Prague, 31st August, 1940.
No. Rpr. 1391/40 Dear Herr Lammers,
Enel. 1. Enclosed I send you the memorandum, which I mentioned in advance in my letter of the 13th of July 1940, No. Rpr. 1197/40, about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian country.
Enel. 2. I enclose another memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same result and with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Fuehrer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and Secretary of State Frank. As I have heard from a private source that individual Party and other Offices intend to submit proposals to the Fuehrer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be grateful to you if you would arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our opinions before
598
3859-PS
the Fuehrer before all sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people.
Heil Hitler,
yours,
[Signed] Freiherr von Neurath.
To the
Head of the Reich Chancellory,
Reich Minister Dr! Lammers,
Berlin, W.8.
Vosstr. 6.
COPY
Enclosure 1
Secret!
Memorandum concerning the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian territory.
I. Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down that that territory from a political and national-political point of view.
From a State-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from a national-political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans.
II. A brief review of the present position from a State-political and national-political standpoint, as it can be seen from the observations and experiences since its incorporation into the Reich took place, will point the path which must be followed to attain the clear and unambiguous aim.
1. It is not as a result of warlike events that Bohemia and Moravia have become a component part of the Greater German Reich. After Slovakia had left the union of Czechoslovakia on the 14th March 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia joined the Greater German Reich on the 15th March 1939 in recognition of the real interests of their country, under the leadership of State President Hacha, and were received into the Greater German Reich in the form of a Protectorate, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the "Anschluss". This evolution differentiates that country fundamentally from other territories in the East, North and West, which have become or are still to become component parts of the Greater German Reich as a result of a victorious war.
2. In this land of Bohemia and Moravia there live some 7.2 million Czechs. The settlement area is almost a solid bloc, once the prevailingly German parts of the former Czechoslovakia had
599
3859-PS
been separated on the 1st October 1938. The small Germanspeaking oases can not alter this materially. The circumstances of a national nature in Moravia and the so often publicized thesis of the completely different national composition of this part of the country cannot be recognized as of fundamental importance for making final decisions.
These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns and communities of over 2000 inhabitants and 3.8 millions in communities of under 2000 inhabitants and in the country, are led and influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion ,to the size of the country. This part of the population also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the population, i. e. small craftsmen, peasants and workmen, adapted themselves better to the new conditions. At any rate, trade and traffic did not come to a standstill. The peasants tilled their fields, whilst workers in all concerns including armament concerns, carried out their tasks satisfactorily. Assimilation to the wartime economy of the Old Reich, and an increase in agricultural production by intensive productive methods were achieved, whilst the specially arduous tasks set this country as regards armaments were completely fulfilled. . .
The machinery of the Protectorate government, and of its officials has also functioned in spite of individual cases of resistance, although it is mostly controlled—at least in higher positions—by precisely those persons who belong to the above-mentioned intelligentsia. .
Even if measured by the most rigorous standards it can therefore be said that this country has—even in wartime, which demanded of both government and people an unexpectedly rapid change-over—carried out its duties as part of the Greater German Reich, in the constitutional structure which has been given to it.
3. But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the government and population behaved in this correct manner because they had accepted inwardly the loss of their independent state and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread longing for a return to -the old state of affairs, even if the people do not express it openly.
600
By and large, the population submits to the new conditions but they only do so because they either have the necessary rational insight or else because they fear the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs for some time to come.
III. But as things are like that, a decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible.
1. The most radical and theoretically complete Solution to the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this country and replace them by Germans. But this solution is not possible because there are not sufficient Germans to fill immediately all the vacant spaces which will in a measurably short time belong to Greater Germany. Even if the urgency of Germanising the Bohemian-Moravian country is recognized and even if it is admitted that it is easier to bring Germans to this area— at any rate from the Old Reich and from Austria—than to Poland, it would probably be impossible to carry out the radical solution in a short while unless we were prepared to allow fields to remain fallow and towns to become deserted. But when we take the total position in the Reich into consideration, that is impossible. To carry out the most radical solution would also r'equire decades.
