A Yes, simultaneously with the request.
Q I shall then briefly return to the problem of the Pravoslaves. You were talking about the fact that you saw yourself in opposition to Kasche and Pravoslaves. Was the conclusion of this problem of especial significance to you as Commander in Chief, and did you succeed in restricting or even preventing the prosecution of the Pravoslaves.
A I did everything possible to counter the endeavors from Zagreb which intended to start a new persecution of the Pravoslaves. In various communications I pointed out to the Poglavnik that I would consider such an action as in contradiction of my task of pacification. I made it clear to all Croatian agencies, that, if necessary, I would use force against these persecutions. And so my troops were instructed, especially in the Pravoslave areas to liberate arrested Pravoslaves if necessary by force. I forbade that newspapers contained proclamations for the persecution of the Pravoslaves, and I had such papers confiscated. The Croatian Ministry of Propaganda no longer dared to take any steps openly in this direction. The later on distributed leaflets. The particularly active Branch of the Propaganda Ministry at Split was warned by me to the effect that I would have it transferred to Zagreb if it went on in this direction and that I might even have it closed down. That caused a storn of indignation on the part of Kasche and the Poglavnik. And even the Reich Foreign Minister who felt himself to be the protector of Croatian sovereignty opposed me and all of them together complained about me. However, since nothing was undertaken against me I consequently stuck to my line of action until the time when I left the Balkans. During my time there was no such thing as persecution of the Pravoslaves, although in many cases the attempts existed for such persecution. On the basis of my knowledge of the situation I am convinced that I saved the lives of many thousands of people.
Q Now, General, let us see. When did Tito start his fight in Croatia?
A Tito started his fight in Croatia as late as the fall of 1941.
Until that date there was peace in Croatia except for small sabotage acts which occurred. When in the summer and fall of 1941 the insurrection in Serbia was smashed, numerous Cetniks and Communists, bands, etc escaped to Bosnia. There they attacked the Croatian garrisons. The German troops stationed there soon intervened in this fight and quite soon after that the first, still very small bands of Tito, appeared. And that was the beginning.
Q What significance did you as German Troop Commander see in Mihajlovic?
A Mihajlovic had an immediate significance because the Cetniks who were in my area were obedient to him. Besides the communication lines through Serbia served my troops which were stationed in Albania. When Mihajlovic under the pressure of German reprisals--it might have been around October or November, 1943--ceased his fights, we knew that his attitude was only one of waiting and that he, as soon as an occasion arose where we found ourselves in difficulty, as for instance the event of landing of the allies in the Balkans would start fights immediately. Therefore, I had to count on a flare-up of a new insurrection in Serbia and that in the rear of part of my Army.
Q General, if I contrast these two people -- Tito and Mihajlovic-and if I may refer back to your statement that Mihajlovic was influenced by the German counter-measures and partically ceased all fights, why did these counter-measures have effect on Mihajlovic but obviously did not have any great effect on Tito?
A To begin with, I must state that in Croatia reprisal measures were only carried out to a very small extent. The reasons why that was possible I would like to enlarge upon on a later occasion. At this time I would like to answer your question to the effect that we knew that the effect of reprisal measures on a nationally minded leader, who considers his own people, would have to be totally different from the effect on a Communist leader who did not have these considerations. The German counter-measures in Croatia did not have a large effect on the highest leadership on the partisans.
They were rather effective concerning the subordinate leaders, the executive agencies, and those parts of the population which supported the partisans. And as such they achieved their aim without doubt.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q General, I now for the moment would like to leave this particular problem, which I would like to designate as the problem of the partisans. I would like now to approach the Italian problem seen from the territorial point of view. In the balance of the area outside of Croatia, which was subordinate to you, the Italians were stationed. Would you briefly describe the situation, please?
