This declining attitude is furthermore shown in his behaviour after his single visit to Buchenwald and after Dr. DING's report on the third Deliberate Meeting in May 1943.
According to the foregoing independent or accessory action of the defendant ROSE as regards the typhus experiments in Buchenwald is to be eliminated.
He remains to be examined as an abettor or aiding person.
First of all, as far as abetment is concerned, in my opinion the influence upon the will of the perpetrator, e.g. in form of a desire or a suggestion or a request, can be considered as such. However, if the perpetrator has decided positively already to commit a certain deed, it is no longer possible to influence his will in this way and thereby it is impossible to induce the perpetrator to commit the crime.
As to the pre-meditated intention of the abettor, it is required that he also actually premeditated all essential characteristic features of the punishable action.
In case the crime committed does not conform to the one which the better pre-meditated, the abettor dolus is lacking.
For the case of the defendant ROSE it ensues in this instance that he did not commit a deliberate and punishable abetment through his letter to MRUGOWSKY of 2 December 1943. For at that time in Buchenwald the experiment series for testing of typhus vaccines had been in operation since almost two years, and all persons: concerned with the planning and execution of these experiments were firmly decided, prior to the time when the letter had been mailed, to conduct the experiment series in the way planned by them, and, it is true, with the intention to test all typhus vaccines on hand as to their protective effect which had not yet been adequately tested. Furthermore, the defendant ROSE could not know that the persons used for these experiment's were not exclusively criminals who had been legally sentenced to death and who had reported voluntarily. I shall explain this in detail in another passage.
If this eliminates a participation of the defendant ROSE by abetting, it remains to be examined whether he knowingly aided in the execution of the typhus experiments in Buchenwald by mailing his letter of 2 December 1943.
There is no doubt that, it is true such assistance can be rendered by psychical means, e.g. by giving an advice. But for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the existence of the state of affairs of punishable assistance it is necessary that the assistant in some way psychologically influence the perpetrator in the sense of inducing the perpetrator to commit the crime, in which instance it may suffice if thereby the last checks and objections are eliminated. But this result is the minimum which is to he demanded of the psychical influence of the assistant, to be able to speak of assistance in the criminal sense.
Beyond that the deliberate rendering of assistance must be in connection with the concrete deed which was committed. If the perpetrator actually commits another deed than that pre-meditated by the aiding person, the way of acting of the aiding person is not punishable.
As I have already explained in detail when examining the question of abetment, that the typhus experiment series in Buchenwald had been in operation for a long time and the persons concerned with the execution of these experiments had been firmly decided to conduct same until such a time as the result at which they were aiming had been achieved. So, the letter of the defendant ROSE was not fit in any way to have a psychologically influencing result.
Moreover, it showed pre-mediation as to a deed other than the one actually committed, namely the execution of medical experiments on human beings by utilizing criminals legally sentenced to death, who had reported voluntarily. Thus, when mailing his letter to MRUGOWSKY he did not do so under full realization of the unlawfulness of these experiments on human beings. He is hot guilty of a subjective guilt and there fore he is not guilty of punishable assistance.
Thus, on the basis of the legal detailed explanations just made, I come to the conclusion that the defendant ROSE has participated in the execution of the typhus experiments in the Buchenwald concentration camp neither as perpetrator, nor as abettor, nor as assistant. Furthermore, that he did not participate in the planning of same and that he did not even approve of their execution through the SS, of which he was not even a member.
So the pre-requisites as listed under Article II, par. 2 of the Control Council Law No. 10 are lacking, which should be existing if the defendant ROSE were to be considered as guilty.
In the case that the Tribunal is not going to share my legal concep tion which I explained just now, and should answer the question of participating of the defendant ROSE in the typhus experiments in the Buchenwald Concentration Camp in a criminally relevant form in the affirmative, it is furthermore to be examined whether the defendant ROSE has reasons on his part which eliminate the culpability of his actions or guilt, or both.
One must arrive at this result if one considers it to be proved that the defendant ROSE acted in a emergency.
Such an emergency exists if there remains no other way than committing an action which constitutes the seemingly state of affairs of a criminal action for the purpose of protecting a legal value, or to fulfill a duty imposed or acknowledged by the Law.
In all civilized states the internal legislation and jurisdiction deal with the solution of problems of the criminal law which arise from cases of such emergency.
