Order to military commanders for cooperation with Japan, including information sharing harmonizing operational plans, in order to induce Japanese military actions against Britain in Asia, noting the implications for the United States

TOP SECRET Only by Officer
Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
No. 44 282/41 Top Secret
Fuehrer's Headquarters, 5 March 1941 [Various handwritten notations and stamps]
14 copies 2d copy
Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan
The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:
1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.
The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation
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will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—"slightly exaggerated"]
2. To prepare the 'way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.
For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.
3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far «East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.
In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented— will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).
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A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.
5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.
The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command [Signed in draft] : Keitel
Correctness certified by JUNGE
Lieutenant Commander
Distribution:
Commander in Chief of the Army (Army General Staff): 1st copy
Commander in Chief of the Navy (1st Sect., Naval War Staff): 2d copy
Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Air Force Gen. St.): 3d copy
Armed Forces High Command: Joint Operations Staff: 4th copy
Office of Foreign Counterespionage, 5th copy
Chief of Foreign Affairs (simultaneously for Foreign Office) : 6-7 copies
Economic Armament Office, 8th copy
Mercantile and Economic War, 9th copy
Dept. L, 10-14 copies