A The Italians had occupied in Croatia the coast in a width of from 150 to 200 kilometers, apart from that they occupied the area of Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania. In Tirana, the capital of Albania the headquarters of the Italian 9th Army Group EST was stationed and so was the Headquarters of the Italian 9th Army. This 9th Army was subordinate to Army Group EST and besides the 2nd Army, stationed in the north, partially outside of my area, but above the area of Trieste, etc. Up to the summer of 1943, also the 11th Army in Greece had been subordinate to this army group. In view of the possibility of landings on the part of the Allies, this 11th army was withdrawn from the army group EST and was subordinated to the German Army Group E in Salonika. It is important for my area that the 9th Army in Tirana had subordinate to it all Italian groups in my area with the exception of the 18th Corps in Zarai. The subordination of this Corps has never been quite clear to us.
Q And what about the strength of the Italians in their future area?
AAs far as I remember the strength of the Italians in my area was five to six army corps with twelve to fourteen divisions, besides there were a number of Panzer units and Black Shirt battalions.
Q The prosecution has stated in the opening statement in the territory of Army Group EST there were 51 Italian divisions; is that in contradiction to your statements here?
A Yes, it is. I cannot say whether or not this statement is correct, but if in the sphere of Army Group East there had been 51 Italian divisions, then there would have been in my area more than half Court No. V, Case No. VII.
of this, approximately 28 to 30 divisions. Then one could conclude more clearly the difficulties which were presented to us by the Italian.
Q General, I would now like to deal with the actual taking over of the commandership in Croatia by you. Up to now, you have told us that on 6 August you received Hitler's orders, which have been much discussed here and as a consequence you analyzed the situation there. When did you actually take over the commander in chief's post?
A In the second half of August the staff of the 2nd Panzer Army was transferred from Russia to the Balkans. It was gathered together on the 25th of August and at twelve o'clock on the 26th of August I received the command to take over this new 2nd Panzer Army. I transferred the headquarters to Vrujacka Banja, 200 kilometers south of Belgrade in southern Serbia.
Q May it please the Tribunal, unfortunately I did not succeed in submitting document book I at the proper time. I was promised that that would be the case and I started submitting my documents at the beginning of October, but I believe that due to the fact that photostat copies became necessary for the copies sent from Washington, matters have been delayed. I have been told today that the translations have been completed, but unfortunately I am not in a position to submit all documents today. For purposes of orientation, I would like to submit my document Rendulic No. 1 in order to clarify the channels of command. This is a sketch which I have given to Mr. Rapp at an earlier date and which later on will get its proper exhibit number. Mr. Rapp was kind enough to say he had no objections to this. May I then in connection with this subject put the appropriate questions. I am now showing you document No. 1, which will be submitted later. Thus is a sketch drawn up by you, which shows the channels of command in the Balkans. On this sketch you can see a vertical line; will you give us a short explanation to this sketch?
A This sketch shows the organization of the strength of the forces in the Balkans and it also shows the organization of the administration.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Down there on the left hand side of the line, which is drawn from Belgrade down, we find Army Group F. The sketch shows that the 2nd Panzer Army was subordinate to this Army Group. The sketch further shows that tha 2nd Panzer Army consisted of the 69th Army Corps, of the 15th Mountain Army Corps, of the 5th SS Mountain Army Corps and of the 21st Mountain Army Corps.
Q I thank you, General.
A The 3rd SS Panzer Corps marked down here, was in the Balkans only for a short period. The 2nd Croatian Corps which is also marked here was always subordinated to a German Corps depending on the situation. That is all I have to say in general.
Q I am interested particularly in the line which I have marked vertically.
A This line shows the separation between the troops and the operational departments and the administrative departments. This separation was a complete one seen from my point of view at the 2nd Panzer Army.
Q May it please the Tribunal, may I mark this sketch for identification as 1-A?
THE PRESIDENT: It is agreeable to the Tribunal.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q General, we will now turn to the fighting situation down there; what was this situation right at the time when you took over the post of the commander in chief?
A The fights in Croatia had naturally not been touched by the change of the channels of command. In many areas they were being carried out and surprise attacks, etc., were carried out also. I cannot remember any large scale operations during the first time of my stay there.
Q How did you approach your own task?
