Cover letter (to Rosenberg) and a memorandum on Bormann's and Rosenberg's views regarding the occupied eastern territories, including the treatment of Slavs

Berlin, 5 September 1942
The Minister on the premises
In the enclosure I submit a memorandum dated 19 August 1942 containing the opinion of my collaborator Dr. Markull on the Bormann letter of 23 July.
I should be grateful if you would consider the memorandum as submitted to*you personally and return it to nie in person, in view of its serious character.' The problem raised is so fundamental for our entire policy in the East that I felt obliged to submit it to you.
(signed) Leibbrandt
Draft
5 copies 1st copy
TOP SECRET
7 Berlin, 19 August 1942
Concerning Bormann's letter
6 copies
. 1st copy
On 23 July 42 Party Director Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates in 8 paragraphs the principles the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Areas in the East. Thereupon the Minister in a message to the Fuehrer dated 11 August 42 explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.
Any person reading this correspondence is struck first of all by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister apparently was particularly concerned about two points: the first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the Slav race, the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems of which more will have to be said. For the rest the Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary he uses them as a basis of his reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann's letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the Department Chiefs, grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our policy. In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a fiction which will show clearly what the situation is.
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Let us suppose Bormann's letter were issued to the Reich Commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister appears to hold identical views. Since the "Ostland" (Baltic area) presents a special case, and since the Ukraine is, or will become, probably the most important region politically, the following discussion will be based mainly on the conditions prevailing in that region.
1. The consequences of a ministerial decree of this kind will be judged best by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice., The supposed decree would, however, be particularly effective and would influence opinions to a particular degree for reasons which will be discussed below. Imagine the formulas of Bormann's letter translated into the language of a member of the. German civil administration, and you will get roughly the following views.
"The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. Therefore compulsory vaccination and German health services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful stooges for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food they won't get any more than is necessary. We are the masters, we come first.
These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary, they are covered word by word by the spirit and the text of Bormann's letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail even today. Those who are familiar with the conditions know that these views coincide, in part verbatim, with the so-called "Fascist viewpoint" as dinned into the masses by Bolshevist propaganda. The political consequences are obvious. .
2. But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was done in Paragraph 1. The above mentioned concepts of our role in the East already exist in practice.
The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people over which he rules in three successive speeches at the opening of the German House on 16 April
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42, at the celebration of the Fuehrer's birthday, and at the inauguration of the Party District. He declared on these and several other occasions that this people stood far below us and should be grateful to God that we, allow them to stay alive. We had liberated them, in return they must know no other goal except to work for us. There could be no human companionship. A "soft" policy of understanding was out of the question. District Commissioners who maintained good relations with the population were mistrusted by him ipso facto. He would on no account follow the Berlin policy.
Let me supplement these pronouncements briefly by a few phrases, which every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm from his own observation. Taken from day-to-day experience they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter.
"Strictly speaking, we are here among Negroes" (meeting of the Cultural Department, April 1942)
"The population is just dirty and lazy" (this was the opinion in the winter, in the spring the same people were of the opposite opinion)
"In my area, whoever shows signs of intelligence will be shot" (District Commissioner "Kreisleiter" Becher, Gaiszin)
"We must always endeavor to incite one group against the other" (often repeated especially by the Police) -"All we do is take what we need, the rest can go to the dogs" (statement by economic officials)
"In all unpleasant matters the odium must fall on the Ukrainian department heads" (general administrative maxim)
I may add that for instance "Kreisleiter" Knuth whom the "Gauleiter" still retains, in spite of the gravest accusations against his integrity in business matters, declared in conversation on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death.. When shortly after Tiso's visit, the famous Lavra Monastery was blown up, in spite of being under SS Guard, the same circle thoroughly welcomed the vent, because they erroneously assumed that it would weaken the Ukrainian national spirit, whereas actually the opposite happened. *
3. There is, however, no uniformity of opinion in regard to these matters within the Ukraine. One might even say that this
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policy is advocated only by Koch's personal entourage and by the colleagues which he has chosen. Oh the other hand nearly all the Department Chiefs at the Kovno office declare more or less openly that they consider these opinions disastrous and detach themselves from them. It was because he sensed this hostility that the Reich Commissioner told his department chiefs some weeks ago in a conference that there were two groups among them, one frankly working against him, the other doing the same thing secretly.
