ters on the 27th of February 1944 ?
A I recall that Antonescu visited the Fuehrer'several times, every six months or so, and I believe that at the beginning of 1944 he did visit the Fuehrer. military discussion? this. When Antonescu came, the Fuehrer explained the military situation to him that is, he invited him to take part in the so-called noon military discussion--of of the situation. I don't recall the exact date now, but there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu took part in a military discussion of the situation. tical nature with Antonescu?
A These discussions begas as follows: Either the Fuehrer was alone with him, or perhaps I was there. Then the others withdrew, and the Fuehrer and he had a long political discussion.
Q Did Doenitz take part in these political discussions ? these political discussions with Antonescu. Sometimes, very occasionally, that was the case, but that Admiral Doenitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu I can hardly believe.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions. BY DR. SIEMERS (counsel for defendant Raeder): a discussion between you and the Japanese Ambassador Matsuoka. The document carries the number 1877-PS, and the number USA Exhibit 152. It is on page 1007 of the German court record. following passage concerning Raeder:
"The Reich Foreign Minister returned once more to the question of Singapore. In view of the Japanese fears of submarine attacks from the Philippines and the interference of the English Mediterranean and home fleet, he spoke once more with General Admiral Raeder. Raeder said to him once more with General Admiral Raeder.
Raeder said to him that the English fleets in this year were so busy in British home waters and in the Mediterranean that they could not spare one single boat for the Far East. The American submarines Admiral Raeder considered so bad that Japan did not have to worry about them." proke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan, or about the value or uselessness of American submarines. I should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there is some error here as to the person involved in this discussion.
A That is altogether possible. I do not now recall either that I ever spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. We had only very loose connections with Japan. have had that from the Fuehrer, and he must have induced me to say that. I could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know about them things. However, I do know that the Fuehrer spoke to me several times about points relating to Japan, so it is possible that this originated with the Fuehrer. I do not know who has testified to this.
Q This document carries the title, "Notes on conference between the Foreign Minister and Matsuoka."
A Oh, Yes, I have seen that. Then it is possible that the Fuehrer said that, in fact, I consider that probable, and it can be that some mistake was made in the notes.
Q. Witness, did you inform the defendant Raeder of such political discussions that you had with Matsuoka?
A. No, that is not possible.
Q. Did you ever speak with Raeder about other political questions or have him present at political negotiations?
A. No, that was not our practice at all. Rather, the Fuehrer kept military and political matters strictly separate so that a military man never had an opportunity, through me, to discuss political matters, and I, as Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military matters at my office.
If there were discussions, they took place at the Fuehrer's headquarters. These matters were very sharply separated. If such discussions took place at all -- and at the moment I can't remember any -- then they were always at the Fuehrer's.
DR. SIEMERS: I thank you. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, Baron Steengracht, whom you had as a witness, answered my question as in whether the high military men were informed of political matters in the negative. I ask you now whether you, as Foreign Minister, oriented the high military men in political matters.
A. No, I must anwer the question as I answered the previous question. That was not our practice. All the political and military matters came in contact only at the Fuehrer's. The Fuehrer told me what I had to do in a diplomatic and political field, and told the military men what they had to do militarily. but it happened only seldom, and what the military men had to know of a political nature they never found out from me, but if they found it out at all, they found it out from the Fuehrer.
DR. LATERNSER: No further questions. BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA):
Q. Witness, did you have an order, on the basis of which you informed the SA leadership of the development and treatment of foreign political matters?
A. The SA? No. There was no such order.
Q. Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at all?
A. No.
Q. And then I should like to ask another question for my colleague Dr. Sauter who is sick. in which von Schirach was discussed and the question of accusing him before the Volksgericht was brought up?
A. Yes.
Q. what consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht have had?
A. I cannot say, of course. I do not know the details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made the suggestion to Hitler that Schirach should be brought before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I don't know the details. However, I, in my turn, said that this would make a very bad impression, particularly in a foreign political way, and I know that the Fuehrer then did not give Himmler any order at all. make such a suggestion, the consequences would have been very serious.
