With regard to the case Ruff, these difficult questions need perhaps not be examined any further, because it has been established without doubt as was stated from a different side that Ruff was convinced that the experimental persons had volunteered and could be convinced according to the position of the case.
5) In this connection one has repeatedly asked, whether Ruff had convinced himself in Dachau, whether the experimental persons used there were actually condemned PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS, whether he had examined tho PERSONAL records of these prisoners for this purpose, further whether he had made sure if the special privileges promised to the prisoners (as for example their amnesty) were actually given to them later on etc. However such exaggerated demands could not be made of the attitude of professional duty of that time to Dr. Ruff, if one does not want to be unfair to him. Dr. Ruff had never been in a concentration camp otherwise; his short single visit on that day in March 1942, when he was in charge of the high altitude experiments, was the only contact which he had in all his life with the concentration camps; the quiet and reserved scientist had never heard anything in his institute about the cruelties as they took place in the concentration camps, and as we learned of them in this court room. Therefore the thought never occurred to him that ho was deceived in Dachau; as a matter of fact he never doubted that the things he was told by the competent authorities were the absolute truth and therefore there was no cause for him to chock what he had heard as to its accuracy. And then one ought not to disregard the position of Dr. Ruff in his only visit to the Dachau concentration camp in March 1942. He had to be glad that he was allowed inside the camp as a civilian; inside tho camp he was not allowed to move one step of the prescribed way, the guard who accompanied him saw to it that Ruff did not see any more than he was supposed to be shown, end that he could never speak a word with anybody in the camp except with the few experimental subjects.
It would be strange were one to believe that Dr. Ruff could at that time actually could have asked to have a look into the personal files of the prisoners or to ascertain himself about the pardon which was supposed to be given later on. The conduct of the prisoners themselves and the discussions he had with them were actually such that any suspicion in the direction indicated could and actually did not occur to Dr. Ruff.
Therefore in the case of Dr. Ruff one has to remember that experiments on VOLUNTEERS are generally permissible and that the voluntariness is also present and has to have in mind if a PRISONER submits to the experiment. This is obviously also the interpretation of the verdict of the American Military Tribunal II against Field Marshal MILCH of 16 April 1947: MILCH know from the very beginning that experiments were carried out on prisoners in Dachau; in spite of that the Tribunal acquitted him on that count. This would not have been possible if the Tribunal had denied on principle the idea of a prisoner volunteering; because in that case Milch would have had to be sentenced already because he allowed experiments to be carried out on prisoners, but besides that in the verdict against Milch of 16 April 1947 it makes as difference whether a prisoner who allows himself to be used as an experimental subject is a political prisoner or a criminal prisoner or whether the sentence on the prisoner was passed by an Ordinary Court or a political Special Court. It would be incomprehensible now if the Tribunal were to take a different attitude to these questions in the case of Dr. Ruff, than Tribunal No. 2 took in the case of Milch.
Your Honors, in chapter four of my written plea, I have on pages 28 to 46 proven that the high altitude experiments of Ruff and Romberg in Dachau at that time were absolutely necessary for Germany at war. Further that these experiments were not extended on principle beyond the solution of the problems which were presented and considered necessary.
I have further proven that Ruff after the completion of his own experiments, after he received notice of Rascher's experiments, went away from Dachau to Berlin immediately afterwards in order to bring back the chamber.
Finally, that the experiments were prepared scientifically well and were conducted correctly.
In the last chapter of my written plea on pages 48 to 62, I have stated that the experiments of Ruff and Romberg were absolutely not dangerous to life, that they were carried out without any incidents, that in these experiments of Ruff and Romberg there were no pains and damage to health to the experimental subjects and that none had any fears.
All of these statements I cannot develop in detail because of the length of time involved, but I assume that the defense counsel for the other defendants will continue to discuss this matter when their turn comes.
On page 62 of my written plea, I then come to the following conclusions:
Dr. RUFF only did what his superiors ordered him to do. If these thus have failed may they be taken to account.
