3) Finally, there must not be "any different way" in which national emergency could be eliminated. One must not misunderstand this requirement. Not every different way, which also, could have been pursued only by corresponding violations, excludes an appeal to national emergency. The requirement mentioned does not mean that the "way of salvation pursued must necessarily be the only one possible. Of course, if the different possibilities of salvation are evils of different degrees, only the lesser one is to be chosen. It must also be assumed that there should exist a certain proportion between the violation and the evil inherent in the danger. This viewpoint, however, does not present any difficulty in our case. In view of the fact that in the present case many tens of thousands of wounded persons were in danger of death.
According to the evidence there can be no doubt that a "better way" could not have been chosen. On the contrary, it has been shown that in peace as well as in war times everything was tried without success to clarify the problem of the efficacy of sulfonamides. The fact that for experimental subjects prisoners were chosen who had been sentenced to die and to be executed, and to whom the prospect of a pardon was held out and actually granted can here not be judged in a negative sense. This fact can not be used as an argument when examining the legal viewpoint, because participation in these experiments meant the only chance for the prisoners to escape imminent execution. In this connection I refer to the explanations I have already given in connection with the so-called likely agreement.
(13) Special Consideration of the War Emergency as Legal Excuse.
Beside the general national emergency discussed in the literature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w recognizes also a special w a r e m e r g e n c y. According to it: "in a state of self-defense and emergency even such actions are permitted which would be against the laws of warfare and therefore against international law." Different, however, from self-defense and emergency in the sense of international law is the "m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y o f w a r" (war-raison) which by itself never justifies the violation of the laws of warfare. E m e r g e n c y and n e c e s s i t y o f w a r however, are d i f f e r e n t concepts. The emergency due to which self-preservation and self-development of the threatened nation are at stake, justifies, according to general principles recognized by the national laws of all civilized countries, the violation of every international standard, ergo also of the legal principles of the laws of warfare. When applying the concepts of self-defense and emergency as recognized by criminal and international law, the illegality of violations committed is excluded if the nation found itself in a situation which by the application of other means could not be relieved.
In this connection the following must be pointed out:
I have already explained before that the experimental subjects on whom the sulfonemide experiments forming the object of this case were performed, came under German jurisdiction, even if he holds the opinion that in the case of Poland it was not a question of genuine "debellatio" but only of "ocupatio bellica". However, of whatever opinion one might be in regard to this question, there can be no doubt that assuming an i n t e r n a t i o n a l e m e r g e n c y the performance of the experiments would have been justified even if at the time of the experiments they still had been citizens of enemy nations.
For the regulating of the conditions of such persons according to international law, the "Order of laws and practices of land-warfare" is decisive which is attached to the Haag Convention of 18 October 1907 regarding the laws and practices of land-warfare. According to what has been said above, however, even a violation of such special conventions, as contained, for instance, in the special prohibitions of article 23, is justified at the time of a genuine war emergency. In view of the fact that the special conditions characterizing a real war-emergency are existent, the objection that citizens of another country should not have been used for the experiments, is invalid.
(14) The Evaluation of Conflicting Rights and Interests as Legal Excuse.
According to well-considered opinions, we must start on the premise that the defendants, both in principle and in procedure, are to be tried according to G e r m a n criminal law. They lived under it during the time in question, and they were subject to it. For this reason I wish to approach one more viewpoint which should be considered independently and in addition to the legal excuses already mentioned, when judging the conduct of the defendants.
For many years the legal provisions for emergency cases have proved inadequate. Theory tried for a long time to fill the gaps with explanations of a general nature, and finally the Reich Supreme Court handed down basic decisions expressly recognizing an "extra legal emergency". The considerations, which they were based are known by the term "objective prin ciple of the evaluation of conflicting rights and interests". In the legal administration of the Reich Supreme Court and in further discussions this principle, to be sure, is combined with subjective considerations of courses of action taken by the perpetrator in the line of duty.
Therefore it is necessary to discuss both considerations - that of evaluating conflicting rights and interests and that of compulsion by duty - together even if we must, and shall, keep them distinctly separated for the time being.
