Q Witness, will you please explain this letter?
A First I should like to point out that the telephone number which sounds somewhat mysterious was the telephone number of the Reich Chancellery extension 183 was my room in the clinic in Ziegelstrasse.
The order which is mentioned there, which was a decree dated 1 March 1944, was merely a production method of equipment against Chemical Warfare and had the following history: When, in the Fall of 1943 air raids on Germany were intensified and there were certain rumors which caused the fear that there might be gas attakks, Chemical warfare and various agencies obtained gas masks. Since my office, Plans and Economics, was working on a general medical supply, the Red Cross which was one of our customers, and the NSV, had the impression that I might be in charge of gas masks too. I got two inquiries and requests for delivery for about 100,000 masks. As I had nothing to do with these I sent them to the competent office in the Speers Ministry. After about four months, at the beginning of 1944, I received the same requests again. I took them, myself, to the head of the Armament Delivery Office,; his name was Doctor Schieber. I learned from him that he could not deliver the 100,000 gas masks that were asked for because in the previous year the increase in production of such apparatus had not taken place, but production had actually been reduced. Mr. Schieber himself -- this was somewhat embarrassing and unpleasant to Mr. Schieber because in the meantime confidential agents had brought the news that the Americans had shipped special equipment for that purpose, which brought gas to England; and, that gas from the former African Theater of War was being transferred to Italy. Under this situation, Mr. Schieber called a conference about the end of February, and advised me at this conference that all industry and development who had anything to do with this matter participated. The result was that the supply of Chemical Warfare defensive apparatus was disastrous in view of this situation. Within the Wehrmacht, within the Russian area alone, there were about 10,000,000 masks, with two to three times as many filters which had been abandoned there. This was about two--thirds of the total production since 1933. The Airraid Warden Service had about twenty percent of its needs.
And, for kinder gas masks there was about seven or eight percent of the needs available. The production of chlorium calcate was adequate for making it safe for the population of one large city after one large raid. Mr. Schieber asked me to inform the competent agencies, which he could not reach directly, about the result of this discussion. Since I went to the Fuehrer's Headquarters the same night and met Goering, who was really the man responsible for air raid precautions, I informed him. Goering had no idea of this situation at the time. For him it was of the same importance; for him, it meant that after one gas raid over Germany, the war would have been over. And, with this attitude and with the drawn-power of conviction, he informed the Fuehrer, himself.
On the next day, I was called to the joint conference and asked whether I would take the production of gas masks into my office for planning and economics. I took the point of view that such an assignment which might have further developments was not exactly commensurate with my office of Planning and Economics. I said that I, myself, might set up a parallel organization to collaborate with the competent agencies. And, that is how the decree came about, which in addition to gas masks gave me control of gas itself, gas production. This was necessary, because in view of the raw material situation, the previous counter-measures which we had produced could no longer be produced, so a substitute material had to be selected, and these had to be tested with our German gases. It was necessary to be informed about the effectiveness of these gases. On the whole, this assignment was addressed to the Ministry for Armament and War Production at the Production Agency, and to me in a sort of control capacity, for the execution of the program which was to be set up, and where the needs of the Wehrmacht and the needs of the Civilian sector were to be adjusted and coordinated in so far as possible.
Any assignment of our own scientific research was not given in easy sense.
When I returned to Berlin with this assignment and tried to I learn about the situation as a whole, that is, to find out the competent agencies for the productions and distribution and use of this apparatus, I learned that there was no unified command. It was quite confused. Not only were the individual matters in different hands, but, for example, the Airraid Police had the right to take measures during an attack, but at the moment of all clear, their authority ceased, and the measures had to be considered and continued by the Aviation Ministry. These things were impossible since a large number of organizations could be effected by the decree, which I did not know at that time. But, on the other hand, because of the rumors of Chemical Warfare, we had to take every precaution in these defense measures so that they would not become known and thus start new rumors.
I was forced to send all my letters as top secret or as top military secret. I turned to all leading men in Germany so that I would not get in contact with subordinate agencies who might think they had something to do with it, but who actually did not. So, I did not send these letters to the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, but to the Reichs ministry of the Interior because in the Ministry of Interior were the decisive agencies of airraid precaution.
