Seyss-Inquart, The Austrian Question 1934-1938
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the contents of this writing, I am referring, amongst others particularly to a Memorandum "The Right of Self-Determination of Germans", to which I shall refer in the following as the "Memorandum" for short.
I have explained in this the historical foundations for the idea of the Union | Ansehlussidee] (Mem. pages 3-6, the psychological assumption and preparedness of the Germans in Austria for the Union (Mem. 8-15), and the developments and tensions which resulted from the prevention of the will to the union (Mem. 7-9). Furthermore, I have described the reasons and consequences which led to the clash between the authoritive regime of Dollfuss and the Social-Democratic parties (Mem. 17-18), as well in short the circumstances which pressed towards the "Putsch" of July 1934, (Mem. 18-19). I could deduct from occasional subsequent inquiries—people did not like to talk about this failure—that the intention behind this July-Putseh was to overpower the Austrian Government while their Ministers were in session, to force them to abdicate and to bring a Government Rintelen into power which had an overwhelming National Socialist influence. An intention of murder against Dollfuss could not have been planned. Eight days before this Putsch I had a discussion with Dollfuss. I have known him from the time imme-
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diately after the war, when both of us, who were officers returned from the field, supported endeavors to unify on one stage the Austrian Christian Socialist and Nationalists. Since then I did not trouble myself with politics; however, I was a leading member of an organization for the Union called "Austrian-German Volksbund" which was above party politics and -whose chairman was Dr. Neubacher, a comrade in arms and friends of mine. I was inclined to sympathize with the National-Socialist party because of their fight for the idea of the Union [Anschluss] and because of the hostile attitude of the Austrian Government, as it in any case was understood in National circles. I supported it by payments (20 s. monthly and once 100 s.), but I did not join the party as a member because I did not wish to take such a binding allegiance upon myself. I was never a member of any party; when "Staatsrat" (councilor of state) I belonged to the "Vaterländische Front" (Fatherland Front) and on the 13th March 1938 I was enlisted in the NSDAP. I had no relations with the leading men of the National-Socialist political organization. In connection with my profession (lawyer) I did know Dr. Waechter and Dr. Ettinghausen, etc.; Dollfuss had asked me to come and see him to discuss the question of the "Aktivierung" (mobilization) of the middle class nationals, apparently to be a kind of counterbalance against the National Socialists. I had to tell Doll-fuss that the old National Politicians completely lacked supporters and that, so to speak, all leaned toward the Nazis; it would be advisable to come to an understanding with Hitler. A useful understanding with the latter could alone guarantee to bring about order in the camps of the Nationals or National-Socialists. Dollfuss reflected, promised further discussions; however, it never came to this. I spent my summer holidays in my home country (Stannern near Iglau) and I received the news through the broadcast of the "Bundeskanzler Putsch." Two days later I left for Vienna. ^
The effect of the Putsch was a complete catastrophy in the National-Socialist camp. Not merely the leaders, but the party members were arrested in so far as they did not escape; the confiscation of their fortunes was announced; the revolt which led to military activities in Steiermark, Kaernten and Oberoesterreich did cost victims; the political management was seriously compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most sinister looking situation was created in regard to foreign politics. In any case, the idea of the Union had suffered a severe setback. I was in agreement about the effect with Dr. Neubacher, and it was our desire to assist in relieving the tension. Following this situation,
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I felt urged to take up politics beyond, the question of the "Anschluss". At that time, Ing. Rheintaller, peasant leader in Oberoesterreich, introduced an appeasement action." He is said to have received a direct consent from Hess in order to be covered against the Party in the Reich. As far as I know, Rheintaller was received by Dr. Schuschnigg, who meanwhile had become the "Bundes-Chancellor". The former National delegate to the "Landtag" (land parliament) Langoth in Linz, was working with Rheintaller. Dr. Neubacher and myself contacted this circle and met there some other men whose names I have forgotten, but who later on did not play a particular role. After some time, the lawyer-applicant from Linz, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to have been an SS man. The main activities consisted in organizing an institution to succor the needy families of those arrested or condemned Nazis. The Government tolerated and finally sanctioned this operation, though it knew that the means came chiefly from the Reich, and because it was known where the money went to, and that such activities of succor would considerably contribute to ease the tension from a psychological and therefore also political point of view; this I was told by Zern-atto who later on became the Chief Secretary of the Fatherland Front. Quite rightly, Langath, the manager, was met with confidence.
Politically it was a question of procure possibilities and a stage for activities of the people of Austria who were oriented nation- ' ally and even at this time towards Nationalsocialism. Dr. Schuschnigg seemed not unsympathetic because he apparently sensed the moments of hate and tension since July 1934 and the narrow basis of the Fatherland Front between the red (socialists) and the brown (Nazis). Also, the foreign political backings (Italy) started to grow weaker. At this time the director of military archives, Oberst von Glaise-Horstenau, appeared as a mediator. He prevented the dissolution of a number of national associations and 3 German clubs, an affair of rather a social nature which was under the Presidency of v. Zardolff, who was also chairman of the German People's counsel, a top organization for those national associations which were outside parties, such as school associations, song clubs, etc. The problem was to provide possibilities for political activities to-those Nationals, i.e. National Socialist people in Austria; however, without their immediately falling into organizational dependence of the Reich Party: It might be tolerated that ideological connections remained, because the same thing also happened within the Social-Democrats etc. Dr,
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Schuschnigg could not make up his mind even later on. Perhaps he could also see more clearly the reasons of the Reich-Partei, being an outsider in regard to party and politics. .
As matters calmed down, the Austrian National Socialists collected themselves again into an illegal party; the organization was built up for better or worse according to the old schedule; those who returned from the Reich were considered to be more "in the know" and authoritative.
The institution of succor, Langoth, remained outside the Party organization. But there were also men in the Nazi circles who considered an absolute dependence on the Reich as politically wrong and endeavored for an independent Austrian-National-So-cialist Party. In particular Dr. Ramer from Kaernten belonged to those, and by his influence the future Gau-leader Klausner, who is now dead; also Globetschnich was in it, though I doubt that he was sincerely convinced, and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a keener interest in political affairs and entered into relationship with the proper Party circles; here, meanwhile, the former Gau-leader of Niederoesterreich, Captain Leopold had succeeded in becoming the land leader of the illegal Austrian Party; he was killed in action in the East, serving as Lt. Colonel.
As time went on, the Austrian government had the leaders „of the reformed National Socialist Party arrested, also Neubacher. I for myself did not join the Party because I considered this was to be futile and wrong. Thus the tension again increased; became similar to the situation as it was before July 1934; however, without the inner political dangers because the Austrian Nazis were not interested in terroristic actions any more, which may have been due to the increasing influence of men such as Klausner, Ramer and others. Yet the outer political influence had altered. Schuschnigg felt the need to normalize the relationship towards the Reich. For this he had to compromise also inter-politically. He certainly had to deal under the greatest difficulties with the radical leaders of the "Fatherland Front". In order to understand this, it becomes necessary to explain shortly the Austrian clericals [Klerikalismus].
The Austrian people distinguished between the exercise of religious faith in the Catholic Church and the domination of public life by the Church. This distinction originates from century old experiences. At the beginning of the 17th century Austria was 80% Protestant. It became re-catholicized under the rule of Ferdinand II with the assistance of the Jesuits by using extremely powerful means of the state. . Thousand« of families had
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to emigrate, to mention only some important episodes. Emperor Josef II 1780-1790 "declericalized" the country—as a parallel happening of the commencing French development—he closed down hundreds of cloisters. In the Year 1854 again a decidedly ecclesiastical regime was in control. The marriage laws and jurisdiction were left to the Church. In the years around 1870 the liberal era came with modern legislation about schooling, etc. The Dollfuss regime and the Fatherland front, were regarded as an ecclesiastical reaction, which is also indicated by the Concordat in regard to marriage-law questions. Struggles, between ecclesiastic dignitaries were involved, not considered as matters in regard to faith or religious belief, but merely as political disputes. Thus it happened that many believing Catholics belonged to the Nazis despite the fact that the higher "Klerus" [Clericals] undertook continuously stronger opposition against the National-Socialism. The ecclesiastical circles unquestioningly exercised great pressure upon the "Fatherland Front" and Dr. Schuschnigg as a statesman, in order to prevent any conciliatory attitude toward the Nazis. '
Meanwhile, Herr von Papen appeared on the scene; he is sure to have tried everything to "normalize" the relation between Germany and Austria. He did not have the confidence of the radical Nat. Soc. leaders in the Reich and was non-aggressive in inner-politics. I do not know if I had met him before 1936. Essentially I kept contact with Glaise-Horstenau. I was informed by him in July 1936 that an agreement was about to be concluded between Germany and Austria which would bring a release from the inner-political tension-amnesties and the inclusion of collaboration by the National Socialists. Dr. Schuschnigg also expected collaboration. I assume that the contents of this agreement of the 11th July 1936 is known.
