Paris, 17 March 1944 The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan The Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Commitment
SECRET! .
My Fuehrer,
In my report of 2 December 1943 on the situation of labor commitment and in the subsequent conference at your headquarters I pointed out, as was my duty, that the total employment of war economy reached in 1943 can be maintained in 1944 only if it is possible to mobilize workers from the occupied territories on a large scale this year as well.
The labor commitment program for 1944 which I thereupon set up and which was approved by you provided among other things for the supplying of one million French workers. Only if the Frenchmen are supplied can your figure of 4,050,000 workers to be recruited be reached.
The organizational measures required for the mobilization of these forces were already taken, as far as my jurisdiction is concerned, in the last quarter of 1943. Now, however, the realization of my plan is encountering serious difficulties, which lie outside my competency and which I must submit to you with a respectful request for a decision.
. 1.
The appointment of protection concerns [Schutzbetriebe— S-concerns] for the purpose of safeguarding armament assignments and transferring civilian quotas occurred in the occupied western territories to such an extent and in such a form that it made a fluent and systematic commitment of labor impossible. I may note the following details in this connection.
Since taking over my assignment I have constantly endeavored, on my own initiative, to promote the execution of the German tasks in the occupied territories with all means available. It is true that I have always demanded, in the interest of making the best possible use of the whole European labor potential for the German war effort, that the foreign concerns are to conduct themselves in exactly the same way as the German concerns in regard to systematizing labor commitment, that is, that they can employ altogether only as many workers as they need to fulfill their urgent tasks and that they do not keep workers—especially members of age classes of military interest—from being taken by the Germans for employment in the Reich.
Moreover, I saw to it that the proportion of skilled workers (who are so urgently needed for the further expansion of German armament) is limited to the indispensable. The concerns were
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also urged to train assistants as skilled workers as far as possible —just as is done in German concerns. They were urged to employ women as much as possible, in order to free men. The introduction of these principles in no way endangered the German tasks in the occupied territories. This is shown by the constantly increasing turnover and production figures and the increasing number of persons employed in concerns working for German purposes.
Now, however, approximately 5,900 armament concerns in France with 890,000 employees and approximately 8,500 civilian concerns with approximately 550,000 employees have been removed from my influence through appointment as S-concerns. In these concerns the need for workers can no longer be examined by my agencies. I am not in a position to investigate whether workers are being hoarded, whether there are surplus skilled workers, to what extent members of the younger age classes are hiding in these concerns. Nor can my agencies any longer carry out a sensible exchange of labor commitment so that women and workers who cannot be exchanged are assigned to these concerns, in order to free fully capable workers for Germany. This exchange is essential, however, if one million workers are to be mobilized. I may remark that aside from the above-mentioned groups of S-concerns the following are also protected :
Railroads and transportation
with approximately .................. 450,000 workers
Agriculture with approximately ...... 2,750,000 workers
Organization Todt with approximately 150,000 workers
Luftwaffe construction 1 with
Navy construction f- approxi- .... 200,000 workers
Armament sector J mately
Wehrmacht agencies
with approximately ................. 140,000 workers
Forestry with approximately ........... 250,000 workers
Gendarmerie with approximately ........ 180,000 workers
Similar conditions exist in Belgium.
[handwritten: 4,070,000
890.000
550.000
5,510,000]
In view of this situation, it is essential that I again be given a free hand, in order to carry out a general systematic commitment of labor, which is in the most urgent interest of the war economy, for which I will of course assume the full responsibility that the
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war-important German tasks in the occupied territories are promoted in every way as far as labor commitment is concerned.
I may report to you, my Fuehrer, in this connection that in the last few months the workers needed by the Organization Todt for its urgent construction programs in the West were supplied. The. RM concerns have likewise been constantly kept supplied with manpower.
2.
Another difficulty for the execution of my plan lies in the completely inadequate executive means available in the occupied territories. An energetic executive is of decisive importance for success in view of the attitude of the French population which, as a result of the enemy propaganda and the terror acts, is becoming more antagonistic toward voluntarily going to Germany or fulfilling a duty assignment. Although I acknowledge the work done by the new police chief Darnand meanwhile to put in order and improve the French police, the fact remains that the French police does not carry out with enough success its tasks in connection with the "France" operation. The police is numerically too weak, not reliable enough as regards personnel, and inadequately armed. It hesitates to proceed against shirkers in order not to expose itself to retaliation measures of the terrorists. In the majority of the districts the disturbances caused by the terrorists continue to increase. This terror is directed against those who want to go to Germany and against their families, against the government and its organs. It also threatens transportation, with the result that in entire Departments there are no passable roads to this very day.