DR. RUFF had no doubts concerning the orders of his superiors for his assignment was urgently necessitated in the interest of his country, engaged in the most difficult war, and of its aviation; if Dr. RUFF at the time had read the entire international literature about medical experiments on human beings he would have been able to learn that experiments much more exerting and much more dangerous than those with which he was familiar, which he knew and planned, were being conducted all over, and also with prisoners, and perhaps are still being conducted without the competent authorities or medical societies declaring them unpermissible and intervening against them.
In long years, Dr. RUFF has proven to be a particularly conscientious and considerate research man who devoted his entire past activity primarily to save endangered human lives. Neither can he be blamed for having collaborated for a short time with Dr. RASCHER. He (RASCHER) has been assigned to him as associate by his highest superiors; he had to rely upon that; if they ordered him to work together with a man who, LATER on, turned out to be a criminal, no liability can be charged to Dr. RUFF. When Dr. RUFF saw through this colleague, forced upon him, and realized his criminal activities, he immediately cut off all relations to him on his own initiative avoided any further collaboration with him and thus probably prevented much toward further disaster..-----
Your Honors, when at the end of tin trial I consider Dr. Ruff in this way in all these long and hard months when I came to know him, my distinct impression is that this kind scientist with his high type of knowledge and his many years of experience in this special field, that this honest man which we have become acquainted with during these months and in whom we can find no fault, this unselfish and responsible researcher, who only thought of his work and thought of others who were in the most danger of their lives, made it his task to save lives. This man does not belong in prison, he should rather continue his research work in the interests of all people and for the salvation of threatened human lives.
I confess quite frankly, Your Honors, to have the deepest impressions that I take with me from this trial and among those impressions is that Dr. Ruff at the end of his scientific assignment of Dr. Ivy, this American scientist and researcher when he asked him to continue certain experiments in the states and to undertake some research in their common special field and to clarify a certain problem, a problem which has as its one purpose to save threatened human lives. Dr. Ruff has not forgotten his task in life and has a consequence has remained faithful to his work. He does not think of liberty and a future for himself, but merely of his great interest in aviators, whom ho loves to help no matter what nationality. You, as judges, have the opportunity to let Dr. Ruff continue his job. Field marshal Milch was acquitted as far as the Dachau altitude tests are concerned, Medical Inspector Dr, Hippke was not indicted at all. Under these circumstances, justice demands that Dr. Ruff be acquitted.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess for a few moments and when we reconvene will hear arguments on behalf of the defendant Romberg.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: We will hear from counsel for the defendant Romberg.
DR. VORWERK: Mr. President, members of the Tribunal:
When the prosecution demands, in the German transcript page 54 (English 12), that the Court give its verdict in the name of humanity, it thereby demands a verdict in the name of the community of the world, of a pipe dream rather than an idea even close to realization.
When the prosecution, on page 57 of the German transcript (English 14), considers the completion of this trial as necessary for all people, this trial should, in their opinion, contribute to the obligation of the peoples of the world to recognize the standards used at this trial, an obligation, that is, which has so far not been recognized generally as legally binding and does not even actually exist.
The prosecution is of the opinion that the true purpose of this trial goes beyond the mere exacting of vengeance on the few. It also holds my client, the defendant Dr. Romberg, responsible for murders, tortures, and other atrocities which he is said to have committed under the guise of medical science.
If this trial is to derive the punishment of doctors from the moral concepts of the civilized world, it must definitely be stated that moral values themselves never constitute a basis for demanding punishment. Max Scheler, in his works "Formalism in Ethics" and "The Ethics of Material Values", has convincingly proven the correctness of this opinion.
Natural law does not even demand the punishment of a person who makes no use of his natural right to resist laws which violate the moral values of justice, loyalty, reliability, and others.
The punishment of such action is merely a measure of expediency, for otherwise the principle "nulla poena sine lege" would logically be incompatible with natural law itself. This principle demands that the legislator not create a new law and thus make retroactively punishable an immoral action which, at the time of the action, violates no legal standards.
Let me in this connection quote a word of the wise Koenigsberger philosopher Kant: "Nothing but good will is conceivable in this world, or even outside of it, which can be considered good without any reservation. Good will is not only what it effects or achieves. It is not its usefulness in achieving some predetermined purpose, but it is the willingness which is good in itself."