AAbove all I was under the impression that I had been put into completely new circumstances and conditions. I did not find it easy to adapt myself. It was all the more difficult to adapt myself on account Court No, V, Case No. VII.
of these conditions having developed without my contribution. I had not been down there to participate in this development. I was under the impression that I had sufficient forces for my task in the area of occupied Croatia. The expected treason of Italy was like a shadow over all my plans and considerations, because in that event a possible new enemy would appear. In any case the area of the army would be doubled. At that time I did not know what forces I would get in that event, but considering the total situation I realized there would not be very many.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The court will recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had this unofficial information concerning the condition of the beat situation in the prison. An effort is being made to keep the cells warm, but there is not sufficient heat there to keep it from being chilly. Apparently it is. There are some boilers being replaced, and they should be repaired and in condition within a week, and if and when these repairs are made it is reported that the cells will be warm. At the present of the ce;;s were fully heated there would not be enough heat for the kitchens and baths. Certain members of the Tribunal have had difficulty themselves in getting repairs for their homes and furnaces, and can appreciate the situation which confronts the defendants, and the heating of the cells in the prison. We hope they will be repaired more promptly than they were for certain members of this Tribunal. If the repairs are not promptly made within a reasonable time may I suggest you make a further report to the Tribunal, and although we have no control over the matter we shall make an effort to see it is remedied, at least as far as any influence we may have can be brought to the attention of the proper authorities.
You may proceed.
LOTHAR RENDULIC DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) BY DR. BRITISH:
Q General, before the recess we had stopped at the discussion of your actually taking over the command of the 2nd Panzer Army and you told us that you had been put into already completed circumstances; what was the consequence of this situation?
A The consequence could above all be seen in the manner in which the troops combatted the partisans. That was a situation which was already established. The troops had for a long time become adapted to this situation.
Another part of the already established facts is the orders and directives which had already been valid at that time for a certain period. There are only two of these orders and directives that I would like to mention, one is the OKW order concerning reprisal measures dated September 1941, and the regulation concerning band warfare dated December 1942. These orders and directives had been with the troops long before I arrived in the balkans.
DR. FRITSCH: May I point out to the Tribunal that this OKW order is Exhibit 53. It is contained in Document Book II. This is Document NOKW 258.
Q General, you did mean this reprisal order, didn't you, the one that talked about ratio figures; may I anticipate this problem and put the following question to you, the reprisal order of one to 50 to a hundred, -- was it ever applied in full?
A No, I do not know of any single instance where this order was ever applied to its full extent. The reprisal measures did only take place very occasionally and then they were kept in far lower bounds.
Q General, may I interrupt you for one moment. I believe the Tribunal is looking for this document. It is Exhibit 53, contained on page 67 of the English version of Document Book II. Will you please continue now?
A If we consider the extent of the area and the intensity of the attacks on the part of the Balkans, and if we also consider the fact that as a rule 12 or more division were constantly engaged in battles then we have to realize, or at least I had to realize when I was under these impressions at the time, -- that these reprisal measures were kept in low and limited bounds, and it was not possible to take any even less measures. Reprisal measures against human lives became fewer until the end they wore applied on very rare occasions.
Q Now, concerning the regulation for band warfare, may I assume that you know this regulation and may I ask you the following; did this regulation of combating the bands have any largo significance?
A For the battle of the troops this regulation was of a decisive significance. All measures are provided in this regulation, in tactical respect, as well as with respect to reprisals. Up until the 7 July 1943 the provision of the regulation had been in force that all captured bandits were to be shot. On the 7 July, that is one month before the 2nd Panzer Army arrived in the balkans, this regulation had been rescinded.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I that point may I mention that the Fuehrer Order which has just been mentioned, and which is dated July 7, 1943, is the order which the prosecution has presented in Document Book XII, as Exhibit 302 on page 98 of the English text as a photostat. This is Document 744 PS.
Q General, did all the other regulations remain valid?
A Yes, all the other provisions of the regulation remained valid.
Q You had further told us that certain orders and regulations had already been in force with your troops before you got there that is before August 1943. What is it that you mean to tell us with that statement?
AA certain theory has been set up here that a Military Commander is co-responsible for those orders, which he passed on in accordance with his duty. What I wanted to emphasize is that these orders and regulations which were of a decisive significance for all events in the Balkans had already been with the military units before I got there.
Q Was it not possible for you rescind these orders and regulations?
A No, that would have been impossible for me. How could one imagine that a commander chief rescinds a Fuehrer order?