The German police force is not strong enough numerically to be able to carry out a thorough search for service evaders besides its regular police duties. In recognition of the special significance of the France drive the military commander issued an order commanding the use of military police and if necessary even of troops, as far as other tasks permit. I myself am trying in collaboration with the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, to organize a protective corps which, as a supplement to the other police organs, is to seize service evaders by force and send them off. The assertion of state authority in the field of labor commitment is merely a part of the question of total authority. We must succeed in putting a stop to terrorist activity and thus guaranteeing that a given state order will be obeyed. It is necessary that, besides supporting the constructive work on the part of Police Chief Darnand, an increased number of troops will be employed especially in those cases in which troops or agencies are directly attacked.
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I may report in summary that the strengthening of executive means is an essential prerequisite for the execution of the screening measures at present in progress. It is being investigated in the course of those screening measures how many surplus workers there are in these enterprises, how many are working at tasks less vital for the war effort, and in how many instances skills are not fully utilized. By removing dispensable workers to the Reich and by keeping order in labor commitment within concerns in France, an attempt is being made to achieve the best possible increase in the total potential.
Should the screening measures not suffice to procure one million workers, we shall consider drafting workers by calling up certain age classes without exception or by mustering all males by communities in the form of a military requisition. For this also it is essential that the executive means be previously extended and intensified.
Respectfully and loyally yours,
signed: Fritz Sauckel
5 April 1944
To the Fuehrer
Fuehrer's Headquarters My Fuehrer:
On 17 March 1944 Gauleiter Sauckel as the Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Commitment sent you a memorandum in which he requests that the blocked concerns of armament and war production situated in the occupied territories be released for recruitment of labor according to his judgment.
On this matter I take the following viewpoint: 1
The expansion of armament and war production which has already taken place and is still expected demands that the occupied territories and friendly countries (Italy, Hungary) be incorporated to a constantly greater degree.
As long as the most vital armament factories of the Reich are not protected against air raids, I am also interested in having an extensive distribution to as many factories as possible. For this I need above all unhampered production in the occupied territories.
In the course of my conversations with Minister Bichelonno which took place in September 1943, the shifting to France was determined, and after that the concept of blocked enterprises was created for all the occupied territories in cooperation with
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Party Comrade Sauekel, after the continuous removal of workers to Germany from these enterprises vital for armament and war production had caused great alarm.
At that time blocked enterprises were created in the occupied areas with his consent and proclaimed by me, in accordance with the principle clearly laid down by me and previously always recognized by Party Comrade Sauekel, the principle that workers in armament and war production were not to be removed by him unless I gave my consent for a withdrawal or transfer.
At that time I renewed the promise given to the blocked enterprises after you my Fuehrer, had stated expressly and without contradiction by Party Comrade Sauekel in the conference at Fuehrer's Headquarters on 4 January 1944 that the blocked enterprises in the occupied territories should not have to part with any of their workers.
I am unable to deviate from the promise given to the blocked enterprises at the time they were created, since in each of these blocked enterprises a public notice issued by my office is posted expressly announcing the fact of protection from possible transfer to Germany.
Moreover, if it be granted that his offices may be permitted to interfere with armament and war production, according to Party Comrade Sauckel's request, it would mean a first and serious invasion of the total leadership of my sphere of work which I built up laboriously, and thus it would seriously endanger its further responsible leadership.
So far Gauleiter Sauekel has merely assigned workers to me for enterprises of armament and war production, while 1 alone made the decisions as to their use in my enterprises or their transfer.
At present the total number of protected workers in the blocked enterprises of armament and war production in the occupied western territories amounts only to about 2,700,000 employed; very soon, however, this number must be increased to about 3 million in order to meet the demands which I will have to make on the occupied western territories. Since the total population of the occupied western areas is 57 million, this is by no means a percentage which cannot be met. On the contrary, it is far below the percentage of workers employed in armament and war production in Germany.