The prosecution charges Romberg with violation, from 1939 to 1945, of the Control Council Law No. 10, which was not promulgated until 20 December 1945. The Control Council Law No. 10 lists criminal acts against international law, determines the responsibility of single individuals, and establishes the competence of this military tribunal.
The question whether the Tribunal is competent as an American military tribunal to pass judgment on offenses committed before the occupation of Germany shall not be considered idle. The fact is that the Tribunal has constituted itself and must make a decision in accordance with Ordinance No. 7, Control Council Law No. 10, the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Executive Order of the President of the United States through which the judges were appointed. We must, however, sharply distinguish the procedural question and the question on which material criminal law is to be applied in arriving at a decision. The proclamation of Ordinance No. 7 shows in itself that even American procedure is not considered applicable without a legislative act of the occupying power.
My written plea or closing brief, which I have submitted and which can be read here only in parts and in its basic arguments because of lack of time, is then followed by a short discussion of Control Council Law No. 10, and especially an answer to the charge of conspiracy. In this connection I refer to the argument presented by the defense in the plenary session of Military Tribunals I, II, III, IV, and V on 9 July 1947.
Also in view of the fact that a decision of this Tribunal has been rendered on 14 July 1947, I do not have to deal with this any further.
In addition, I have considered the preparation, execution, and result of the Ruff-Romberg experiments, to which I want to refer here. But I would also like to make a brief statement about the position of the prosecution expert Professor Ivy in regard to slow-sinking experiments.
The question now arises whether the danger of the slow-sinking experiments emphasized by Professor Ivy really was so great that these slow-sinking experiments, in view of the evident unreliability of the calculations and animal experiments, are to be considered medically not responsible. Where does Professor Ivy see the special danger in these slow-sinking experiments? Professor Ivy considers it possible that in these experiments anoxia lasting for almost ten minutes could cause damage to the brain cells. He also considers it possible that the damage to the brain cells caused by the slow-sinking experiments were not detected because no intelligence tests were given in which a decrease in the learning capacity could have been noted (page 9145 of the German, page 9036 of the English, and pages 9186-9187 of the German, page 9080 of the English minutes).
The following questions are to be clarified in regard to this testimony:
1. Is there any damage to brain cells when anoxia lasts less than ten minutes?
2. When such damage appears under longer anoxia, is it then localized in the cortex cerebri?
3. When the damage is not localized in the cortex cerebri, but in other parts of the brain, how does such damage manifest itself and by what methods can it be detected?
4. Is it possible to conduct an examination of the learning capacity by an intelligence test?
and 5. How great is the degree of probability for such an injury?
Is it so great as to define the execution of similar experiments as being irresponsible?
These questions were answered by Professor Ivy as follows:
To Question No. 1: Professor Ivy answered the question as to whether he knew a case of demonstrable brain injury incurred through temporary anoxia, "No" (page 9308 of the German and 9201 of the English transcript), and then he continues on page 9309 of the German and 9201 of the English transcript: "Two factors have to be taken into consideration here: First the degree of anoxia and then the time. These two factors must be taken into consideration, and as you say in your own report you were dealing with the extreme limits that, in your opinion, were still on the harmless side of the danger line."
To Question No. 2: Dr. Ivy, when asked where, after long lasting anoxia, the brain injuries occurred, affirmed that in most of the cases such injuries appeared in the main ganglia and especially in the area of the corpus striatum, that is, not in the pericranium (page 9309 of the German and 9202 of the English transcript).
To Question No. 3: Dr. Ivy answers and affirms the corresponding question that injuries of this kind generally are connected with disturbances known as parkinsonianism. Disturbances of this kind may also appear later, after 5-10 days, and then even lead to death. In any event, however, these disturbances cannot be ascertained through intelligence tests (page 9310 of the German, page 9202 of the English record).
