[Extract from an Austrian court document in the proceedings against Dr. Rudolf Neumayer.]
Copy '
Vg 1 b Vr 445/45 Hv 187/45
Third day of Trial—30 January 1946
Commencement: 9 a. m.
Present:
Tribunal, Defendant, Defense Counsel as on the first day of the trial.
Secretary: JAng. Trumler.
The Witness Wilhelm Miklas, personal particulars in File No. 29 adds: resident in Vienna I. Wildpretmarkt No. 1, not related to the accused.
The Defense states that it will waive the swearing in of this witness.
The Prosecuting Attorney also states that it will waive the swearing in of this witness.
518
3697-PS
3697-PS
The Witness: Warned to tell the truth and not sworn in after it was agreed upon to waive the oath.
The President: Since when have you known the defendant?
The Witness: Actually only since his appointment as Finance Minister in 1936. I cannot remember the exact date now.
The President: That is to say since November 1936. Do you perhaps, know the reasons why the Chancellor fixed on the defendant at the time when the Finance Minister, Dr. Draxler, resigned from the Cabinet?
The Witness: I do not know the reason. For me the order of the Austrian Chancellor was alone decisive, who himself chose the members for his Cabinet. In this case I naturally raised no objection, particularly as I knew that this was done in agreement with the National Council. I also do not know the reasons why the Chancellor felt obliged to fix on the person of Dr. Neumayer. Obviously the Chancellor wished to have someone who was not a political outstanding expert in financial affairs. That was my impression. .
The President: After Dr. Neumayer's appointment as Finance Minister you must have come repeatedly into contact with him on the occasion of receptions and certain other State occasions. Did you become better acquainted with the defendant?
The Witness: I did not often come into contact with the defendant, even privately.
The President: Cannot you tell us something about the events of 12 February 1938—that is, about the Chancellor's journey to Berchtesgaden and the results which followed—how the change of government, etc., came about?
The Witness: I only know one thing, that on 11.11.1938 a so-called "Patriotic Ball [Vaterlaendischer Ball"] took place in Vienna. The newspapers wrote at the time that this was the first official State ball in Austria since the government of the "Patriotic Front [Vaterlaendische Front"]. In this connection I remarked that I could look back on a period of 52 years' work as a State Official and that I was not a member of the "Patriotic Front". I always declined to become one, because of my position as President. I was convinced that the head of the State must be above all parties. One can imagine how difficult that was to carry through. I had a very difficult position. I did not attend this official State ball of the Patriotic Front, but went with my wife to Mariazell that day. There I received a telephone message from the then Secretafy of State, Dr. Guido Schmidt, who informed me that a meeting had been arranged in Berchtesgaden between the Chancellor and the Head of the German State, Hitler.
519
3697-PS
I would point out in this connection that we had received terrible drubbings by Germany in the economic and political spheres in the years preceding 1938; I would point for instance to the 1000 Mark embargo, which considerably curtailed our tourist traffic in the Western Alps. I would point out that this telephone conversation took place perhaps as early as 10.11.38. In any case I was asked by Dr. Guido Schmidt what I thought of the Chancellors meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. To this I said: "It is of course very difficult". It was intimated to me that the Chancellor desired this discussion, it was only á question of ask-, ing the President if he was in favor of it. I asked what was to be the aim of this discussion whereupon I was told that the object was to clear up the misunderstandings which had arisen in Austria in the execution of the Agreement of July 1936. This Agreement of 1936 was drawn up by the Government alone and was exacted by Germany and accepted, and remained a "gentleman's agreement." It was thus no State Agreement but a pact between the two heads of the Austrian and German Governments. The President had naturally nothing to sign. It is thus that this "gentleman's agreement" came about. It was also the same with the "Berchtesgaden Protocol." Germany, through the 1000 Mark embargo, had, as already mentioned, taken our best tourist traffic in the Western Alps away from us, so that there was ill-feeling in the Western areas.
Replying to a question by the Prosecuting Attorney: The witness states: Is it indeed true that at that time (11.11.1938) the 1000 Mark embargo was no longer a matter of the moment.
The President: Did the invitation regarding the meeting between the Chancellor and Hitler in Berchtesgaden come from Austria or from Hitler, i.e., from Germany?
The Witness: This invitation came from Germany through Herr v. Papen. Consequently the Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg, went to Berchtesgaden accompanied by Dr. Guido Schmidt. On their return from the Berchtesgaden journey they gave a short report on the manner in which the discussion had taken place. I have only heard one thing regarding the contents of the Berchtesgaden Protocol, that Dr. Guido Schmidt sat for hours in an adjoining room of the Berghof and tried, together with Hitler's confidants, to alter this or that point of the Protocol in Austria's favor, or to let it drop altogether. This was all done in Austria's interest. Dr. Guido Schmidt has therefore rendered service to Austria in a certain sense. The protocol was handed over by Hitler in the form of an ultimátum. I was told all this by Dr. Guido Schmidt.