Quite apart from interstate agreements, concessions of amnesty, etc., this agreement contained the phrase (quoted from memory): "the Bund-Chancellor anticipates to include the national opposition for collaboration". This phrase was the main question regarding Austrian inner policies up to the agreement of the 12th February 1938. During this time, Chancellor Schuschnigg received different men from the National Opposition, radical representatives, for instance Capt. Leopold. They were called, in Fatherland circles, the "undaunted" and even "conscientious Nationals". I was classified as one of the iatter. The interpretation of the above quoted phrase caused in the Nat. Soc. camp a fundamental difference of opinion. The rsWi-
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cals were of the opinion that the Austrian government was obliged to admit the old NSDAP, which meanwhile had started to reconstitute itself. The "conscientious" like myself, Dr. Rainer, Klausner, etc. with different points of view, were of the opinion that the organization and form (method of activities) had to be discussed with Dr. Sehuschnigg, respectively accepted by him; however, it had to be executed in a manner of an independent Reichs organization. Also, other Austrian official politicians occupied themselves with the question of the National opposition, and I have reason to assume that some, for example Neustadter, Sturmer, encouraged to a certain extent the radicals in order to secure some backing with the population against the ecclesiastical block of the Fatherland Front. The Austrian "Heimatsehutz" becaihe during this time insignificant. I was frequently together with the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, Zernatto, whose lively, intellectual and at times easy manner of conversation overcame difficulties more easily in conversations with Sehuschnigg. I then took the point of view which became increasingly more revealing to me, -that the solution could only be found in the Austrian Nat. Sol. activities, in those legal forms and methods which corresponded to the Austrian conditions, and that they should partake in the government; in return Hitler was to guarantee the independence of this political movement notwithstanding the ideological leadership by him, being the founder of the movement. Austria on her part, however, was to enter into the closest relationship with the Reich in so far as it was compatible with international law. The "Union" was thus not an acute and perhaps postponed point in the program and my coworkers—and I also believe that Mr. von Papen thought it was neither necessary nor important to make the question of the "Union" the object of an acute political controversy. We were firmly convinced—as soon as inner political difficulties were eliminated and the outer political tension was eased—that the "Union" would develop step by step automatically; an already existing state of affairs would only have to be confirmed in as far as political and legal arrangements were concerned. Reports from foreign countries indicated that there would be no objection to this solution, on the contrary, one would be quite happy to have this sore question done away with painlessly. Yet, retrospectively one can say today that all who shared this opinion did anticipate an evolutionary development of National Socialism from its period of "Sturm and Drang" (youthful influence) and that with the satisfaction of its national claims—equality of sta-
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tus and union of Germans—National Socialism would find all its scope in the building up of the inner Reich. Looking at it from today's point of view, this moment might have arrived at about
1939. Even Dr. Schuschnigg inclined toward this point of view. He believed in the idea of "Greater Germany" but had to decline a "Union" under this National-Socialist regime. When I replied thereupon that then he will renuncíate the "Anschluss", he answered most decidedly: "One may expect an evolutionary development of National-Socialism". I myself was so absolutely convinced of the urgent necessity of the union of all Germans, that I looked upon this question from an inner political point of view, but never could make it dependent upon the political system as it might be at a time in Germany or Austria. No German must remain an outside observer if the system does not seem to be the right one, but he must take part in the controversy. The Austrian leader of the Social Democrats, Julius Deutch, expressed himself similarly in the Austrian labor paper under the title "And Yet" [Dennoch] at the time of the election of Hinden-burg as Reich President. Herr von Papen whom I met more frequently, perhaps every six to eight weeks, expressed himself cautiously. I gained the impression that he did not wish to commit himself until he was fully acquainted with the opinion of Berlin. The radicals opposed vehemently my policy. Quite apart from the fact that they declared it as being against the Fuehrer, they tried defamation in their own way. For example, they spread a rumor that I was a pupil of the Jesuit college "Stella Matutina" in the Vorarlberg, where Schuschnigg had studied, and that I intended to commit treason against the National affairs in collaboration with Schuschnigg. A clearing of the situation inside the Reich seemed to have taken place in so far as State Secretary Keppler was put in charge of all the Austrian matters. Other Party offices, however, were not troubled much by this appointment. The "illegal Landesleitung" (county leadership) of Captain Leopold in Austria had rented two floors in the Tenifaltstrasse, Vienna I, from where it officiated. The "simple citizen" saw in this a way which could still accomplish a solution with the NSDAP, and he was less inclined to accept political considerations. Zernatto urged me to become more active realizing that I could , not work with success with the Nazis in the frame of the Fatherland Front; the plan, as approved by Schuschnigg, was agreed upon: "I shall be appointed Counsellor of State with the task to examine the conditions of the National opposition for their inclusion and submit such proposal while an Inns-
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bruck acquaintance of Schuschnigg's, Dr. Pembaur of the Fatherland Front, should form a Volk's political council for the preparation of the collaboration of the nationals with the Front."
I immediately expressed the desire to go to the Reich myself, in order to ascertain by contact with the responsible people how far my plans had expectation to find consent. Keppler negotiated, with Schuschnigg's consent, a visit to Hess and Goering. I explained my opinion to these two. I made a special point of it that this must not be a question of party successes. With these, put into the background the Austrian National Socialists could become active, and Austria could become an important supporting position for the Reich; at the same time this double.partnership would offer many advantages as regards international affairs. Hess asked me to see him once more. I assume that meanwhile he had talked with the Fuehrer. Hess was most interested and cordial and said about as follows: "You certainly have good intentions and I shall follow up your work with interest. I regret you are not one of the old fighters." I was not quite clear about the meaning of this last sentence; first I thought it meant an acknowledgement, but perhaps Hess intended to express that an old fighter would not have proposed "half measures". My visit to Goering was superficially impressive, but as for its contents, there is nothing that stuck in my memory with the exception that Goering was more interested in political activities as a matter of principle, but that what I brought along was too little. Incidentally, as far as I know Goering then already had established a direct connection with the Austrian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Guido Schmid. Not too encouraged, yet without a refusal from the Reich, I started my activities, which immediately became the object of strong attacks by the radical section of the Fatherland Front and by the Radical Nazis, who after my visit to Hess and Goering were more opposed to my co-workers than to me personally. I particularly became the wall of wailing for all Nazis who had complaints. Here the "Volks political council" with its at times rather clever representatives from the "Bundeslaender" (Bund countries) was successfully interconnected. Despite all, I gained the impression that the administrative and executive authorities incited by the Fatherland Front, did away repeatedly with all that had been achieved on the one side by restrictions, arrests and dismissing of people, by exploiting the still continued illegality, that is of the decidedly party-political activities of the Austrian Nazis. Endeavors to ease the tension by instituting the
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commissions as provided for in th^ agreement of the 11th July 1936, hardly met with success, although Schuschnigg was considerably accommodating in one of my last representations, after the previous negotiations were almost in vain. During this time, Dr. Jury, who had kept a decisive distance from the illegal work of Leopold, also entered the circle of my assistants. In consequence of the above described circumstances, the situation grew rather worse than better. It became obvious to me that only a decisive refusal of Hitler to those "Illegals" could produce an improvement, whereas activities of the National Socialists had to be permitted within those limits to be agreed upon with Schuschnigg. I withdrew when towards the end of 1937 the really hopeless legitimate movement was also officially strongly supported, and I wrote a letter to Schuschnigg or Zernatto explaining my point of view. I did not participate in meetings of the State Counsel and I went to Garmisch (Germany) upon an invitation by the Reich Sport Leader, Dr. Rammer. I informed Zernatto of this trip. Without being prearranged, I met von Papen in Garmisch. We lamented about our troubles while the weather was bad. Once again I explained my point of view and took the occasion to mention that a corresponding initiative had to be reached in the Ministry in order to meet the methods practiced by the Administration. The Ministry of the Interior may have been talked about, but certainly not about me. This time, von Papen was less secretive. I believe that he said he would discuss these matters with Hitler, Eight days after this conference, having returned to Vienna, I went to Zell an See. From there—I believe—I was called to Vienna by Zernatto. At the same time I was informed by National Socialist quarters—possibly by Keppler—that a meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler in Berchtesgaden was in the making. In any case, I had this information from Reich German quarters before Zernatto or Schuschnigg told me about it. On the day of my departure I had a long discussion with Zernatto, which was later on joined by Schuschnigg, in regard to details of an inner-political arrangement. About 2/3 of my propositions were accepted, the most important ones which were meant to impress Hitler, but not freedom of activities for the Nazis nor participation in the administration and in the conduct of the affairs of the State. I assumed that Schuschnigg reserved those for his negotiations in Berchtesgaden. I informed Dr. Rainer and Dr. Jury in broad lines about the results of my discussion; it is possible that thus it reached Berchtesgaden. I do not know if it excited interest.