2. But to attain the objective of filling this area with Germans, a total evacuation of Czechs is not necessary.
If one looks at the population of the present Protectorate area more closely, one is astonished at the large number of blonde people with intelligent faces and well built bodies, people who would hardly strike one unfavorably in Central Germany or Southern Germany, nor to speak of the region east of the Elbe. In view of the great amount of intermarriage with Teutons'which has gone on during the past millennium, I consider it would be quite possible—for this reason if for none other—to leave a large part of the population in Bohemia and Moravia. In that respect the Czechs differ fundamentally from the Poles, and can therefore not be treated according to the same principles. It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the one hand, of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for Germanisation by individual selective breeding whilst on the other hand expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich (i. e., the intelligentsia which has developed in the
744400—47—40
601
3859-PS
last 20 years). If we use such a procedure, Germanisation can be carried out successfully.
IV. In my opinion, therefore, neither can the Czech people be quickly eliminated from this area nor is it proved that such elimination would be in the interests of the Greater German Reich. To decide the question as to what is to be done with each individual member of the Czech people, i. e. whether he is to be received into the German national community for assimilation or whether he is to be kept apart from it, will need many years.
V. There then arises the question : what constitutional form shall this country have during the transitional period, which I estimate at a minimum of two generations, and how is it to be administered.
In accordance with what I have explained above, we have to start from the fact that we must reckon with the presence of about 7 million Czechs who live almost in a solid bloc. For the constitutional form of the Protectorate for the Czech rump State, it was originally points of view based on foreign policy that counted above all. But this form has, after the experience we have gained in close on 11/2 years, proved itself in the field of home politics and administration as well. There is therefore no essential reason to depart from it.
For the administration of the Bohemian-Moravian country by German officials alone we have not got the manpower. Every man who thinks in a statesmanlike and simultaneously practical way therefore has the idea that the simplest way is to let these Czechs administer themselves within the framework of the Greater German Reich and in accordance with its aims, i. e. to leave them an administrative organization of their own and to give them administrative autonomy within the limits just mentioned. And finally, it will be such an administration, in tune with the majority of the population that will best succeed in ensuring quiet and order, and consequently the smooth running of daily life in this area. A German administration modelled on the lines of the German Gaus could not but have a disquieting effect, because it would all too easily be tempted to use administrative methods employed in the Old Reich which would not be suitable here and because—in its whole being—it is much too intensive not to arouse resistance unnecessarily.
Equally, the German administration must continue in the transitional period to limit itself to supervising the actual administration of this country, to laying down guiding lines according to which the administration is to be carried out and to issuing
602
É859-PS
orders to guarantee and further at all times the interests of the Greater German Reich. The activity of the German administration here is thus a governing activity. It is clearly eliminated in the decree of the 16th March 1939. I must insistently warn you against abandoning this kind of German administration before this area has become Germanised. It is simple and clear-cut and entails intervention only if the execution of the Fuehrer's political directives is endangered.
But then it also becomes apparent from this that the Czech problem can only be handled homogeneously and by one central Reich bureau. Any dismemberment of Bohemia and Moravia is bound to endanger the clear, unified direction of the Czech administration and the Czech people. However clear the objective and the means may be, they are nevertheless bound to be variously interpreted by various administrations and then the methods used are also bound to differ. In view of the mentality of the Czechs and their great tactical skill, they will soon find ways and means of playing off the various administrations against one another. Their tactical political ability has been schooled through hundreds of years. A forced partition of the country would fan up political nationalism anew and 'only strengthen opposition. Therefore, direction must come from one central government authority, in the hands of one person only. The Czech problem cannot be solved at one fell swoop. For the Germanisation of this country, many separate means will have to be adopted in the most varying spheres, and because these means will require many years to become effective, a constant unified direction of Bohemia and Moravia will be necessary. In a struggle between races nothing is more harmful than a vacillating attitude and an unified line.
A Reich policy can be followed in the Protectorate only by central direction. But if we, for instance, ceded Moravia to the Niederdonau Gau [Lower Danubian district], not only, would a differentiation between Bohemia and Moravia arise, but the accession of this district might even place Austria face to face with new difficulties in its relations to the Reich, which would above all also entail for the Greater German Reich itself dangers that should not be under-estimated.
The necessity of a unified direction of policy towards the Czechs is not affected by the fact that not all Czechs live in the Protectorate. The Czechs who live in neighboring districts, outside the Protectorate, are just "splinters" without any significance as compared to the mass living in the Protectorate. When
603
3859—PS
they are being Germanised or removed, we can go at quite a different speed, and other methods can be used for handling such minorities. These differentiations need not disturb us. The real Czech problem only exists in the Protectorate. And that is why, in the long run, it can only be settled here.