520
The President: What did the Chancellor report to you regarding the discussion at Berchtesgaden ?
The Witness: The Chancellor informed me that certain points had been agreed upon regarding an interchange of officials, particularly with regard to officers of the Armed Forces. Thus the Chancellor gave information on matters which one can discuss among friends. These are the principal points which the Chancellor mentioned to me. The Chancellor reported further that, with regard to the remodelling of the Government, the entry of Seyss-Inquart into Dr. Schuschnigg's Government and his appointment as Minister of the Interior was demanded. That was a direct command by Hitler. After much hesitation and under the influence of the reception at Berchtesgaden, as well as of military pressure behind the scenes—Hitler is said to have raved during this discussion—the Chancellor undertook the desired remodelling of his Cabinet. If this demand of Hitler was not fulfilled, there was the greatest danger of the outbreak of war. Hitler granted the Chancellor a short period of time in order that Dr. Schuschnigg could discuss this demand with his people.
I think the Chancellor was allowed a period up to 15.11.1938. The authoritative members of the Austrian Government declared at that time that we must endeavour to yield. There was the danger of the outbreak of a second war, which might have been a terrible danger for the whole of Europe.
This remodelling of Dr. Schuschnigg's Cabinet, by the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior, took place during this period. Seyss-Inquart was thus made Minister of the Interior and immediately brought in the National Socialists in the National Socialist spirit [im nationalsozialistischen Sinne] to reinforce the police, as in a similar instance at the time of Dr. Dollfuss, and, as happened previously under the Social-Democratic government, when the "Republican Defensive Confederation" [Republikanisch Schutzbund] was formed. You can imagine what a difficult position I had between these parties, which had their own private military forces. In my position as President I was so to say the whipping boy of the government, the party for the moment in power.
The President: You now appointed Seyss-Inquart Minister of the Interior in accordance with the demand? Were you acquainted with him before this, or did you only now make his acquaintance ?
The Witness: I only made his acquaintance on his appointment as Minister of the Interior; before that I did not know him. I had only heard that he was doing quite well out in Doebling, in
744400—47—35
521
3697-PS
any case he was a man with whom one could talk things over. I was also told that Seyss-Inquart was a diligent church-goer. But I knew nothing more about Seyss-Inquart personally; I did not know him personally before his appointment as Minister.
The President: Was this appointment of Seyss-Inquart a difficult problem?
The Witness: It was not only a difficult problem, it was directly caused by the circumstances which prevailed at that time in the Chancellery on the Ballhausplatz. The President could not act otherwise, under the burden of saving Austria from the worst that could happen, namely the entry of the German troops which would be looked upon as enemies and preventing a total war. Vienna would have been "bombed to bits" by the Germans.
The Prosecuting Attorney: Had you not previously inquired of the Western Powers as to whether you should consent to the Berchtesgaden Agreement?
The Witness: The Chancellor was continually in contact with the Ambassadors of the Western Powers, and continually drew their attention to Austria's difficult position in face of the Hitler Reich threat to Austria; but he found little understanding of the matter. The leaders of the Western Powers only saw the difficulties of their own countries. At the eleventh hour Mussolini refused to be consulted. There was also no real interest on the part of England. We felt ourselves to be completely abandoned by Europe.
The President: Did the defendant, who was Finance Minister . at that time, attend the Ministerial Council Meetings of Dr. Schuschnigg's Cabinet?
The Witness: Yes.
The President: Do you know whether, and to what extent the individual Ministers were informed of the events at Berchtesgaden and of Hitler's demands?
The Witness: I can make no statement about this, I do not know. In this connection I would remark that, in my position as President I could not take part in the meetings of the Ministerial Council. In any case I did not discuss the Berchtesgaden Agreement and its consequences with the defendant. I cannot say therefore if the Defendant was well informed on this point or not.
The President: What can you remember regarding the events of Friday, 11.3.1938. What took place then in the Chancellery, what were your own experiences at that time?
The Witness: I must admit that I was not kept informed by the Government of the events of that time relative to the difficult
522
3697-PS
situation in which Austria had found herself at that time. I was not informed of all the events which took place in the sphere of Foreign policy. Of course I could have done nothing about it. The consequence of not having been informed about everything was that I was somewhat surprised at the terrible foreign situation, which threatened to become acute. As Schuschnigg was in contact with the Western Powers, as with Paris and London, I did not consider the matter to be so very threatening and tragic.