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On the 12th of February Schuschnigg, together with Schmidt, was with Hitler. As for details I do not know anymore than what has meanwhile been spread at home and abroad. Anyhow, I was told by Schuschnigg that the possibilities for military actions were demonstrated to him. Most certainly it was a hard day for Schuschnigg. .
On the 13th of February I was informed by State Secretary Schmidt in the presence of Zernatto about the agreement of Berchtesgaden. I assume that the wording of it is known. I can not recollect its wording. Apart from a general amnesty and reparations, the admittance of the National opposition was renewedly and more clearly confirmed. A certain guarantee was my appointment as Minister for the Interior and for Public Safety. It is true, I had talked with Schuschnigg, Zernatto and von Papen of the necessity of such an adjustment, but never of my candidacy for this. However, if it really should take place, it was reasonable that I might be entrusted. I was told that my name was not mentioned by Hitler but by Schuschnigg on Hitler's questioning whom he recommended for the prospective post of Minister. Subsequently I made a particular point to retain in office the former Secretary of State for the Security Department, Strubl, although he was like a red cloth for the Nazis, because I wished to have an experienced expert. I even included Strubl in my Cabinet of the 11th of March. The further decision that I was to be the liaison officer in charge between the Austrian Government, the National Opposition and the Government of the Reich was of equal importance to me. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Schmid, designated for this duty, had declined to have anything to do with these questions; I myself however, was most limited in my capacity for action by those offices. I was forced to inform first all the different groups and had to take care not to prejudice their attitude by my own stand. Thus on the 11th March, for a certain time, I really felt only as a kind of "girl telephone switchboard operator" between Berlin and Vienna.
Making in advance a concluding remark; I want to state: the agreement of February 12th and my appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs could only be favorably looked upon by the National Opposition—which were at that time exclusively only National Socialists, a fact that cannot be contested. To clear up the position of this opposition was the purpose of all those endeavors that have been made, one may say, for years. If one should say that I endeavored to revive the possibilities for ac-
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tivities by the National Socialists in a different form, then one is perfectly right. This I have always expressed openly and clearly and I had already called Dollfuss' attention to the necessity of coming to an agreement with the Nazis, because the National, in the old middle class conception, was no longer a political factor. If one wants to state that I wished to reinstate the Nazi party in their specific form, organization and dependence upon the Reich, then one is wrong. That is just the thing I wished to prevent. To achieve this end it was necessary to find new men as leaders, who were politically intelligent and to finally see that Hitler, being the party leader, gave a corresponding declaration. I believe that I found those men, and I am still to this day convinced, that a large portion of them, had honest intentions in this matter; for example Dr. Jury, Dr. Rainer, Engineer Rheinthaller, and of course also Dr. Neubacher. But all of them were in agreement that without a direction by Hitler as the leader of the movement, the matter could not be achieved. Partly the men had an inner feeling for him and were bound to him by their oath, partly they realized that a success in any other direction would be futile in view of the Nazi followers of Hitler in Austria. All that mattered in those discussions with Hitler, was to induce him, being the leader of the movement, by appropriate counter offers, and to gain the necessary declaration concerning the independence of the Austrian National Socialist. Should this have happened, then I believe, almost even to this day, in a success, because the Austrian Nazis could have been won over to this political way. If they had had the possibilities to try to materialize by legal means the ideas of National Socialism which did not only consist of their racial point of view, of the principle of dictatorship, etc., in a form fitted for Austria, and to exercise real responsibilities, then most important of all, the continuous uncertainty about arrests, dismissals, confiscations, etc., which had made these people so susceptible to radical slogans would have subsided. These peoples would , again have returned, I might say, into an Austrian middle class quietness, which they would not have relinquished so easily in view of the experiences of the past years in favor of political adventure, if the influence of the Reich-party had been excluded. It was my aim to achieve this. I believe that this has not been discussed in Berchtesgaden. Hitler most probably would have avoided this or superimposed this by his talk, while Schuschnigg probably thought it would belittle himself if he discussed inner political questions with the Reich German, namely the head of a foreign State.
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But in such a situation it is of no avail to put the head into the sand ("Ostrich-politics"). The situation happened to be thus in the camp of the National opposition. If one asked for satisfaction along this line, it became necessary to walk, along this way or it might have been better, not to commence anything at all, but to have tried to make a clear start with those social Democrats, who would be admitted into activities. However, such an attempt would have been short lived, in view of the current interior and foreign political situation. As it was, Schuschnigg only took half measures; he conceded to certain details such as amnesty, reparation, permission to wear the swastika, etc., which in this situation only proved to be stimulants for the radical propaganda without any real political counter offers. He opened flood gates without having any provisions for the steering of the flooding waters. If within the terms of this agreement there had been fixed, and confirmed by Hitler, certain possibilities for activities, forms of organization, restrictions as regards realization of the party program, exclusion of the dictatorship principle and responsible independence of the Austrian Nazis, then it might have been possible to control these matters by avoiding political mistakes if Hitler had confirmed it. But such decision was not put before Hitler by Schuschnigg. When I prepared for it later on, the Fatherland Front interfered with the polling plan, which gave Hitler the opportunity to renounce the conditions of the agreement of February 12th. It is only conditionally right if it is said that my political line of action and its partial realization led to the final result of the 11th of March. My actions were certainly contributing causes, but what actually was done on the part of the Austrian State Leadership was not in execution of my idea. Basically the, reasons which led to the development of the 11th of March are much deeper. The latter was unavoidable unless my ideas could have been realized. In 1942 I received an expressive confirmation about this. An acquaintance showed me a report, which was made by the Chief of the Security Police and SD towards the end of 1937 and which was presented to Hitler via Himmler. Heydrich describes the Austrian situation and arrives at the conclusion that invariably it must lead to the collapse of the "Austrian System". "The only circumstance which might become dangerous for the plans of the National Socialist Movement—I do not remember the expression of Party or Reich leadership—could be the policy of the State Councilor Seyss-Inquart. This was tuned to suit the Austrian mentality and in time it might be suited to give its own character to the Nazis
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movement in Austria, different from the Reichspartei, which could take away the revolutionary impulse."