Q. How is it that you were witness to this conference, and what was your attitude at it?
A. I have already said that I sold at that time that it would make a very bad impression. I said that to Himmler and Hitler, I am not familiar with these matters.
DR. BOEEM: No Further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the defendants' counsel? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of Nations' declaration of 1927?
A. To which declaration are you making reference?
Q. Don't you remember the League of Nations' declaration of 1937?
A. The League of Nations made many declarations. I ask you to inform me of which you are talking.
Q. It made rather an important one, about aggressive war in 1927, didn't it?
A. I do not know about such a declaration in detail, but it is clear that the League of Nations, like everyone else, was against aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of Nations.
Q. Germany was a member, and the preamble of the declaration was:
"Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence an international crime..
A. (Interposing) Not in detail, no.
Q. It was rather an important matter to be familiar with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on foreign policy, wasn't it?
A. This declaration was certainly important, and it corresponds exactly to my opinion at that time. Unfortunately, the individual people demonstrated that the League of Nations was not in a position to save Germany from disgrace.
Q. Did you continue to hold that as your own view? Did you continue to hold the expression of opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?
A. That was my basic opinion, but on the other hand I was of the opinion that in some form or other Germany also had to be helped.
Q. So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you weren't familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail with the BriandKellog Pact?
A. Yes, I knew about that.
Q. Did you agree with the view expressed in the preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?
A. Yes.
Q. I just want you to help us on how you carried that out. Let's take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr von Schuschnigg?
A. You mean in the discussions on the Obersalzberg with Hitler?
Q. Yes, on the 12th of February.
A. At this discussion -
Q. (Interposing) Witness, answer the question first, and then you can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threatswere put to Herr von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that yes or no, and we will go into the explanation later.
A. In that sense, no. I believe that the great personality of the Fuehrer made such an impression of Schuschnigg, and the arguments that he presented, that Schuschnigg finally declared himself agreeable to the proposals that Hitler made to him.
Q. Now, let's just look into that.
A. I personally, after the first talk with Adolf Hitler, had a conversation with Schuschnigg from which I could perceive his reaction to the first conference. This reaction was that of having received a vast impression from Hitler's personality and attitude. Schuschnigg, in this conversation, emphasized to me that this conversation with Hitler took place in a very friend ly way and that he, and I quote him, regarded this as a historical occasion by which the two people should be brought closer together.
Q. Who were present at the Berghof -- I don't say in the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler, yourself, the defendant von Paper, the defendant Keitel, General Sperrle, and General von Reichenau?
A. I believe that is so, yes.
Q. And on the morning of the 12th, I think that Hitler and von Schuschnigg were together for about two hours before lunch in the morning, isn't that so?
A. I don't know the time precisely. Anyway, they had a long conversation.
Q. And then, after lunch, von Schuschnigg was allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, isn't that so?
A. I can't say that precisely, but it is possible.
Q. Then, after that, con Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt were called before you and the defendant von Papen, isn't that right?
A. I don't remember that. I don't believe so.
Q. Don't you remember that? Just think again.
A. Do you mean -- then I didn't understand the question, perhaps.
Q. Then I'll put it again. After a conversation that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you and the defendant von Papen and had a conversation with you, about which I will ask you in a moment.
Now, isn't it right that you and von Papen saw von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?
A. No, I don't believe so. I don't believe that is true.
Q. Don't you remember exhibiting to von Schuschnigg a typewritten draft containing the demands made on von Schuschnigg? Now, just think.
A. That is altogether possible. Hitler had dictated a memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg, yes, but I am not sure any more of the details.
Q. What memorandum -
A. (Interposing) Let me add that I do not know about this and I must add for the better understanding of the thing that at this time I was not at all oriented regarding Austrian problems because Hitler handled these matters personally, and I, for a few days -
Q. (Interposing) If you hand someone a memorandum at what you have described him as saying was a historic meeting, presumably you can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum contained. What were the points in the memorandum?
A. Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in detail. This whole meeting Teas one between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, and everything that was agreed to there was suggested to the Fuehrer by someone else, or was suggested by the Fuehrer himself and then dictated. I did not know the details. I only know that it was a question then, first of all, of bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria, because National Socialists had been arrested in Austria and thus the relations between the two countries had been greatly troubled.