To Question No. 4: With regard to this point Dr. Ivy stated that he had knowledge of papers on the registration of injuries of brain cells through anoxia by way of testing the learning capacity in animal experiments (page 9307 of the German, page 9200 of the English record). According to the statements of Professor Ivy no experiences in connection with the reduction of the learning capacity of human beings, nor the registration by means of intelligence tests, are available.
To Question No. 5: To Judge Sebring's question (page 9217 of the German, page 9111 of the English transcript), "Is in the Ruff-Romberg report mention made of experiments of which it can be said with absolute certainty that they resulted in deaths, permanent injury, or great pains for the experimental subjects?"
the expert Professor Ivy answered, "No, but you will recall that I said that there was a possibility that the learning capacity of the experimental subject might suffer from the long anoxia of the brain. However, that was not the purpose of the Ruff-Romberg-Rascher experiments."
To the President's question, "Mr. Ivy, is it or is it not your opinion that the experiment of a slow descent from an altitude of 47,500 feet, as executed by the defendants Ruff and Romberg, would probably cause injuries for the experimental subjects?" Professor Ivy gave the following answer: "I said already that possibly the learning capacity might suffer from it, but there is no reason to assume that injuries can be caused." (Page 9437 of the German and page 9325 of the English transcript) This is such a low degree of improbability, also confirmed by this severe expert of the prosecution, that no reproach can be made to a scientist if he conducts such experiments, especially when the experimental subjects were warned with regard to the possible risk connected with the experiment.
The discussion of the final reports on the Ruff-Romberg-Rascher experiments, Document No. 402, Exhibit 66, Document Book II of the prosecution, and the questions whether the Ruff-Romberg experiments were painful or dangerous for the lives of the experimental subjects cannot be dealt with in detail now. In this connection I want to refer to my written closing brief.
With regard to the question of voluntary participation of the experimental subjects in the Ruff-Romberg experiments, I refer to the same brief and to the speech of my colleague Dr. Sauter.
I go on with the question, whether criminals can be used as voluntary subjects. The voluntariness of concentration camp inmates was denied by General Taylor who pointed out the terrible living conditions in the concentration camps. In this connection I want to point out that in 1942 the German people and with them Dr. Romberg did not yet know anything about the terrors in the concentration camps, which later became know to the public. Furthermore the terrible conditions as they prevailed later, especially towards the end of the war were only developing in 1942. The experimental subjects used in the Ruff-Romberg experiments were further German criminals (this point was shown). In other words, these experimental subjects were not prisoners in the sense of the nazi regime, but persons who in any government would have been detained in prisons. The fact, that professional criminals and criminals were transferred to concentration camps is just the point that renders the evidence so difficult. I want to emphasize once more that the fact that the experimental subjects of the Ruff-Romberg experiments were criminal prisoners, who in any event would have been incarcerated and were no victims of the national socialist regime must be taken into consideration.
Besides the fact that the living conditions in a concentration camp in 1942 can not be compared with those prevailing towards the end of the war and as they are know to everybody today, the hardships resulting from these conditions or from any other conditions might be an argument for the voluntariness as well as against it.
If the witness Hielscher was also speaking of the voluntariness under duress and said that the concentration camp inmates seized every opportunity eagerly in order to improve their conditions and if he described this attitude as an objective compulsion, this expression defines more properly the concept of the philosophical freedom of choice that practically never exists in real life.
Even the expert of the Prosecution, Prof. Leibbrand in his partial attitude upheld this point and declared that prisoners could not be considered as volunteers.
There is no doubt that this point of view is obviously wrong, which is proved by the fact that prisoners are considered to be in a position to make commitments that are legally binding. I do not know of any case, in which the legal science failed to recognize such a commitment, because the prisoner in view of his arrest was under duress and therefore was not free to make a decision.