When I discussed with Schmid and subsequently with Schuschnigg the results of Berchtesgaden and their execution, I immediately declared, that before exercising my functions I had to ascertain by a personal conversation with Hitler, how far he would be in accord with my plans and would be prepared to give basic declarations. Schuschnigg immediately gave his consent to my proposition for a trip to Berlin, which was arranged as far as I remember by State Secretary Keppler and the Austrian Foreign Office; in any case I traveled with diplomatic privileges (passport). During those and subsequent conferences with Schuschnigg, Zernatto, Schmid, Strubl and perhaps other Austrian politicians, (I believe also with the Austrian Land Captain Cleissner) I developed my plans as follows as it grew increasingly self evident to me: The "volks political council" should be developed into a kind of head office department . "National Community" under the leadership of Dr. Jury, who was to become a member of the State Council, thus enabling the Austrian Nazis to busy themselves within the Fatherland Front; at that time I still thought that it could be managed from within the Front, which was of a special concern to Schuschnigg. As a parallel intention, Schuschnigg planned to establish a "Legitimate Work Community", to which I did not object. In this national community the Austrian Nazis were to be roped in. Dr. Fischbach was to be appointed a member of the "Economic council" in order to represent there the national-Socialist aims; he was a personal acquaintance of mine, who was never a member of the Party and not a proper "Nazi"; and for the same purpose Engineer Rheintaller was to be appointed in the "agricultural economic council". Any political activities outside these organizations were forbidden and were to be prosecuted by the police. Klausner who was looked upon as a kind of Party Leader by the Austrian Nazis, as far as they had left the radical standpoint, was earmarked to receive a leading position as soon as the organizational preparations permitted. The political secretary of Klausner was Dr. Rainer. The political leadership of the Austrian Nazis was to be exclusively in the hands of those men who were responsible for their activities toward the Austrian government. The proportion of power of the individual now-legalized, political groups was to be ascertained by suitable means, and the distribution of the individual functions of public affairs was to be made accordingly. In any case, Schuschnigg was to remain the political leader and Bund Chancellor. This system of collabo-
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ration had to be carried out for a certain period—I mentioned 3 to 5 years. After that, new arrangements might be entered into after ascertaining the proportion of power, but then also the principle of dictatorship was to be rejected; but each legal political group in Austria Was to participate proportionately in their size in the executive power and in the public affairs. I state quite clearly that I presumed that the Nazis by their work would gain the confidence of the large majority of the people, that meantime the Reich had grown out of their period of youthful exuberance, and that foreign countries would look upon the political development as an internal Austrian affair, without any critical character. I was of the opinion that after that time had arrived, international questions (for example the "Anschluss") would be solved according to the demonstrated will of the Austrian population. The aim of my propositions, however, was to do away with the dictatorship of the Fatherland Front which was in reality the Austrian clericals. Because, though the dictatorship of the Nazi regime in the Reich was opposed, the dictatorship of the clericals of Austria was much greater and more unjustifiable because the clericals who really had the conduct of the Fatherland Front did certainly not control more than 20% of the vote of the Austrian population, but prescribed the remaining 80% their political activities. Obviously the radical "Front" leaders defended their position of power to their utmost against this "Re-democratising", and attempted to influence Schuschnigg with all sorts of political and world philosophical arguments.
In order to explain further developments, I must still mention an event of the 12th of February, which might have facilitated the solution as I had planned. One night I was requested by Schuschnigg to come to see him immediately. In his study Glaise-Horstenau, Zernatto, Strubl, and, I believe, Schmid were assembled. Strubl reported that he had uncovered a plan for a "Putsch" by the illegal Landleadership of Captain Leopold and he had effected the arrest of all the "Landleadership" people. This plan, in itself not a very serious matter apparently without a chance of realization, was for an organic development of Central Europe and for the fulfillment of the Rights of Self-Determination of the Nations as proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson.
I arrived in Berlin in the morning of February 17. Keppler met me. He drove me first to Himmler; this was not foreseen in the program shown me. The visit lasted about 15 minutes. Himmler attempted to bring up police matters which I could not discuss with him for I lacked information, having just been appointed a Minister the day before. Finally he advised me to
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take only very reliable personnel in my Central Telephone Office, which advice I did not follow, for I left everything as it originally was. I never had any objections to having my phone conversations overheard; they were overheard when I was a Minister; it probably happened .similarly to my other colleagues. I suppose primarily that Himmler just wanted to see me personally. Thereupon I rode to the Reich Chancellery, where I was received with the usual ceremony. During my conference with Hitler, which lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and St. Sch. Keppler were waiting in the antechamber; Hitler did not have them called in. I greeted Hitler with the German salute and immediately offered the explanation that he should not be surprised that I, as Austrian Minister, greeted him with the Hitler salute for I considered him, despite the Treaties of Peace, as the Fuehrer of the German Peoples, who led us out of the discriminations of the peace treaties; besides I was also the Austrian Minister and as such, I was responsible for the leadership of the Austrian State. I wrote a record of the most important parts of our further conversation, a copy of which must have been found in the port-folio seized at the time I was apprehended. I related to Hitler the situation in Austria since June 1934 and especially pointed out the ruinous effects of the illegal policy initiated by the Reich upon the Austrian Nazis, upon the foreign policy of the Reich and even upon the idea of Anschluss. Further, I begged Hitler to withdraw the policy of the party and to approve a solution in a common German interest. Then, I presented him with my own program, as I have developed it above, and I underlined as being the most important of all questions, the necessity of rendering the NationalSocialist activity lawful in the frame of Austrian contingencies, and I insisted upon the need of an independent leadership, not bound to the party in Germany, and which would be responsible in Austria. That it was a fact that every National Socialist considered him (Hitler) as the promoter and the propagator of the political idea, but the developments ought to be carried out according to the possibilities of Austria; herself. I gave him my opinion about the principle of totalitarism, the so-called Kulturkampf and told him that the 25 points' program could not be carried out schematically. Twice I pointed out to him that I should be obliged, in my capacity of Minister for Security, to imprison the National-Socialists who would show any illegal activity, and twice Hitler agreed with me. I explained to him the meaning of having a close collaboration between Austria and the Reich in economic, military and foreign political fields, and pointed
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out the advantages of carrying out the German idea from the two sides. I told him finally that I was not ready to accept being the Fuehrer of a "Trojan Horse". I begged Hitler to approve my suggestions and to issue a fitting approval as soon as the organizational preparations would be initiated. Hitler approved all my proposals, but he told me that he was not quite sure that I would be able to carry out all my plans in Austria. He mentioned Sehuschnigg politely, but reservedly. If I remember well, he told me that he intended to invite Chancellor Sehuschnigg and Reichs Administrator Horthy to attend the launching of a Cruiser, which was to take place this summer. He was still uncertain as to the name: Tege-hof would not be good because of Italy, it should rather be Prinz-Eugen. He said also, that there was no reason to worry about the 25 points of the program; one must simply go from'the idea of Volksdeutseh (Volks-German) to the idea of Gesamtdeutsch (Whole German). Thereafter he spoke freely of his various plans, such as the Super-highways, the Elbe-Bridge in Hamburg, etc. I finally had the impression that, although Hitler was not rejecting my proposals, he preferred to wait and see if there would be possibilities to carry them out. I thought then that it would be important to settle up, as fast as possible, the preliminaries of the organization necessary for the establishment of the new status. The realization of the Anschluss was not discussed further than I have reported above. In Berlin, I also paid a visit to Reich Minister Frick (an exchange of words without importance) and Reich Minister Ribbentrop, who I begged to give the contemplated speeches in a friendly tone. On the following night I went back to Vienna.