Finally among the District Commissioners at least 80% oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the General Commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding, that its cultural gifts were surprisingly high, that its labor efficiency was considerable, that we however were about to throw away a precious stock of gratitude, affection, and confidence. Statements like the following are heard frequently:
If this policy is continued, there will be a catastrophe.—These sharp practices will attain nothing except to make the Ukrainians hate us. Our position here is already lost, etc.
For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the Master Race is. to relax the discipline of our officials. Thus the report of the Kiev Commissioner General of March 42 reads: Regrettably enough there were also greater numbers of offences committed by Germans. It is to be hoped that the work of the law courts will soon succeed in eliminating those elements whose place is not in the occupied areas and in creating a situation where higher standards of general conduct are required from every German in the occupied countries.
4. The above mentioned policy of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine is in obvious contrast not only to opinion of 80 % of his District Commissioners and specialists,, but also to the decrees of the Minister. In the decree of 22 November 41 it is expressly pointed out that the Ukrainians must not be considered, let alone treated as niggers. In the decree of 17 March 42 this order is reiterated more emphatically. The decree of 13 May 42 opposes the opinion that the Ukrainians are not a nation at all, and the false doctrine of the Master race. Yet in spite of efforts lasting for a whole year it was impossible to change the official spirit of the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine. The majority of the administration leaders place their hopes in the Minister. A ministerial decree conforming to the Bormann letter would be considered by them as evidence of a complete change of policy and would result in deep depression and loss of confidence.' This con-
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trast of opinion between Minister and Reich Commissidner has become known not only within the Civil Administration, but 'also in the Supreme Reich Administration. Many officials of other branches have visited the Ukraine as well as the "Ostland". Nearly all of them come home with the conviction that the Minister could not carry through his policy, and that, on the contrary the Reich Commissioners considered the Ministry completely superfluous in view of the position of Governor General Frank.
5. Perhaps one ought to inquire whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the Ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The Minister's reply of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction.
In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to rearrange a continent / of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions and to the dignity of the Reich. The frequently reiterated demands for a differentiated treatment of the Eastern nations are based on the conviction that these nations, after having been liberated from Bolshevism must, as a matter of course, be given their national and cultural rights. Unless this is presupposed, they could never be expected to foreswear Russian nationalism.
Another reason why the Minister's policy cannot be interpreted merely as a tactical manoeuvre is the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word "liberation" ought never to have been mentioned. No theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university institute should be allowed to function. No Ukrainian artists, doctors, judges should be brought to Germany to attend course as is happening now. '
6. Therefore the situation is this: Although Bormann's letter originates from Field Headquarters, it cannot be issued as a ministerial decree since such a decree would disavow the entire policy hitherto pronounced by the Minister. If his policy were founded upon a far reaching conception, this conception would simply be smashed. If his policy merely pursued a certain tactical line, this too would fail since Koch's opposition has rejected and sabotaged these tactics from the beginning. In this connection it is neces-R-36
sary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter. Leaving aside the question whether this similarity is accidental, in any case the result is that Koch's opinion has prevailed over that of the Minister. Judging by previous experience, it cannot be assumed that Bormann's letter will remain for long unknown to the Reich Commissioners, at least in regard to its general tendency. Thus the question arises whether this development is to be allowed to take its course, and whether th'e matter can be allowed to rest where the report to the Feuhrer of 11 August 1942 left-it. Only the Minister himself can decide upon this question. Even so the following considerations are useful: ever since the Ministry was set up on the principle of concentration and unity of leadership, it lost more and more power in striking contrast to that principle. The question of the relationship with the Police, so important in practice, was settled to the disadvantage of the civil administration. Unified leadership in the hands of the District Commissioners was thus dissolved. The higher SS and Police leaders refuse to pay the usual respect to the General Commissioners such as reporting, etc. All technical questions are decided upon by Speer. Agricultural questions are dealt with by a department of the Ministry of Food and by the Office for the Four Year Plan; the same applies to Forestry and Trade. Authority in racial questions is assumed more and more by the Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood. Nor is there any unity among the authorities in questions of propaganda. It is not surprising in view of this development that the Supreme Reich Administration continue their attacks and try to pry loose one prerogative after the other. Nor is it surprising under these circumstances that in the Berlin Offices it is openly rumored that the Ministry is to be changed into a mere staff organization. This is not the place to enter further into these matters. They may rather serve as a background against which the necessity of a clarification of basic policies stands out all the more sharply. The Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories enjoys particular prestige with the public because of the personality at its head. This is not the prestige of an able tactician, or of a reckless tyrant, but the public have rightly confidence in clear-cut spiritual solutions. In the same ' way the prestige enjoyed by the Ministry from the other Reich Authorities rests specifically on this foundation. The considerations set out above lead perforce to the conclusion that the existence of Bormann's letter constitutes an attack against this foun-
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dation. The political line therefore is doubly threatened by the organizational difficulties mentioned above.
