specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany's military and political positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks, incase of a possible advance westward. and Austria, would constitute the conquest of food for from five to six million people, including the assumption that the comprehensive forced emigration of one million people from Austria could be carried out. both militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, since they would provide shorter and better frontiers; would free fighting personnel for other purposes; and would make possible the reconstitution of a large new German Army. in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset, a revolutionary putsch was attempted, but that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria, and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis, internally, in Austria. in the light of the larger aggressive purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force, in order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally, and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine into motion, and making a threat of force. without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war, and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action, made it possible in the end for them to pluck this plum without having to fight a blow for it.
against Austria. It, again, is "Top Secret", with the added legend in German "Chefsache Nur Durch Offizier," "Chief Matter only to be delivered to an Officer." For War, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg. The importance of this Top Secret directive is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander in Chief of the Navy, was one of only four copies, establishing the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the armed forces. political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack from any side, and also states that Germany does not intend to unleash an European war, it then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, Third paragraph of the German text:
"The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.
"a) to counter attacks at any time.
"b) to enable the military exploitation of they occur."
preparations of a general nature for war. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:
"2). The preparations of a general nature include:
"a). The permanent preparedness for "b). The further working on 'Mobilization without public announcement' in order to both as regards strength and time."
be special preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, which is on Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text:
"I). Special Case 'Otto.'" "Case Otto," as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for aggressive war against Austria.
I quote:
"'Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy.
"The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.
"Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna, and will break any resistance." tions, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the defendants, Schacht and Goering, in November 1937.
DR. FRANZ EXNER: I am Prof. Exner, defending Colonel-General Jodl. I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been treated. This document repeats a document of the General Staff, which prepares for all kinds of possibilities of war. The possibility has even been that you have in this document that Germany might have had to have a war with Spain. part relating to Austria; and in that way, the appearance was created as if it were planned to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities. document should be supplemented by the reading at least of the paragraphs of this document which come after it. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all possible eventualities.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants Keitel and Jodl that they will have the opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any document, parts of which have been put in by the prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism they think necessary then.
does not go to the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of it shall be read. You will have an opportunity later to read any parts of the document which you wish.
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental basis of the objection just stated by distinguished counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken. States Ambassador Bullitt with the defendants Schacht and Goering, in November 1937. L-151, offered as EXHIBIT USA 70.
It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State, on 23 November, 1937. embarrassed, because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got it in German, apparently.
MR. ALDERMAN: I expect you have, yes; you have the German version. original exhibit. On top, is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin on route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Goering, among others.
of the report:
"Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal with Hitler, was not through political discussion, but through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy; and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military field, in which he was intensely interested.
Hiter was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment, he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor inasmuch as -- and that is Schacht's opinion -- it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany."
And for the defendant, Goering's statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering," on Page 2 of that document, the second page, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:
"The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities.
"If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.
"I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied: 'We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous on the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.'
"I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this matter, because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich.
"He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said, 'There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit.
Such a solution is absolutely unacceptable to us, anf for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.'" Goering used the Latin expression "casus belli"; it is not a translation from the German, in which that conversation was carried on.
"I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudetan Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich." accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, recording contemporaneous conversations and events.
My next subject is: Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions by Austria; a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February, 1938. great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was what the defendant von Papen called slowly intensified psychological pressure.
There were increasing demonstrations, plots and conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold, and approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of State of Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
The official communique of this conference is quite calm; I invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is document 2461-PS, the official German communique of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February, 1938, taken from the official Dokumente Der Deutschen Politik, Vol. 6, 1, page 124, number 21-a. the mutual desire to clarify, by personal conversations, the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the defendant von Papen. quote: "Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation." was a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communique of the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1939. Politik, Vol. 6, page 125, number 21-b, is translated in our document 2464-PS. I invite the Court's judicial notice of that communique. Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police.
In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crime.
I invite the Court's judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communique concerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February, 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Vol. 6, 1, page 128, number 21-d. conference, the Austrian Nazi Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single, legal political party of Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?
MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, sir; Document 2469-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is Exhibit what?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn't read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communique.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, sir. Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents. I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.
This document consists of the defendant von Papen's own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is von Papen speaking, in his own notes:
"I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he "--that is, Schuschnigg--" had acted under 'brutal pressure' in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable more pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no.'" And then von Papen says:
"It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
"In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European combinations. This question would be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly."
Thus we have, through the words of von Papen, Schuschnigg's contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him, as recorded by von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry. up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied. in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl's handwritten diary, in German script, which I can't read. It is our document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72. this is his genuine diary in his handwriting. also the fact that for some days thereafter defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement.
It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security. threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas.
I quote from General Jodl's diary, the entries for 11 February, 13 February, and 14 February, 1938.
The entry of 11 February; "In the evening and on 12 February General K "--Keitel--" with General von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
"13 February: In the afternoon General K "--Keitel--"asks Admiral C"-Canaris--" and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
"14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the military p reparations."
The proposals for deceptive maneuver's reported on by approved the proposal.
In the original document that note of Austria make very interesting reading.
I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order:
"1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe.
No troop movements or redeployments.
"2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may "(a) Through C-men in A ustria.
"(b) Through our customs personnel (staff) at the "(c) Through travelling agents.
"3. Such news could be:
"(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of the VII A.K."(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, "(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin.
(As a matter of fact, this is the case.)
" up by saying, "and, incidentally, it is the truth"."(d) The police stations located at the frontier of "(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (Gebirgsbrigade) in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and Berchtesgaden".Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
(Whereupon at 1130 hours a short recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite the preparations for both German and Austrian national socialist. Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the court to take judicial notice of the official German communique covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appeared in the "Documents der Deutschen Politik, Volum 6-1, page 128, Number 21c, a copy of which will be found in our document 2484-PS. in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria - three weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with its quota of further victories - Schuschnigg made an important announcement. plebiscite throughout Austria, the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: "Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and united Austria?" A "Eys" answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German government on 11 July 1936 and who have February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "Yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg government. the Austrian government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi's organization received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation, (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler's approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.
Reiner to Rechscommissioner Buerckel, transmitted, as I have already pointed out, to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence - our document 812-PS, U.S.A. 61.
beginning on page 11 of the German original:
"The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks, he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and SeyssInquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
"Negotiations with the government were not successful. Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer. On the 10th March, all preparations for future revolutionary actions had already been made, and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders. During the night of the 10th and 11th, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the party freedom of action, and that he would back it in everything it did."
Next, Germany's actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.
tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria. indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.
The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl's diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10th March.
"By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring a strong majority for the legitimate party in the absence of plan or preparation. The Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it.
"This same night, March 9 to 10 he called for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Neubauer is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Buerckel, in the Platnik. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at ten o'clock. I follow at 10;15, according to the wish of General Von Wiemann, to give him the orderly draft "Prepare Case Otto."
"1300 hours, General K, which I think plainly means Keitel, informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detailed in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini, and the reasons are developed which afforded the Fuehrer to take action. 1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the commander of the VIII Army, Corp Area 3, 7th and 13th Army Corps, without reserve army.
"Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critcal hour acting as foreign minister. The previous February the defendant Ribbentrop had become foreign minister, and Von Neurath had become president of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As foreign minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force, and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy." That is the end of the quote.
I now offer in evidence our document C-102 as Exhibit U.S.A. 74, captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme Command of the armed forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialled by the defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated, "Hitler mixed political and military intentions."
I quote paragraphs one, four, and five of the directive. First the caption: "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.", with some initials, referring to "Operation Otto." Thirty copies. This is the eleventh copy. Top secret.
"1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed force to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.
"4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give persmission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.
"5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms." USA 75, special instruction number one, directive, 11 March 1938. This was an implementing directive issued by the defendant Jodl and it provided asffollows:
"Top Secret. General. Forty copies, of which this is the sixth. Special instruction number one to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No 427/38 with some symbols. Directive. Our policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.
"1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.
"2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order of Jodl."
Next, the actual events of 11 March in Austria. The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate documents.