I would have had to order that one or the other order, one or the other regulation is no,longer valid for the 2nd Panzer Army, or forbid compliance with the Fuehrer Order regarding my own Army."
The troops would not have understood such an order at all which prevented them from complying orders and regulations made by Hitler. Furthermore, they would have been justifiably under the impression that their own military commander attacked them and knifed them in the back in this difficult struggle in which they found themselves, and they would have thus been under the impression that they deprived of the application of one last urgent means. I am convinced that such an order given by me certainly would not have been followed by men and I would have never been in a position to force anybody to follow such an order of mine.
Q. Did you have any proof for this attitude of the troops what can you tell us about the life of the men, in partisan warfare?
A. I knew very well that everybody in my troops, from the General down to the last man, was very unhappy in the Balkans. There were hundreds of requests concerning a transfer to Russia, although there were all the time the most fierce battles in force. One has to understand that the life of the men in the Balkans bordered to almost unbearable conditions. First of all their activity was not properly esteemed from the military point of view, and secondly they lived in a constant danger, which besides was superfluous.
(INTERPRETER KURTZ)
It is hardly pleasant to assume that behind every bush there is an enemy and expect everybody to fire on you. I myself experienced what the troops felt. To give you one example, on one occasion I dined with the Battalion and the room looked out to the garden. I noted just outside the window that there was a sentry, and I asked why a sentry was there all the time. The Battalion Commander told me we have to have him there because otherwise we can never be certain that somebody will not throw a hand grenade into our lunch, possibly by the people who live next door, who otherwise live quite loyally, but nobody knows what they have up their sleeves. We have had sufficient proof in that respect, and the troops felt most unhappy. That was the impression one had to gather.
Q. General, on this occasion I would like to ask you something; what were the means at your disposal to see that your orders were carried out?
A. I mentioned before that it would have been quite impossible to force anyone to carry out my orders, an order which would rescind a Fuehrer order. The means to force anyone to carry out an order of mine were first disciplinary punishment, where you could appeal in certain cases right up to Hitler. You could appeal, you could put men before a courtmartial. I had to ask myself whether a courtmartial would have been in a position to sentence a defendant because he had not followed my order, but had followed an order given by the Fuehrer.
In that procedure a sentence by the courtmartial in that respect would have lacked any legal basis to have my order carried into affect. It was entirely impossible to invalidate a Fuehrer order which was in force. There was no means at my disposal at all.
Q. General, let me ask you now a question which is not immediately connected with this; according to the regulations of the German Army is the Commander in Chief responsible for what his troops do?
A. Yes, he is responsible, but only for those acts which the troops committed because of an order issued by him on his own initiative. Under no circumstances can he be held responsible for acts committed by his troops which lack the basis in the orders given by an agency which is above him. To give you an example, if my troops on the basis of orders mentioned which had been issued without my interference before I took over my command, and which were with the troops and I was powerless to do anything against them, if in other words the troops acted on the basis of those orders I find it quite impossible to regard myself responsible for those acts and after I think this over, there is in the field of reprisal measures no act committed by my troops which was not based on those orders.
Q. When you looked at the orders which existed at that time would it not have been possible for you at that time to devise a scheme entirely different from the procedure suggested until then in the fight against the partisans?
A. No, that would have been impossible. I had a large number of troops under me, quite adequate for my tasks, but in an order to initiate an entirely now procedure I would have needed so many troops that I would have been in a position to protect every single one of the general objects on roads, on railways, -- that I would have rendered it impossible for the partisans to do anything at all. For that I would have needed so many troops that the highest military leadership would never have given me all those troops, even if they had them, because in that case the aim of the enemy who supported the partisans would have achieved more than they had already, namely to tie down as many forces as possible by the partisans.
In other words, there was little hope of-a not very happy expression, - there was no hope at all to initiate any other procedure.
Q. Now, this opinion, General, applies particularly to the Balkans area, does it not? Now, could you give us any examples by which you could support your opinion?
