What could the defendant Karl Brandt learn from the forms?
The Prosecution thinks that Jews and foreigners were to be affected in the first instance. By the affidavit of the director of the Jewish lunatic asylum in which all insane Jews of Germany were concentrated, it is proved that this was not done.
The prosecution says that all persons unfit for work were to be killed as useless eaters. But it is ascertained that even workhouses were requested to give information only about cases of really grave insanity.
What did the defendant Karl Brandt know about the procedure?
He knew that the authorization which was issued was not an order given to the doctor, but only conferred on him the right to act under his own responsibility with the most critical consideration of the patient's condition; this was a clause inserted in the ordinance of 1 September 1939 on Karl Brandt's initiative.
The defendant Karl Brandt knew that the specialists whom he did not know were chosen by the Ministry of the Interior and that the experts were eminent men in their specialty.
The defendant Karl Brandt also knew that the authorities concerned saw no reason to object to the execution of the measure and that even the chief jurists of the Reich declared the legal foundations to be irreproachable, after having been informed of the facts.
Within this framework the defendant Karl Brant approved of official Euthanasia and supported it.
But the prosecution calls even the Euthanasia thousand fold murder. In their opinion there is no formal Law, and it is alleged that the expert Dr. Lammers confirmed this.
Yes, but he also stated the even an informal ordinance was valid. Even an order issued by the Fuhrer had the force of law, as the unambiguous effects of such orders make perfectly clear, in particular to a foreigner.
But for the defendant Karl Brandt it is of no importance whether the Ordinance of 1 September 1939 was actually valid; the only important thing was that he had reason to believe it was valid and that he could rely on this opinion.
German Courts have already dealt with oases of execution of Euthanasia; but those cases occurred after the official procedure had been stopped, like Hadamar, or persons had been killed who could never have come under the powers conferred in the ordinance, or other crimes were committed.
It is to bo observed that these sentences always emphasize the base motives of the offenders. On the other hand, these courts were concerned with the question in respect of public law only insofar as they state that no formal law was submitted. In one case the court restricted itself to information given by a member of the Prosecution staff in the trial before the International Military Tribunal.
The real objections to Euthanasia are not based on a formal point of view but rather on the same reasons which are advanced against the admissibility of the medical experiments.
Even an insane person of the lowest degree may not be killed, it is said.
No human being may presume to kill another human being.
But the right to kill in war is accepted in international law, and public law allows the suppression of a revolt by violence.
What prevents the State from ordering killing as well in the sphere of Euthanasia?
The answer is that there is no motive which might justify an action of this kind.
The economic motive of eliminating "useless eaters" is certainly not sufficient for such measures. Such a motive was never upheld by the defendant Karl Brandt; it was apparently mentioned by others as an accompanying phenomenon and later taken up by the counterpropaganda.
The move of pity with the patient was considered by the defendant Karl Brandt as decisive. This motive is tacitly accepted for Euthanasia on the deathbed, and doctors in all countries increasingly profess to it.
In former times the courts were concerned repeatedly with homicides committed out of pity, and in sensational trials juries found offenders not guilty who freed their nearest relatives from the torment of life.
Who would not have the desire while in good health to die rather than to be forced by all the resources of medical science to continue life degraded to a boast's existence; Only misunderstood civilization keeps such beings alive; in the normal struggle for existence Nature is more charitable.
But the legislator has hitherto refrained from giving the authority to kill in such cases. But he may resolve the problem if he wants to. The reasons for his restraint are exactly those which led here to disguise those measures and to keep them secret. It is the fear of foul machinations in the sphere of inheritance, the psychic burden laid on tho relatives, etc. The individual does not want to boar this burden, nor is he able to do so. It can be taken over only by the State, which is independent of the desires of those concerned.
That such is the will of the respondent majority of those who really get into touch with these problems was shown by the result of the inquiry conducted by Professor Meltzer, which has been offered as evidence. It was carried out by him many years ago to get an argument against Euthanasia and its principal supporters, Binding and Hoche. He got the reverse of what he had expected himself as an expert.
But I see a third motive which unconsciously plays an important part; it is the idea of sacrifice.
A lunatic may cause the psychic and economic decay of a family and also ruin it morally.
When soind human beings bring great sacrifices for the community and immolate their lives by order of the State, the insane, if he had the capacity of a mental resurrection and of decision, would choose a similar sacrifice for himself.