In my closing brief, I will give a brief comparative application of International Domestic or Emergency Law, together with assumptions or details, in order to be able to affirm such an emergency. I come to the following results:
The principle of recognizing an emergency within the limits drawn here as a reason for exculpation, which exempts the person acting in a state of necessity from punishment, consequently is so firmly anchored in the legal consciousness of our time that it must be accepted as a generally recognized legal principle of the civilized Nations. As such it can claim to be recognized in this trial too.
But there is yet a second reason for this. Recognized International Law accepts the legal concept of "self preservation". Theory and practice agree that the infringement of laws and prohibitions of International Law are admissable when such infringement is emergency to every actual urgent danger which threatens the essential values of life and no other way is available to remove this danger.
Substantially this is nothing else but the emergency concept of the domestic law, except that the prerequisites for the existence of the right of self preservation according to International Law are somewhat more lenient than those required for a state of emergency according to Domestic law.
The cases usually quoted in this connection in literary works refer almost without exception to violations of the rights of territorial sovereignty of another state for the purpose of warding off some evil to one's own sphere of legal values. Never has it been asserted, however, that the case of the rights of self-preservation was restricted to such cases. There is moreover no intrinsic reason whatsoever, why this right should not be asserted also in the case of some dangerous epidemic.
In this respect the right for self preservation seems even more justified, since the squashing of the typhus epidemic in the further course of the last war was not only in the interests of Germany but also of Germany's enemies, their civilian populations, their armies and especially their prisoners of war in German captivity to whom the epidemic had already spread and might easily have spread further, thus afflicting the whole world. Therefore the objection - which by the way is rejected also by the expert witness for the Prosecution, Professor IVY, that the necessity of war does not justify a violation of rights cannot be raised here. Because after all, fighting this typhus epidemic was not a war operation in the interests of Germany only, but it was directed to check a danger for the whole world which had arisen during the war.
The leading manual of International Law by Oppenheim expressly confirms that the right of self-preservation is admissible also for the elimination of states of emergency caused by forces of nature.
It will have to be examined whether in the case of defendant ROSE all of these prerequisites are present in order to have to affirm a state of emergency.
I have already pointed out before that during the second half of the year 1943 an actual danger to the life and health of millions of people in Germany and the Eastern territories under German occupation did exist due to typhus.
This fact is absolutely indisputable and has already been accepted by the Tribunal, when the President, on the occasion of the hearing of Witness HAAGEN at the session of 18 June 1947 declared:
"The Tribunal is quite aware that typhus is a very serious and dangerous disease and constitutes a great menace to humanity and that it was a very great danger and menace to Germany during the last war. We have repeatedly heard about that and it's not denied."
Hundreds of thousands have already succumbed to this disease during the last war up to the year 1943 as can be seen simply from document NI-5222 - Rose Exhibit 56 already mentioned by me. As the history of typhus with which defendant ROSE was already familiar of course at that time shows and as he further knew from his own experience from his activity in combating typhus in Eastern Asia, there existed at that time the danger of a catastrophe of undreamt of magnitude.
It was moreover certain that the danger could not be stemmed by delousing. Vaccinating all endangered persons also was not possible to the extent which would have been necessary, as the vaccine of Weigl which was known to be effective could not possibly be produced in the required quantity. As regards the other known vaccines the necessary experience concerning their effectiveness was lacking, to undertake the responsibility of their production on a large scale and to use them.
To await the epidemiological evaluation of these vaccines was not feasible. It would have taken years and claimed untold sacrifices of human life. A conclusive clarification of the problem, alone in the experiments with animals, is not possible for scientific reasons. The competent scientists did not agree at all on the effectiveness of the various vaccines. For the authorities responsible for the checking of this danger, there remained nothing else to do therefore in order to clarify all doubtful questions with the least possible delay, but to give orders for these vaccines to be tried out on human beings.
The carrying out of these experiments on human beings consequently was a necessity caused by the typhus catastrophe which was spreading as witness IVY also has recognized necessities conditioned by the war.
It had become impossible to find volunteers for this experiment.
Incidentally it might perhaps not at all have been justifiable from a moral as well as from an ethical viewpoint to use volunteers for this life endangering experiment. For the German Penal Code contains in its Art. 216 the following stipulation:
"If somebody has been prevailed upon to kill by the express and serious demand of the killed a sentence of imprisonment of not less than three years is to be pronounced.
The attempt is punishable."