Q. Now, did this activity, on the basis of the decree, take that much of your time?
A. The work with this program was the decisive work for me in 1944. This program developed like an avalanche. One Reich agency and one specialized group, one after the other, joined in it. There was not only the very painful development of a new gas mask for the population, but at the end we had to build airraid shelters, especially these in connection with Speer because of the ventilation argument; they were taken care of together with ventilation problems on the Navy.
It was a program which affected perhaps more people than any otter program of the Ministry for Armament and War Production. I did not establish any special agencies for this work. I worked by collaborating with the competent agencies which actually carried out the work for me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I an coming to another subject now.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will recess until 1330.
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 3 February 1947.)
KARL BRANDT - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION-- (Continued) BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q. Witness, you were speaking about the emergency situation of airraid precautionary measures. Were there other fields where a similar emergency prevailed in fields with which you were in contact?
A. As far as we are concerned with medical matters, I received an additional field of tasks in connection with the so-called Geilenberg program This dealt with a merely industrial program for the rebuilding of a certain works. However, this rebuilding played a decisive role for me. I must say at first how the medical care was handled in industry during the years of the war. When pointing out certain matters about our medical science, I said that we tried to centralize everything and bring it into a certain direction; and I said that the result, of course, was different. It was similar in our civilian medical care. The reason was that the leadership itself within the civilian care was not unified at all, although it was always cleared from political points of view. Industrial work was cared for medically from three different sources which not only had no connection with one another but really quarreled with each other. At first it was the group of works physicians, an institution which was subordinated to the German labor front. That is Dr. Ley, who had really nothing to do with medical matters as such but who from his own initiative and from his medical organization instituted about fifteen thousand such organizations. He had desired to push aside all read medical efforts in industry. These works physicians had to care for the supervision of the work with reference to hygienic institutions, prevention of accidents, et cetera; but they had already started to care for the actual medical treatment of the workers.
This actual medical treatment in factories was the task of the medical insurance companies, an office which was headed by Dr. Grothe, who was a collaborator of Dr. Conti, the Reich Health Leader whom Dr. Leibrandt mentioned recently.
A third institution was added, the medical confidential service, which also carried out expert opinions. This was an institution of the Reich minister of Labor, in this case Dr. Delte, and to which other social institutions were added. These three organizations generally came to the worker in industry; and thus it occurred that in a real case of emergency the jurisdiction was left unclear.
Now, in the year of 1944, the first air-raid against the German ball bearing works started and shortly thereafter started against water works. Since as a result the entire war potential was endangered, the previously mentioned Geilenberg decree was issued by the competent minister and the Fuehrer. In this Geilenberg decree there was a clause which concerned itself with medical care for industrial workers. I was commissioned with the task of carrying that program through. I could only do that with the assistance and support which under the circumstances had to come from the framework of the civilian and perhaps also the military sector since I had no organizational institution of my own.
A justified prerequisite for such a measure was the knowledge of the necessity and the size of the need which might arise. I have already indicate that I had quarreled partly with certain party organizations; and Dr. Ley in this case belonged to that, with reference to his work, medical institutions which were based on a purely political level, and Dr. Conti, who followed the same direction. When a few days later, after this decree was signed, the Leuna works near Merseburg were attacked, I immediately went there in order to look over the situation. I was not introduced to the works physician as soon as I arrived; but I was led to the works manager, who told me that I would not be able to speak to the physician. He explained that, owing to a circular after the issuing of the Geilenberg decree, Dr. Ley had ordered that his works physician not deal with me and that people commissioned by me not speak to me and give me any information.
I then succeeded in speaking to this works physician privately. I happened to find out that under certain circumstances assistance could be brought from other surrounding works so that there was no additional military help necessary, that is, medical offices and materials.
But even for that I needed an insight into the situation as Dr. Conti gained it in medical insurance organizations. I established connection with Dr. Grothe by telephone and asked him to come to me with material about Leuna. He said that he would but did not come personally. He only sent a personal friend, who told me that Conti had forbidden him to speak to me. This meant that the order with which I was commissioned failed completely since I could not do anything in any matter at all.
I then spoke on the telephone to Dr. Conti, who confirmed the fact that he had forbidden his subordinates to speak to me. Consequently, I went to the headquarters of the Fuehrer and told him that I wanted to resign my offices since under these circumstances I was not in a position to perform the tasks which were put to me.