VI. The incorporation of the Sudeten district into Bohemia/ Moravia for historical reasons does not appear.appropriate, even if one takes into account that this strengthens the number of Germans.
VII. If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful, well thought out utilization of the Germans who are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary. The Greater German Reich will have ,to make use of the help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over the reins of public administration where the interests of the Reich make it absolutely necessary (e. g. military and parts of the police).
In the Protectorate there is in existence a (Czech) Protectorate administration working along technical lines and organized according to the needs of a modern State, and this can do the greater part of the work that is done in the Reich itself by the German administration. It is even possible that when the war is over it may be given further tasks that are now performed by German authorities. It will suffice to incorporate comparatively few Germans into the key positions of the Protectorate's administration and to have a German leadership in Bohemia and Moravia composed of a comparatively small number of German government authorities.
VIII. The past of Bohemia and Moravia, the history of the country which is of particular importance to the German nation and which is reflected in the history of the capital, Prague, and the particularly heavy tasks which—as far as the human mind can see—will devolve on that city in a racially foreign area, make it appear an absolute necessity not .to weaken its position as the center of Bohemia and Moravia in any way by breaking off parts of the territory. Any city that is to be a focal point requires sufficient space to keep such a position. Such a city must be the gravitation-point of a large area having a big population,
604
3859-PS
3859-PS
in order to be able at the same time to radiate and fructify the area and population with the yields of its spiritual, cultural and industrial labors. In the case of Prague there is the additional point that it would be prevente'd'from fulfilling its historical role of gaining influence further southeastwards as well if its old hinterland of Bohemia and Moravia were cut into, precisely at a time when this age-öld German city of Prague is at last once more placed in a position to exert this influence according to the ideas of and for the benefit of the Greater German Reich. Even if the broad political lines are laid down in Berlin for the South East countries too the individual threads, at least in the industrial and cultural spheres, will still emanate to a large extent from here, on account of the position of Prague and its past.
That is why this country deserves special attention and furtherance, in the interests of Greater Germany. We should beware of experiments, even of a purely administrative kind, which would only too easily make it difficult to attain the clear and unambiguous object of the gradual confounding of land and population with Greater Germany and the role that is due to this, country on account of its geqgraphical situation and history. Copy certified correct:
SS Obersturmbannführer [Lieut. Col—signature illegible] ENCLOSURE NO. 2.
MEMORANDUM ON THE TREATMENT OF THE CZECH PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE ORGANISATION OF THE BOHEMIAN-MORAVIAN TERRITORY The Purpose of the Memorandum
The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established under definite political conditions and the legal and political order it received at the time arose from these conditions. (14.3.1939). The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich Protector at its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem and should therefore be retained, or whether it should give place to some other form of government is being raised by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will briefly
A. Indicate the nature of the Czech problem;
B. Analyse the present way in which it is being dealt with ;
C. Examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability and finally
D. Express an independent opinion on the whole question.
605
3859-PS
On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come.
A. The Nature of the Czech Problem
I. The nature of the Czech problem becomes evident from
(1) A look at the geographical and ethnographic map,
(2) the knowledge of racial conditions and
(3) from the historic fate of the Czech people.
(1) The Czech people, which belongs to the western Slavs, lives not only within the German political Lebensraum but also within its ethnographic Lebensraum. Its territorial position prohibits political independence. The inability of the Czechs to organise themselves into a permanent state is a fate arising from their geographical position. The Greater German Reich must be able to dispose of this territory and its inhabitants politically. Out of this arises the question of the fate of the Czech people and of the constitutional form of its incorporation into the Reich.