The President: What have you to say regarding the plebiscite ?
The Witness: This plebiscite was suggested to the Chancellor by France. The Chancellor regarded this plebiscite as a good safeguard for Austria. It could then have been publicly referred to that Austria stands steadfast by reason of the people's vote. Austria must then have remained a State. But this plebiscite was arranged too late. Had it been carried out—as I continually urged—perhaps in 1934 or 1935, things might have been different. Had it been carried out after the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, that would "probably" still have been the right time. But I even regard this "probably" as doubtful. For I was told that already at that time the situation in Austria was such that a plebiscite might possibly have led to armed conflict between the parties, i.e., to civil war. For Austria was at that time already severely infected with National Socialism. A plebiscite at that time would perhaps have been all the more likely to bring about the intervention of Hitler Germany.
Thus, at the beginning of the week to 11.3.1938, the problem of the plebiscite came up. At that time the Chancellor visited me with the Foreign Minister—other men also called on me in this connection—and was of the opinion that a plebiscite was necessary for the moral security of the State. I naturally agreed with pleasure, and would remark in this connection that this plebiscite must be formally held by the President.
The Chancellor therefore visited me with the Foreign Minister and I agreed to the plebiscite. The Chancellor then went to Innsbruck and there, in his party circle, in the "Patriotic Front" made the speech showing the Austrian point of view which is so well known to all.
He thereupon returned to Vienna and from this moment on began the counter-thrusts on the part of the National Socialists who already felt themselves protected by the military might proclaimed by Hitler. Thus this prohibited National Socialist Party had already made itself manifest to the outside world. Austria was already undermined by the Nazis. There was now much correspondence back and forth between the Chancellor and
523
Hitler. Schuschnigg tried to find some kind of way out. Schuschnigg insisted in carrying out the plebiscite. In the meantime the events of 11.3.1938 took place. With regard to these events of
11.3.1938 I should like to say that I still believed, "What can happen to us, at all events we are assured of the protection of the Great Powers and of Italy, Hitler will not dare to bring us to our knees by armed force." But in the end the National Socialist revolution within the country, strengthened by the consciousness that the Nazis were certain of military help from Germany, was not to be checked. This National Socialist Revolution within the country grew and grew and resulted finally in Hitler's military ultimatum.
On Friday 2.3.1938 about midday, I knew nothing about a military ultimatum, indeed of any ultimatum at all. About midday I drove home to my modest dinner. While at home I received a telephone message from the Foreign Minister that Germany had just sent an ultimatum to the Austrian Government which demanded the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, i.e., the formation of a new Government under the leadership of Seyss-Inquart. The ultimatum probably also demanded the abandoning of the plebiscite proposed for Sunday. The plebiscite was to take place under National Socialist direction. This ultimatum had, I think, no time limit. This ultimatum was given to the Schuschnigg Government and not to the head of the State. Naturally Dr. Schuschnigg did not wish to bear the responsibility alone and I was therefore informed and asked to come to the Chancellery. I arrived at the Chancellery at 2 p. m. and was personally informed of this ultimatum. I said "that is quite impossible, we will not be coerced, we have 'Protecting Powers', for example in Geneva, and we would like to know what they will say to it." We immediately informed the Western Powers about the ultimatum. For this purpose Ambassador Ludwig communicated by telephone with Rome, Paris, and London. Teletype messages were sent. We wanted to discover the frame of mind of the government circles of the Western Powers. I said the ultimatum was to be refused. That appears to have been done by the Government in some form or other, whereupon the German Reich presented a military ultimatum. This military ultimatum contained the same demand as the first one. This ultimatum was addressed to the head of the State, i.e., to me.
The President: When was this military ultimatum presented?
The Witness: In the afternoon round about tea-time. This ultimatum I also refused. Then the Secretary of State, Dr. Keppler arrived and informed him that I was refusing the ulti-
3697-PS
matum. A second military ultimatum was then presented, that was at approximately 6.30 p.m. Major General Muff brought me this second ultimatum. The two military ultimatums had a time limit up to 7.30 p.m. After the expiration of this time limit the entry of German troops into Austria was threatened—there were
200,000 men on the Western border from Bregenz to Passau. We were threatened with the German troops obtaining the requirements of the ultimatum by force. I informed the two gentlemen, Dr. Keppler and Major General Muff (I was on good terms with the latter) that I refused the ultimatum. I condoled with Major General Muff that he was the one to have been chosen to hand me the ultimatum. I refused both ultimatums and told the two gentlemen that Austria alone determines who is to be the head of the State in Austria, as is also the case in Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and also in the Scandinavian countries, and why should we not be granted this right, and that I insist upon Austria herself and her functionaries alone determining the composition of the Government. That was noted by the two gentlemen. I naturally informed the Chancellor of this. There was continual contact between me and the Chancellor during the critical hours of 11.3.1938, in fact until the morning of 12.3.1938. There was also continual contact between us and Dr. Guido Schmidt. After Dr. Schuschnigg had delivered his well known farewell speech in the evening, he was still busy with the carrying on of the Government until the formation of a new Government. Dr. Schuschnigg had already told me of his resignation before making this radio speech.