(Occupied areas 1:21, Germany 1:8)
It must be possible to dispense with these workers, in view of the total number available in France, without hampering the procurement of additional workers for Germany.
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I regret that Party Comrade Sauckel did not, before writing to you, my Fuehrer, endeavor to reach an agreement with me regarding the treatment of the blocked concerns [Sperrbetriebe]. Many of the disputed points could doubtless be solved in mutual agreement, especially in view of the principle, hitherto consistently recognized by him, that the manpower in the industries of armament and war production, also in the occupied territories, is chiefly my responsibility.
Please order that (1), the blocked concerns in the occupied territories and in Italy continue to be protected in accordance with the agreements; (2) exceptions to this are to be allowed only by me or with my concurrence; and (3) the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment is to contact me for the purpose of clarifying matters further.
I very much regret that I now have to bring this affair to your attention, my Fuehrer, after having settled by myself other much more important and more significant matters, which distressed me much more, in order to give you, with your tremendous burdens, no unnecessary worries. "
Heil my Fuehrer! yours, Signed: Speer
List of those present
for the Conference in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July 1944 1600 hours
Name
Official
Capacity
Station
Dr. Kuehne Warlimont Dr. Kohlhaase
Dr. Landfried
Mi.V.Chief General of Artillery Director of Labor Section of the Supreme Commissioner Staff Fuehrer * * *
Walter Funk and
Albert Speer Milch Krosigk
Steengracht St.s.
Abetz Ambassador
Hanel Lieutenant General
von Linstow Colonel of Gen. Staff 693259-46—49
Mil.Rg. * * * [illegible]
OKW
Adriatic Coast Trieste
of the Military. Administrator for Italy
illegible
Foreign Office (A.A.)
German Embassy in Paris Armaments Commissioner Staff France
Military Commander France-
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Official Capacity
Station
Saas
Koegel
Frans sen
Waeger
Sarnow
Lieutenant-General Lieutenant-General Ministerial Director
Lieut. Col. of Gen. Staff
Colonel of Gen. Staff
Plenipotentiary-General for Italy
Armaments Inspector Belgium
Armaments
Gen.Staff of Army
Gen.Qu.
Gen.Staff of Army
Reeder
Heider
Ley
Chief of * * *
Chief of General Staff
Gen.Qu.
Brussels
Brussels
Sauckel H. Backe Marrenbach Leyers
Labor Plenipotentiary Minister
Commander-in-Chief Armament Plenipotentiary
Berlin
Reich Food Ministry German Labor Front Italy
Also present
Ministerial Director Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
Ministerial Councillor Broehling
Ambassador Rahn
Dr. Huber * * * [illegible]
Police Chief Dr. Kaltenbrunner General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann Colonel Meixner (OKW)
Re: Increased Procuring of Foreign Manpower Executive Conference, 11 July 19 Ub
Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs and representatives indicated in the attached lists of those present. No guarantee can be given for the absolute completeness of the lists, as all participants did not sign.
Reich Minister Dr. hammers reported by way of introduction on the various proposals at hand by the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment that serve the purpose of bringing about the increase in labor commitment in Germany which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited the theme of the discussions by saying that actually all possibilities were to be examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be covered, for example the question of the reestablishment of an acceptable price and wage scale between the Reich and the extra-German territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion can be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must be examined how the executive
To Rk. 5815 C
Berlin 12 July 1944
1. Note.
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forces, regarding the inadequacy of which the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment raises lively objection, can be strengthened, on the one hand through an influence on the foreign governments and on the other through building up the indigenous administration (Executive), whether by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, of the police, or of other German agencies. Reichsminister Dr. Lammers then gave the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment, Gauleiter Sauckel.
Gauleiter Sauckel stated that the present deficit in the matter of the half-year program of 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be fulfilled by 30 June of the current year, amounted to 500,000 workers. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were apprentices and women, both of which categories cannot be regarded as workers of full value. Of the 560,000 foreigners who were put to work, three-quarters came from the East alone. This result is a scandal in contrast to the German people who are incorporated in the labor process to the greatest extent, and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German authority in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers were still idling. In executing the labor commitment we did not exert the necessary severity and in particular we were not able to, achieve the necessary unity of the German authorities. It would not do for German authorities to interfere irresponsibly with the tasks of the GBA (Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment). The latter must have much greater freedom of action, as was the case in 1942. With the present methods of recruitment for voluntary commitment we will not make any progress, for one thing because the volunteers still at hand exposed themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly obligated and decently treated in their work, they did completely satisfactory work. The treatment of the wage and price questions connected with the subject was desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If it were not dealt with now, then our labor commitment program would fail with the consequence that the fighting forces no longer could receive the arms they need.