In Vienna, I contacted Zernatto and then went to Sehuschnigg. I gave him a detailed report and urged him to make a decision. During the following days, I was busy with the taking over of my new departments. I left the charge of the police matters to Strubl, who gave me his report every evening and' I encharged my National-Socialistic collaborators with the task of calling together the National-Socialists in several towns, such as Graz, Linz, etc., to inform them of my plans and of my visit to Hitler. These actions took place with the agreement of Zernatto, and the speech in Linz was broadcasted. I had already spoken over the radio and declared that nobody in Austria ought to believe himself an outstanding Nationalist^ and that I should deeide in the future about the orientation of our national policy. The political life was marked, on one side, by the Nazis still lacking active leaders, now showing their Swastikas openly, still lacking effee-
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tive leadership, except that the former illegal leaders came again on the open since they were no longer branded with illegality; and on the other side by the reaction prevailing against the Covenant of Berchtesgaden in the radical spheres of the Patriotic Front, of which I supposed Schmitz, Vienna's Burgomaster, to be the leader. Thereafter the speeches took place. Hitler spoke of the intolerable persecutions of the Germans in the surrounding countries on account of their German sentiment, but found the future more promising. Schuschnigg spoke of the "hard days" in Berchtesgaden and launched the motto: "Up to here, but not further!" I shall mention that Schuschnigg had previously shown me some parts of his projected speech, but the above-mentioned sentence had not been read to me. That sentence meant a public rejection of my program and that I should be considered by the national opinion as a tattler, whose words were no longer to be taken seriously. From that time on, the National-Socialists began anew to listen to the radical partisans of illegality, but they had the authorization now, thanks to the Covenant of Berchtesgaden, to act publicly for their ideas or at least to show publicly their adhesion to them. Their actions took more and more often the shape of demonstrations. I seriously called Schuschnigg's attention to these facts and I told him that I was, of course, ready to interfere, in my capacity of Minister of Security, against single individuals who were trespassing but that I could not take any measures, according to the role assigned to me by the Covenant of February 12, against National-Socialists manifesting their opinions in the above-mentioned way. I told him in one case that I was forced,to resign. Schuschnigg was well aware of the seriousness of the situation, especially after my visit to Graz, or rather on account of the motives behind that visit. I told him that it could not go on like this. In consideration of Hitler's readiness, steps should now be taken especially in international questions, to settle the matter definitely. Schuschnigg mentioned the difficulties he was meeting in his own camp, and told me that my dismissal was not conceivable. He added that he understood my attitude quite well as the Minister of Interior; well, we should just have to see how we could get along with all this. At any rate, nothing positive was achieved in the sense of the execution of my plans, although I repeatedly called the attention of Zern-atto and Schmid to this. Of course, there were the nominations of Jury, Dr. Dietbock and Ingenieur Rheintaller, who began to build up their spheres of activity, but had to deal, of course, with the most serious opposition from the Patriotic Circles.
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One evening, I was called to Schuschnigg at the Patriotic Front. I suppose this took place on March 8, at any rate on the same day he went to Innsbruck to issue there, on the following day, the plans for a poll to take place on March 13. Schuschnigg laid down his plan to me: to have a vote taken by the Patriotic Front, the theme of which approximately concerned the provisions of the First paragraph of the Bund Constitution. He begged me however to keep this secret until noon the next day. I promised him to do so, although this was contrary to the tasks of a liaison man, but I kept my promise. The plan was, in my eyes, far too surprising and altogether too important to take a stand immediately on it. I asked Schuschnigg whether his intention was irrevocable and, as I was told it was, I expressed the most serious objections, for a poll worked out in such a way should inevitably be considered as an insult by the National-Socialists. Schuschnigg then turned all his attention to conversations with several leaders of the Front, so that I could only converse with Zernatto, whom I told of my great preoccupations. Zernatto was not very well acquainted with the matter. Later on in the evening, I went to my office, or to my legal chancellery, where Jury came to me and explained to me 'anew the plan of the poll with all the details he had learned in the "Front". I told him that I could not say anything about it and that he should come to see me the following day at noon time. On the day after, I presume before the visit of Jury, I wrote a letter to Schuschnigg and perhaps also to Zernatto, in which I explained my position in the matter of the poll plan. In doing so, I perhaps caused a certain prejudice against the Reich's Nazis and against those of Austria, but the matter was so important and urgent ! I declared that such a poll was not deserving of this name, for it did not respect the provisions laid down by the Constitution and was neither based upon the system of a public list of voters nor run in the lawful ways, not even being put under the control of reliable public poll commissions. It was contemplated that all public officials (State or town officials and employees) the personnel of the Railways, of the Post-Office, Telegraph, tramways, etc. and also private institutions of a certain importance (I think those with more than 20 employees) were to participate in the voting, so that the elected people would just have to be brought to a table where they have to say only "Yes" or "No." Neither Freedom, nor secrecy, nor even the right to vote were safeguarded/ Further, it was evident that no citizen of the Bund could vote "No", for he would have exposed himself to a violation of the fundamental laws and therefore to judiciary
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prosecutions. At last, there was then no possibility of expressing one's own political views, and the political purpose of the poll was therefore quite obvious. I asked for the postponement of the voting and for the execution of my own plan; in that way a later vote would be by no means equivocal and would meet general approval, the National-Socialists being .given the possibility of defending their ideas by some addition or by any other means. I handed over a copy of that letter to Jury or to another Nazi Fuehrer, asking him to transmit it to Keppler or to Hitler. That letter was written in an obliging form, which is my usual way, and further I hoped that some means of escape out of that situation could be found.
If I did write to Hitler directly, I also certainly sent a copy to Schuschnigg or to Zernatto. I expressed my point of view verbally, in person or by phone, to Zernatto and to Schmid. Both of them gave me hope and told me to wait for Schuschnigg's return. Even the Nazi Fuehrers seemed to be rather embarrassed, but they approved of my device; at any rate I did not have the impression of a "radicalization" [Radikalisierung] but rather of an "embittering", [Verbitternug]. And I was embittered myself too. I, who always had availed myself of any opportunity to speak frankly, resented a delusion from all these doings. They had no influence upon my personal appreciation of Schuschnigg but I turned from a devoted collaborator to a reserved politician. Schuschnigg came back but I hardly succeeded in seeing him. He and the Patriotic Front were exceedingly busy with the preparation of the poll. In the evening of March 10, Schmid called me up, after I had a conversation with Strubl concerning the situation. The former informed me that the political tension was increasing even in the workers' quarters a certain agitation was spreading out, although it could not be ascertained that it was due to a communistic action. He pointed out that the National-Socialists were showing discipline and obeyed the police orders. Nowhere had collisions taken place; he assured me that the Austrian Police had enough experience and ability to prevent the conflicts. I approved his measures and gave him my agreement to his plans, but I told him that I would be obliged to resign at the first collision occurring between the Executive power and the National-Socialists. He understood this in the sense that I intended to do my utmost to avoid such collisions, but that I would resign my functions in the Security Department and. leave him a free-hand in the other case. Schmid declared to me that he considered the situation to be serious, not from the Police point of view, but politically. T agreed. He asked me, whether I did not
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desire to have a conversation with the Chancellor; I told him that I was awaiting this for several days. Schmid then arranged a conference for me with Schuschnigg, which he attended. I do not remember if Zernatto attended it too. I explained all my thoughts and proposals to Schuschnigg; I told him everything I had learned in the Reich (which meant nearly nothing) and with the Austrian National-Socialists (which meant very little). Schuschnigg seemed obviously preoccupied too, but rather confident in the foreign political situation. Later on, I happened to hear incidentally (not from official sources), that the Burgo-meister of Rome, Prince Colonna, had been in Vienna and had encouraged Schuschnigg in his attitude. I suggested to Schuschnigg to publish my proposals and to arrange the immediate appointment of some National-Socialists into the Ministry; (I was thinking of Dickboeck, although he was only a technician, Jury, Rheinthaller some others into the provincial Governments [Landesregierungen], etc. In that way I felt I was able to summon the National-Socialists, with the support of their leaders, to vote "Yes" at the coming poll. Schuschnigg would have had to postpone the votes for the determination of the intended poll, according to my proposals. Schuschnigg demonstrated a certain willingness for my proposals concerning the admittance of Nazis; he showed more reserve about the international questions. There he wanted to content himself with a general declaration; he was still more reserved about the question of authorizing a National-Socialistic action within the Front. Thereupon, I proposed to him a black-brown coalition; Schuschnigg left the question unanswered, although we were "on edge" about it. It had become late when I left the Offices of the Bund House and received the invitation to come to the Hotel Regina, where Klausner was with several Nazis. I arrived at the Regina about 12 o'clock; a dozen men were gathered in a room, among them several from the Bunds counties. Those whom I knew were partisans of Klausner's tendency. The spirits were highly tensed with expectation. Present were Klausner, Rainer and Globotschnigg; I,told Klausner of my interview with Schuschnigg. He declared to me and the others that, according to a communication from Berlin, the Reich Government had taken a position, and that a messenger was on his way to bring me a letter from Hitler. He was expected the next. morning. He gave me no further details and I had the impression that he personally did not know exactly what position had been taken, but that he only knew that Berlin was not in agreement with the project of the vote. He summoned the attending Nazis to remain accessible to him during the next day. We de-
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cided thereupon to wait for the news from Berlin, for their provisions would be authoritative. I went home. In the early hours of the morning I was called on the phone by Strubl. An important article had just been published by Dr. Jury in the Wiener Neusten Nachrichten (the National paper) which was a sharp criticism by Jury against the vote and which passed along the motto: Do not participate! I had the text read to me; I did not know about its planning and contents. I agreed with Strubl that the article was not an act of hostility against the Government, but of a sharp polemic character. It constituted no reason for the taking of security measures; Strubl should inform Schuschnigg; if the latter was to find the article politically intolerable, he could then have the newspapers confiscated.