The President: Did you know this radio speech?
The Witness: I did not hear it, I was told about it later on.
The President: The Chancellor spoke as follows in this speech: "The President has charged me to inform the Austrian people that we yield to force". Do you remember this passage?
The Witness: It is quite out of the question that I could have given such an order. I have never said anything regarding the contents of this speech. He may have drawn "his conclusions from the consultation I had with the Chancellor—he did say that we must say that we must yield to force. I gave no instructions whatsoever as to this speech of the Chancellor. Only one thing occurred. Dr. Schuschnigg told me already in the afternoon that he intended to resign. This resignation was, I think, made known by radio. That must have been about 2 or 3 p.m. It is possible, however, that his resignation was not notified by radio, but that the countermanding of the plebiscite was made known. But in any case the Press was advised of the Chancellor's resignation. I
525
3697-PS
said at the time "things have not gone so far that we must capitulate".
The President: Did the Chancellor say to you the second time that he would make his resignation public?
The Witness: No. According to old custom the Press is advised. I would state that I did not know that the Chancellor himself would speak. Reverting to the Chancellor's radio speech, in which he refers to an order given by me that we must yield to force, I would remark, as previously mentioned, that this is the conclusion drawn by him from the conversations with me and Dr. Guido Schmidt. He considered himself morally justified, as Europe had left us in the lurch. The conversations with Paris, London, and Rome continued in the meantime, but with no results. Mussolini could not be contacted. Paris said "we have trouble enough with the new Cabinet crisis home". It was just such a situation as would have led to a conflict over Austria with the outbreak of a second World War. This dreadful situation applied to the whole of Europe. Since I had no help whatsoever in either domestic or foreign policy there was only one solution possible, that a Chancellor be appointed who would be acceptable as negotiator by the opposite side, i. e., by the government of the Reich.
The President: Thus the position at that time was such that the Austrian State could be said to be in a state of emergency, on the brink of war?
The Witness: Yes, it certainly was.
The President: Were you personally, as head of the State, yourself in a state of peril on account of this emergency? Were you aware of the internal situation during these critical days? Did you know what was then happening in the streets of Vienna?
The Witness: Yes, I was occasionally informed as to what was happening in the streets of Vienna. I also knew that the Chancellery had been closed, by the Nazis. I even knew more than that. I knew that a deputation of Nazi rebels had been admitted to the Chancellery; but I only knew later on that they had been admitted to the Chancellery by Seyss-Inquart, who was Minister of the Interior and had been given executive powers. I knew what was happening in the streets from reports.
The President: Did you not, as head of the State, have the feeling of yourself being in a serious position?
The Witness: To be sure.
The President: Did you have the feeling that you were still free in your decisions and acts?
The Witness: In a serious situation one is no longer free. It is coercion. Thus I undertook this reforming of the government
526
3697—PS
3697—PS
under pressure from inside and outside. This pressure went so far as to include my person, as head of the State. In any case my own situation, that I was a prisoner of the mob, was quite clear. That was no longer the will of the authorities, but a dictatorship. The military ultimatum expired at 7.30 p.m. After this time limit, if this ultimatum was rejected, the German Army was to march in. But my firm attitude and refusal to accept the ultimatum was so successful that the Armed Forces delayed their entry until the following morning; from a military point of view they could do this easily, as already in the evening of 11.3.1938 the Austrian Armed Forces, in obedience to an Army Order, had withdrawn somewhat from the Inn-frontier in order to take up a secure position.
The President: Has the question of whether resistance could ever be carried out by our Armed Forces ever been looked into?
The Witness: This question was looked into; the little State of Austria has some 20,000 men in the Army, thus 10,000 to 12,000 men perhaps would be drawn up on the Western frontier; against them they had forces almost 20 times their strength, not forget-ing the superiority of the German Air Force. I also invited the inspector of the Army, Infantry General Schilhawsky, to our discussions. Only with him did I discuss the question of whether we could offer resistance or not. He requested me to relieve him of the decision as to whether Austria could possibly be defended. In this connection he mentioned another General with whom I should discuss this matter. I should, however, prefer not to mention the name of this General.