1.) The consideration of an evaluation of conflicting rights and interests as legal excuse is generally formulated as follows:
"Whoever violates or jeopardizes a legally protected right or interests of lesser value in order to save thereby a legally protected right or interest of greater value does not act in violation of the law."
The lesser value must yield to the greater one. The act, when regarded from this point of view, is justified, its unlawfulness - and not merely the guilt or the perpetrator - is cancelled out.
This so-called principle of evaluating conflicting rights and interests first of all a formal principle which establishes the precedence of the more valuable right or interest as such. This formal evaluation principle requires on its part a further material evaluation of the rights or interest to be comparatively considered. This evaluation again requires to adopt the law and its purport to the general attitude of a civilization and, finally, to the conception of law itself. Let us examine the conclusions to be drawn from this legal situation in our case:
Agreement and so-called likely agreement, just as well as a national emergency and a war emergency, constitute special legal justifications, the recognition of which allows us to dispense with a recourse to the general principle of evaluating conflicting rights and interests. The latter retains its subsidiary importance. Furthermore, those two special legal justifications refer in their purport to a fair and equitable way of thinking as well as to the proportional importance of various types of evils; thus they themselves include the conception of evaluating conflict ing rights and values.
For this reason, among others, the following must be explained in detail at this point:
a) A national emergency and a war emergency unmistakably were existing in 1942. Every day the life of thousands of wounded was endangered unless the threatening would infection could be checked by applying proper remedies and by eliminating inadequate remedies. The danger was "momentary". Immediate help had to be provided. The "public interest" demanded the experimental clarification of this question. The evidence has shown that the question could not be clarified by experiments on animals or by observing of incidental wounds.
b) But the last word on this question has not yet been said just by referring to the public interest. Opposed to the public interest are the individual interests. The saying "necessity knows no law" cannot claim unlimited validity. But just as little can the infringement on individual interests in order to save others, be outright considered as "contrary to good morals". The evidence has shown that the members of the resistance movement of Camp Ravensbrueck who were condemned to death could escape the imminent execution only if they submitted to the experiments which form the subject of this indictment. There is no need to examine now and here whether the experimental subjects did give their consent or whether they presumably would have consented, if, from their personal point of view and in the full knowledge of the situation, they could have made a decision within the meaning of an objective judicial opinion based on probability.
What really matters is the question of whether the defendant, upon a just and fair evaluation of the interests of the general public and the real interests of the experimental subjects could come to the conclusion that, all circumstances considered, the execution of the experiments was justifiable. This question doubtslessly can be answered in the affirmative. Quite apart from the interest of the state in the execution of the experiments, the participation in the experiments was in the real and well-considered interest of the experimental subjects themselves, since this participation offered the only possibility of saving their lives by way of an act of mercy.
(15) The Defendant's Erroneous Assumption of an Agreement by the Experimental Subjects.
The hearing of the evidence has shown that the experimental subjects in Camp Ravensbrueck were not selected by the defendant Karl Gebhardt nor by any of the other defendants, but that the selection was made by the competent agency within the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin or the Political Department of the Ravensbrueck Concentration Camp. During the conference in the beginning of July 1942, in which the conditions for the experiments were agreed upon, it was expressly assured that the experimental subjects were persons sentenced to death who were to be pardoned if they survived the experiments.
In view of the fact that the defendant Gebhardt did not himself select the experimental subjects and that, on the other hand, no complaint of any kind on the part of the experimental subjects were ever reported to him, - the defendant Fischer also was not in a position to make any personal observations along these lines, - we now must examine the question of the legal position of the defendant Gebhardt if he assumed erroneously the consent of the experimental subjects.
In criminal law it is a generally recognized principle that there can be no question of intentional action if there existed an erroneous assumption of justificatory facts. This principle can be found also in Art. 59 of the German Penal Code. But beyond that, this legal principle may be considered one of the principles which are generally valid and which are derived from the general principles of the criminal law of all civilized nations, thus representing an inherent part of our modern conception of criminal law. In application of this principle, and even if the court does not consider the consent of the experimental subjects as proven and therefore does not provide the prerequisites for a legal excuse for objective reasons, - we still cannot assume an intentional on act on the part of the defendant Gebhardt if he acted under the "erroneous assumption of an agreement by the experimental subjects."