Q And how were these difficulties finally overcome?
AAfter very violent quarrels during the course of which Martin Bermann who was continually in the headquarters played some part, it finally came to the hitherto mentioned decree, about the health and medical service, according to which I was appointed at the same time to Reich Commissioner, which gave me the possibility to deal with an agency concerned with the medical service and to give them directions in order to be able to execute my own part.
Q I shall later come back to this first decree. You were speaking about difficulties in the civilian sector, was it similar with reference to the Wehrmacht?
A Within the Wehrmacht these difficulties were perhaps not so obvious and open but they existed in practically the same way, and above all they were supported by the different concepts which existed about the tasks of the chief of the medical service, that is the leadership, and the medical service itself. In addition the question was never closed about the collaboration between the chief of the Wehrmacht medical service appointed in 1942, and the other medical chief belonging to the Luftwaffe and the Navy.
Q Do you remember the directive for the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service of the 7th of August, 1944, where you too received a special function?
A This official directive was a special directive approved by the Fuehrer on the basis of a decree which he had signed. The decisive thing about it was that a differentiation was made between the Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service, the Army Physician and the Army Medical Inspector on the other side, who until that time were concentrated in the hands of Chief Handloser of the Army Medical Service.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, that is Document No. 227. I don't know whether the Tribunal has a copy of this document. I have not been able to find the page in the Document Book during the recess, but I now hear it is contained in Document Book No. 1, and if the document is available I should like to hand it to the witness. (Document is handed to witness) BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q Did you define this directive which you received in the basis of this decree?
A To indicate my own tasks I must point to the position which the new Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service received from the strength of this decree. That situation was that within the Wehrmacht the Fuehrer was the Supreme Commander. To him were subordinate, as the next executive agency, the Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel. The normal channels for the Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces should have been that the Chief of the Medical Service of the Air Force, the Chief of the Medical Service of the Navy and also of the Army should have ended at the highest place, that is, in this case, at the Fuehrer's. That should have been the case through the Chief of the OKW, especially through Handloser, that is to say through Handloser as Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical Service.
In actual fact, however, the Supreme Commander of the various armed forces circumvented the Chief of the OKW, Kietel, by taking the direct route to the Fuehrer, so that quite obviously Kietel was no active organ within the Wehrmacht leadership. Since Hitler himself was at the same time Supreme Commander of the Army, the newly created Army Physician and Army Medical Inspector were also therewith directly subordinated to Hitler, and the Chief of the Medical Services of the Armed Forces would again be circumvented naturally. In order to find a link for the Chief of the Medical Service of the Armed Forces in this decree of the 7 August, 1944, the directive states: That he, accepting his merely technical order, should lead the medical service according to the general outlines of the Guehrer. These general outlines with which we are concerned were measures which were to be taken in accordance with the Decree No. 1, and which were to be adjusted to the civilian medical service. I give you two precise examples. Since there was a lack of medical equipment, especially because of the inroads of the wartime needs, the Wehrmacht had to put some material at the disposal of the public, and at the same time had to keep free a certain amount of hospital space for the civilian administration, but there are other points of view in this decree which are certainly important. There is the newly created army physician, army medical inspector. He was at that time appointed on the basis of the proposal and if I remember correctly without any influence of GeneralOberstabsarzt Handloser, appointed by Himmler, who in the meantime had become the Supreme Commander of the Reserve Army, since the 20th of July. This was possible, since coinciding with the 20th of July, the Chief Adjutant of the Wehrmacht with Hitler was injured, and his successor, General Schmundt, was in close connection with Martin Bormann, and the General of the Waffen SS, Fegelein, who at the same time was a liaison man of Himmler to the Fuehrer. If it is of importance for the creation of that decree, I should like to point out one sentence with reference to my special view of the decree, that is to say, the Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht, or through, so far as the special field is concerned, the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht, the organization within the frame work of the Wehrmacht.
This establishes clearly that the representation is really carried out by the Medical Chief himself. If such a unified solution was established with reference to the Wehrmacht, it would necessarily have been necessary to do the same thing on the civilian side, that is to say, the creation of the office called the Chief of the Civilian Medical Service. Preparations in accordance with that were actually made for this Chief of the Civilian Medical Service, and this is something where Martin Bormann was interested and it was provided that the health leadership would also have to be represented in the face of foreign powers.