A. An example about the use of troops which I have just described as impossible for a belligerent state, existed in modern military history on the occasion of the occupation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina by the Austrian troops in 1878. The troops, who at the very beginning were not very strong, had to face heavy fighting against the partisans. These partisans were hunted all over the country, were fought, but it soon became clear with the means which had been employed no early pacification of the country would have been possible. For that reason it was decided, to send Infantry divisions to Bosnia and Hergegovina. These divisions had four regiments each, and amounted to 22,000 men. In other words, twice the strength of the German divisions in 1943. These strong forces in Austria were employed because Austria was not at war at the time. Now, if you were to take the proportion between Bosnia and the whole of any area on the one hand, and the strength of the troops you would have had in the whole area, of the second Panzer Army had to have 150 German divisions in order to equal the Austrian forces. That would have actually amounted to the strength of the whole of the German Army in the East in 1943. With those forces there was peace and quiet very quickly, and then the Austrians were withdrawn and the strength of five or six German divisions were left in the country until the outbreak of World War No. 1. In other words, the country was entirely pacified and the occupation forces were very strong, nevertheless, this strong occupation force was in no position to prevent that on June 28, 1914, that the Crown Prince and his wife were shot at, nor could they prevent attempts on soldiers and railways the possibility of the attacks, and the necessity for reprisal measures are based on the fact that the perpetrators usually could not be apprehended is out of all proportion.
I mean the necessity for reprisal measures does not become surperfluous, even if the occupying power is very strong.
Q. General, one question which as meant quite generally; was the development taken by partisan warfare, which you encountered in the Balkans, a surprise to you, and how far had this development been influenced by the military situation as such?
A. The development of partisan warfare in the Balkans was a complete surprise. This development can only be explained by the development of military technique. Without the airforce, supply of the Balkans from abroad would not have been possible, and that, of course, was an essential source for them to spread their organizations. Without the effective weapons such as tommy guns, the highly effective military condition of certain small units would not have been feasible. Without wireless technic partisans would not have been directed and lead by Tito in this last area. It was only through the development of military technique that partisan warfare spread so vastly as it did. It was my observation that together with the spreading of partisan warfare counter-measures equally developed and grew. In the views held concerning those countermeasures, which are based on concepts of international law going back 40 or 50 years, perhaps have also overcome development and if, as we have heard recently here, we find that other armies also adopted this intensified form of reprisal measures I think I am justified in saying that even in the field of reprisal measures the development of international law is a very general one, and is not only limited to German views.
Q. General, now let us discuss the position in your area; you yourself said that it was not only possible to keep the ratio of reprisals lower and lower and to limit them to a greater extent; can that be true that a new element cropped up in this problem, and if so what element was that?
A. No entirely new element cropped up suddenly. I mentioned the condition of combat which had been pursued also by the partisans. I, with the utmost energy, insisted that the partisans be combatted in a strictly military sense, and in actual fact this was carried out. These forces were fighting all the time. I sometimes would receive very strong forces, even if only temporary. The army itself went out on operations. Time and again we had the necessity that we must get the partisans to come out and fight and to disclose their forces, so that they could be deflected from any other operations, and that was done successfully.
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt just a minute?
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. General, in your answer to an inquiry, the one just previous to the one you just made, you commented on the necessity for reprisals and also commented on the fact that possibly there had been some use of reprisals by other armies than the Germans. Without in any way indicating my personal attitude and in no way binding the other members of the Tribunal, but merely by way of inquiry, if we were to carry on the matter of reprisals that had been carried on to the degree as shown by the evidence here and to the degree it is intimated was carried on by other armies, warfare would become merely a brutal kind of barbarism. Now somewhere along the way there has got to be a stop to that kind of warfare, hasn't there?
A. If I may give you my answer, this after all is not what warfare is about, namely to adapt brutal measures. We ourselves always described them as the ultimate and most extreme methods, and these methods are used only in order to protect and ward off unjustified attacks against which otherwise you have no possibility of protection. I am convinced that if the Russians in Berlin had not decreed that for every Russian soldier shot 50 Germans must be shot, that a great many Russian soldiers would have been shot in Berlin. The Russians did not have at their disposal another method to protect their soldiers, however, strong as the forces in Berlin might have been, because it could never have prevented that someone might shoot from a cellar or window and that somebody might throw a hand grenade after dark. If I have said reprisal measures are a necessity and the development in the whole type of warfare which became so intense in the Balkans, other Armies also availed themselves of that type of warfare, but I only was referring to those methods which are indespensable to protect ones own troops against attacks against which no other type of protection exists.