It was on March 11th. I dressed with the intention of taking a little walk in the streets of Dornbach and of thinking quietly about the question. About 8 a. m. I was at the Western Railroad Station; I had heard that Glaise had been in Berlin and was expected to arrive with the early train, and I hoped to hear some more news from him. As he was not on that train, I went to the air-field. Glaise had arrived by plane and I was told that a messenger, carrier of a letter of Hitler to me, had driven to the Germany Embassy. I was informed that von Papen had been called to Berlin and I did not wish in this situation to get in touch with a German office before I had received the letter. I asked Dr. Hueber, Goering's brother-in-law, who had come with the same plane, to fetch the letter for me; he did so and brought it to me. Glaise and I read the letter in the car. Glaise told me that the public opinion was highly excited in Berlin, and that military events seemed to be brewing there. In its general contents, the letter repeated the position I had adopted with Schuschnigg and contained the demand to postpone the vote by four weeks, and to have one in the form pointed out in my proposals :
i.e. with a possibility of a decision to have a National-Socialistic vote. The letter contained some erroneous things, which I attributed to lack of orientation, but which I corrected in the discussion with Schuschnigg. The Reich Government demanded that a decision should be reached by noon. I went with Glaise to Schuschnigg and informed him of the letter I had received, and of its contents. The letter stated that, in the case of its rejection, the Reich Government would abandon the position it had adopted on the basis of the agreement of February 12, and would consequently recover a free-hand for any eventuality. A military action was to be understood without any possible con-
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fusion. This was expressedly ascertained in our conference with Schuschnigg. As noontime had now come, I begged Schuschnigg to make a decision before 2 o'clock. Thereupon I went with Glaise into Dr. Fischbeck's office, where I had been told that Klausner was waiting for me. I also found there, I think Rainer, Globotschnig and Jury. I informed them of the contents of Hitler's message, of my conversation with Schuschnigg, and of the terms fixed at 2 o'clock for the decision. Then I sent to Schuschnigg a written confirmation of our interview in the morning. At that time, I went with Glaise to Schuschnigg in the Bund Chancellery. As I was in the ante-chamber, I was called to the phone: Goering wanted to speak to me. He asked me for information about the situation ; I answered that I was just on my way to see Schuschnigg. He asked for a telephone answer but Schuschnigg refused; I transmitted it to Berlin. (I often used to phone to Berlin, especially to Goering.) Goering told me on the phone that the answer of the Reich Government was' that Schuschnigg's resignation was requested. I transmitted this to Schuschnigg with the above described impression of b,eing a switchboard-girl. Thereupon, Schuschnigg was ready to accept the first request; I spoke about this with Schmidt and Zernatto; I thought that this step was coming- too late; the tone of Goer-ing's voice in the phone had been too significant. In fact the news arrived from Berlin of their refusal, and they requested my nomination to Bund Chancellor. I had a new conference with Schuschnigg in the presence of Glaise. We were all very excited. Although our ways of politics had parted for some days, the method used here did not please us. I declared that I had reasons to believe the Berlin people would not give up their resignation request, and this opened the way to forebodings of a possible military conflict. Schuschnigg did not desire to be the pretext to this and he declared that he offered his resignation to the Bund President. The situation was such that I did not feel very pleased with the idea of becoming his successor, and I told it to him. We parted with a hand-shake. For my own part, I declared that I did not wish to participate in any discussions the object of which would concern my own person. I did not do it, despite the frequent requests from Berlin or from the Austrian Nazis, but I left the Bund Chancellery. I was sharply reproached for this later. Buerckel, especially, used this argument to prove the necessity of his functions of Reich Commissary for Reannexation. But I believe that I was right in doing so. I strolled along the streets of Vienna. The agitation was in full swing, on
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account of the imminent vote. Many Nazis wearing swastikas were strolling on the sidewalks. The police was in full control; public order was in their hands. I drank a cup of coffee in a cafe and went to my Solicitor's offices. When there, I received news from Berlin, informing me that I had to go to the Bund Chancellery to manage the things there. I refused. Some time after, there was a call from the Bund Chancellery: Keppler had arrived in a plane and I was asked to go there right away. I followed this suggestion, in order to help Keppler with my advice. He suggested I go with him to Miklas, which I refused. I stayed in the Pillars Room [Saeulensaal] near Schuschnigg's study. Miklas hesitated to accept Schuschnigg's offer.of resignation but it had already been announced on the radio. Thereafter, Schmid and Zernatto came to me and we had a rather long conversation together upon the situation. Both declared that it was quite clear to them, that Berlin wanted to bring the matter to an end and would do so. The Austrian System was to be liquidated, everybody saw this clearly, even Schuschnigg. The best course would be that I take over the functions of Bund Chancellor; this solution would be a guarantee for a lawful development of the situation; this was important in the viewpoint of international policy and would give the hope for a "half tolerable" progressing of the matter. I was rather well-prepared for the first eventuality (I still remembered the Putsch of July 1934) but as for the second one, my experiences of the last days had made me- skeptical. I declared that I preferred to "let the things come to me." After repeated interventions of Schmid and Zernatto, the question of who,could be taken into such a Ministry was posed. I suggested Strubl, to retain his functions of St. Sch. of the Security. Keppler had shown me the rough-copy of a telegram (a hint of which had stood in Hitler's letter, but I had considered it of no interest to me) in which I was supposed to act as "Provisional Government" and to request the invasion of Austria by the German Forces on account of outbroken or impending inner disorders. I told Keppler that this would be contrary to my opinion and to my duty: I primarily wanted to deal with this matter to support politically, and in lawful ways, the Anschluss questions, which was here incidentally posed. A provisional Government never was a lawful Government, and speaking of disorders which did not exist at all, would only pretend that there was such an opposition against the Anschluss, that it would not help; the Patriotic Front was anyhow unable to hold its position. At about 6 p. m., as I was standing in the antechamber, Keppler came to me
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again and tolji me that Berlin was insisting. I was ushered into a room apparently to have a conversation with Schmid. Keppler told me then: "What shall I do ? What shall I say to the Berlin people?" I answered him: "Well, you know my position, do what you want." In the further course of the evening, I no longer heard of that telegram and nobody ever mentioned it to me. The matters were apparently decided already. Furthermore, Schusch-nigg's resignation was considered as a matter of fact, and so was the fact that Ender should not be called into office. Ender was a "christlich-sozial"s Fuehrer of Vorarlberg into whose Ministry I should have entered as Vice-Chancellor, according to an idea of Miklas; this idea would not have been so bad, for I appreciated Ender very much. Later on he was arrested, and I took energetic steps to have him liberated. The overwhelming argument then was a declaration of Strubl, who declared that he could no longer guarantee the intervention of the Police forces against the National-Socialists; in Vienna, many Police officers had already adopted the wearing of brassards with the Swastika. Even General Schilhasski is said to have declared that a successful use of the Bund Army could not be relied upon. I learned later on—and this confirmed my opinion about the non-necessity of an invasion of Austria by German forces—that the Police of the other laender of the Bund arid their various administrations had declared themselves for the National-Socialists, and Nazi Fuehrer, had appeared everywhere among the provincial Governments where they really took over functions. About 8 p. m. I spoke of one of these cases with Strubl; he said that there had been no clashes anywhere in the country; there remains little to be done, only that orders should be given for the maintenance of order. Later in the evening, the impression was that Miklas and Schuschnigg were awaiting some event to be a motive for the resignation of the government and to start it. Apparently they were awaiting the German invasion. About 7:30 p.m. Strubl came and told that he had just been informed by a frontier-post, that German troops had crossed the, frontier. (In fact the crossing took place only half an hour before midnight) I expected everyone to say "Well,
. good" [Na, also] ! And the prepared gesture of departure happened: Schuschnigg made his famous speech. He had hardly finished when several gentlemen came to me, (among them Schuschnigg's political secretary) and Schmid I believe and they insisted upon my going to the microphone and announcing that I was taking over the Ministry of Interior and Security and would provide for peace and order, or else there was the danger of con-