Q Witness, these are the difficulties which lead to this so-called decree?
A Yes.
Q Who was the successor of Schmundt? Wasn't that General Burgdorf? Would you please correct yourself. You made a mistake before.
A The successor of Schmundt was General Burgdorf.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, there is obviously a mistake of translation with reference to the Geilenberg Program and to water works, hydrating works is mentioned. This is something a little different than water works. These are really petrol works we are concerned with, the production of fuel from coal.
THE PRESIDENT: Concerning which document is that?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is not concerning a document. The witness had said that large difficulties had started in connection with the Geilenberg Program and he mentioned hydrierwerke which was translated "water works".
THE PRESIDENT: You referred to the translation here?
DR. SERVATIUS: I now come to Decree III. It is document NO----, in Document Book I, behind the first two decrees. I hand the document to you.
THE PRESIDENT: I will ask the translator if he recollects the phrase which it is contended was mistranslated.
MR. RAMLER (translator): Yes, sir, I do.
THE PRESIDENT: You are confirmed that the translation orally was incorrect and that counsel's suggestion is correct?
MR. RAMLER: As far as I know it is correct. I thought that the word itself could be translated as these works. However, before consulting a dictionary I can't make a definite statement as to what is the correct word.
THE PRESIDENT: You will investigate he matter?
MR. RAMLER: Yes, sir. We are concerned with merely a technical expression.
BY DR. SERVATIUS:
Q Witness, would you define your attitude to that decree, especially in relation to former decrees I and II?
A Through Decree III of the 15th of August 1944, where at the same time I was appointed the Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health Services, it can be said that the first and second decrees were not rescinded. This can be seen by the words "at the same time as well". It also says in the text "in this capacity this officer ranks as highest Reich authority." That is whenever I signed in my capacity as Commissioner for Radical and Health Services, not when I did it as Commissioner General. This justified me to take care of matters concerned with the Medical and Health Services and issue directives. On the strength of this decree it had at least formerly become superfluous that in the case of directives from the Fuehrer I did not have to re-issue another directive, but I could do it without anything else in writing. That was important with reference to the multitude of tasks that had in the meantime arisen. A big concrete example about the collaboration between me as General Commissioner and later Reich Commissioner with the Wehrmacht will explain that. I previously pointed out there the situation which at that time prevailed among our wounded. From this developed the concrete task of rebuilding of hospital bases in rear areas. A further task was collaboration with the Air Force and with special Air Squadrons put at my disposal which came from the contingency of the Fuehrer Headquarters and which were necessary for the transport of wounded and the transportation of medical equipment to the front. In this manner thousands of heavily wounded persons were brought back. For this purpose I needed some plan in order to judge the needed material, and for this I needed the development of Troop Special Service in the detailing of medical educational possibilities, the commitment of transportation department of sick, of hospital trains going back to home cities, the collaboration with industry as I mentioned before with reference to the Geilenberg Decree and many other matters.
The case is similar in Civilian Sectors. The difficulties which I had with Mr. Conti were just mentioned by me. Here we were concerned to keep physicians at home as far as possible and at the same time cover the needs of the front. The creation of evacuation hospitals, of hospital cities as they became necessary, especially toward the end of the War, which were to accept sick people from the various "gaus". Measures were necessary to take care of the heavily damaged areas of western Germany. If one tries to recall the situation as it prevailed at the time in one's memory, one knows that it was not possible to do anything by long ways of negotation and to clarify matter it was necessary to act immediately and make decisions and to do everything which seemed could be attained and which seemed necessary. It happened to me in Hamburg that after the severe raids there a transportation department which belonged to the Police and consisted of thirty to forty sick cars could not be used since the President of the Police could not be reached and gave no order.
Q From this new special task which you received one could only conclude you received new jurisdiction to carry through these tasks?
A The possibility of execution was to be set up. I should have said it should have been set up because it only seemed like that when the decree was issued at the end of August 1944, at the time when Germany itself was an area of warfare.