Q. I appreciate that you had to deal with an extraordinary and unusual condition and with individuals and bands and troops, who apparently had no reason or didn't use it and were extremely difficult to handle.
The thing that disturbs me is that if we are to carry on that type of fighting or punishment against them our whole civilization becomes a barbaric civilization?
A. I don't think that this danger exist, because conditions of that sort where units might be forced to protect themselves only by reprisals are highly exceptional cases.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Doctor.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q. General, perhaps I might in this connection ask you to look at Volume 25; I am talking about Exhibit 570 of the Prosecution, which is on page 53 of your Honor's book, and on page 42 of the German text. It is Document NOKW 1772. This is a letter addressed to the Commanding General of the 15th Mountain Corps; does this letter represent your own views?
A. Yes, the Commanding General had just arrived in the Balkans and made a few suggestions as to how to change our procedure. The changes were mainly concerned with the idea to make an aim to pacify the occupied areas and to give them proper administrations. These suggestions coincided entirely with the view I had myself. But he, from his point of view, could not realize that all prerequisites for the carrying out of these measures did not exist. These prerequisites were to have a large number of forces. Therefore nothing remained to do but to hunt partisans as much as possible and to fight them as much as you could and to disperse their forces all the time. In that respect the letter named gives an insight into principles of warfare pursued at that time.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. General, in your copy you have marked a few passages with red pencil. Would you please read those passages?
A. This is under I to III, the third paragraph on page 54 in the English copy and it reads as follows:
"The present conduct of the war to eliminate the threat of bands is primarily dependent on the strength of available forces. The main target of the fighting must be the armed forces of the enemy. Accordingly, operations must be conducted in such a manner that the armed forces of the enemy are caught, destroyed or at least seriously damaged."
Then in paragraph V on page 55 of the English Document Book:
"It is not necessary to discuss in detail the proposed conduct of the war which aims essentially at 'a conquest by sectors' of sections of terrain and their occupation and pacification because the forces necessary for this are not available. The situation as regards forces necessary for this are not available. The situation as regards forces does not permit the employment of divisions exclusively for occupation and pacification without drawing upon them for other missions."
Q. General, did you want to express here that you by your measures wanted to eliminate reprisal measures bye and bye?
A. The purpose of this constant battle was to keep the partisans on the jump all the time. This letter is an extremely frank one. It refers only to the fight of the partisans against the armed forces. Not one word is said here or reprisal measures or that reprisal measures, for instances, was weakening national strength or to decrease the civilian population, as has been asserted in this trial. Not one word is mentioned here. Had this been intended you may rest assured that in this highly confidential letter this would have been expressed without any doubt.
Q. Let me leave this complex now and go over to something else. This is the question of the Italians. You have already pointed out that the Italian question was an important one to you, and I am sure that at that time you worried about the problem which was imminent. May I ask you first to tell us something about that? First of all, how from a military point of view was the territory which was occupied by the Italians?
A. The mountains which separates the interior of the Balkans from the Coast was entirely in Italian hands. These mountains were a savage country full of rocks and in some cases you had veritable jungles there. The only two roads led to Albania and from Bosnia to the Coast there was a new one and one good road from Croatia to the Coast; and otherwise there were few roads of any value. In the mountain area these roads were extremely difficult to negotiate for a driver.
I want to mention only one instance. The main road to Albania which leads from Southern Serbia to Skutari -that road goes through the mountains with so many bends that at a stretch of 60 kilometers you have 1,200 bends and there is only one read which leads to the Coast along the whole coastal front of 1000 kilometers. This is the small track railroad that leads through Bosnia. Otherwise, in the whole of Dalmatia there is one road that leads up the coast a distance of 170 kilometers and from the Albanian coast the nearest railroad is at a distance of 400 kilometers; but the most important factor in this area was that even with modest means you could block it extremely easily.
Q. Now, what was your situation, General, when you took over this supreme command concerning a potential quitting on the part of the Italians?