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fusion. I thought that the rule was that a resigning Minister was still responsible for the running of the affairs of his province until his successor is appointed, if no other stipulation was decided by the Chief of the State. But the general resignation of the Government was not clearly expressed, so that I urged, in my well known radio-speech, the maintenance of good order. Thereafter Miklas promoted me to Bund Chancellor; until then, I had not moved a finger to attain that. Who else could have been chosen? I remembered my talks with Schmid and Zernatto. It was now necessary to build up the cabinet. I contacted my collaborators. Miklas, Schuschnigg and other present former Ministers present had retired into the small Council room. As I heard that some Nationalists with Swastikas were also going there, I ordered the evacuation of the room and placed sentries of the Bund Army around the room. I went into the room myself. Schuschnigg gave me his support for my building up the new Ministry: he saw the list I had made, found it useful and advised Miklas to accept it. He did so, and the taking of the oath was set for the next day. I invited Schuschnigg to take him home in my car. The streets were congested with people; emotional explosion of the outsiders was to be reckoned with; Schuschnigg and the directress of the Ladies Section of the Patriotic Front took a seat in the back of the car. I took a seat in front of them in the additional seat of the closed coupe and« saw them safely to their- home. I still took care of Schuschnigg later on, although I paid him no visits, for I had soon noticed that my interventions would have been observed distrustfully by someone (Heidrich) of the Security Police. My collaborator, Dr. Wimmer, visited Schuschnigg in my place. Besides Goering also concerned himself with the realization of his wedding intentions. On two occasions, I could also interfere: after the affair of the "Protectorate," Hitler came to Vienna. He asked me about Schuschnigg; I told him that I saw no reasons for the intended prosecution of Schuschnigg to take place, for he had only acted in conformity with the duties of his functions, though he always was awkward in his policy, his political attitude could not be a motive for a prosecution. Hitler then said nothing. Shortly after Buerckel made an unfriendly . remark, that the prosecution against "my friend" Schuschnigg should not take place. On February 1st, 1945, I was in Berlin for a report. I was waiting in an anteroom of the Fuehrer's bunker. Then the Chief of Security, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, came to me and told me that he had a proposal to make to the Fuehrer about Schuschnigg. The latter was in Sachsenhausen, and the
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gamp was to be evacuated. 1 told Kaltenbrunner that they ought to take Schuschnigg to Southern Germany and to let him remain in the camp until the Americans overrun it, for Schuschnigg would never do anything against Germany. Kaltenbrunner answered that he would propose this project to the Fuehrer, and tell him that it was mine. As far as I have learned, that is the way it happened. On that night, Himmler came by plane to Vienna; he was received by Kaltenbrunner, whom I intended to assign to a post in the Police, for he had shown himself always very loyal to me.
On March 12, early in thé morning, I called Hitler over the phone. I told him about the invasion by German troops and expressed the opinion that it would be better to make a kind of mutual and common action out of this, even if this had but the character of a mere gesture from the part of Austria, to demonstrate that, from now on, the Germans of both States would be going together. Hitler approved. Thereupon, some Austrian troops marched into several German towns. Then I had a conversation with Miklas. I informed him of my talk with Hitler and told him that the latter had begged me to come to Linz; he "wanted to drive there this very day. In that conversation, we both were agreed that the present situation was a transitional one, the definite composition would, of course, depend on Hitler's decision.' We talked about the possibility of the approaching consequences for the State, and we recommended the avoidance of taking illegal measures in fear of international difficulties. In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and drove then to meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the evening. I never saw such an enthusiasm. The welcome was spontaneous and of no. precedence. In my welcoming speech, I declared that the article 88 of the St-German Treaty was no longer binding. (It prohibited the Anschluss, and was a public contradiction of the Right of selfdetermination proclaimed by President W. Wilson as the basis of future Peace. It was an injustice especially for Austria). The prohibition of the Anschluss was largely responsible for the events in Central Europe since 1918. I always insisted openly that this was an injustice, as well when I was Councillor of State and lateras Minister in my speech broadcast in Linz. My position was: I saw in Austria's independence and autonomy the right for the Germans to decide whether they desired to be incorporated into the Reich. After the demonstration, Hitler retired. He told me he would go immediately to Vienna, to discuss the further developments; but he made no allusions. The unanimous, really over-
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powering demonstrations in all parts of Austria and in all classes of the population were made with the motto: One people, One Reich, One Fuehrer. I believe that Hitler under that influence decided what should be done the next day. I drove back in the night from Linz to Vienna with the car.
On March 13, early in the morning Strubl came to me and begged me to accept his resignation and his quitting of active Police services. I let him know that he had been called into my Ministry by myself, with the approbation of the Bund President, and that he enjoyed my confidence. Besides, I considered Strubl as a quite loyal and also well experienced man. I told him that I was not fond of losing my people, but Strubl begged insistently that his wish be satisfied; he pointed out his resolution was the result of a conversation he had with Himmler. I suppose that Himmler would have made a reference to the probable developments of the events, (but Strubl did not say a word of this), and the consequences he could expect for himself, for he was the man the Nazis hated most.. I gained the impression that his own personal welfare was at stake, and that he had no longer the energy to retain his functions. I granted him his wishes. I was, later on, often urged to start in prosecutions against Strubl or, at least, to suppress his pension, which I refused. Thanks to my intervention with Himmler, the only measure which was taken was abatement of 25 per cent, which was the mildest measure against outspoken political opponents. Later on, I once met Strubl in Kassel, he told me that he was getting along well and was contented. Under the circumstances, the successor of Strubl could be no other than Kaltenbrunner. My proposal for his nomination was accepted by the Bund president and Kaltenbrunner was sworn in as St. Seh. for Security. On that occasion, I had a conversation with Miklas. The picture was still getting clearer to our eyes, and there would also be state-political consequences. I think that it was then that Miklas declared that according to the Constitution legal procedures could be followed to attain the goal and that he would not be an obstacle to them. .About noon St. Sch. Stuckart came from Linz by plane. He was bringing a proposal for a reannexation Act of Austria to Germany and the Fuehrer's wish for a prompt execution of it. This was the adequate clarification of the situation and would have a favorable effect in the international point of view. Ribbentrop, who was in London, had reported that the situation was looked at calmly there and that any lawful decision would be appreciated. I think that my Foreign Minister, Dr. Wolff brought me similar informa-
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tion. I gathered my available friends and collaborators and dispatched Wolff to inform the Bund President that I would come and report to him as soon as possible. I must say that we all had gained the conviction that the high time for the Anschluss, our goal of long time, had now come. The undeniable enthusiasm among the Austrian population at the arrival of Hitler and the German troops was a proof that the population had the same thoughts. There only remained to ascertain whether the present situation would cause objections to arise against the realization. We saw the matter in this light: It was evident that the situation would bring a close relationship and a deep exchange of influence between Germany and Austria. Now already liaison men were coming steadily from the Central Departments of Berlin who con- , tacted the Austrian Ministries and Offices. It certainly seemed better that the Reich formally take the full responsibility, as they were at any rate expected to exert their full influence. Very likely this would bring the best results for Austria. In fact, our
600,000 unemployed workers found employment in the shortest time. A rejection would have resulted in a critical situation, and I could not have brought myself to it unless I had been personally convinced that there were extraordinary reasons e.g. a danger to the Reich, and the denial of the "accomplished facts" would only have brought about greater difficulties instead of preventing them. The allusion of former Foreign Minister Schmid on the 11th, that we should keep matters in our hands in the interest of a more favorable development, was also not to be disregarded. The international situation was good; there were no threats of complications and the conditions for a development in lawful ways existed. Anyhow things had not developed as I had expected them to do; they could have worked out in an easier and more natural way. I dare say by an automatic development, but there was no reason which could have given us the right, the possibility, or the will to deviate from the realization of the deepest national desire of every German in Austria. I called up a Council of Ministers, after having been told by Wolff that the Bund President would make no difficulties against that realization; he was to return to his home in the meantime and should await me there. On my proposal, the assembled Council of Ministers, assembled in the meantime, adopted the proposal of the bill to which my law section had made some formal modifications. The votes on the 26th of April had already been planned in the first draft. According to the provisions of the Constitution of May 1st, 1934, any fundamental modification to the Constitution could be decided