(2) Originally there existed a strong racial difference between the Teutonic Germans and the Slav Czechs. But the fact that the Czechs belonged for a thousand years to the Old Reich or to States governed by Germans, determined not only the political and social but also the racial structure of the Czech people, i.e. it considerably altered it. From the very beginning a mixing of German and Czech blood took place here. Just as the Czech princes took their wives from amongst the German noble families, so also did the rest of the nobility and the citizens and peasants intermarry with Germans. Only towards the end of the 18th century did the ratio of Germans to Czechs of 5 to 3, which had existed till then,—in the flat country as well,—change to that of 3 to 5,—a fact which can be explained only by the quiet transformation of a corresponding number of Germans into Czechs, whose descendants, bearing Czech or German names, today live as Czechs. On the other hand, particularly in the course of the 19th century the Germanisation of numerous Czechs took place. The outcome of this thousand year long historical process is the far reaching racial levelling off of the two peoples in the Bohemian area, so that now only a minority has retained the original distinctive racial features in a pure state. This strong intake of Germanic blood also explains the ability of the Czech people to produce considerable achievements in the spheres of culture and civilisation—especially since the beginning of the 19th century— to a far greater degree than, for instance, the Slavonic Poles. The Germans from the Old Reich, who expected to find a "Polish Economy" [translator's note: slang for "chaotic state of affairs"]
606
in this country, are always astonished at the high cultural level in Bohemia and Moravia.
(3) History finally shows, that the practice of incorporating Bohemia into the Beich, at first as a tributary and then as a fief was an advantageous solution for both sides.' The withdrawal of Bohemia in the 16th century is not an isolated process, but is one of the many cases of the breaking up of the Old Beich into separate territories. The break took place in connection with and was caused by the great religious confessional antagonisms which led to political cleavages not only between neighbour peoples but also within the individual peoples. From 1526 until 1918 Bohemia was then again made a part of a comprehensive and vast state structure, and lived in it in a kind of political autonomy. Only the Masaryk-Benes epoch produces an attempt at absolute opposition to Germanism.
If the territorial situation forces the inclusion of Bohemia and Moravia in the Beich, the racial picture provided by the Czechs permits a policy of assimilation or of changing nationality for a majority of the Czechs: the past finally demonstrates the protectorate-like form of the inclusion of Bohemia in the Old Beich as it proved itself during centuries.
II. At present the Czech people are in the midst of a real and extremely severe spiritual-political crisis. The collapse came suddenly and catastrophically. A tremendous number of new things have stormed in on the Czechs. They have not as yet found a way out of the collapse of the old values, concepts and orientations. The present mental-spiritual attitude of the Czech people is somewhat as follows:
(1) In the case of the one-time exploiters and of the majority of the intelligentsia, who are very numerous in proportion to the total population and who are very conceited: they hope that we will be defeated and that Czechoslovakia will subsequently be resurrected. This class is irreconcilable.
(2) Then—and that also in the circles of the elder intelligentsia—a class of Czechs who entertained doubts of the durability of the 1918 arrangement even in Czechoslovakia. (Advocates of the former Austro-Slavism, older State officials, as well as officers and men faithful to Austria). These people are beginning to remember that they had lived well for centuries while they were part of a foreign State union.
' (3) A factor comprising primarily the wide class of peasants, workers and petits bourgeois which until now we have hardly worked on at all in the way of political propaganda. Their na-
3859-PS
tional consciousness bears no strongly developed national-political, but a more patriotic, folk lore note. This circle may follow a clever German leadership, if it can continue in this manner for the time being and if it is no longer incited by the intellectuals.
B. Analysis of the present constitutional and political shape of .
Bohemia and Moravia.
The constitutional position of the Reich provinces of Bohemia and Moravia has not reached its final shape with the setting up of the Protectorate, and the Czech problem cannot yet be regarded as having been finally solved thereby. On the contrary, only the first stage of a process has thereby been entered on. The war has greatly influenced this course. The effect has been partly to speed it up, in as far as the Reich has attained a dominant position in Europe and the world within a short space of time, whereby a certain part of the external political considerations of March 19 89 have been eliminated; and partly obstructive, because the need for the contribution of the Protectorate to efforts vital for the war, (intensive agricultural production, production of arms and munitions, functioning of trade and traffic) forbids any attack on the Czech national spirit because, of possible interruptions in the smooth-running of production on which might result for the duration of the war.
The setting up of a central Reich authority which is subordinated only to the Fuehrer has proved itself absolutely correct. Under the leadership of the Reich Protector, the Czechs have, by and large, rendered their contribution to the production demands of the Reich, during the war also, without any big acts of sabotage, partly out of conviction that only thus would they maintain their autonomy and secure their national existence and partly for fear of punishment. The Czech administration, controlled and directed by the Reich Protector, has functioned and works even in times of crisis without serious disturbances, owing to suitable German pressure. .
