his idea of the whole thing. With his impression concerning the increase of tension it could he that which was also in connection with the final conclusion of the Czechoslovakia question.
At that time Rear Admiral Raeder suggested Hitler to stop the homogenous building up of the navy, or at least he brought this subject to a discussion, that to build *** for the navy could he carried out in a shorter time. In other words this request was an expression used by Gross Admiral Raeder, that he was worried about the future. At that time Gross Admiral 1314 a Raeder received the following answer from Hitler:
No, don't you worry. The construction of the navy will take place in a homogenous way as we had planned it. And there was a certain construction sector around the middle of 1944 or 1945.
DR. BERGOLD: No further questions, Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DENNEY:
Q. Witness, were you at the Fuehrer conference that preceded the invasion of Poland sometime in August 1939?
A. I participated in this conference also.
Q. And that was the first time that you ever heard or believed that Germany was going to invade Poland about August 22, 1939; is that right?
A. If you ask me the question in this way I cannot give you a clear answer. I also have to state here that the unchangeable belief that an attack was planned on Poland was not discussed during this conference or a speech held by Hitler. As far as I know, Hitler painted, let us say, a very dark picture of the increasing tension between Germany and Poland and that ho had made up his mind at a certain point when the tensions would increase, then to make the decision, as he said at the time, to counter this Polish violation and forceful acts of Poland near the German border and to bring this problem to a final conclusion.
Q. When did you find out that he was going to attack Poland? You just said that you didn't find it out in the August meeting down at Obersalzburg. When did you find out? The night before they went in?
A. Even during this speech, I believe on the 23rd or 24th of August. At the time everybody agreed that even this time Hitler would succeed in getting out of this problem or jam and find some sort of political solution as he did with Czechoslovakia.
Q. You didn't have any idea that they were getting ready for war?
A. Oh, yes, indeed. Of course I did. After all, we also knew with Czechoslovakia that the military units and the political units always endeavored or were afraid that maybe things won't develop as well as the political leadership things, and that is why we prepared ourselves for a war.
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Q. Well, then, you were getting ready for war, weren't you? In case things didn't work out with the politicians, why then you would have to go to war -- you and the Luftwaffe and the army.
A. Well, naturally, it was decisive in case of war that the political leadership -- the political leadership was the decisive factor. Should a war break out, not the army or the navy were the ones who decide on the war, but the political leadership.
Q. Well, if the political leadership -- and that was Hitler -- decided that you go to war, you were going to support him were you not?
A. If I agreed with him I do not know. However, an order of the political leadership has to be followed by the Wehrmacht.
Q. Yes. I don't care whether you agreed with him or not, but if he did give the order for you to go to war, you would go to war, wouldn't you?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. And you were ready for war?
A. With the insufficient means we had at our disposal, a preparation had to he taken. That the Wehrmacht never was ready for a war, I believe, has already been discussed and clearly shown in the first great trials of last year.
Q. Well, if we look at 1945, they probably weren't ready. But they had reasonable success starting in 1939, You couldn't say that your campaign starting with Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France -- you wouldn't say that these were a total loss, would you?
A. Not at all. However, I am of the opinion that this was not due to the increasing of the German power or of the German Wehrmacht, but rather to the fact that the military status of these countries, first of all in the west, was of such a low level, which level had not been anticipated by the German Wehrmacht, and which surprised all the commanders in chief of the Luftwaffe, the navy, and the Wehrmacht.
Q. In other words, if you had known they were as weak as you say they are you wouldn't have had to do so much to get ready.
A. If we had known that, of course, that is correct. But one doesn't know those things in general.
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Q. Now to get back to this meeting of 23 May, 1939, is that where Hitler talked about concluding a peace with the western powers after the war with Poland?
A. No, not in this precise formulation. There were never discussions with regard to concluding a peace with this or that party. What you just mentioned concerned concluding peace with the western powers only occurred after the Polish campaign, October and November, 1939, when Hitler held a speech at the Reichstag.
Q. Well, did he talk at this meeting of May 1939 about the campaign against Poland?
A. Yes, I believe that this also was discussed; yes.
Q. Well, if he discussed that, he also had to discuss the possibility of the western powers entering on Poland's side because they had a treaty with Poland, didn't they?
A. Absolutely. This was also mentioned. I remember now for certain a chain of ideas which read approximately as follows: one could be certain, however, of the fact, that I shall never permit the tension to come so far as to produce a war between Germany and half of the world or with the whole world, or to create a two-front war.
Q. He said at that meeting, he did not want to have a two-front war?
A. Yes, indeed, explicitly.
Q. Did he talk about the possibility of operations against England at that meeting?
A. I cannot say yes, but he discussed the fact that the Polish operation could also cause a friction with the western powers, therefore, also with England. That was one of the possibilities he wanted to prevent.