Why should not the State be allowed to enact this sacrifice from him and impose on him what he would want to do himself?
Shall the State be forbidden to carry out Euthanasia until the whole world is a hospital, while the creatures in nature keep stainless thanks to what is believed to be the brutality of Nature?
The decision whether such an order given by the S ate is admissible depends on the conception of the life of mankind in society and is therefore a political decision.
Neither the defendant Karl Brandt nor anyone else who participated in legalized Euthanasia would ever have killed a human being on their own authority, and in German sentences the blameless former life of the parsons stigmatized as mass-murders is always emphasized.
This is a warning to bo cautious. Did they really commit brutalities, or were they sentenced only because they were not in a position to swim against the tike of the time and to oppose to it their own judgment?
A Christian believing in dogma will turn away in pity from this way of thinking. But if the order to use Euthanasia to the foreseen limited extent was really in such contradiction to the commandment of God that anyone could see this, it is comprehensible why Hitler, who never withdrew from the Church, was not excommunicated.
This must remove the burden of guilt which one now want's to pile up. Then humanity would have perceived clearly: in this devilish struggle no man can hold his own, for God stands for Justice.
If there are offenders there are many co-offenders, and one understands the saying of Pastor Neimoller: "We are all guilty."
This is a moral or a political guilt, but the burden cannot be conveyed to a single person as criminal.
Herewith I have shown the fundamental lines according to which the actions of the defendant Karl Brandt have to be judged.
For the legal judgment by this Tribunal the primary consideration is that no prisoners of war or foreigners were submitted to Euthanasia with the knowledge or the will of the defendant Karl Brandt.
Thus the defendant Karl Brandt cannot be punished under Law No. on this count either; what happened between Germans is not subject to the decision of this Tribunal.
Finally, the defendant Karl Brandt is also charged with having belonged to the organization of the SS which has been declared criminal.
Evidence that the defendant Karl Brandt knew of a criminal aim of this organization and approved of it must be brought by the Prosecution.
A reference to the general assertions in these proceedings is not sufficient to bring this proof, for precisely here the prosecution cannot prevail with their assertions in regard to Karl Brandt.
As to the details, I refer to the statements made in my closing brief.
The fact that the defendant Karl Brandt was the only member of the SS who at the same time retained his position as a Medical Officers of the A my shows that his honorary rank in the SS was really only formality and that he was no true member of this organization.
When the defendant Karl Brandt gave evidence here as a witness that he wore the uniform of the SS with pride, this only shows that he, like the majority of the SS men, knew nothing about criminal aims.
In judging the organization of the SS the International Military Tribunal was aware only of a small part of the whole, looking, so to speak, through a keyhole into a dark corner.
Nor could the defendant Karl Brandt have any personal knowledge of Himmler's secrets, for Himmler rejected him personally, as is shown by a number of affidavits. Since even in his own sphere, Medicine, the defendant Karl Brandt could not obtain information, how is he to have obtained knowledge of other matters?
I do not want to repeat the affidavits which give information about the basic attitude of the defendant Karl Brandt and show that he took up a position which was irreconcilable with the mentality supposed to be typical of the SS. In this connection I merely refer to the statements made by Pastor Bodelschwingh, Dr, Gerstenmaier, Meyer-Bockhoff, Philipp Prinz of Hesse, and others.
If I as the Defense Counsel consider Karl Brandt's conduct as a whole and see the wounds he has received in the struggles of life, I must acknowledge that he is a man and not a criminal.
For the Tribunal's decision, however, the only conclusive fact is that the defendant Karl Brandt did not disturb the circle of international law, for he committed no war crimes and consequently no crimes against humanity. I therefore ask that defendant Karl Brandt be acquitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Before proceeding to hear the arguments submitted on behalf of defendant Handloser, the Tribunal will take a short recess.
(A recess was taken)
MARSHAL: Persons in the court room with please be seated.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear counsel for the defendant Handloser.
DR. NELTE: For the defendant, Handloser.