Since "express and serious demand" is a much narrower definition than a mere consent, it follows quite clearly that according to the German material criminal law the killing of a person even with his consent is not exempt from punishment. According to this it would be quite impossible in Germany to carry out a life endangering medical experiment on a human being at all, except if the state makes available the person on whom the experiment is to be carried out, for instance in the form of a criminal sentenced to death, and thereby assumes the responsibility protecting the experimenter from criminal proceedings as the state also does in the case of its soldiers who during the war must kill intentionally in action.
Thus also in the present case 43 persons in protective custody and professional criminals were made available by the Reich Criminal Police Office in Berlin for the carrying out of this experiment, 30 of whom were selected and used for the testing of the Copenhagen vaccine.
Taking into consideration the average death-rate with typhus, there could be counted on the deaths of a few persons in the course of this experiment in the worst case, whereas on the other hand the lives of tens of thousands were saved, and that quite independently of whether the Copenhagen vaccine stood the test or not.
For if it had proved good, it would without doubt have been produced and injected in large quantities. If, contrary to the expectations that had been nourished with regard to this vaccine after the animal experiments, it did not prove good - as it then actually was the case - then its production and injection without a sufficient protective effect was prevented and therefore likewise the lives of unnumerable persons were saved. Thus, there can be no doubt it that - already with regard to numbers - no inappropriate means was used for the averting of an imminent loss and that the loss to be expected due to the experiment was by no means greater than the imminent loss.
The defendant ROSE could not be expected to watch inactively how the catastrophe was completed. In this connection there must be taken into consideration that he, in his capacity of hygienist in an exposed position, was under the obligation to do everything in order to help avert the imminent danger known to him. This obligation to help hundreds of thousands of persons threatened by typhus was on the other hand faced by the obligation always to act according to the ethical principles of the medical profession. There can be no doubt at all that the defendant ROSE has suffered extremely under the conflict of these obligations and has seriously and carefully weighed these two obligations. This is guaranteed by his personality described to us by different parties in the homeland and abroad. If he decided in favor of the former then he regarded it at that time to be his primary duty. Not the least reason for his making this decision was that he had spent the greatest and most decisive part of his career as a research scientist not in Germany but abroad. Thus he knew that also abroad life-endangering medical experiments have been carried out in numerous cases on volunteers with whose genuine voluntary status may be regarded as highly doubtful and on criminals sentenced to death.
For in this connection I wish to stress emphatically - and that relates to the subjective part of this case - that the defendant ROSE at that time proceeded from, could and had to proceed from the belief that with the Buchenwald typhus experiments exclusively criminals were used who had been sentenced to death and who had volunteered.
In my closing brief I explained in detail why the defendant had to hold such opinions and I come to the conclusion that a punishment of the defendant ROSE is out of the question, not merely because of a lack of participation in the experiments on human beings in a form relevant to penal law but also because he acted in a state of emergency.
Your Honors, the two Prosecution experts, Professor IVY and Professor LEIBRAND, both have testified that medical experiments on living human beings may only be carried out in accordance with the principles of medical ethics only on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless we have learned from numerous witnesses and documentary evidence, that this principle has not always been observed in the various epochs of medical research. This may have to do with the fact that no formal regulation by law has been found for this subject in most countries including Germany.
In Germany the highest government authorities held the opinion during the last war, that in times of war, which demands from every citizen the sacrifice of his life, the criminal may be forced to submit in the interest of the state to a medical experiment dangerous to life, since by the fact of his imprisonment the criminal is protected against the dangers of war to a large extent. The defendant ROSE unfortunately could not exert influences this attitude. As far as has become known during these proceedings, my client is one of the few physicians, who fought this opinion during the Nazi dictatorship. Not only did he protest against this attitude toward his superiors, but he even repeatedly demanded in large circles before numerous listeners in sharp manner, that these human experiments for the testing of vaccines should be discontinued. May I remind you in this regard that Professor HORING told his friends that he could not understand at all, why professor ROSE should be indicted.
For it was ROSE, the only one, from whom he himself knew through personal experience that he had had the courage to oppose publicly the human experiments during the reign of HIMMLER. ROSE was the one who then maintained the good old traditions of German physicians.
Not only the Chinese Minister of education CHU CHIA-hua spoke for Professor ROSE and described him as an honorable man, but from the most various countries statements of research workers and other personalities of public life, were sent to me during this trial only the smallest part of which hag been included in my document books. All these letters show that it would cause the deepest concern if this eminent scientist should be sentenced in this trial as a belated victim of the Nazis.
Would it not be tragic beyond comparison, if this very man should be sentenced by you for just that against which he fought?