The President: Was there ever any possibility of resisting?
The Witness: No. It was from the very beginning a lost cause. The question of resistance was considered. The Generals discussed it and it was realized to be hopeless from the beginning. As I therefore was completely abandoned both at home and abroad, I decided finally, in order to avoid useless shedding of blood and to save the existence and the life of the Austrian people in these critical hours, to appoint a National Socialist as Austrian Chancellor. At midnight I therefore appointed Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the former Minister of the Interior, as Austrian Chancellor. By this means I saved the life of my soldiers and also the life and existence of my homeland. Political reasons (not alone military reasons) forced me to capitulate. There was no other way out. I was informed how terribly the German Armed Forces were acting in accordance with Hitler's instructions. The discoveries made in Berlin show with what brutal words Hitler had given permission to his troops to invade the country. The lives of the
527
3697-PS
3697-PS
civil population, above all of the working population of Vienna were in danger. Perhaps if I could have gained time and have entered into negotiations with the German Reich, perhaps I should then have succeeded in interesting the Western Powers in Austria's cause.
The President: Did you speak to Seyss-Inquart before his appointment as Chancellor?
The Witness: No, he was only summoned then; he.did not come himself. I did not negotiate with him. Neither did I negotiate with Minister Glaise-Horstenau. I sent for Seyss-Inquart, after I had come to the realization above described. I even thought of the appointment of another head of the Government. But that was impossible. I therefore sent for Seyss-Inquart. That the opposition knew only too well that I was the only resister is shown by the fact that the next day (12.3.1938) during the morning, Himmler had arrived in Vienna from Berlin by air. His first demand of the new Austrian Chancellery was the dismissal of the President. This clearly shows that I was the sole and last resister in Austria.
The President: When the new Chancellor was designated in the person of Seyss-Inquart, did he inform you which Ministers he (Seyss-Inquart) had in view?
The Witness: Seyss-Inquart handed me no list of Ministers then. He told me at the time that he would have to leave for a short time in order to talk to his Party comrades. He compiled his list of Ministers only some time after his appointment as head of the Austrian Government. Actually a list of Ministers was compiled from among the National Socialists already admitted to the Chancellery. Thus a government revolution had already broken out before I had summoned the new head of the government. Names of Austrians, e. g., Prof. Menghin, etc., appeared on the list of Ministers. I said to myself that these men, who are Austrians, will yet endeavor by some means to place in some kind of favorable position and that Austria will perhaps remain a semi-independent State.
The President: When you summoned the Chancellor did he tell you what he intended to do? Did you ask him what steps he intended to take in the next few hours?
The Witness: No, I did not want to ask him, if I was compelled to appoint him head of the Austrian Government by force. I knew one thing, that the Nazis wanted an Anschluss with the German Reich in some form. Seyss-Inquart knew that I was opposed to and rejected this demand, so a mutual discussion of the matter was superfluous.
528
3697-PS
The President: When was the list of ministers presented to
you i
The Witness: About midnight, after the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as head of the Austrian Government. The following names appeared on the list—Dr. Neumayer, Prof. Menghin, Reinthaler, Jury, Wolff, Fischbock and Hueber. I then ordered that the swearing-in of the Seyss-Inquart Government should take place on Saturday, 12 March 1938. At this swearing-in I gave a very short address. The substance of this address was as follows: I said, "My Lord Chancellor and Ministers, you will not require me to speak to you about the events of the last few days and wish for an explanation. I demand of you one thing only: you have been appointed by virtue of the Austrian constitution and must fulfill all rights and obligations for Austria according to the Austrian constitution." Seyss-Inquart has become the head of the Austrian State. The swearing-in of the newly formed Government was carried out according to the old Austrian form. All the ministers took an Austrian oath of allegiance—that is to say to an Austrian Government. This swearing-in took place about 10 a.m. on 12th March 1938.
The President: Was it immediately after this swearing-in ceremony or a little later that the accused came to you?
The Witness: It was later and not directly after the swearing-in. But as far as I can remember only a little time lay between. The accused thanked me for his reappointment as Finance Minister, which was not a customary procedure. I pointed out to the accused that it was Seyss-Inquart who had appointed him as Finance Minister and told him, that Seyss-Inquart had designated him as his colleague. Furthermore, I explained to the accused that I was thoroughly in disagreement with the whole affair and also intimated that in this situation I could no longer remain President.
On being questioned by the President the witness declared: It is possible, that I passed the remark that I could no longer remain President at the point of the sword. I also plainly told the accused that he naturally was not to assume that I was in agreement with the events of the previous night. The accused was rather astonished that, so to speak, I should announce my resignation to him and not wish to collaborate with the new system. He had to be prepared, therefore, for me not to be in agreement.