Mr. President, please permit me first of all to draw the Tribunal's attention to those passages in my closing brief which I cannot bring here orally for lack of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the defendant, Handloser, and all other defense counsel, may be assured that the Tribunal will give the most careful attention to the briefs which they will file or have filed on behalf of their respective clients.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, your Honors, I regret exceedingly that none of the representatives of the Prosecution are present, who this morning treated the defendant Handloser in a rather peculiar way. It is important to me right at the beginning of my presentation to answer what the Prosecution this morning said regarding the similarity between the defense for Handloser and the defense for Keitel. Apparently by this parallel the impression was to be created that Handloser's case, that is to say the facts in the Handloser case, are similar to the facts in the Keitel case before the IMT. A person who makes such an assertion either is not familiar with the documents put in in the IMT trial or in drawing such a parallel he is pursuing as particular aim. This can be seen, and I may assume that the Tribunal as clearly recognizes this aim as I do. If, however, the Prosecution has brought up the ghost of the Keitel trial then I must be permitted to point out the following:
The Prosecution has stated, I quote, according to my notes: "In his defense Handloser refers to the fact that he, as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Services, had no right to issue orders." And Keitel made the same statements in his trial before the IMT. From the opinion of the IMT, from the judgment against Keitel, I shall read as follows:
"Keitel had no power to issue orders to the three branches of the armed Services". Thus, the IMT confirmed the correctness of Keitel's allegations on this matter. It must be assumed that the Prosecution is familiar with this judgment of the IMT and, therefore, knew that the IMT had set down in its judgment that Keitel had no right to issue orders. Nevertheless, however, it has here asserted the contrary. There is, however, one circumstance that makes this comparison between Handloser's and Keitel's case interesting. In the case against Keitel the Prosecution based its charges on an increditably large number of documents. There were more than 2000 documents bearing Keitel's signature. The Prosecution emphasized at that time the convincing nature of that nature of the evidence and it was on this that the IMT's judgment was based which deduced Keitel's participation in War crimes.
And now, your Honors, take the 19 document-volumes put in in this proceedings by the Prosecution. You will find therein no single document that bears Handloser's name as a signature or as the person responsible for the criminal facts. This is an extraordinary fact but it is true. And, only this fact can explain why the Prosecution found itself under the obligation to do what I have just described their doing.
The Prosecution has charged Professor Handloser with special responsibility for, and participation in, tests which were conducted in concentration camps on involuntary experimental subjects contrary to recognized rules of medical science.
The indictment is directed against Professor Handloser personally, in his capacity and on account of his functions, rights, and duties as Inspector of the Army Medical Service and Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service.
By this, the Indictment rises to an importance which exceeds the frame of a personal indictment. The statements of the Chief Prosecutor are a collective indictment of German physicians and, in Handloser's case, of the physicians of the Wehrmacht, but the Prosecution has not adduced concrete evidence for this in the course of its submission of evidence.
This collective tendency, it seems to me, is a danger for the objective determination of the truth, for, in retrospect, single events which are without inner connection and dispersed over years, can easily be made to appear as the workings of a plan. This tendency can be recognized for instance in the question of the Chief Prosecutor (page 23 of the English transcript):
"Are the experiments a continuous list of atrocities, or has the entire group something in common?"
The Prosecution sees this "common thing" in the fact that the experiments had a "public connection" with the battle in the air and on the battlefield, as well as with the most important diseases which had "to be combatted by the German forces and authorities in the occupied countries."
The prosecution believe that this explains: "the reason why the Wehrmacht and especially the Luftwaffe participated in the experiments."
From there it is only a small step to the statement often repeated in the individual facts that the experiments were carried out "in the interest of the Wehrmacht". so that, according to the old axiom "cui bono", the Wehrmacht, i.e. the medical service of the Wehrmacht, could be pointed to as the guilty party.
In an interrogation with Dr. Fischer I have dealt with this question in connection with the sulfanilamide experiments in Ravensbrueck. Evidence has shown quite clearly that the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht did not participate in those experiments in any way. During the cross examination by the prosecution, Dr. Fischer confirmed that the sulfanilamide problem was an important problem for the German Wehrmacht. That is correct. The full truth, however, is that the sulfanilmade problem was an over-all problem, one that is of equal interest to the civilian and military authorities. In the meantime even laymen understood that the gigantic, scientific battle between penicillin and sulfanilamides was an admirable competition for the health of humanity.
Dr. Fischer confirmed that in his answer to the question of the Prosecutor he did not want to say that this problem was of a purely military nature, but that it was a problem for all physicians.
The same also applies to all epidemic problems, which show even more clearly that the entire population, front line and zone of interior, occupied territories and prisoners of war, have the right to demand that all authorities responsible for sanitation must take steps to combat epidemics effectively. The words "in the interest of the Wehrmacht" are, as such, neither a proof nor an argument.