It is up to the state to declare the voluntariness of a prisoner who volunteers for an experiment as sufficient, if the state intends to use prisoners and criminals for experiments. The physician has nothing to do with this question. It is beyond his sphere of influence. He only knows that the rulings recognize that kind of soluntariness and give him the authorization to use these persons as experimental subjects. The physician has the right to be of the opinion that the sentenced criminal has the absolute freedom of choice between both possibilities, either to serve his sentence or to volunteer for an experiment. The prisoner has the same freedom of decision as the patient, who can chose between a dangerous operation, sickness and death. This is particularly the case, if we are concerned with a first experiment on a completely new technique of operation. Never was such a decision considered as being under duress or morally objectionable. The physician is used to this free decision in a situation determined by fate. From his point of view it makes no difference whether he gives a choice to a person who has fallen ill by an accident or by predisposition or to the person who has become a criminal by accident or by predisposition. For a doctor and a scientist voluntariness must be sufficient. The supreme principle in this field could be for the scientist: An experiment is unobjectionable, if the experimental sub jects gives his consent, provided that the doctor, when conducting the experiment takes all the necessary precautions.
The problem is made more difficult by the fact that no legislation about experiments on human beings exists and still, experimentation with human beings is an indispensable prerequisite for the further development of medicine, which will be treated in the chapter on the Necessity of Experimentation on Human Beings. Everywhere in this field, certain rules have taken shape which can be considered as the law of common usage and which are quite generally and through silent acknowledgement accepted and recognized in the entire world.
In the course of these proceedings, valuable material has been collected by the defense which demonstrates the law of common usage in cases from the absolutely harmless to the fatal experiment. Without a doubt, this evidence would be suitable to codification of medical law of common usage in regard to experimentation with human beings and to direct legal development in this regard into safe channels. We do not want to examine here whether this would be possible within the framework of an international body such as the Red Cross. Perhaps, in this way, a problem of the future could be solved, a problem whose immensity and tragic nature is clearly seen in the question put to each one of the defendants by the expert of the prosecution, Prof. Dr. Alexander:
"Do you think it permissible to kill 5 people, if, by so doing, you can save the lives of 5,000 people?"
I refer to Dr. Sauter's statements and wish to skip the next 2 pages of the excerpts. And I continue on page 10.
For the supplying of prisoners as experimental subjects, without doubt the state has to assume the responsibility. As far as this matter is concerned the oath of Hippocrates can certainly not be applied to the physician. There were states which at least at times did not prohibit abortion. In almost all countries the interruption of pre pregnancies is permitted if the health of the mother is at stake, an exception which Hippocrates did not know.
The physician's duty to preserve secrecy, one of the most noble fundamental principles of the medical profession, must be broken by the state if a public interest demands it, e.g., in the fight against contageous diseases, in the system of public insurance, or in the discovery and solution of a crime.
Here belong also the obligation on the part of the person carrying social security to undergo an operation, the sterilization laws, and many others. Apparently the legislator feels no qualms in such cases, because his laws bring the doctor into conflict.
For the doctor war must be the greatest madness of all. While he is fighting with all means of his art to save the life of a sick person, the lives of thousands in the flower of health are destroyed or forever injured. So far as he is able, a doctor most patch up again those who are injured, not so that they can now live in peace, but so that they can return to the front. The doctor does this, though it must run counter to the very meaning of his profession. He grasps the necessity, because the State has ordered him. I bring this forth to show that the State, from various points of view, influences medical ethics. It is evident, that, if the State orders the doctor to do something that is contrary to his ethics, the State must undertake the responsibility for this. If therefore, the State makes experimental subjects available for medical experiments, it bears the responsibility for this fact, which, however, does not relieve the doctor from the duty of carrying out the experiments to the best of his medical ability and with the greatest of care.
Only to this extent is the scientist personally responsible.
There follow now proofs that the experimental subjects used in the Ruff-Romberg experiments were exclusively German criminals.
Now I should like to turn to the question whether the Ruff Romberg experiments in rescue from high altitudes were necessary.
It would appear necessary briefly to scrutinize the problem of human experiments as such.
The development of medical science would have been inconceivable in the history of mankind without the medical experiments. If one reflects that our entire medical knowledge and practice represents the sum total of the experiences that have been collected by natural scientists, healers, and doctors in the course of millenia in an unbroken series of human experiments, from the most harmless to the almost certainly fatal, only then can one calculate the great implications of the problem that confronts this high Tribunal, particularly as regards the effects of its judgment on the future.