THE PRESIDENT: The afternoon session of the Tribunal will hear from counsel for the defendants, Ruff, Romberg and Becker-Freyseng.
DR. WILLE: (Counsel for defendant Weltz.) Mr. President, I would like to tell you that I just went to the translating department to find out about things. It was considered that the order would be followed that the case of Rose would come after the cases of Romberg and Weltz. Now, this business about the translation is the following: the cases which have been translated are Romberg, but not Ruff and Weltz, but there are some other cases which have not been translated. It is also doubtful if the translation can be completed today or even tomorrow. I may perhaps tell the Tribunal the following cases are ready: Romberg, Pokorny, Beiglbock and Schaefer. These cases are at your disposal, but the case of Romberg ha.s not been translated nor have the cases of Schaefer, Brock, Hoven, Becker-Freyseng, Nuff and Weltz. These translations will be forthcoming later, but the Tribunal might decide about the order of the cases.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, counsel, what arguments did you state have been fully translated so the Tribunal might have them?
DR. WILLE: Those ready are Romberg, Pokorny, Beiglbock and Schaefer.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had been advised that none of those translations were ready. If those translations are ready so the Tribunal may have them on the bench, then this afternoon we will proceed to hear counsel for Pokorny, Beiglbock and Schaefer. I presume that arguments on behalf of Ruff and Romberg should be presented in sequence if possible. If there is further time available this afternoon, then we will proceed with some other arguments. The translators have all the translations even if they are not ready for the Tribunal. This afternoon we will proceed, if the translations are available, with the arguments for the defendants Beiglbock and then Pokorny.
THE INTERPRETER: This is the interpreter. The translation of the Beiglbock plea is not yet completed, perhaps it would be best to put that at the end.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will proceed then with the arguments for Schaefer, Pokorny and Beiglbock if these translations are ready.
The Tribunal will now be in recess until 1:30 o'clock.
(a recess was taken until 1330 Hours.)
Afternoon Session.
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear from counsel for the defendant Schaefer.
DR. PELCKMANN: (Counsel for the defendant Schaefer) Mr. President, Your Honors: I need not deal with the questions why the general, political and organizational back-ground as alleged by the prosecution does not apply to Schaefer. I need not do this as, for legal reasons, the legal term conspiracy is not applicable in the Trials before Military Tribunals in Nurnberg.
In the question which concerns us solely, namely whether Schaefer has been guilty of a crime against humanity as listed under Control Council Law 10, we must take into consideration the principle of all civilized nations quoted repeatedly in the verdict of the I.M.T. Guilt under criminal law is a personal one. Therefore no punishment without guilt.
In view of the vagueness of the definitions of participation listed under Art. II, 2 a legal bridge can only be established through a very strict subjective commission of an act, by a very strict examination of the whole of the evidence as to whether and why the defendant can be found guilty, and whether and why a charge can be raised against him from a given situation taking into consideration all circumstances which have had influence on his psychology, his acts and commissions. Finally, the question has to be investigated whether - provided the defendant has conducted himself in the manner he is now expected to - other consequences would have resulted, i.e. the actual event could have been prevented.
What do we find? if we examine such facts as are applicable here?
Schaefer, called up as a soldier in 1941 and promoted to Unterarzt, i.e. not an officer, was given the order of dealing with problems connected with Sea-Distress and in particular with the problem of thirst.
It was with great pleasure that he carried out that order because he knew that to solve that problem would once and for all finish the tortures suffered by all shipwrecked people all over the world.
He settled down to his work with that scientific thoroughness for which I have offered detailed proof. By reading the entire literature for months it became possible for him, at the orders of the Chief of the Medical Inspectorate to hold a lecture on thirst and the fight against thirst in Sea-Distress at the Nurnberg Conference of 1942. The lecture was a purely academic one and not a report on experiments on human beings. The prosecution, it is true, alleged on 12 December 1946 the opposite, but the complete document #401, Pro. Exh. 93, proves that this allegation is wrong. (re: Schaefer Exh. #17). I should like to mention here that no proof has been furnished for the fact that Schaefer has heard, or heard about Holzloehner's and Rascher's lectures at that meeting.
In dealing further with the sea-water problem, Schaefer made Investigations, which had already been made by I.G. Farben. Through scientific collaboration with that firm a method was finally found which made sea-water drinkable without any injury to health. Many chemical and pharmacological investigations and experiments lead to this result. There was no need for experiments on human beings, because on the basis of all known scientific methods of research, Schaefer realized that this method was entirely innocuous.