The Prosecuting Attorney: You have said that it was clear to you, when you appointed Seyss-Inquart as Head of the Government, that the Anschluss with the Reich would follow and never-
529
theless you allowed the Ministers to take the oath. Were you acting under compulsion? Why did you undertake the swearing-in?
The Witness: The swearing-in of every Cabinet named by me is' the duty of the President; Seyss-Inquart was appointed as Austrian minister. He was Hitler's agent. There was always the possibility that, through him, Austria would remain a sovereign state or perhaps a semi-sovereign state like Bavaria. When Himmler was already in Vienna, Seyss-Inquart sent his State Secretary, Dr. Wimmer, to me and he explained to me how things stood. Germany had made the demand that I be deposed as President. Seyss-Inquart who also visited me on this subject, first talked round the matter by saying that it was extremely distasteful to him but that he was bound to comply with the order of the German Reich and he therefore urged it upon me to send in my resignation. My view of the resignation was as follows: Under Dollfuss, I repeatedly asked to be allowed to resign—naturally this was done in private without being announced publicly —since I could not tolerate that the head of the State was so to speak publicly held responsible at home and abroad for the Government and/or for any regents. I had had enough of it. However, at the time the foreign enemy presented me with these demands, I now more than ever felt it my duty to remain in office. I did remain and then, on 13.3.1938, when the law of reunion [Wiedervereinigungsgesetz] was submitted to me for my signature—that was about 5 in the afternoon—I refused to sign it. Seyss-Inquart came to my official residence about the matter, accompanied by Menghin, who was then Austrian Minister. I refused to sign this law of reunion and I refused for political reasons. My refusal was due not only to my fundamentally opposed opinions, but I refused also because, according to the Austrian constitution, I would be obliged to institute a general plebiscite about the "law"—which sacrificed the sovereignty of Austria—before it was signed, the signature merely having the significance of that of the State notary, that is to say, a certification' that the law in question had come into existence formally and in accordance with the constitution. There was, however, no time left for such a plebiscite owing to Hitler's impulsive and strong intervention—indeed Hitler is alleged to have said: "I will have finished with the Austrian business in 3 days". Thereupon, the government cited Article 3 of the Federal constitution. Seyss-Inquart wanted to account for Himmler's already described demand by means of article 3 of the 1934 constitution. He agreed, however, when I said I was quite prepared, in consideration of
3697—PS
Austria's position as it then was and under article 77, par. 1 of the constitution, to surrender to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself, but without myself resigning. As a result of my refusal to sign the Anschluss law, there was no documentary authentication. For I saw that documentary authentication was not given. Naturally, the Anschluss law had then to be published by other means, signed by Seyss-Inquart and all the Ministers. At that time, I drew up in my official residence a letter to the Chancellor (Seyss-Inquart) saying as I have already stated above that, by virtue of article 77, par. 1 of the constitution, I was surrendering to him the functions of President for as long as I was prevented from carrying them out myself. Minister Menghin was called in as a witness to this. The "Anschluss law" that was submitted to me was a draft. I did not have the original but was only given a copy. The ministerial council had previously decided that Seyss-Inquart must be the sole plenipotentiary.
The Prosecuting Attorney: You have told us that you appointed Seyss-Inquart head of the government under political pressure from at home and abroad. You knew what course the . Seyss-Inquart Cabinet would take. Why did you not resign on 12.3.1936 when it was suggested to you? What was there still to save?
The Witness: I considered resignation as cowardly flight. It would have been cowardly to abandon my fatherland in that hour of need and not to seek any possibility of negotiation.
The Prosecuting Attorney: But that was quite hopeless. Austria's independence was buried by that time.
The Witness: That may be.
The Prosecuting Attorney: As head of the state, I would have resigned.
The Witness: No, I would have regarded that as cowardly.
The Prosecuting Attorney: In connection with the Berchtesgaden agreement, you stated that the Western powers showed themselves to be disinterested. What possibility of negotiation did you still have in mind on 12.3.1938?
The Witness: There were always possibilities. One had to have dealings with the German Reich to know what its demands actually were. And further, I wanted to gain time so that even the Western powers could realize what was happening; perhaps the Western Powers would then have intervened. It was more a question of gaining time, because I did not give up the hope that the Western Powers would perhaps still intervene.