The highly developed and difficult technique of modem operations has been acquired by the emperic method, the human experiment. The same is true of our knowledge of the means of combatting the great afflictions of mankind or our knowledge of the maximum doses of a medicine that is also a poison. Human experiments were as necessary for the testing of the remedies provided by the chemical industry, such as salvarsan and penicillen, as they were for the testing of modern physical methods, shortwave, x-ray, and radium therapy.
No one is able even to approximate the number of human experiments or the number of sacrifices that paved the way for medical science to its present pre-eminence. The great afflictions, formerly the scourge of humanity, which annihilated whole populations, have been conquered: the black death, the plague, leprosyx have been all but exterminated. Other great diseases still take their numerous victims. The struggle against cancer, tuberculosis, malaria, and many other diseases is still going on.
In this struggle the method of human experimentation for which deductive thinking provides no sufficiently secure basis, has in modem times come even more prominently to the fore. And indeed, there is no other way. Animal experiments, calculations, deductions by analogy can only help and supplement.
The crucial experiment must be conducted on man. The euphemism "therapy" can not conceal the fact that these are in reality experiments. Witnesses like Professor Leibbrand simply ignored these obvious facts. If every doctor had adhered so strictly to dogma, to the oath of Hippocrates, as Professor Leibbrand asserts he has, then medical science would still be in its Stone Age.
A doctor who stubbornly maintains this point of view and repudiates on ethical grounds any experiment on human beings does not thus solve this problem; he simply puts it on another man's shoulders. Such a doctor is a sort of conscientious objector in medicine, who does as little to solve the problem of human experimentation as the conscientious objector does to banish war from the world. Others, again, have purely personal motives. They do not feel themselves to be robust enough, or for other reasons wish to have nothing to do with such experiments - a clever and convenient way out, which, however, does not do justice to the scientist's obligation to the common weal.
Fortunately for mankind, however, there have been doctors at all times who have seen not only their duty toward the individual but also their duty toward humanity. Have all physicians who have carried out such experiments violated the oath of Hippocrates? Are all the great and famous scientists -- Pasteur, Ehrlich, Reed, Grossi, Strong, Calmette -- criminals; are they at least doctors who have violated the Oath of Hippocrates, this Oatn that the prosecution has placed in the foreground as the moral law guiding this proceedings and that public opinion has consistently used for the moral defamation of all the defendants here?
It remained for Professor Ivy, the prosecution's star witness, shortly before tho conclusion of this trial, in evaluating human experiments throughout the world and in according recognition to their ethical value to testify here on the stand that, to be sure, the Oath of Hippocrates had its validity, but was to be applied in its narrowest meaning only to the doctor at the sick bed. Moreover, Moll, in his book on medical ethics that Professor Leibbrand so often quoted, writes the same thing.
Since it is not possible to collect all the necessary data in experiments at the sick bed, in the course of history doctors have carried out experiments in which the pathological condition to be investigated is artificially induced; in part, to ascertain the degree of contagiousness during quarantine; in part, to investigate the pathological conditions in question without the interference of incidental symptoms; in part, to test the development and prophylactic effects of vaccines; and, finally, also in order to investigate pathological conditions in man that under normal circumstances should not appear or cannot be investigated; and here belong, for example, the states of hunger and thirst, the state of being very cold, the effects of great altitudes or great velocities, particularly the effects of acceleration and deceleration, and many other abnormal conditions that are brought about by changes in the normal conditions of life.
Such experiments were, in part, carried out on patients who, without their knowledge or on the assurance that a now method of therapy was being applied, were infected with additional diseases, or on whom new therapeutic methods were tested. These suffering from cancer have been particularly burdened with this, as can be soon from the history of cancer research.
In addition, there were and are doctors who did not turn to the sick bed for their experiments, but who carried out their experiments oh volunteer prisoners, soldiers, and free civilians, who were told what was at issue and who then either, for reward or idealism, made themselves available for experiments. Such a doctor was not bound by the Oath of Hippocrates, which prescribes for the patient, the victim, primum nil nocere; he was doing his duty as doctor and scientist, who is not fighting the battle against desease in the individual patient, but is called upon and obliged to take up the battle against disease as such, and thus is serving humanity as a whole.