Q Witness, we shall come back to it. I should like to submit charts submitted by Prosecution with reference to the position which you held, your own plan, the plan signed by you, and I should like to illustrate your position using these charts to explain how far you were superior, where you had orders or directives, and so on. Before I submit these charts I have a few technical corrections to make with reference to the translation. I am being informed about the following mistake. It was said that the Army Medical Inspector as of 20 of 7-44 was appointed without Handloser's influence. In the translation the opposite was said, namely, appointed by Hand loser.
I wish to correct that. Witness, it is true, isn't it, that the Medical Inspector of the Army was appointed without Handloser's influence? Didn't you say that?
A. Generalartz Walter, who at that time was Army physician and Army Medical Inspector, became evident to Himmler since he had instituted certain hospitals and there in he saw something very special and on his own initiative, probably through Burgdorf and Fegelein, appointed Walter as Medical Chief of the Army without Handloser, exclusive of any influence in that respect.
Q I now submit to you these six charts which are documents coming from Document Book Volume I, at first 645. The chart is headed "Organization under the Reich Commissioner, Karl Brandt." These two lines, however, were struck out. Is this chart available and does the Tribunal have it?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you the exhibit number of that chart?
DR. SERVATIUS: The exhibit number I am afraid I don't know. The chart was submitted in the first document book and is NO-645. I am just hearing that it is exhibit #3.
Q Witness, would you define your attitude to this chart and say something about its creation?
A The decisive thing about this chart is that at the head, the designation "Organization of the German Medical Service under Reich Commissioner Karl Brandt" was struck out and this was then signed by me. In order to understand it further I must say something about how this chart originated. In the last year and during the course of 1945, I was repeatedly interrogated about my activities and position in 1945 in Kranzberg. In connection with these interrogations two charts were made by me and on these charts I illustrated the possible organization as it maybe should have been at one time. During these conversations, in order to keep everything simple, certain designations of the offices were not considered important and these two charts were then submitted to me here with the question whether I made them, which question I answered in the affirmative. I then signed these charts but with that signature I did not mean to say that whatever is contained in these charts, and there is no accompanying text to it, is correct. It could not be correct at all, since it says on the chart here on the right side, "The Chief of the Civilian Health Service, Dr. Conti." From my present testimony it can clearly be seen that there was not such an office but that it was the wish of the people who participated that there should have been such a position. This "Chief of the Civilian Medical Service" firstly did not exist at all and there was no department in the Reich Labor Service co-ordinated, as it is indicated on this chart, so the entire combination is wrong on the civilian side as they are described in my two charts, that can only be understood if certain explanations are made.
On the left side it says "The Chief of Medical Service of the Wehrmacht." The Reichsarzt-SS and Police was never subordinated to that office. At that time, during discussions, it had been said in order to render a complete understanding of this chart possible, that in this special respect the Reichsarzt-SS and Police was also subordinated to Handloser but not generally.
My department for Medical Science and Research with the name of the Chief, Professor Dr. Rostock, never had any connection, for instance, with the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and the arrows which can be seen here do not show that there was no subordination of these offices to me.
The Office of Science in the Reich Ministry of Education on the second chart on the left is an office of the Reich Ministry of Education and that can very clearly be seen, and comprises, as the word science generally does, not only medical matters but also philosophy and astrology. This is similarly the case with the other offices described here.
The Military Medical Academy is an institution of the Armed Forces. The row of positions as there indicated at the top of the chart only show offices where medical matters were worked upon or could be worked upon.
Q To whom was the Military Medical Academy subordinated?
A The Military Medical Academy was a purely armed forces institution and I am sure Generaloberstabsarzt Handloser can give more information about this relationship.
I must now point to the Department of Planning and Economy, the leader Sickinger. Here, for instance, there are arrows pointing to the Reich Ministry of Economy or the Reich Ministry of Armament and the Four Year Plan. That, of course, does not mean that I could give any directives to the Four Year Plan, whose chief was Goering. The chart can only be used for the purpose of giving some kind of idea or picture of the entire field of the Civilian and the Wehrmacht Sector. This adjustment was my personal responsibility. In other respects the Office of Science and Research and Planning and Economy were for the purpose of adjusting the needs in these departments and bringing them up to the needs which at that time were necessary.
Q And you described the whole thing as a working chart or a working plan?