In the indictment and during submission of evidence by the prosecution it was not asserted that the experiments were carried out "on behalf of the German Wehrmacht". During submission of evidence, the prosecution has expressed, or, at any rate, tried to make it appear, that the Wehrmacht had caused or promoted these experiments, because it had an "interest" in them.
Equating objective interest in research with illegal experiments in this field is not evidence, but an invalid costruction, unless causality is proven.
The prosecution not only had to prove, as it did, that Professor Handloser and his offices had an objective interest in each research, but that there was a special interest has by no means been proved against Professor Handloser in any single instance.
This submission of evidence by the prosecution, based on general reasoning in the case Handloser, is misleading, because it connects things which are generally valid and permitted with individual facts which were not symptomatic, but exceptional occurrences.
There is no country and no army in the world which never has carried out tests and experiments in the same fields. In this proceedings it has also become evident that research in all countries applied the same methods, including the experiments on human beings.
Mr. McHaney stated explicitly, page 5532 of the German and page 5465 of the English transcript, that the defendants in this trial are not being accused because of the experiments on human beings as such, and that these experiments are an approved method of medical activity. He then continues:
"The crimes (of the defendants) are in their majority connected with the use of non-volunteers for the experiments and also with the lack of care of knowledge during their experiments and things similar to these, which we can characterize as illegal actions." (Page 5465 of the English transcript).
The field of research in Germany was colossal. Universities, academies, medical-scientific institutions, laboratories of the big pharmaceutical industry, medical institutes (Robert Koch Institute, Institute for Experimental Therapy, Frankfurt), medical scientific institutes of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht, and finally the research institutes of the SS. All these institutes, conducted medical research in all fields during the war, especially about problems which appeared urgent, directly or indirectly as a result of the war.
If we compare this entire field with the individual facts listed in the indictment, we must establish that the experiments characterized as criminal are only the smallest parts of the entire research; furthermore, that the medical institutes for scientific research which were under Professor Handloser's supervision are not charged with any of the experiments which are indicted here, even though nearly all fields of research which are under discussion here were also carried out in institutes which were under Professor Handloser's supervision.
If this is the case and if none of the experiments carried out in these institutes is indicted here, then an actual surmise, namely that arising from a satisfied interest, speaks for the fact that Professor Handloser as Inspector of the Army Medical Service was not interested in these experiments as they are indicted here.
In this proceedings the prosecution again and again has talked about "responsibility" as if only one specified conception of responsibility were existing. However, this conception has, as I already stated in my opening statement, many meanings. (Page 3127 end 3128 of the English Proceedings). The prosecution accuses Professor Handloser in all charges against him of "special responsibility for and participation in" the tests and experiments. It can not be recognized from the statements of the prosecution which importance with regard to criminal procedure the words "special responsibility" besides the word "participation" are supposed to have. One may assume that the prosecution desires here to make a distinction between "general" and "special" responsibility where apparently the "general" responsibility of a defendant is based on the office he held or to his membership in a group, and the "special" responsibility on the participation in a special case.
Whatever the case may be, if in these proceedings a "responsibility" is mentioned, only the criminal responsibility can be referred to. Such a criminal responsibility may arise if the defendant instigated, ordered, carried out or permitted the offense of if he participated in any other manner actively and by this participation made himself liable to punishment. Therefore, this results in the fact that the accusation of "special responsibility for and participation in" are synonymous and can only mean that the defendant had participated in the facts of the individual cases in a manner for which he is liable to punishment.
This finding seems necessary, because during the submitting of evidence the prosecution repeatedly asked, whether one of the defendants would take the responsibility for the field covered by his office or for the behavior of one of his subordinates. As here the establishing of the responsibility of a defendant for which he is liable to punishment is at stake, the question arises whether one can assume at all the criminal responsibility for illicit acts of another person.
The assuming of the responsibility for the field covered by an office exists only within the field of political and military responsibility. Ministers are responsible to Parliament, military commanders to the Supreme commanders having military jurisdiction without the question of a personal guilt having to be considered here.
For the establishing of the criminal responsibility which alone is under consideration here, only the legal principle that a guilty person is the very person who violates a law, who commits an illegal act, can be considered here. The punishment of a person for the behavior of another person would be incompatible with this principle. This also applies to the relation to the deputy in office and to the members of the office. Just as there is no deputizing in guilt, there is also no deputizing for punishment.