Staatssekretaer von Steengracht, Foreign Office, stressed that the Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment. The Foreign Office could, however, do nothing besides urging the foreign governments more or less intensively to fulfill the German demands, which had been done consistently up to the present. The executive is in the hands of other offices which
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therefore would now have to express themselves on the subject of the conference.
The Deputy of the Head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had to place themselves in the service of the work of acquiring manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was and was not employed exclusively in pressing military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be assigned for the purposes of the GBA. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:
a. The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over in addition the task of acquiring manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone, who cannot fully prove the purpose of his stay in these areas, is to be seized forcibly.
h. When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, are wholly or partly evacuated the population suitable for labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.
c. The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the areas near the front should be handled especially intensively with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.
Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and expressed the expectation that certain successes could therewith already be achieved.
On behalf of the military commander of Belgium and Northern France. The Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder, put up for discussion the possibility of expansion of the Feldgendarmerie, at the time comprising only 70 men, and of the civilian searching service [Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 people). If the Feldgendarmer were strengthened to 200 men, appreciable searching results could be accomplished. At the inquiry of Reichsminister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont agreed for the OKW to this strengthening of the searching service.
On further inquiry by the Reichsminister Dr. Lammers, whether with the withdrawal of the troops the population suitable for recruiting could not be taken along, Colonel Saas (Plenipotentiary General for Italy) stated that Fieldmarshal General Kesselring had already decreed, that the population in a depth of 30 kilometers behind the front area was to be "captured." This measure could however, not be extended to areas situated farther behind the lines as thereby the sharpest shocks would occur in the whole structure of these areas, especially in regard
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to the industry not fully employed in production.
Gauleiter Sauckel was of the opinion that widest circles of the Wehrmacht saw in the labor recruiting program something disreputable. It had actually occurred that German soldiers had endeavored to protect the population from being taken by the German labor service. Therefore an instruction of the fighting forces on the extraordinary importance of labor recruiting seemed necessary. In opposition to the much too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war when occupying territories, immediately to have the fighting troops commit the whole population to labor. The question of administration (Executive) thus was not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. One must finally proceed to establish examples, then the passive resistance would quickly change into active cooperation. One ought also not to shrink back from proceeding with drastic means against the administrative heads [Behorden-leiter] themselves who sabotage the labor commitment. Not the small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other means too must be applied. Thus thought should be taken for the removal of a great part of the remaining exceptional Italian harvest in order to improve thereby the rations of the Germans and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the entirely insufficient alimentation of the Italian military internees who were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute for these military internees gradually altered. No inconsiderable working energies would be released thereby.
Reichsleiter Dr. Ley underscored these statements and suggested the establishment of a searching office made up of all German forces in the extra-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless enrollings in large areas.
Against these proposals, doubts were expressed:
Reichsminister Funk anticipates from ruthless raids considerable disturbances of the production in the extra-German territories. The same opinion is held by the Chief of the Military Administration of Italy, Staatssekretaer Dr. Landfried, who considers the German forces comprised in the executive body as too . small and fears that the Italian population will escape the seizure in great numbers and will flee into uncontrollable regions.
Reichsminister Speer stated that he had an interest both in spurring on an increased labor recruiting for the Reich and also in the maintaining of the production in the extra-German territories. Up to the present 25 to 30 percent of the German war
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production had been furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, by Italy alone 12y% percent.
The Fuehrer recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The executive is well in a position, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, to seize sufficient foreign workers with its present strength, as a relatively small number of executive men are sufficient for this, purpose. All that is needed are stricter orders, but no violent measures nor large-scale raids may be carried out. One should, rather, proceed with clean methods step by step.
For the military commander in France, the military administration chief Dr. Michel referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and advanced the opinion that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age classes is prepared in France, but has not yet begun, as the German military authorities have not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities cannot be doubted, but it is in part lacking among the lower and middle authorities. These and the persons willing to work expose themselves, with a loyal attitude toward the German authorities, to reprisals by the French population.