Nevertheless, the Reich Protector is today forced to maintain an administrative activity based on the status quo. We cannot be satisfied with this kind of stationary policy in the long run, but must emerge from this passive attitude one day and enter upon an attack against this area and against the Czech people within the framework of a plan embracing the whole Reich. This then necessitates a change of the constitutional structure of the Protectorate, since the further undisturbed functioning of the Reich Protector's present administrative apparatus does not by itself bring about the assimilation or Germanisation of the Czechs.
608
3859—PS
C. Opinion on various Party and other Projects
Various Party and State authorities are at present concerning themselves intensively with the future shaping of the Bohemian-Moravian area and the solution of the Czech problem. The causes for these projects are:
(1) The plans of individual Gauleiters concerning the reforming and remodelling of their regions. (Sudetendistrict, Lower Danube, Upper Danube, Silesia etc.).
(2) Constitutional deliberations by some State authorities concerning Reich reforms and the New Order of the coming Reich. (Ministry of the Interior, Hess' Staff).
(3) Certain economic and financial interests of Berlin State departments (Ministries of economy, finance, food, postal services and transport).
Nearly all of these projects foresee as speedy a dissolution of the Protectorate as possible and with that of the office of Reich Protector, demand a splitting up into 3 or 4 Reich Gaus of the territory which is at present one whole and with this the earliest possible total incorporation into the Reich administration. From such a splitting up of the Czechs into several Reich Gaus, they expect—besides a simplification of the Administration—a speedy solution of the Czech nationality problem, i.e. Germanisation in a short time by means of the offensive power possessed by the Gaus.
The efforts of the Lower Danube Gau leadership aim at separating Moravia and joining it to the present Lower Danube Gau, with Brno as the Gau capital, and intend Bohemia as a kind of Czech "reserve". From the Lower Danube to Silesia a German corridor is to be created, In this connection the tribal differences of the "Moravian Slavs" are also specially speculated upon. .
To this the following has to be pointed out:
(1) The decision about the solution of the Czech problem must not be made dependent on the special interests of individual Gauleiters, however justified such interests may seem at present. The New Order of the Reich is at stake, and with it the final solution of the Czech question, i.e. Reich interests and not Gau interests. The latter are to be subordinated to the former. The emphasis on the primary importance of Reich interests excludes neither the bringing in of the native forces in the adjoining frontier areas which have proved themselves in the racial struggle, nor consideration for the requirements of the industries belonging to these areas, industries which for ages had their natural marketing area in Bohemia and Moravia.
609
3859-PS
(2) The opinion that, by splitting up the national bloc living in one closed body and distributing it to several Reich Gaus the Czechs can be Germanised more rapidly—these projects too consider total evacuation impossible to carry out—is wrong for these reasons:
a. because the first reaction to partition would be an increase in political tension among the Czechs, the flaring up of resistance and a fresh growth of political consciousness among the Czechs, whereas what is desired is to make them unpolitical and disorganized ;
b. because administrative frontiers can never destroy a united people and an administrative splitting up unfortunately does not end the existence of a Czech nationhood very conscious of unity. History has proved this in Poland, which was thrice incorporated by partition into three different states. It was then that the political regeneration of the Polish people really started in earnest;
c. because, against a Czech nationhood which in reality remains unified, there would stand—not a unified Reich authority but a number of Gau offices or Reich Governorates working and experimenting along different lines, as we know from experience. The German strength would be split up, and the vital Czech people would find it easier to deal with these divided German forces;
d. because such an official "Czech partition" brings with it sharp reactions in the field of foreign politics and disturbs the Reich's policy of wide spaces in the South East. To this must be added the fact that the Czechs were not incorporated as a result of war, but that they asked for protection, which might perhaps frighten other South Eastern peoples off doing this.
It should further be noted that the creation of a "Czech reserve" in Bohemia does not constitute a constructive solution, as this gives rise to new administrative problems and the "Czech reserve" is not Germanised—the problem thus remaining. In addition it is hardly possible to prevent these Czechs multiplying in the Reserve and they will shortly begin to emigrate once more into the neighboring frontier areas.
D. Own Opinion
The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanisation of area and people. In order to attain this, there are two possibilities:
I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Mora-
610
3859-PS
3859-PS
via ,to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed territory, or
II. if one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the simultaneous application of a great variety of methods working towards Germanisation, in accordance with a plan containing a target year.