The method was called "Wofatit SW", "I.G. Method" or "Schaefer Method".
In principle and its composition it is, with a very few small deviations the same method as invented by the American Dr. Ivy and used by the U.S. Forces. This was confirmed by Dr. Ivy as a witness.
The Schaefer-Method was completely finished by the end of 1943 and the Inspector of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe, Schaefer's highest superior wanted to introduce it in the Luftwaffe.
The Technical Office, another branch of the Luftwaffe opposed the introduction, giving as a reason that there was not sufficient silver available to produce the method.
The important men in the technical Office, Oberstingenieur Christensens and Stabsingenieur Schickler insisted on the introduction of a method invented by Berka. This consisted of food-sugar which removed or lessened the salty taste of sea-water, but made no change in the salt-contents.
I have proved how Schaefer, since the beginning of this plan fought against the "Berka-Method" as a piece of sharlatanism.
He wrote a damning report on the results of experiments carried out by Oberstarzt von Sirany on behalf of the Technical Office on voluntary patients of a Luftwaffe hospital with the "BERKA-METHOD". Schaefer had been ordered to carry out this examination by his superior officers in the Medical Inspectorate.
The result of Schaefer's attitude was that the Technical Office and officers of the Luftwaffe suspected him of being saboteur.
SCHAEFER realized what that accusation meant in the third Reich and the fifth year of the war.
He knew of cases where Medical Experts were persecuted by the R.S.H.A. (i.e. the Gestapo) merely for deviating scientific opinions in important military matters.
Nevertheless he explained his opinion that the "BerkaMethod" was pointless in the conferences of 19 and 20 May, when the suggestion was made to test that method on concentration camp inmates. As an extreme warning he explained that the Berka-Method would lead to death on the 12th day at the latest. This has been proved by prosecution document #177, Exh. #133 and Schaefer Document, Exh. #19.
That was all he could do in his position as noncommissioned officer, as the smallest among the resplendent uniforms of the 13 higher officers.
Schaefer does not make a decision in that conference. That is not done in military circles. The highest office chiefs order and command. The defendant Schaefer does not receive the order to make experiments on concentration camp inmates. He is not even being sent to joint the commission investigating the conditions of the experiments, because he is well known as an opponent of the whole affair.
Another chance to prevent these completely senseless experiments, as Schaefer saw it, on human beings with the "BurkaMethod", be it in concentration camps, be it in Luftwaffe hospitals, passes by. On 25 May 1944 the world famous Prof. Eppinger of Vienna stated that Burka's idea, regarded as utterly absured by Schaefer namely that his (Burka's) method, would dr-ive sea-water through the body without any harm, was not entirely wrong. Three other professors, famous medical experts, concurred in Schaefer's opinion. This is proved by Schaefer documents Exh. 19, 35, 36.
This lost Schaefer another medical reason openly to oppose the carrying out of these experiments.
No law in the world can demand that Schaefer should have done more than he has done, if one takes into consideration the situation in Hitler Germany and Schaefer's particular position, and his rank in a correct and understanding manner.
Never was there in the conferences mentioned in the prosecution documents a word said or an order issued that the Schaefer method was to be tested on concentration camp inmates. Only for that would Schaefer have been responsible. In view of the excellence of his method he would not have shied clear off that medical responsibility although he would not have approved of using concentration camp inmates.
The experiments with the "Burka Method" for which he was not responsible were carried out without his help and his knowledge. It is therefore not incriminating for him that he listened to the lecture of Prof. Beiglboeck which completely revealed the uselessness of the BurkaMethod.
I make the motion therefore to acquit defendant Schaefer and release him from custody.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear from counsel for the defendant Beigelboeck.
I would ask that some German counsel kindly notify Dr. Sauter that his argument on behalf of the defendant Ruff will be called following the argument submitted by Dr. Steinbauer.
DR. PELCKMANN: May I add something else, Mr. President, my colleague Gawlik has asked me to report to the High Tribunal that the time which has not been used up by my plea, he would like to use up himself.
THE PRESIDENT: That is probably true, but the Tribunal does not extend the time saved by one counsel to any other particular counsel.
DR. STEINBAUER: For the defendant, Beigelboeck:
Mr. President Your Honors Paragraph 5 of the Law for the Protection of Animals of 24 November 1933, Reich Legal Gazette I 987 prohibited interference with or treatment of living animals for purpose of experiments which are connected with considerable pain or damage to them, for the territory of the German Reich in it's entirety.