This principle of purely personal responsibility is being expressed in the sentence of IMT (pages 16502/2) - Doc. HA-01, Figure 4, Doc.-Book Handloser I, page 2. According to this, the fact that criminal guilt is personal one belongs to the most important generally acknowledged legal principles.
The International Military Tribunal has clearly objected to the attempt to transfer the principles of political responsibility to criminal law.
Military Tribunal No. 2 took the same point of view in the sentence against Milch, and gave the reasons in a most appreciable and detailed manner as follows:
"It must be constantly borne in mind that this is an American Court of Justice, applying the ancient and fundamental concepts of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which have sunk their roots into the English common law and have been stoutly defended in the United States since its birth. One of the principal purposes of these trials is to inculcate into the thinking of the German people an appreciation of, and respect for, the principles of law which have become the backbone of the democratic process. We must bend every effort toward suggesting to the people of every nation that laws must be used for the protection of people and that every citizen shall forever have the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, before which all men stand equal. We must never falter in maintaining the practice as well as by preachment, the sanctity of what we have come to know as due process of law, civil and criminal, municipal and international. If the level of civilization is to be raised throughout the world, this must be the first step. Any other road leads but to tyranny and chaos. This Tribunal, before all others, must act in recognition of these self-evident principles. If it fails, its whole purpose is frustrated and this trial becomes a mockery. At the very foundation of these juridicial concepts lie two important postulates:
1. Every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent, and 2. that presumption abides with him until guilt has been established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unless the court which hears the proof is convinced of guilt to the point of moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must continue to protect the accused. If the facts as draw from the evidence are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they must be resolved on the side of innocence. Under American law neither life nor liberty is to be lightly taken away, and, unless at the conclusion of the proof there is an abiding conviction of guilt in the mind of the court which sits in judgement, the accused may not be damnified.
Paying reverent attention to these sacred principles it is the judgment of the Tribunal that the defendant is not guilty of charges embraced in Count Two of the Indictment.
These statements have a special and previously judged significance for the case Handloser, because Count #2 against Field Marshal Milch referred to the high altitude and freezing experiments and to the problem of responsibility in his jurisdiction. Handloser, when questioned by the prosecution, stated that he took the responsi bility within the sphere of activity for everything he instigated by an order, or by a general regulation, (3005/6) Page 2990/91 of the English.
But the prosecution submitted neither an order nor a regulation, nor any other evidence which could be an order or a regulation, with regard to the experiments as such, or to the participation of one of his subordinates in such experiments as are indicted here.
The sphere of activity of Professor Handloser as Inspector of the Army Medical Service is clearly and definitely regulated by the Army Medical Regulations H Dv 21 part I Section 5 - 11 - Doc. HA-28a, Exh. 2 In this field he was the superior of the Army Medical Officers and was competent to issue orders, also with regard to research as far as research work can be ordered at all.
But the prosecution neither has asserted nor proved, that Professor Handloser as Inspector of the Army Medical Service issued orders or decrees to the research institutes subordinated to him - Army Medical Academy, Berlin, Mountain Medical School Sankt Johann Spotted Fever and Virus Institute Cracow-Lemberg Surgical Special Hospital of the Supreme Command of the Army in Brussels - to carry out illicit experiments on human beings, or that such experiments were carried out there.
The assertion of the prosecution that some Medical Officers of the Army came somehow into contact with persons or offices outside the army jurisdiction, which are guilty or illegal experiments on human beings, would only be important if these Medical Officers of the Army would have committed a punishable act or participated in such an act and if this could actually be charged to the improper behavior of the defendant Handloser.
The prosecution apparently assumes that the highest authority (i.e. chief) of a large sphere of activity has knowledge of all happenings within this sphere.
Furthermore it does not conform to the actual experience that the person exercising the highest powers of command within the military hierarchy of the army is in some degree the originator of all orders carried out by a subordinate in this hierarchy. If an order has been issued it must be determined who of all the supervising chiefs of the offices in this hierarchy is the originator responsible before criminal law for this order. If no special order was issued it must be examined whether the incriminating behavior was prompted by circumstances, which lie within the scope of responsibility before criminal law of the defendant personally, such as orders and regulations which rendered possible the criminal behavior of a subordinate or appropriate consent, to commit the criminal offense before its beginning or its completion.