Q. Himmler did not want to have any trouble with anybody but Poland, is that what you gathered?
A. Yes. Yes, indeed.
Q. Just Poland, not anybody else?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it at this meeting that he talked about creating a incident to start the Polish war or was that at a later one? Do you recall?
A. No. No. No. That is one of the points which I always understood after the end of the war, namely that firstly, the so-called bad treatment of the population between Germany and Poland probably had been greatly exaggerated by the German propaganda. Secondly, I learned last year that the attack on the radio station Gleiwitz was not arranged by Poles, but apparently by Germans. Hitler did not specify about the creation of such an incident in May 1939.
Q. You did not find out until after the war was over that the attack on that radio station, which was allegedly made by Poles actually was made by Germans dressed in Polish uniforms, is that right?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Do you recall Hitler even saying anything like, "Don't worry about the incident that will touch off this Polish conflict. I will take care of that. Do you recall his ever saying anything like that either at the meetting under discussion or at the meeting held at Obersalzberg in August 1939:
A. No not in this connection. He said without his the instigating this, the tension with Poland could be increased so much that the honor of the Reich and the German nation would necessitate an attack.
Q. An attack by whom?
A. An attack by the German Wehrmacht, of course.
Q. This meeting held in 1939, you had an opportunity to discuss it during the first trial of the United States, that is against Hermann Goering etc.?
A. No. I did not. I was not examined as a witness. I had been called as a witness here. However, I was not examined. On the basis of my coming to Nurnberg, I interested myself very much in all these various questions.
Q. And how long did this meeting last? How long?
A. Well, I would say about an hour and a half to two hours. I believe this is correct.
Q. Did anybody talk beside Hitler?
A. No. Nobody else.
Q. I guess nobody talked very much when he was around. Do you know who else was there.
A. It all depended upon the subject of the conference. In this case it was a speech by Hitler. Later on, toward the end of August, 1939, it was also an explicitly a speech held by Hitler. There were conferences with the Fuehrer, however, where one could discuss the military operations and how they should be carried out. The military leaders made their oral reports. And then there was a discussion in one or another form of course. Such a discussion was possible, it also was always carried out.
Q. Do you remember who was at this meeting of May 23, 1939?
A. The defense counsel asked me about that before.
Q. I can ask you about it, too.
A. As the Prosecutor just asked me, according to what I said before, I have to answer: the three leaders of the Wehrmacht, Goering, Brauchitsch and Raeder. And the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder. The Chiefs of the Admiral-Staff were present. Furthermore, General Bodenschatz was there and Schmundt. From the Navy, Puttkammer and Albrecht, and Engl as adjutant out of the army and the adjutant of the Luftwaffe, I do not remember his name. And Jeschoneck, adjutant.
Q. Jeschoneck was not an adjutant.
A. He was a chief of the general staff of the Luftwaffe. I believe there was a small mistake in translation.
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Q. That is what I wanted to clear up. Colonel Schmundt was an adjutant then?
A. Colonel Schmundt was chief adjutant.
Q. Did you see Keitel there?
A. Yes. Keitel was probably there, too. Jodl was probably there, too.
Q. Did you see Milch?
A. That is just the point in question. I was personally of the opinion that Goering was there at the time, but it has been eight years since that conference and it is quite possible that perhaps Feldmarshall Milch was also there in addition to Reichsmarshall Goering or as his deputy.
Q. Did you see Warliamont there?
A. I could not remember that. I do not believe he was.
Q. Did you hear him say anything about labor at that meeting?
A. No, I could not recall that any such idea was expressed during tho meeting. I do not see in what connection this problem would have fitted in.
Q. You don't think at that time that Hitler wanted to go to war with anybody else other than Poland, do you?
A. Well, that again is the question, if he wanted to. At the time, at least I was of the opinion that it was not his wish to create the friction between Germany and Poland, and at that time he wanted it known he might be forced to do so.
Q. In other words, you might got into a war with Poland through no fault of your own, maybe Poland would attack you?
A. The later, I do not believe. One could say that, if I have the right to express a political opinion, that, because of the non-aggression pact which was concluded with Poland in 1939, one could hardly expect an attack of Poland. We counted this could be possible, but not probable.
Q. You knew in 1939, May, that you had a non-aggression pact with Poland did you not?
A. I must admit right now I do not remember exactly. There were quite a few pacts also with Poland. One was at that time, May, 1939. If it had any importance, I do not remember such a one.
Q. Did you attend any other meetings with all of the chiefs of the various branches of the Wehrmacht between May 1939 and September 1, 1939, except this one which is referred to in Prosecution's Exhibit 3 and the conference at Obersalzberg which was held in August about which we had some talk before?
A. Well, I only participated in these two conferences with Hitler. As far as I know there was no other conference of all the other Wehrmacht branches before the attack on Poland.