While thus protecting horses and dogs, cats and rabbits, for reasons of humanity one did not shrink at the same time and at the same place from doing such things on human beings. According to the indictment, human beings were cruelly murdered by the tens of thousands in the extermination camps, and all this was diabolically done in the name and under the cloak of science or misusing a method connected with science. And there was the aggravating circumstance that most of the victims were defenseless people whom political fanaticism or the war had led into the hands of their torturers.
It is therefore not to be wondered at that all these cruelties which in addition have been exploited by propaganda in some countries produced new ways of contempt and indignation and fanned the thoughts of hate and vengeance smouldering below the coals to bright flames!
Under such circumstances it is made very difficult for the judge, who is only human, after all, to arrive at a just judgment. That is where the defense must come in, and where it will be their high moral duty to contribute their share to scrutinize with dispassionate objectivity the subject of this trial, which is so rich in horrors, and to arrest the glance of the eye for the guilt and for the responsibility of each one of the 23 defendants. The external circumstances alone entail the great danger that the deep shadows which seem to fall on the one or the other of the defendants will equally darken the whole lot of them.
The Chief of Counsel, however, said in his opening speech: "We cannot be content with proving that these crimes have been committed and that certain people committed them. Our deep responsibility towards all peoples of the earth is to show why and how these things occurred." As a defense counsel, I profoundly agree with the Chief of Counsel. This trial, with its toil and labor, must not be confined to the mere purpose of punishment, it must also contribute to making such crimes impossible forever and everywhere by exposing their causes and connections. The Chief of Counsel, however, sees the cause in National Socialism alone, the criminally demented error which has wormed its way into every sphere of German life, and the consequences of which were devastating. Though it is correct that National Socialism magnified certain pathologic degenerations of our Western form of society up to paraxism, it is not the only cause and the evil springs from much deeper sources.
To expose them all would go far beyond the frame of this trial. we have to be content with drawing a sketch of the situation. We all feel we are treading on swaying ground and are in the midst of a serious crisis of our order of society. Its causes are twofold: spiritual-moral and social economic which overlap, supplement and connect one another. The heirloom of our forebears seems to be used up: scepticism steps into the place of faith, nihilism enters the place of reverence, a certain spiritual vacuum is seemingly bridged by activism, but everything becomes relative and the denial of all metaphysics is called positivism. Man is only a conglomeration of bones, nerves and muscles, and entirely relinquishes his place as a soul-endowed individual. He marries according to selective breeding, he nourishes himself with vitamins and calories, his sensual life is hormone content, and his ethics is psychoanalyzed. The masses with their lack of judgment and their intrusion step into his place and show their preference for the super-dimensional. Everything becomes unique and great! The economic consequences are proletarianization and mechanization. But human dignity and real freedom step into the background. Technique celebrates triumphs, but therein lies the danger.
And science? It also celebrates triumphs. Natural science has reached undreamt of heights. Man tears asunder the veils of nature, penetrates into the stratosphere, smashes the atoms, creates nitrogen out of the air and uses it to fertilize the soil, and synthetically produces fuel, gold, and jewels. Aye, the science of our time has become void of poesie and void of soul.
It has offered but little resistance to its subjection to politics, and the Austrian Wilhelm Roepke, who lectures at the University of Geneva, is justified to quote from Rabelais in his book "The Social Crisis of our Time.":"Une science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'ame.'
The German people, after so many years of suffering and a long way of the end of its trials, refutes the cruelties as set forth in the indictment and speaks with Montaigne: Je hais cruellement la cruaute! "I cruelly hate cruelty!" Therefore it would understand if the mouth of the victors would pronounce a severe judgment also in this trial, but it demands that the millennium-old commandments of the Decalogue should also elsewhere be valued more highly than the biologism of our present day. For, while talking of peace, the scientists of the world are mobilized to create newer and more effective weapons, millions of Germans expelled from their native soil err hither and thither, hungry and cold, whilst woman and children who were frozen to death were carried out of the unheated refugee trains from the East, and millions of prisoners of war suffer a fate which is one single outcry of violated human dignity.--
All this had certainly to be contributed to the question put by the Chief of Counsel.
Before I go into the details of the charges against my client Dr. Beigelboeck, I would like to talk shortly about two problems which seem to me important for the judgment.
1) The legal basis of the indictment, and
2) the question of the medical-ethical basis of this trial, or, in short, the relationship : Physician and research-worker.