II
What has been said so far shows how necessary it is that the situation be clarified; how and when this is to be done, is for the Minister to decide. In his letter of 11 August 1942 he has left open for himself the possibility of a special audience with the Fuehrer. There are, however, several more points which need clarification.
1. Without wishing to criticize in anjr way the statements of Party Director Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the working of his letter does not. always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. À phrase like "brisk trade in contraceptives" had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer. In the same way abrupt phrases like : "vaccination of the non-German population is out of the question", "under no circumstances higher education", "the population must not rise to a higher standard", "under no circumstances German Health Services" would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved. Compared with the dignity of the conception of the German State phrases like these would seem altogether inadmissable as instructions for the German policy in the East.
2. As has been mentioned above, the Reich Commissioner Koch leads an especially strong agitation against the so-called "soft" policy. Any action founded on understanding and on a politically commendable respect for the justified susceptibilities of foreign nationhood is at once denounced from their quarters as weakness and slackening of the "master consciousness". But this attitude leads to the same inconsistencies which were discussed above in Part I, Paragraph 5, in connection with the question of tactics. In the "Voelkischer Beobachter" of 20 August 1942 Koch proudly speaks of the Ukrainians having been furthered in their cultural and intellectual efforts. This shows that even if one starts from his viewpoint, it is impossible to disregard entirely foreign nationhood. The unfortunate "master" complex, however, surrounds even sensible measures with those clouds of mental reservations and tactical insincerity which were characteristic of Czarist policy in regard to non-Russian nations. For the rest, it is entirely incomprehensible why there should be any fear lest we might breed "by any of our measures a master-feeling" in Slav nations. (Bormann letter, Point 5) Surely it goes without'saying that no-
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body thinks of subjecting even the most russified person of German blood to Ukrainian or Esthonian judicature or police. Nobody knows the German nation better than the Fuehrer. He knows only too well that the German sometimes tends to be all too decent and careless. But he also knows that judging by past experience all the worst instincts are usually aroused by appeals tc&the master spirit as propagated from Rovno. Certain incidents in the Government General ("Kreishauptmann" von Hirschfeld, Cpt. von Sahla) ought to serve as warning examples. It should be emphatically stressed that the German claim to leadership is a matter of course, and that a continuous, mistrustful overstressing of that claim is only liable to cause breakdowns in personal and political relations.
3. A further important point which needs clarification is constituted by the numerous historical errors on which these various authorities base their opinions. [This paragraph and the following (4) contain historical proof that there is a Ukrainian nation and that it is wrong to speak of a "uniform Slav rabble".]
Ill '
The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They a,re, however, dictated by concern and duty. [This paragraph contains proposals of policy. Germany ought to rule for the benefit of Europe and not on the principle that the occupied countries are to be exploited for the benefit of Germany alone. The nations in the East should be ruled, but not oppressed. "One can lead only those whom one respects." Proposals for simplification and unification of administration. The letter ends:]
These demands of political philosophy are being realized in a grandiose manner by our Japanese ally in his newly occupied southern districts. The general rules for the administration of Greater Asia which were published a short time ago ("Foreign Policy", July 1942) contain a classic formula for a Reich policy of this kind. The dangers inherent in the character of the Japanese nation such as arrogance, misuse of power, lack of respect for foreign nationhood are exercised by an open challenge by the highest official authority, an act of frankness which gives the impression of supreme self-reliance. The political opinion thus expressed is strikingly similar to the Minister's own concept. The fate of the Reich will depend on whether or not this concept can be realized. '
(signed) Dr. M