531
3697—PS
The Prosecuting Attorney: Negotiations should have been made with the German Reich; instead of Dr. Schuschnigg, the NationalSocialist Seyss-Inquart was the negotiating party on the Austrian side and you knew indeed what course Seyss-Inquart had set and in what direction Seyss-Inquart was heading. Seyss-Inquart, who was made head of the Austrian government by desire of the opposing side, could not follow a course which was against the wishes of Germany. In your place, I would have resigned. You should not have sworn in the National Socialist Government.
The President: Were you of the opinion that there was a possibility of negotiating with the German party even after Seyss-Inquart succeeded Dr. Schuschnigg?
The Witness: I was of the opinion that there was a possibility of negotiation with Germany. ",
The President: Did you still have Austria's independence in mind at that time?
The Witness: I thought that Austria might perhaps remain a semi-sovereign state. I also had good news from Bavaria. For there were opponents in the German Reich who were not in agreement with the tyrannical system of the National-Socialists. We had to bring up all these possibilities during the negotiations.
The Prosecuting Attorney: Little Austria ?
The Witness: Yes, little Austria. Even Seyss-Inquart had to consult with his politicians at home; he couldn't act entirely on his own initiative.
The Prosecuting Attorney: As President, you were acquainted with the programme of the National-Socialists?
The Witness: Yes.
The Defence Counsel: There were indeed Austrians among the ministers in the Seyss-Inquart government. Did you not also know Dr. Neumayer to be a responsible Austrian official?
The Witness: I knew him to be a very useful and able Finance Minister, and in this, the political bias of Dr. Neumayer was of no interest to me. The person of primary importance for me was the Chancellor who chose his own officials. I saw Seyss-Inquart as an Austrian who must have known that Austria must remain a country and a people. . .
The Defence Counsel: Did you consider Dr. Neumayer a good Austrian and not as a National-Socialist?
The Witness: I did not think Dr. Neumayer was one of the radical Nazis. I did not know that he had any connection with national or National-Socialist circles. I knew Dr. Neumayer as an Austrian official.
When, after the ministers had been sworn in, you spoke to the
532
3697-PS
accused and told him that you would not remain President for long under the pressure to which you were subjected, you said that the accused was somewhat astonished. Did you have the least idea that this accused had committed treason, that he might be a traitor?
The Witness: No.
The Defence 'Counsel: Mr. President, did you state the following at your interrogation before the examining judge: "As is well-known, Schuschnigg had handed me his resignation already on the afternoon of 11.3.1938—it was announced at 7 o'clock in the evening—but I had naturally entrusted him at once with the task of continuing the conduct of government affairs with a view to forming a new government. He and Dr. Guido Schmidt, his Foreign Minister, remained at the Chancellor's office throughout the evening and night of 11.3.1938 until after midnight, most of the time with me; they kept me continually informed about what was happening outside, also about the progress of the NationalSocialist revolution in Vienna and in the provinces of the federation, [Bundesländern] about the occupation of the most important nerve centres of public administration, about the hopeless answers to appeals for help made by the Austrian Foreign Office to Rome, Paris, London and other capitals. (Ludwig, the ambassador, had telephoned). Soon after, Vienna Radio was transmitting National-Socialist reports and, since 10 o'clock in the evening, the swastika flag had been flying from the roof of the Vienna office of Chief of Police on the Schottenring, while the crowd of National-Socialists assembled in front of the Chancellor's office grew denser and about 40 of them, said to be a deputation, were admitted to the closed Chancellor's office through the back door, and that by the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. The guard detachment on watch must have looked on full of wrath; I learned of it only on the next day." Were you of the opinion that, from the moment Dr. Schuschnigg resigned from the offiee of Chancellor, the Austrian government still possessed some power, or had the power already been transferred then de facto to the National-Socialists?
The Witness: My statements before the examining judge are correct. At that time, the Schuschnigg government had, de facto, no powers whatsoever.
The Defence Counsel: You know that the accused still remained in the Seyss-Inquart Cabinet later on. Have you personally ever held this against him? '
The Witness: No, on the contrary, I was glad that there were
533
3697—PS
Austrians of conviction in the Seyss-Inquart Government, who, in my opinion, had somehow taken office in Austria's interests.
The President: Did you or any member of your family approach the accused with any personal request at any subsequent time? Because you stated before the examining judge: "In early summer 1939, when my eldest son, Finance commissar (retired), was discharged from state service, and was endeavouring to find another post, the family advised him to apply to Dr. Neumayer, his former Minister, who might perhaps find him a job in the Vienna City Insurance Concern, of which he had become the director in the meanwhile. My son was indeed received by Dr. Neumayer but his request came to naught. At any rate, Dr. Neumayer's attitude was one of refusal."
The Defence Counsel states in this connection: The statement that Dr. Neumayer's attitude in this matter was one of refusal must have been based on incorrect records or on erroneous records.