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by the Council of Ministers with the approbation of the Bund President. A vote or a confirmation by the nation was in no ways provided for. In the case where the Bund President would, for any reason, either have resigned his functions or be for some time impeded in fulfilling them, his prerogatives were to go over to the Bund Chancellor. I went to the Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The President told me that he did not know whether this development would promote the welfare of the Austrian Nation, but that he did not wish to interfere and preferred to resign his functions, so that all rights would come into my. hands, according to the Constitution. The possibility of my dismissal or resignation were only slightly mentioned and recognized as quite inopportune in the prevailing situation. I shall mention here that I happened to hear, later on, that it had also been thought, at that time, of a Military Government and that a Reichs German was even considered being appointed chief of the Civil Administration. .This man, in fact, presented himself to me a few days later, to tell me that he did not see now the necessity of his taking over such functions, with which I agreed. He did not carry out any functions and hardly made an appearance. Then there were some letters exchanged between the Bund President and myself, confirming our conversation and his retirement. Thereafter I drove to Lenz, where I arrived around midnight and reported to the Fuehrer the accomplishment of the Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much impressed by it; for a while he remained quiet, then tears dropped from his eyes down his cheeks. He said that he was especially happy because his motherland had achieved her annexation to the Reich without any shedding of blood. St. Sch. Stuckart and my Sch. of State Dr. Wimmer, were present. Hitler added: "Yes, a good political action saves blood." I had the conviction that this idea has been the very basis of his actions and of his policy in the direction of the State. I begged him then to accept my retiring from my functions, and my returning to my solicitor's duties, as the very tasks of my political wishes were now achieved. Hitler reserved his decision on this. The following morning was occupied with the reception of visitors from the Reich. , The Euehrer came to Vienna in the afternoon. In all villages and towns alike, there were huge crowds of people massed to cheer Hitler wildly. For several hours they filed by in front of the Hotel Imperial. No official, technical discussion took place. On the 15th there was a great demonstration on the Heldenplatz: there and in the Ringstrasse, over 500,000 or 600,000 people were massed. The enthusiasm was indescribable. I met the
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Fuehrer at the Hotel ; he asked me who was expected to make the speeches? When I told him that I intended to make a welcome , speech to him, he asked me to show him the#draft of this speech. I showed it to him; its contents are well-known; they were the true expression of my personal feelings. Hitler declared himself satisfied, gave it back to me and spoke for some time with the persons around him; I think that they were Himmler, Frick, perhaps also Lammers and some others. Later on, I was told that he had decided to have me appointed to the post of Reich-Statthalter [Governor]. As we were standing on the speaker's platform, he had somebody announce: "Now the Reich Statthalter for Austria will speak, Mr. Seyss-Inquart." In the afternoon, after a parade of troops in Austrian and German uniforms, the Fuehrer left Vienna by plane. I was the Chief of the Civil Administration.
Then there were more and more influences exerted from the Reich, and Buerckel steadily gained more power. He gained hold of the Party and with it the whole politics, together with press, propaganda, church and Youth matters, etc. Later on he was appointed Reich Commissioner for the Re-annexation. I was not personally placed under his command, but I was bound to his decisions in matters of re-annexation; things then went in the following way: the Central Departments of the Reich addressed themselves to Buerckel's Staff, who in their turn, called the Austrian charge d'affaires [Referent] to them. I' had to lead the current Civil Administration as a secondary Department, and to adapt my methods to Buerckel's in order to yield more influence. His decisions did not reflect technical ideas, but they were based on political viewpoints as he understood them, all according to the impression he wanted to make upon Berlin or Vienna. On April 18, I explained my viewpoint about that situation to the Fuehrer, in the presence of Buerckel, and laid down the unfavorable results of'these methods; after a long discussion, Hitler agreed with me and said to Buerckel: "If things go on so, the joy of the Austrian people for the Anschluss will soon turn into weariness of the Reich." But there was little change. Later on, however, it became more and more difficult for me to approach the Fuehrer. Evidently this was due to Buerckel and to Heidrich; notwithstanding, the fact that they were not good friends to one another.
This assimilation did not worry me in the long view; I was sure that the genuine Austrian particularities and qualities would in fact find their place after some time. Although wartime was no propitious time for administrative innovations many institutions
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were built-up in the whole German Reich based on Austria's example during the war; previously, the very same Austrian institutions had been abrogated in Austria etc, and. replaced by Reich's methods! Examples: Social-insurance and educational matters. Of dourse, such transformations would have. been more easily carried out in peace-time. I believe that Hitler expressed himself sincerely when he declared at Helden-Platz, on March 15th, "That the return of Austria to the mother-nation would be the greatest realization of his lifetime". But evidently he intended to make still greater ones in the future!
The poll on 20 April was a practical demonstration of Austria's unanimity for the Anschluss. It would be foolish and false to assert that this was not the real will of the Austrian people. There were enough neutral observers in our country who could prove the contrary. All arrangements made for the voting (processing, lists, commissions and votes) were quite within the limits of the Constitution; the voting was free and secret. The commissions were composed, not only of "old fighters" but also of State and Town Officials. Buerekel had given orders, on April 18th—at the time when I was on my way from Innsbruck to Graz —that the Party should collect the results of the polls and report them first to him. As I learned this on April 19th, I demanded the immediate cancellation of these orders, for in the eyes of the Fuehrer I would refuse otherwise to be responsible for the smooth, legal evolution of the voting. Buerekel cancelled them. It is possible that some contested votes were interpreted in favor of the Nazis and of the Anschluss by the cheek-commissioners, but this can only represent a very small percentage. It is true that there was no official counter-propaganda and that our propaganda was overwhelming. Even the high Ecclesiastics had made a positive appeal. The Germans of Austria did not express their vote as much out of Party political reflections as out of their very heart's desire. This desire will always prevail. The annexation of Austria - has been recognized by the foreign Nations. Therefore, the events of March 1938 are a finished and acknowledged matter of fact.
Before finishing, I want to put anew the question, whether another solution was possible in the situation of Austria? Even today, I come to the conclusion that my personal plan would have met with success, not as to its final goal, but in its methods and policies, if the Austrian State's leadership had thought of a solution in the sense of national opposition. They acted in their own responsibility. My removal had no other reason. For my own part, I always played with an open hand; Schuschnigg was certainly never deceived by me. The reasons why my devices were
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not "adopted are because the Patriotic Front (which meant Austrian Clericalism) would not see Austria going side by side with a Germany under the hated Nazi leadership and bringing her help and advantages; and because Hitler did not wish to secure the political existence of Austrian Clericalism by giving his consent. The two above mentioned considerations never worried me, for I thought only of'the interests of all the Germans. When the Anschluss was achieved, I felt very thankful towards the Fuehrer.
When I consider my own behavior at that time, I recognize that my mind and my actions were always inspired basically by my "all-German" i feeling, which ought to have led to a reasonable and passionless policy, and eliminated a disputed question instead of creating a new one. And, of course, I did not like to cease working before my work was finished, this is easy to understand. The disappointing experience I had when I saw how the Western Powers dealt with this question showed me that a great energy was necessary for such a task. I was convinced of the possibility of my plan being adopted. A lawful character was given to the final act. Was there not a desire of "being important"? Whoever is not, more or less, ambitious ? Perhaps only he who was born to be a perfect wise man, or he who has already gone through a long and bitter lifetime of experience. I was not born to Tie "wise" and the era of bitter experience was not standing behind me, but in front of me, just as with every German. I think I can say, at any rate, that a desire of "being important" never overwhelmed my feeling of responsibility.
That is how I have described the events from July 1934 until March 1938, as far as I know them. I had to write them from my memory, without the help of any documents or other means. They may be, therefore, somewhat incomplete, but I wrote, them according to the best of my knowledge and conscience.
Nürnberg, 9 September 1945 [signed] Seyss-Inquart