A The words "working plan" was not mentioned for the first time in Kranzberg two years ago but in order to give this chart some kind of a heading, since "Organization of the German Medical Service" was struck out, I agreed with one of these gentlemen, I think it was Herbert Meyer, to the words "working plan." It only has a meaning where the necessary explanations are given. I might read the text which I added at that time. "My own offices were subordinated to me personally and I was responsible for them, that is, the Department for Medical Science and Research, and the Department for Medical Planning and Economy."
Now follow the names of the medical chiefs. "For such tasks as were given to me or to my departmental chiefs, or for such tasks as arose from special situations to me or to my own offices, there was a power of direction of the various offices as they are described in the plan, that is, from the Office of the Reich Commissar for the execution of such tasks as far as it was not in contradiction with the other offices from which they received direct superior directives. For the execution of these mentioned tasks of my offices I bore a personal responsibility. The tasks of the General Commissioner, the co-ordination between Wehrmacht and Civilian Sector, that is in reference to medical and health matters, continued to exist as the basical task of the Reich Commissioner. The Decree 1 of 1942 which referred to medical and health service was not rescinded through the decree for the appointment of the Reich Commissioner.
Q Mr. President, another mistake of translation is pointed out to me with reference to Handloser. It was said that the Reichsarzt-SS Grawitz in certain respects was subordinated to Handloser. Would you explain what you said, witness?
A I do not recall my sentence.
Q I shall repeat it to you.
A The Reichsarzt-SS was in no way subordinated to Generaloberstabsarzt Handloser. He was completely outside his jurisdiction and competence.
Q I should like you now to consult the second chart, which is.....
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the Tribunal would like to know whether or not Defendant Brandt, the witness, and his counsel, would care to have the Defendant Brandt prepare a new chart showing his present idea as to what the true picture is, to be compared with the chart concerning which counsel has just examined the witness?
DR. SERVATIUS: I have not prepared a chart, as is suggested, but I can do that later and submit it to you.
THE PRESIDENT: With such a chart before it, the Tribunal could weigh one chart against the other and probably understand the situation more clearly, together with the evidence of the witness in connection with the chart.
MR. SERVATIUS: Yes, Your Honor, I am going to draw up a chart, as you suggest.
BY DR. SERVATIUS:
I now submit to you the chart of the Armed Forces Medical Services which was signed by your co-defendant, Professor Handloser. It is the Document NO-282 and it is Exhibit No. 9. Would you define your attitude towards this chart?
AAt the head of the chart, it is said and confirmed what is established in the official directive of August, 1944, where it says that the chief of the armed forces medical service will have to work according to the general directives of the Reichs Commissar for Medical Health Services. It does not say, however, and that it confirms in the same chapter, that the Chief of the Medical Service of the Wehrmacht is technically in charge of all medical problems, according to the directives of the Chief of the OKW. I believe that General Oberstatsarzt Handloser wanted to indicate here with reference to his relations to me and I am sure that he will be able to himself explain the official relationship between me and him. In addition, I am of the opinion that Mr. Handloser has tried to describe matters as they actually were, especially when one points out to the note which he made himself. According to my opinion, one must draw a clear cut line between the bureaus of the Army, Navy and the Luftwaffe on one side and the field of the Waffen SS, the Organization Todt and the Reichs Labor Service, that is the affiliated associations as they are designated. I know of the difficulties and particularly the responsibilities which Dr. Handloser experienced in order to receive medical technical reports from these latter three organizations. With reference to the left boxes in the chart, that is Army, Navy, and Air Force. I should assume that the description is correct certainly in principle.
Q Then, I ask you to look at Chart No. 3 and this is Document No. 418, Exhibit No. 12. Won't you define your attitude to this chart?
A It is a chart, which originated from Professor Schroeder and is an organizational chart of the Reich Medical Research Organization. The chart looks very complicated and I am not very well versed in these relationships of positions so I could not gain a complete picture of these charts and various arrows where I could say they are correct.
Q Will you please refer to your position?
AAs far as my position is concerned, the designation according to my opinion is not very clear from that crossed line and technical subordination should be deduced. The decree from the Wehrmacht Medical Service of August 7th, 1944 says very clearly that the technical subordination has to go to the chief of the OKW of the Armed Forces.