It cannot be disputed that these experiments caused sacrifices, sacrifices of people who gave their lives for the peace and welfare of humanity, sacrifices that were endured in order to make the "thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to", as Hamlet puts it, more tolerable.
I believe that I am not exceeding the limit which is at stake here if I ask the question: Were not all the real or ostensible advances of mankind, of which our age is so proud, bought at the expense of a vast number of sacrifices? I draw your attention to the history of the great discoveries, of seafaring and flying; I draw your attention further to the accomplishments of techniques, the invention of the automobile and Railroad construction, mining, electricity, etc. The history of each such development is a list of victims, and everyone knows that.
So much of the necessity of human experiments per se, which must be basically recognized, a development is not to be broken off suddenly, or the methods of modem science are not suddenly to change from the ground up.
Whether certain rules are to be observed in the execution of human experiments, and if so which rules, will be discussed later. At this point I am interested in the fundamental assertion that experiments on human beings must be permitted because the struggle against human nature forces us to adopt this attitude.
If, in the future, all experimentation on human beings is prohibited, not the doctor, not medical ethics, but only humanity would have to suffer.
Military Tribunal II in its judgment of 16 April 1947 against Erhard Milch took the same attitude by finding the Defendant Milch not guilty on this count of his indictment, although Milch know that experiments on human beings, the same experiments with which my client is charged, were carried out for the Luftwaffe. Of course, not every experiment on a human being is necessary. But tho question of whether such an experiment is necessary can be answered only in the individual case.
In the following, then, the necessity of experiments for "rescue from high altitude" is proved in detail. I refer to tho written plea or closing brief which I have handed in. In conclusion I should like to say the following on this chapter:
According to the evidence presented, the result must be stated to be that the Dachau experiments of Dr. Ruff and Dr. Romberg were absolutely necessary experiments.
The necessity of the Ruff/Romberg experiments was not denied by the Prosecution expert Prof. Ivy, who admitted that the same or similar experiments were and are being carried out in the American air force.
The latter fact can be seen from the fact that the Defendant Dr. Ruff, until his arrest, worked for tho American air force on the same questions on which he had worked for the DVL. It also results from the fact that almost all leading German aviation medicine experts are at present working in the USA, with the exception of Drs. Ruff, Romberg and Becker-Freysong, who are under indictment here. Since the USA is at the present time not at war, and since it cannot be assumed that that country is arming itself for another war, we must assume that the necessity of such experiments is not a temporary one, but is absolute, that is, applied to the Ruff/Romberg experiments, that the execution of the experiments for "rescue from high altitudes" was not only necessary because of the fact that Germany was at war, but the solution of this problem was of extreme importance for the further development of aviation in general.
Prof. Ivy, propounded three general principles for experimentation on human beings. These principles, as he testifies on the following page, he submitted, as a representative of the delegates' committee of the American Medical Association to this committee in December 1946, whereupon the committee took the following stand in this matter: I quote:
"The committee finds that the experiments which are described in Dr. Ivy's report correspond to the principles of medical ethics of the American Medical Association. These principles consist of three fundamental demands:
1) There must be voluntary consent of the experimental subjects on whom the experiments are to be carried out.
2) The degree of danger inherent in each experiment must first be established by animal experimentation.
3) The experiment must be carried out under responsible medical supervision in an orderly manner.
I should like to state that, after a study of the above evidence and from a knowledge of medical literature, it is obvious that experiments have been carried out which do not conform to these principles.
But even in applying these rules, which were propounded in 1946, it is certain that the Ruff-Romberg experiments, as described above, are quite within the framework of those three rules and have in no way violated medical ethics.
Conclusion: in the closing brief the Rascher experiments are discussed, which have been contrasted to the Ruff/Romberg experiments. It has been proved that Romberg did not take any active part in these experiments and that he personally opposed the Rascher experiments.
Not only is it completely out of the question that Romberg took any active part in the Rascher experiments, but in this case he cannot even be charged with an omission.