Q. What did you think this was all about, this May meeting?
A. Well --
Q. Did you think he just had you in there to make a speech?
A. I just tried, when the Defense Counsel, asked me such a question, to give an explanation. I, myself, and also Admiral Raeder recognized the tendency or the intention which Hitler had in this conference of 1939, but under it vaguely, as I said before, the main thing was the Studium Ausschuss, or teaching institutes, which the Fuehrer mentioned toward the end of his speech. The creation of this institute was stressed by him to such an extent that Raeder and I were of the opinion that this was the main topic of the speech which lasted from one and half to two hours. That is why he pointed out the dangers of a war in the East. That is why he mentioned the fact there could be a friction between Germany and the Western powers. Once in a while, in between, he told us, "Do not worry, I shall not make any fast decisions. I shall see to it that Germany does not come into war with the whole world, etc." In other words, according to both Admiral Raeder's opinion and mine, it was not quite a statement concerning war aims or war within a short time, but only the very drastic reasons given for an organizational measure.
Q. Do you remember him saying anything about the aim will be to force England to her knees?
A. The way you just said it now, I don't know. It could be that he said we don't have to make ourselves unreasonable illusions as it will be impossible to force England down to her knees, for instance, with our Uboat weapons, with the U-Boat weapons which was very weak at the time. In other words, the possibility of such being expressed is admitted. However, if this was used I cannot swear to it.
Q. Well, do you remember talking about England which can be blocked from western France at close quarters by the air force?
A. No, no I don't remember that.
Q. Do you remember him talking about the Navy with its submarines extending the range of the blockade?
A. You mean to extend the range of the blockade? Well, I do not remember exactly, but if this problem was touched upon, however, it sort of fixes the whole chain of ideas with the possibility of the development of war which was discussed, and that could fit in, yes it could.
Q. Well, you did not have any aircraft carriers in the Navy, did you?
A. No, we did not. We had only one which was under construction.
Q. And you did not have any battleships and heavy cruisers to amount to anything, did you?
A. Well, battleships -- well, we owned two -- two were being constructed, and for a blockade against England we furthermore had the three heavy cruisers which between 1930 and 1935 had already built.
Q. Well, other than these heavy cruisers that you had, the principal weapon of the Navy was the submarine, was it not?
A. For such a war as actually took place the submarines, of course, were the best weapons that we could use, on account of the very simple reason that the high sea forces were very very weak. If one prepares oneself for a war explicitly as a war -- as it happened in 1930, then we should have had twenty four times as many submarines, as we actually had at the beginning of the war, in order to wage war successfully against a strong power as England was.
Q Do you remember him talking about the Army holding positions essential to the Navy and the Airforce, and in that connection he continued saying, if Holland and Belgium were successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England would have been secured?
A The ways and possibilities of waging war against England were discussed, at the same time comparisons were made regarding the course of the war in 1914-1918, and it is quite possible that the Fuehrer said that the basis on which the war 1914-1918 was conducted, the high sea warfare as had to be carried out, was not sufficient. That the war against England could be taken into consideration again would have to be carried out on a broader and greater basis. I believe that this was one of the aims which the Fuehrer mentioned, and this Studien-Ausschuss, or teaching institution was to concern itself with it.
Q As a matter of fact he talked about the World War I, and mentioned the fact that if you had two battleships and two more cruisers in the German Navy in the first World War, and if the battle of the Juetland had been fought in the morning that the British Fleet would have been defeated?
A I don't know if I do understand the prosecutor's question that the Fuehrer spoke about the Skagerrak, or about battle of Juetland.
Q In World War I?
A In that connection the opinion was accepted by Hitler that had there been two or three more battleships and cruisers, the battle would have been won, is that it?
Q Yes, and if the battle had been fought in the morning instead of later in the day, as it happened?
A I don't remember that.
Q You don't recall him saying anything about that?
A No, I don't. I believe that I would have recalled all of that if he would have mentioned the Skagerrak battle. No, I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't think that he spoke about those things.
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Q. These final principles that Dr. Bergold asked you about, no one must be --- (interruption) no one must be admitted who was not concerned, and so forth?
A. That is concerning the secrecy, yes, he discussed that I know that, because it is usual that after every conference of such a nature where secret things were discussed, all the participants are told or are reminded of such a secrecy.
Q. And this was a very important conference, wasn't it?
A. Indeed.
MR. DENNEY: Nothing further, Your Honor.
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Witness, you have had a fairly good recollection of the subjects which were discussed at that meeting, had you not?
A. Yes. Yes, indeed.
Q. Are you personally acquainted with the Schmundt memorandum?
A. No, I never read it. I remember from last year, that this Schmundt memorandum was used during that first session and played quite an important part there.
Q. Well, you knew about the question on the colonies on which the memorandum deals, and in part reads: "Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockage." Do you recall that item being discussed?
A. I am sorry, but I cannot tell you with certainty that I could swear to such a statement. No, I cannot.
Q. That appears in the memorandum there, and the next item says: "If fate brings us into conflict with the west, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely on even such in time of war then in peace." Do you recall that?