(16) The Erroneous Assumption of Likely Agreement.
The same applies if the defendant Gebhardt erroneously assumed a likely consent of the experimental subjects. We do not mean here an erroneous assumption with regard to the legal suppositions of such a one, but the e r r o n e o u s a s s u m p t i o n of such f a c t s, which, had they existed, would have induced the Tribunal to recognize the "likely consent." I am referring here to my argumentation for the legal excuse represented by the "likely consent," which I understand as "an objective judicial opinion based on probability and according to which the person concerned would have consented to the act from his own personal standpoint, if he had been fully aware of the circumstances." Provided that the defendant Dr. Gebhardt assumed the existance of such circumstances which seems certain according to the evidence - and even if he did so erroneously, the intent and thus the crime in this case also would be excluded according to the evidence - and even if he did so erroneously, the intent and thus the crime in this case also would be excluded according to the generally acknowledged principle.
(17) The Defendant's Erroneous Assumption of an Emergency (Putative Emergency), I already mentioned the circumstances which justify the assumption of a national emergency and a war emergency caused by the special conditions prevailing in 1942.
If these conditions were actually prevailing, the illegality of the act and not only the guilt of the perpetrator would be excluded, for reasons emmerated before. If the defendant had erroneously assumed circumstances which had they really existed would have justified a national emergency and a war emergency, then, according to general principles already mentioned, the intent of the defendant and thus his guilt would be eliminated also in this respect. The evidence especially the defendant's own statements on the witness stand, leave no doubt that when the experiments began in 1942, he had assumed the existence of such circumstances, which were indeed the starting point and motive for ordering and carrying out these experiments.
(18) Action by Order and in Special Military Position.
The defendant Gebhardt carried out the experiments for testing the efficiency of the sulfonamides by direct order of the head of the state and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler, as transmitted to him by his military chief, Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler. In this case Gebhardt did not act as a surgeon and chief physician of a large clinic, but as General Lieutenant and Consulting surgeon of the Waffen-SS. When carrying out this order, the fact had to be considered that Germany was in a state of war, which threatened and made problematic the foundations of the German nation.
When the legal consequences arising from the fact that the defendant Gebhardt acted upon military orders, are examined, the constitutional and political conditions prevailing in Germany in 1942 should not be left without consideration. I shall deal with all questions arising from these conditions when evaluating the evidence presented in the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer. To avoid repetitions I refer to those later arguments which are equally relevant to the case of the defendant Gebhardt. The relation of the defendant Gebhardt to the Reich Fuehrer SS, Himmler, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Hitler, was in this respect similar to the relation which existed between the defendants Fischer and Gebhardt.
In both cases acting by order and in a specific military capacity represents a legal justification, or at least an extenuating fact.
DR. SEIDL: I now ask the Tribunal to take notes of Numbers 19 to 31. I shall not read them into the record, but I should like to 'point' our first in my closing brief and especially in the supplement in reply to the Prosecution. There are a number of statements which refer to what I have read and what I have allunded to. I shall now turn to the case of the defendant Herta Oberhauser.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, it approaches five 9'clock and you still have an hour an a half approximately remaining for your arguments.
The Tribunal will now be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHALL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 Hours, 16 July 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Karl Brandt, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 16 July 1947, 0930, Justice Beals presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal I.
Military Tribunal I is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain if the defendants are all present in court.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: The secretary-general will note for the record the presence of all the defendants in court. Counsel for the defendants Gebhardt, Fischer and Oberhauser may proceed with his argument. Counsel, you have one hour and 40 minutes remaining for the presentation of the arguments on behalf of your three clients. You may proceed.