Q. Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it back. Weren't the three points the reorganization of the Austrian cabinet, including the appointment of the defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis convicted of crimes; and thridly, a declaration of equal rights for Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland Front?
Are these the points that you were putting to von Schuschnigg?
A. That is more or less correct, I guess, although I don't remember exactly. That would correspond to what I knew about Austrian matters at that time.
Q. And did you tell von Schuschnigg that Hitler had informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final demands of the Fuehrer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?
A. I can't recall it in exactly those terms, but that is possible. It is possible that I told Schuschnigg something to that effect.
Q. Did you say, "You must accept the whole of these demands"?
A. No, I don't believe so. I exercised no pressure on Schuschnigg at all I know that this conversation lasted from an hour to an hour and a half and was confined to generalities and also personal matters. From this conversation I had a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg's personality and could not have exercised any pressure on him.
Q. You told us that before, and I am suggesting to you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that.
Don't you remember Herr von Schuschnigg turning to the defendant von Paper and saying, "Now, you told me that I wouldn't be confronted with any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden," and Herr von Papen apologizing and saying, "That is so. I didn't know you were going to be confronted with these demands.)
Dont you remember that?
A No, I don't. Also, that cannot be true. Hitler again and Guido Schmidt remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you were putting?
A That is quite possible, that changes were made. I don't remember the details, though. Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply with these demands within three days? for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you some document.
Are you sure you didn't hear that Hitler told Schuschnigg he must comply within three days or Hitler would order the march into Austria? military and political pressure? There could be no other pressure than suggesting marching into Austria, could there? at that time, that would have been a pressure, certainly, but in the long rum it would have been impossible to find any solution between these two countriesif they had not come closer together, and I, I should like to emphasize, always stood on the view that these countries should enter into close relations, and I had in mind a customs union. that took place on the 12th of February. Don't you know that Schuschnigg said "I am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I can only sign this protocol subject to reference to President Miklas?" Don't you know that?
A No, I don't remember that in detail.
Q Don't you remember Hitler pointing to the door and calling Keitel?
A No; I have already heard about that here.
Q You know it is true, don't you?
Q You know it is true, don't you?
A No, I don't.
Q Don't you remember Keitel going in to speak to Hitler?
A I have already said I haven't heard about that. I don't know about that. dition that within three days these demands would be fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?
A No, that I didn't know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness had the German document book in front of him. I tried to get most of the pages agreeing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken). BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Witness, will you look first, at the defendant Jodl's diary, the entry for the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop document book page 9, U.S. 72, 1780-PS. The entry is as follows:
"In the afternoon General K."--that is Keitel--"asks Admiral C."-that is Admiral Canaris--"and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for those deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval." hold of rumors or gossip, is it? That is a definite order, a superior order to General Keitel, isn't it?
A I don't know anything about any military measures, so that I couldn't pass any judgement about the value of this note. The Fuehrer did not inform me about any military measures.
part handling the document, and that Hitler never said a word, to you about what he was arranging with the defendant Keitel, who was also there?
Q Well, now, just look at the next entry for the 14th of February:
"At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." these military measures or the effect on Austria?
it quite possible that the Fuehrer, in order to put more pressure on his wishes, had done something in this field.-
Q Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am putting it to that -- it did contribute -- but surely you as Foreign minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a Foreign Minister, know something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl was saying, that the effect was quick and strong; the impression was created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations. Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria ? not know anything and if I would have known, I wouldn't have had any cause to say now that it wasn't a fact. It is a fact, however, that during the years before and during the days before the conversations between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, I was busy at the time taking over the Foreign Office, and so much so, that as far as the Austrian problem was concerned, I only considered it as being on the edge of foreign political matters.
Q You know -- also you know, you were engaged in the Foreign Office; and my question was perfectly clear -- my question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you didn't know anything about the effect in Austria -- you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich? Now, answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the effect in Austria? serve it in detail. rion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you know nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keiter on the Fuehrer orders? Is that your final answer? time later I went to London, and that is the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair, that these things proceeded somewhat according to the conversations in Berchtcsgaden.