Such a Germanisation provides for:
(1) The changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs;
(2) The expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who are enemies of the Reich, or "special treatment" for these and all destructive elements:
(3) The recolonising of the territory thus freed with fresh German blood.
To I: I consider that the total expulsion of 7.2 million Czechs is impossible to carry out,
a. because there is no space available where they can be settled afresh;
b. because there are no Germans available who can immediately fill the vacated space;
c. because the core of Europe which is highly civilized and highly sensitive, economically and in the technical field of communications cannot stand being disturbed in its functions and cannot tolerate a vacuum;
d. because human beings represent Reich capital and we, in the new Reich, can not do without the working power of 7 million Czechs;
e. because probably the shock effects on other South Eastern peoples are undesirable.
To II: In my opinion, Germanisation can nevertheless be achieved by means of the three possibilities here mentioned. The successful attempts at assimilation in past centuries, the bringing of millions of Czechs to the German racial level which thereby took place, and which is described above and the power of attraction of the new Reich make it possible and probable that several million Czechs can be got really to transform themselves nationally. To separate this transformable part of the Czech population from those who are racially inferior is the task of special commissions of investigation, to be appointed for this purpose. (Perhaps within the framework of the public health services). Via a systematically carried out political neutralization and depoliticalisation, one must first of all arrive at a political (spir-
611
3859-PS
itual) and then at a racial assimilation of the Czech people, in order finally to attain a real national transformation.
This process will have to continue both in the Protectorate area itself and also on a wide scale in Germany proper. Well planned methods sure of their goal are to be employed in all spheres of national life in an elastic manner and in a great variety of different ways. Only some of these methods can be pointed to here in their general lines:
WORKERS:
Raising of the standard of living—participation in the social achievements of National Socialism (German Labor Front, Strength through Joy)—granting of obvious advantages on declaring in favor of Germanism (elimination of every defamation)—large scale exchange of places of work with the Reich proper—including transfer of families (at present 95,000 Czech workers voluntarily work in the Reich proper after having been recruited)—a certain differential scale of wages between the Reich proper and the Protectorate to be maintained as an inducement—transfer of female domestic servants into the Reich proper—ditto waiters, menservants, musicians, etc.
FARMERS:
Participation of Czech farmers in the advantages of the German agricultural policy favorable to farmers—good policy of markets and prices—inheritability of farms only for German peasants—German defensive farm settlements along the Eastern frontier.
MIDDLE CLASSES:
Materially promote trade and commerce—offer social advantages to officials—open up personal prospects—promotions— award of honors.
YOUTH:
Fundamental change in education—extermination of the Czech historical myth—education towards the Reich idea—no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language—first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools—never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the "Collegium Bohemicus" at the German university in Prague—2 years compulsory labor service.
$ iji $ $ $ $ f
Large scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north as far as the. suburbs of Prague.
612
3859-PS
Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language.
Marriage policy after previous racial examination.
In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaus must be excluded.
Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and "special treatment" for all saboteurs. Principle: "Pastry and whip"!
The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the "master in Bohemia" to the Fuehrer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem. Only thus can the task be withheld from the departmental jealousies and the multiplicity of the Ministries and other Reich and Party offices. The Czech is always impressed only by the direct use of Reich authority. With his political skill and his tactics, trained throughout centuries, he can easily deal with three or four different provincialisms, particularly since for the time being "mother Prague" [pencil note: Head Office in Russia] will in any event remain the political brain of the Czech nation.
. Any division of the Protectorate area violates this principle.
Until suitable successes have been achieved in the intended process of national transformation, I therefore recommend the following:
(1) The maintenance of the territorial unity of the present Protectorate area. Frontier adjustments on a small scale in favor of the adjoining Gaus, or for technical reasons, are always possible. (Pilsen, Morava, Ostrava, Neuhaus, etc.).
(2) The maintenance of one central Reich authority in Prague, with one man at its head, who is directly subordinated to the Fuehrer and equipped with all the necessary powers for Germanizing.
(3) The step by step elimination of the autonomy of the Czechs, and the careful, gradual elimination of the Czech machinery of state connected therewith, commencing with the highest authorities, but retaining a body of Czech officials and employees.