Ambassador Abetz confirms these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, is of no use; it will only drive the population the more quickly into the Maquis. In these territories, in which the Wehrmacht is employed anyway, some 10,000 more workers would doubtless be seized. Then these same German forces could be employed for executive measures, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered,
100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection, entire plant communities might be transplanted.
The chief of the security police Dr. Kaltenbrunner declared himself willing, when asked by the GBA, to place the security police at his disposal for Jthis purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age classes could be seized with these weak forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.
State Secretary von Steengracht (Foreign Office) commented on this. The agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, on the request of the Foreign Office, to issue the correspond-
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ing orders. If these orders were not carried .out, this was due to the inadequate executive of the foreign governments themselves. In France this had for political reasons been reduced to a minimum. In Italy there was no longer an executive in actuality. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn 'to comment on this for Italy.
Ambassador Rahn believes that there is still a sufficient number of workers in Italy, so that in theory 1 million could still be taken out, although % of the Italian territory had been lost with respect to population also. He had always been in favor of the system of drafting age classes. This was, until before the fall of Rome, in general successful, as can be seen from the fact that
200,000 Italians could be seized for military purposes. Since that time the situation in Italy has become extremely difficult, however, since the fall of Rome was an enormous shock to the Italian people. The German authorities had attempted to intercept the effects and united the entire executive in the person of Marshal Graziani. At present, however, the use of violent methods on a large scale is not possible, since that would cause complete disorder and interruption of production. The best example for this is the retaliatory action ordered by the Fuehrer because of the strikes in Turin through which 10% of the personnel were to be seized as unwilling to work. 4,000 German forces were collected for this purpose. The result was that the food supply to Turin was cut off by the resistance movement and the supply of energy was interrupted, so that 250,000 workers had to stop work. This could not be justified in view of the considerable contribution to the war of the Italian armament industry. General Field Marshal Kesselring declared that a continuation of "forced obligations would cause not only the loss of the armament production in the upper Italian area, but the loss of the entire theater of war. In the face of this statement, the hardest political will must keep silent. The only thing which could happen would be the execution of the forced obligations in the rebellious area proper. Ambassador Rahn believes the following practical suggestions could be carried out:
a. The recruitment of volunteers is to be continued.
b. To a limited extent, plants are to be transferred to the Reich with machinery and workers.
c. The transmittal of salary savings of the Italian workers in Germany to their homeland, which is not operating well, is to be safeguarded. For this purpose an automatic procedure is
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to be introduced, which Ambassador Rahn had already proposed in another connection.
d. The system of the induction of age classes will he reintroduced when the German military authorities consider the time ripe.
In answer to the reported remark of General Field Marshal Kesselring, General Warlimont (OKW) commented that this remark was unknown to the OKW. The OKW's approval of this standpoint could therefore not yet be assumed.
Gauleiter Sauekel declared that all these proposals were inadequate, since they were not suited to set into motion the masses of manpower which he needed. The execution of all these proposals had already been tried in practice, since the labor commitments authority had at no time limited themselves to one method. He still had to call it seriously damaging to the execution of the labor commitment that his far reaching competencies and powers had been made the subject of discussion. What he needed, as already said, was "elbow room."
At the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Gauleiter Sauekel declared himself willing to set up several programmatic demands on which he wants to vote with the participants and which then are to be submitted to the Fuehrer with a request for acknowledgment and legalization. A written formulation will follow. For the time being the GBA presents his demands as follows :
a. The proposals of General Warlimont will be discussed directly among the participants and will be executed together.
b. The GBA receives permission to establish national security and recruitment machinery for labor commitment, which will operate on the basis of orders and directives of the GBA without need of interference by other offices.
c. The regulations made by the French and Italian authorities in regard to German labor commitment are to be fortified by concrete execution regulations which guarantee the most active collaboration of foreign authorities in the acquisition of manpower.
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, having made these statements, closed the meeting by pointing out that he would inform the Fuehrer about its results and that he would leave the further treatment of the problem, as proposed, to those concerned. 2
[signed] L. [Lammers]
2. Respectfully submitted to the Reich Minister signed M.13,/7 [ ?]
Kr. [Kritzinger] [illegible initials]
17.J.
772