In detail, any special observation according to my recollection, I did not know during these days -- it is possible that I forgot that in the meantime because there were many years between then and now.
Q Just look at the next two entries in Jodl's diary: "15 February. In the evening, an official communique about the positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued." 16 February, Changes in the Austria Government and the general political amnesty." Do you remember me putting to you what Herr von Schschnigg signed -- and the condition was made that the matters would cone into effect within three days within three days there was a conference about the effects and the changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn't it -- three days -- three days -- you still say -
A Of these three days I know nothing. I said that before, but that out of this meeting would have come consequences in the way of appeasing that was a matter of course.
Q You call it "appeasing"? Is that your considered view to the Tribunal that assuming that the defendant Jodl is telling the truth or assuming that the defendant Keitel said that to him, as General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put in hand, isn't that the most severe political and military pressure that could be put on the chancellor of another state
A If one considered the problem from the higher point of view, no; but here we deal with a problem which, under the circumstances, could have led to war, to a European war, and I believe that it is better -- and I have later expressed that to Lord Halifax in London -- it was better that this problem should come to a solution than to be a point of disturbance in the European Continent.
Q I don't want to put words in your mouth. Do you mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Schschnigg so long as the problem was solved? Is that your view ?
A I didn't got that question. May I ask you to repeat it ?
Q My question was: Is it your view that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr von Schschnigg if by that means the problem was solved ? a war could be avoided, I considered that the better way.
for seven years?
A I don't know; at any rate, I believe at that time Schschnigg -- I don't know the details, but he must have taken some steps which were against the interests of the state, but if you say "prison", I know only from my own recollection that the Fuehrer, at many instances, had said and pointed out that Schuschnigg should be treated especially well and decently and that he was not in jail, not in prison, but in a house and that his wife was with him. I could not say more from my own experience and from my own observations of that.
Q You mean "prison". I will substitute for it "Buchenwald" and "Dachau" He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you think he was enjoying himself there? the first time I didn't know it before.
Q Just make a chance -- don't make a chance, but try -- just try to answer my question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for seven years -- seven years ?
Apr-1-M-RT-7-1a
A I could not say anything to that point. I can only say no, only, that in my opinion. what I heard then, he was not in prison but he was confined in a villa and he had all the comforts which he could possibly have or which was possible under the circumstances. That is what I heard at that time. I liked that because he made a very favorable impression on me.
Q There is one tiling he didn't have, witness, he didn't have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had happened at Berchtesgarden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for these seven years, did he? That is quite obvious. with all you say, that he was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but comfortable or not, he didn't get the chance of putting his side of the happenings to the world, did he?
Q You couldn't judge? You know perfectly well, don't you, that Herr von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his account of anything while he was under restraint for these seven years? Don't you know that quite well
Q Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to another subject. I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the dealing with Czechoslavakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of 1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you -- through your ambassador in Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche Party under Konrad Henlein?
A I am sorry but that isn't correct, May I explain that again? document book on page 20 in your book -- it is page 31 in the English bookand listen while I refer you to a letter from your ambassador.
A Which number, please?
Q Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in Prague to the Foreign Office.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant's document book, it is the prosecution's book. I will See that hereafter that is correct.
Apr-1-M-RT-7-2a
Q Now, this letter from your ambassador to the Foreign office?
A Yes, I know about that letter. May I -
Q Just let me refer you to paragraph 1. I refer you to paragraph 3, so you needn't be worried that I shall miss it. Paragraph 1: "The line of German policy, as transalated by the German Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party, My- -(that is, your ambassador)- - directives are to be complied with implicitly.-Paragraph 2. "Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial rights of citizens is to be improved," In paragraph 3, "Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which, in the end, might lead to political complications and adopt the line of gradual promotion of Sudenten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parrallel diplomatic action".
Having read that, don't you agree with me that I put to you a moment ago, that the activities of the Sudenten Deutsche Party were to take place according to the directives?
A May I explain that now? Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is perfectly easy to answer that question yes or no. Isn't it right that that letter shows that the Sudenten Deutsche Party was acting under your directives; isn't that right?