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Gebhardt, Fischer and Oberhauser): Your Honor, if you would take up now my final plea for the Defendant Herta Oberhauser you would find in the index that it consists of 10 points. Point 1, which deals with Count I, I do not have to deal with here after the Tribunal has already decided about the count of the common plan or conspiracy. Supplementing what I said about this count, referring to the Defendant Gebhardt, I should like to add that my final plea for the Defendant Gebhardt, contains a few statements which deal with the Law #10 of the Control Council and I would like to ask the Tribunal to take note of these statements. I shall permit myself to add something to this point in a supplement which I shall submit to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel may submit the supplement he requests.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to point 3 of my final plea for the Defendant Herta Oberhauser which deals with the selection of experimental subjects. I can say here conclusively as a result of the evidence that the Defendant Oberhauser had nothing to do with the choice of the experimental subjects, that that was merely a matter of the organization of the Reichs Security Office or at least the political department of Camp Ravensbrueck.
Number 5 of my brief deals with the treatment of experimental persons after surgical operation and this point deals with it from the legal point of view. The Tribunal will find this on page 13 of the English copy. Although the defendant Herta Oberhauser did not participate in the carrying out of the operations, she did attend to the experimental subjects under the direction of defendants Karl Gebhardt and Fritz Fischer insofar as the latter did not do this themselves. The evidence proves that especially the defendant Fischer in most cases carried out the postoperative treatment of the experimental subjects and especially the changing of the bandages and applications of new plaster casts. The activities of the defendant Oberhauser were limited mainly to the distribution of the various Sulfonamide preparations and the administering of pain-relieving preparations. She carried out the orders given her in this connection and did not develop any independent activity in connection with the post-operative treatment.
When reviewing the results of the hearing of the evidence, it can be said that the defendants Gebhardt and Fischer as well as the defendant Oberhauser did everything to keep the damage to be expected, as low as possible and to avoid fatalities. This is especially true in the case of surgical measures, which had to be taken to fight wound infection and particularly gas gangrene. These operations and treatments had to be carried out for the sake of the experimental subjects. These operations were, therefore, not carried out for experimental but for curative purposes. The defendant Oberhauser did not take part in these operations, but merely took over the post-operative treatment to an extent which I have already described. But what is true with regard to the post-operative treatment is true to an even higher degree regarding her activities concerning purely conservative medical treatment such as the administration of preparations in the treatment with analgesics and the changing of dressings.
For, the defendant Herta Oherhauser, by taking over the postoperative treatment after the experimental operation was carried out and on which she had no influence at all did not accept any responsibility for the experiment as such. She would not have been asked to carry out the post-operative treatment, if her ward had not happened to be next to the large operating theater in the hospital of the Ravensbrueck Camp. Therefore, her actions can only be judged according to the regulations for professional conduct during curative treatment. The hearing of the evidence has given no final proof that the defendant intentionally or carelessly violated any of the professional rules generally recognized in medicine. It is correct that in some of the sworn affidavits presented by the prosecution in Document Book 10, the defendant Oberhauser is accused of having neglected the care for the experimental subjects.
In another connection I have already pointed out that these sworn affidavits are mainly founded on conclusions and also repeatedly contain allegations which are founded merely on hearsay. But these allegations are definitely contradictory to the statement of the witness D z i d o and the statement which was given by the witness Margareta M y d l a in her sworn affidavit (Exhibit Oberhauser No. I). Especially this latter affidavit which was not contested by the prosecution, clearly proves that the defendant O b e r h a u s e r did everything within her power to help her patients if possible, and that in spite of the most difficult conditions she tried to treat patients in accordance with the principles generally recognized in medicine.
The presentation of evidence has, therefore, given no proof that the activity which is specified as "post-operative treatment" presents the set of facts necessary for conviction under any criminal law.
The same applies to the few deplorable, fatal cases which occurred in connection with the sulfanilamide experiments. With regard to the details I refer to the statements of the defendant Karl G e b-h a h a r d t in the witness stand and my own arguments made in evaluation of the evidence on this Count in the case of the defendant Karl G e b h a r d t, and which will be supplemented in the closing brief. The hearing of the evidence has shown that the defendant Herta Oberhauser can not be blamed in any way for these three fatalities. She reported to her superior camp physician and the local medical officer whenever the symptoms of the disease gave rise to any doubt and also caused the defendant Dr. Karl Gebhardt or another medical officer of the Hohenlychen hospital to be called in. The defendant Herta Oberhauser could not do any more. If, despite all that, some cases resulted in fatalities it was obviously not due to anything the defendant Oberhauser had done or failed to do. In any case, the hearing of the evidence has not given a definite proof for the presence of such a casual connection, nor has the evidence given any facts which would prove that the defendant acted carelessly and therefore criminally.