I recommend paragraph (3) for the reason that—
(a) Owing to lack of officials we are not in a position to appoint German functionaries for the 7,950 urban and rural administra-
613
3859-PS
tion offices, the 92 county administration offices, and 2 Provincial authorities, and because, owing to the enormous tasks which will face us in the future Beich we have to make use of Czechs on a large scale. .
(b) Because—thanks to the German hand which guided it— the Czech administrative machine did function on the whole— during the war too—will continue to work in the future too and —in its own interests—will maintain quiet and order on the Czech's own responsibility.
(c) Because it is quite sufficient if we occupy all the important key positions in the higher administrative offices with a comparatively small but well trained body of German officials, and, instead of ourselves administrating every little detail, issue directives and lead, i.e. rule.
* ***** *
This memorandum takes for granted the intention of wishing to Germanize the area of population of the Protectorate. It therefore does not deal with the problem of an absolute "degradation" of the Czech people to a purely auxiliary race [Hilfsvolk] on racial grounds (Askari viewpoint!), a race to be outlawed socially and intermarriage with which would have to be forbidden. The practical carrying out of a complete degradation is rather considered as impracticable, and only an individual degradation is visualized as a special method of "special treatment" [Sonderbehandlung] in accordance with D II/2. And according to the explanations contained in this memorandum, this degradation does not seem to be necessary, because the solution of the Czech question, and with it the final pacification of the centuries-old Bohemian-Moravian center of unrest [Brandherd] in Europe, can be attained in the manner proposed.
At the end of a certain period of transition, during which the process of Germanization must be brought into full operation in a uniform manner, nothing any longer stands in the way of a partition of the present territory of the Protectorate and its allocation to the Beich, or of the creation of new Beich Gaus.
Prague, 28 August 1940.
(Signed) Secretary of State
K. H. FEANK.
614
Letter to Lammers on plans for the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia, reqesting an interview with Hitler, with two memoranda on the subject, including the incorporation of the territory into the Reich and settling it with Germans, Germanization of racially suitable Czechs, and "special treatment" of others
Authors
Constantin Neurath, von (Baron; foreign minister)
Constantin von Neurath
German general and Nazi war criminal (1873-1956)
- Born: 1873-02-02 (Kleinglattbach)
- Died: 1956-08-14 (Enzweihingen)
- Country of citizenship: Germany
- Occupation: diplomat; lawyer; politician
- Member of political party: Nazi Party
- Member of: Schutzstaffel
- Military rank: Obergruppenführer
- Position held: German Foreign Minister (period: 1932-06-01 through 1938-02-04; replaced by: Joachim von Ribbentrop; replaces: Heinrich Brüning); ambassador
Karl Hermann Frank (German state secretary in Bohemia and Moravia, and Prague)
Karl Hermann Frank
Czechoslovak member of Czechoslovak national parliament and Nazi Germany politician (1898-1946)
- Born: 1898-01-24 (Karlovy Vary)
- Died: 1946-05-22 (Prague)
- Country of citizenship: Germany
- Occupation: politician
- Member of political party: Nazi Party (since: 1938-01-01); Sudeten German Party
- Military rank: Obergruppenführer
- Military branch: Schutzstaffel
- Position held: member of the Reichstag of Nazi Germany
Date: 31 August 1940
Defendant: Constantin Neurath, von
Total Pages: 19
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: PS-3859
Citation: IMT (page 12379)
HLSL Item No.: 453627
Notes:The first memo may be von Neurath's work, but this is not stated; the second was by Frank (28 August).
Trial Issues
Administration & organization (all cases) Nazi regime (rise, consolidation, economic control, and militarization) (I… Germanization of persons, property, or occupied territories (IMT, NMT 3, 8) Racial selection and discrimination (theory, screening, relocations, kidna… Education, propaganda, and youth programs (IMT)
Document Summary
PS-3859: Autenticated photostat of memorandum of von Neurath re: future sharing of the Bohemian-Moravian territory
PS-3859: Letter from Neurath to Lammers, 31 August 1940,. containing: notes on the future of the Bohemian-mora-vian territory, with the object of incorporating it in the Reich and of filling it with Germans; memorandum by Karl Hermann Frank, 28 August 1940, on the "Czech problem", viz. Germanization and other questions concerning Bohemia and Moravia
PS-3859: Letter dated 31 August 1940 from von Neurath to the defendant LAMMERS enclosing a memorandum by von Neurath and Carl Hermann Frank on the subject of Germanization in the Protectorate.