Q Why not?
AAnd that I would like to explain; just this letter testimony of the fact that the things were quite to the contrary. Between the Sudenten Deutsche Party and many offices within the Reich, connections had been established and that was quite natural, because there was a very strong movement among the Sudenten Germans which desired a closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had come to power. These tendencies started to impair the connections between Germany and Czechoslavakia and this letter bears proof of the fact that I desired and attempted to clarify these connections which existed between the Sudenten Germans and the Reich.
Apr-1-M-RT-7-3a and I put to you three times, I think, quite clearly. Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudenten Deutsche Party, were from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that?
A Yes, I deny that emphatically. Just the opposite is the case. This letter means an attempt to avoid the difficulties of the Sudeten Germans and the difficulties which were caused with the Czechoslovak people, and it shows an attempt to bring the matter into a sensible field, which could not be done. ambassador writes to the foreign office and says that the line of German policy as transmitted by the German legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party? What does that mean if it doesn't mean what you have said -- that the party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it doesn'tmean that? to get the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to accept a sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent should not impair relations between them and the Czechoslovak government. That was the sense of the conversation with the embassy in Prague. That is very clearly seen by this letter. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to page 26 of the German document book--page 33 of the English--you will find thenote of the personal talk which you had at the foreign office on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other gentlemen whose names are not so well known. I only want you to look at four sentences in that, after the first one: conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret. And then you refer to the meeting that the Fuehrer had had with Konrad Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind. graph which begins "The foreign minister," and the second sentence is: "It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with the consent of the Czechoslovak government. This, on the one hand,would give the impression abroad that a solution has been found; and, on the other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans."
remarks about Benes, it says:
"The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German Party with theCzechoslovak government is finally this: to avoid entry into the government" -- observe the next words -- "by the extension and gradual specification of the demand to be made." And then you make the position of the Reichcabinet clear:
"The Reichcabinet" -- the next sentence but one -- "itself must refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards London and Paris as the advocate" -- note the next words-- "or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands." the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak government, and the Reichcabinet in its turn would avoid acting as peacemaker in the matter-in other words, witness, that you through your influence on the Sudeten Germans were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no agreement could be come to about the difficulties or the minority problem. Isn't that right? Isn't that what you were telling them at that interview?
Q What would you say these words meant? was the only time--or maybe I have seen him once more; unfortunately, only once or twice--in order to influence him also to assure a quiet development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten Germans went very far that time; they wanted to get back to the Reich. It seemed to me to present a dangerous solution which had to be caught in some form or another before it could lead to a war. Henlein came to see me then. But I want to point out that this was the only time, I believe, that I had a chance to speak to Henlein in detail about these questions. Soon afterwards the whole Sudeten German problem dropped out of my influence. What is in this document, and there is no doubt of it, is the following:
That first I wanted to assure a more quiet carrying out of the problem, so that diplomatically we could support it also with justification; secondly, that we should avoid that suddenly by acts of terror or other wild incidents a situation could arise which would lead to a crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
That was at that time the reason why I called for Henlein. clear the Sudeten German party at that time had very far-reaching demands. They would have liked to see that Adolf Hitler should, send an ultimatum to Prague saying "You have to do that", and that is all. We did, not want it; that was a matter of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful solution of things. Therefore, I spoke to Henlien at that time to find a way in which the Sudeten German Party should proceed in order to get their demands, fulfilled in the end. These demands which I had in mind were demands of a far-reaching cultural autonomy. these gentlemen not to come to an agreement with the Prague government?
A I could not specify that now. That may have come from a tactical consideration. I assume that Konrad Henlein may have made a suggestion at that time and that I just agreed; but in detail I did not know the problems. I believe that it was so that Henlein himself developed his program. That is not said here in detail. I may have agreed to it more or less. I believe that more for tactical reasons it seemed advisable for Henlein not to enter into the government and to assume any responsibilities, butfirst to try in a different direction. ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon knew that there wasn't going to be any question of relying on peaceful measures, didn't you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military preparations for the occupying of Czechoslovakia that autumn?