The importance of Count 4 of my brief seems to me to make it necessary to read this part into the record.
It is the preliminary examination of the experimental subjects which also was carried out by the defendant Oberhauser. I would ask the Tribunal to look for this on page 8 of the original.
The evidence has shown - and the defendant admitted it herself as witness on the stand - that she carried out the preliminary examination of the experimental subjects before the surgical operation and that she determined whether or not they were fit for an operation. Of what did this preliminary examination consist? From the defendant, Herta Oberhauser's own statement it can be seen that the examination consisted of examination of the experimental subjects for skin diseases and of a check-up of the heart and lungs. Furthermore, X-ray photographs were taken. However, the defendant Oberhauser had nothing to do with the evaluation of these. The examinations carried out by the defendant Oberhauser consisted therefore of nothing else but the application of examination methods which are customary before every surgical operation, even the smallest.
We have to add here that all these operations necessitated administration of a narcosis and, for this reason, this preliminary examination seemed most necessary.
From these facts the following legal conclusions can be drawn: In the evaluation of the evidence in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt I have already explained the reasons which inevitably bring about the adoption that for the legal consideration of the defendants' actions only that law, which was valid at the time of the deed, can be applied. They lived under this German law and were bound by the regulations of this legal system. If these basic legal principles are applied, which generally confirm with the principles of the penal law of all civilized nations, the conclusion should be drawn that the preliminary examination, as carried out by the defendant Oberhauser could only be considered criminal if she had the intention to support these experiments with the examinations.
This question must be answered in the negative. The task of the defendant Oberhauser consisted exclusively of the examination of experimental subjects selected by another office, and to separate and return those who, according to her medical conviction, were not fit for even an insignificant surgical operation. In view of the fact that she did not take part in any of the preliminary discussions nor was she informed of any of the medical deliberations in connection with these experiments - also proven by the evidence - it appears quite improbable that she herself wanted those experiments or that she had the intention of supporting these experiments in any way that could be considered criminal. According to the results of the evidence and especially in view of the coinciding statements of the three defendants themselves it must be presumed that the intentions of the defendant Oberhauser regarding these preliminary examinations were concentrated only on the desire to eliminate people who were physically unfit. This and only this was her intention. Where it was not possible to find such physical defects and to prove them objectively and to return the prisoners on the grounds of these findings, the defendant had no influence upon the further procedure. According to the coinciding statements of the defendants and especially the defendant Oberhauser's own testimony it must further be presumed that she did not want to have anything to do with the experiments as such, for the sole reason that she had more than enough to do with her own patients, who required extensive specialized treatment, and she could only have the one desire not to be burdened with further duties in addition to her original assignment.
According to the facts it also appears completely out of the question that the defendant Oberhauser supported in any way whatsoever the decision to carry out these experiments, neither in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt nor in the case of any other person connected with these experiments, thus that any psychological assistance for the purpose of backing the intention of the principal defendant existed.
The result of the evidence in this direction is completely unmistakable and I refer particularly to the statement of the defendant Karl Gebhardt in the witness stand.
In these circumstances it is difficult to understand what exactly should constitute a "promotion" of these experiments. The defendants had no "intent" to promote the principal crime and she actually "did" not promote it. The charge of attempted aiding and abetting in the meaning of the German Criminal Law must be eliminated for lack of an "intent" to that effect.