In the course of these proceedings, the prosecution would have to assert and to prove in each case:
a) that the behavior of the subordinate constitutes a punishable offense
b) that this behavior was the result of either
1) a special order or general directive issued by the defendant as superior, or
2) consent given by the superior prior to the offense, i.e., omission of a duty-bound prevention.
Only in this case can the defendant be charged with being an abetter, offender or accomplice, or participator.
In my Closing Brief I have dealt with the various details which have been submitted by the Prosecution in order to deduce Handloser's responsibility from the contact of subordinate medical officers with persons or agencies who are directly accused. In principle I have to say -- and this goes for the Prosecution's Closing Brief as well -that in no case is there any substantiation nor proof of the factual elements necessary according to penal law.
The Prosecution described the activities of the subordinates in a general form, as for instance: Visit Prof. Eyer - Dr. Schmidt at Buchenwald. Visit Dr. birth in Strassburg. Visit Dr. Dohmen in Strassbourg, but they left us in the dark how far these activities can be judged criminal and on which facts to base a criminal responsibility of Handloser.
In no case the assertion has been put forward concretely of a casual activity of Handloser's nor of his knowledge.
It seems as if the Prosecution believe that the contact of one of Handloser's subordinate with a person or agency who is incriminated by some experiment were sufficient to prove: knowledge, condoning and promoting of these experiments This would be a construction but no evidence of facts according to penal procedure.
Furthermore, the Prosecution seems to think that official supervision over a medical officer would produce the result that his attitude and his knowledge could automatically be regarded as the attitude and the knowledge of the highest superior, who would be Professor Handloser. This would be incorrect because it is in contradiction to the fundamental principle of individual guilt.
If one desires to arrive at a correct concept of the term official supervision and is to apply its content to the problem of this trial in the case of Handloser one must not rely on a theoretical analysis of the term, but one has to draw a visual image of this institution rooting in facts and in practice.
Official supervision embraces the right and the duty within an agency or channel of command to order all that to supervise it, or to have it supervised, which is necessary and possible, in order to:
a) secure the execution of orders and directives issued by a higher agency;
b) guarantee obedience to and execution of orders and directives issued by his own agency;
c) supervise obedience to the general principles of military and medical-military service.
The crux in this trial; which is a trial of Professor Handloser's person; is again not the assertion that Handloser has violated his duty with respect to the general official supervision in his capacity as Medical Inspector of the Army; but the Prosecution seems -- again and again one can only assume so -- be haunted of a concept of a concept of personal and immediate official supervision of Professor Handloser over all medical officers of the Army and over all agencies subordinated to him.
Especially strongly this is evidenced as soon as the discussion turns to the Military Medical Academy and to the medical officers who were active there.
Exactly when discussing this case of the Military Medical Academy -I draw Your Honors attention to Document HA 29, Exhibit 4, page 60 of the Document Book -- Professor Handloser clearly expressed the purpose and aim of this institute; its organization and its relation to him in his capacity as Medical Inspector of the Army. The Military Medical Academy was an independent institution charged with the following tasks:
(a) additional training of new classes for medical officers (training group A and training group B)
(b) medical and practical advance training of medical officers and clinical treatment of Army medical problems and tasks (tug grp.C). These problems were attached and solved just as they were in any other academy; on the academy's own responsibility.
To evaluate correctly the subordination under the Army Medical Inspector; one should compare it to the subordination of a University under the "Ministry of Culture". From this it follows; that as far as treatment and carrying out of clinical tasks are concerned; those persons were responsible for it who had been assigned to the Army Medical Academy for this purpose. Prof. Handloser, as Army Medical Inspector; could only be considered for an evaluation or decisions of questions if they were submitted to him directly or through official channels. In this trial we can only be concerned with questions which were treated by training group C. If problems arose, whose decision, according to the opinion of a Chief of the Institute, should be reserved for a higher authority, then the Chief of the Institute submitted the matter to his Chief, i.e., the Commander of Training Group C. If the latter considered himself unable to decide then the Commander of the Army Medical Academy was competent for the decision.
Only if the affair exceeded the competency of the Commander of the Army Medical Academy, was it brought to the attention of the Army Medical Inspectorate and there it came to the Chief of the Department for "Science and Health Research". Again only if the latter too, believed that important fundamental questions were involved, were they submitted for decision to the Army Medical Inspector after the Chief of Staff of the Army Medical Inspectorate had been informed.