Vol. 226-3
Armament in the Ukraine '
Inspector .
In the field, 2 December 1941 . Secret'
To General of the Infantry, Thomas,
Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt]
Berlin W
Kurfurstenstr. 63-67 *
—1— enclosure
For the personal information of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt] I am forwarding a total account of the present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable clarity. ..
Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report through official channels or to make it known to other departments interested in it because I do not expect any results that way but, to the contrary, am apprehensive, that the difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.
Only the department authorized in the piatter if it sees clearly can order a stoppage within the possibilities.
The report has been drafted by OKV Rat Prof. Seraphim and has no official but a definitely personal character.
I. agree with his statements in all respects.
I wish to add, that the departments in question receive reports of the situation which state the existing material difficulties with complete frankness and that moreover nothing has remained untried by me to point out the existing difficulties and mistakes also to the gentlemen of the Reichskommisar Ukraine again and again in order to have them checked.
I would be obliged if the enclosed report were used only for the information of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt] himself and his closest workers and if it were left exclusively to the decision of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department to forward information on the essential facts which primarily might induce a change of the situation which gives rise to serious anxiety.
Jewish problem. '
Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a difficult problem because that the Jews constituted a large part of
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the urban population. We therefore have to deal—just as in the General Government [gg.]—with a mass problem of policy concerning the population. Many, cities had, a percentage of Jews exceeding 50%. Only the rich Jews had fled from the. German troops. The majority of Jews remained under German administration. The latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that these Jews represented almost the entire trade and even a part of the manpower in small and medium industries besides the business which had in part become superfluous as a direct or indirect result of the war. The elimination therefore necessarily had far reaching economic consequences and even direct consequences for the armament industry (production for supplying the troops).
The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious-obliging from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might displease the German administration; That they hated the German administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage. Surely, there were some terrorists or saboteurs among them just as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that the Jews as such represented a danger to the German armed forces. The output produced by Jews who, of course, were prompted by nothing but the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to the troops and the German administration.
The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later, specially detached formations of the police [Ordnungspolizei] executed a planned shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded from east,to west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the Ukrainian militia and unfortunately in many instances also With members of the armed forces taking part voluntarily. The way these actions which included men and old men, women and children of all ages were carried out was horrible. The great masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000 to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat [RK]; no consideration, was given to the interests of economy. '
Summarizing it can be said that the kind of solution of the Jewish problem applied in, the Ukraine which obviously was based on the ideological theories as a matter of principle had ' the following results:
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a. Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the cities. '
. b. Elimination of a part of the population which hated us undoubtedly. , *
e. Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many instances indispensable even in the interests of the armed forces.
d. Consequences as to foreign policy—propaganda which are obvious. _
e. Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect contact with the executions.
/. Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the executions—regular police— (Ordnungspolizei).
Scooping off the agricultural surplus in the Ukraine for the purpose of feeding the Reich is therefore only feasible if traffic in the interior of the Ukraine is diminished to a minimum. The attempt will be made to achieve this ,
1. by annihilation of superfluous eaters (Jews, population of
the Ukrainian big cities, which like Kiev do not receive any supplies at all); .
2. by extreme reduction of the rations allocated to the Ukrainians in the remaining cities;
3. by decrease of the food of the farming population.
It must be realized that in the Ukraine eventually only the Ukrainians can produce economic values by labor. vIf we shoot the Jews, let the prisoners of war perish, condemn considerable parts of the urban population to death by starvation and also lose a part of the farming population by hunger during the next year, the question remains unanswered: Who in all the world is then supposed to produce economic values here? In view of the manpower bottleneck in the German Reich there is no doubt that the necessary number of Germans will not be available either now or in the near future. However, if the Ukrainian is supposed to work he has to be maintained physically not due to sentiments but due to very sober economic considerations. Part of these is also the creation of an orderly correlation between currency, prices of goods and wages. . _
(Summary) .
Population. .
The attitude of the Ukrainian population is still obliging in spite of the deterioration of its economic situation during the last few- months. A change of attitude is to be expected with continued deterioration which is certainly to be anticipated.
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The Germans [Volksdeutsche] in the Ukraine do not constitute an element on which the administration and the economy of the country can lean. '
A considerable proportion of the Jews who partly represented more than half of the population in the cities of the RK. ha? been executed. Thereby the majority of tradesmen has been eliminated thus hurting also interests of the armed forces (supplies for troops, billets). *
Billeting, food, clothing and health of the prisoners of war is bad, mortality very high. The loss of tens of thousands even hundreds of thousands during this winter is to be expected. Among them is manpower which could have been utilized successfully for the Ukrainian economy, also skilled specialists and tradesmen.