But one arrives at the same conclusion also if one applies the Participation Clauses of Control Council Law No. 10 to the conduct of the defendant Oberhauser. Here too a commission or ommission can only be considered legally important insofar as the participant o or assistant was guided by the intent to support the crime of the principal criminal or to promote it by any other means. If this intend was lacking the actions, too, are legally unimportant even under application of Control Council Law No. 10. In judging the action of the defendant Oberhauser the Court will also have to take into consideration the fact that the sulfonamide experiments in the Ravensbrueck Camp were not carried out by some unknown doctors, but that a physician of the caliber of the defendant Karl Gebhardt was responsible for these experiments. The defendant Karl Gebhardt was Professor of Surgery and a doctor who was highly respected far beyond the boundaries of the German Reich. Beyond this he was the physician in charge of a large clinic which was located in the immediate vicinity of the Ravensbrueck Camp and although the defendant Herta Oberhauser as specialist for skin- and venereal diseases had no special knowledge of the leading doctors in this field, it is, on the other hand, clear beyond a doubt, - from the presentation of evidence and especially from the testimony of the defendant Oberhauser herself, - that the defendant Karl Gebhardt was for her a medical authority of the first rank; and, if it were only for this reason, it must be held completely impossible that she in any legally important way could even have considered to fortify or strengthen the decision of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, to carry out these experiments which he himself conducted only in compliance with orders given him.
By examining the experimental subjects she merely carried out her orders and did nothing which could rightly be called a consequential promotion of these experiments. Her position in the Damp and in connection with the experiments was so inferior that the intent to promote these experiments through personal decisive activities must be ruled out completely.
Add to this that any doubts about the legality of these experiments must have faded out before the reputation of the defendant Karl Gebhardt as a physician and surgeon, when the defendant Herta Oberhauser observed that the defendant Karl Gebhardt started to carry out and supervise these experiments personally and that he did not entrust the continuation of these to one of the doctors of the Ravensbrueck Camp but to one of the best doctors from the hospital in Hohenlychen.
I now come to point #6 of my plea, which is on page 16 of the original. It deals with the scientific evaluation of the experiment and the report on the result of the experiments as given at the meeting of the Consulting Specialists in Berlin in May, 1943.
The presentation of evidence has not only proved that the defendant Oberhauser was in no way connected with the preparatory discussions of these experiments and the decisions which led up to the sulfonamide experiments, but, furthermore, that the defendant Oberhauser had nothing to do with the scientific exploitation of the experiments and with the publishing of the results. The scientific utilization of the result of the experiment was done exclusively by the defendants Karl Gebhardt and Fritz Fischer.
The report on these experiments was also made exclusively by these two defendants. The defendants Herta Oberhauser was not even present at the session of the consulting specialists in Berlin in May 1943 and only learned about this report afterwards. These facts also clearly reveal that it was only by accident that defendant Oberhauser participated in the sulfonamide experiments and that her actions were not prompted by any scientific or other interests she may have had, but were exclusively caused by the fact that she was working in the Ravensbrueck camp at the time when these experiments were carried out.
(7) Acting on orders.
I have already stated .that with the lawful consideration of the attitude of the defendant Herta Oberhauser in connection with the sulfonamide experiments, all the reasons for the exclusion of injustice and guilt should also be taken into account, which I have already gone into in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt. This applies particularly also to the reason for the exclusion of injustice as far as the consent of the experimental subjects is concerned and the reason for the exclusion of guilt in the erroneous acceptance of such a presumed consent. Furthermore, all those facts have to be considered which justify the assumption of a state of war emergency. The defendant Oberhauser can in particular allege that she had acted on orders, and that for this reason her conduct would either not be punishable at all, or that it would b e at least justifiable to acknowledge this fact as mitigating to a considerable extent. Defendant Oberhauser did not find herself the object of military subordination. However, a few months after joining the administration of the Concentration Camp Ravensbrueck as camp doctor, she was sworn to duty by decree of the competent authorities. The fact of this compulsory service called for a much stricter condition of subordina tion and obedience than the principles of the general labor law had been applied.
It must be added that the type of organization in a concentration camp differed only very little from that of a military service. Defendant Herta Oberhauser was not less bound to the orders she received than any other member of the SS or of the administration of the camp at the Concentration Camp of Ravensbrueck; consequently - just because she was a woman who naturally could assert herself even less than a man the reason for the exclusion of punishment or for mitigation of punishment should at least be recognized to the same extent as in the case of defendant Fritz Fischer, since she acted on orders. I shall deal separately with the legal questions arising from these proceedings when evaluating the evidence for the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer.
I should like to ask the Tribunal to take note of numbers 8 and 10. I need not go into detail about point 9 now, as the prosecution in their closing brief took that into consideration against defendant Oberhauser as to participation in sterilization experiments.