The Witness states in this connection: In the year 1939, my oldest son, Dr. Wilhelm Miklas, who was in the Ministry of Finance, was dismissed from the state service by the Nazis. He then joined the army, spent 4 winters in the East and, at the beginning of the fifth winter, he was taken prisoner by the Russians and died of spotted fever in a prisoner-of-war camp North of Lemberg. That was the middle of October. He was the third victim of the war. Of his [or "my". Typing not clear] seven sons, who were all conscripted, three were killed, two are still prisoners and two returned home a few weeks ago.
I can no longer remember what I said before the examining judge with reference to my son. My eldest son made various attempts to gain a post but unfortunately in vain. As far as I know, he also applied to the accused. But this effort too was unsuccessful, he did not obtain the desired post.
The Witness Dr. Wolfgang Troll: Personal particulars in File No. 22 and adds: living in Vienna III., Neulinggasse 18, no relation of the defendant, after having been warned to tell the truth, and after formal taking of the oath, states : I have known the defendant since 1936. It must have been in November, at the time Dr. Neumayer entered the Schuschnigg Cabinet as Finance Minister.
The President : In what capacity did you make the acquaintance of the defendant?
The Witness : In my capacity as Recorder of the Cabinet Council. I was the Recorder at the Cabinet Council meetings. For
534
3697-PS
ten or twelve years it was my task to make the arrangements for the Cabinet Council meetings and take the minutes.
The President: Do you still remember when the Cabinet Council sat, following the journey of Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. The journey to Berchtesgaden was on 12.11.1938. The Cabinet Council meeting which followed it took place then about a few days later.
The Witness: I remember that.
The President: What information on the discussion with Hitler did the Chancellor at that time give the Ministers, and also to the accused who was present?
The Witness Dr. Troll: The Cabinet Council meeting must have been held on the 16.11.1938. At this meeting Dr. Schuschnigg said quite briefly that he had been to Obersalzberg, that the matter had not worked out at all well; but he did not give further details at the Cabinet Council meeting regarding what had happened at Obersalzberg.
The President: We want to ascertain what the defendant knows or could have known from this Cabinet Council meeting.
The Witness Dr. Troll: I also did not ascertain any further details. I was the Recorder. The Chancellor did not mention individual details. Dr. Schuschnigg did not state what demands Hitler made at Berchtesgaden at that time. I believe the Chancellor made no mention of this at the meeting.
The President: Do you remember whether the Chancellor said that Hitler had demanded that Seyss-Inquart should enter Dr. Schuschnigg's Government as Minister of the Interior?
The Witness: I believe I remember that. I do believe that the Chancellor said that.
The President: The Chancellor said that he was put under great pressure.
The Witness Dr. Troll: One could have got that impression.
The President: The next Cabinet Council meeting was with the newly formed Cabinet: Dr. Pilz, Dr. Taucher had already left and in their place was the new Cabinet with Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior. That was on 21.11.1938. Could you tell us anything about this Cabinet Council meeting which took place between 21.11. and 11.IIL1938?
The Witness Dr. Troll: On 11.III.1938 there was no Cabinet Council meeting. It must have been in the previous week, that is, in the period between the 3rd and 7th March 1938. So far as I know, at that time as well as on 21.11.1938 only technical matters were discussed at the meeting. What happened on the fol-
535
3697—PS
3697—PS
lowing day I no longer remember as the particulars regarding this were lost.
The President: Was it mentioned at these meetings how much freedom was to be given to the native National Socialists with regard to whether the wearing of the swastika was to be permitted or whether that was to be permitted only within certain limits or whether the German greeting might be used, etc.?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I cannot remember having heard anything at all about such matters. It was not customary to discuss political matters at the meetings. Political events were discussed beforehand, outside the meetings so that the Cabinet Council had only to carry out the formal passing of resolutions regarding pertinent matters.
The President: Do you know whether the defendant was called in to these discussions outside the Cabinet Council?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I don't know,—for those discussions usually took place at the Chancellor's place; I do not know who was invited to them.
The President: What do you remember about the events of
11.III.1938?
The Witness Dr. Troll: A Cabinet Council meeting had been fixed for midday on 11.III.1938. However, he never came to it. The events of that time took place in rapid succession. In the course of the afternoon, the Secretary of State Dr. Kepler, appeared. He wore a uniform, and I noted that at that time I did not know the uniforms. Discussions then took place between the Chancellor and Minister Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Chancellor in the course of the afternoon, towards evening. I do not know the purport of these discussions, as I was not present at these discussions. The conclusion of the discussion was that the Chancellor, Dr. Schuschnigg came out of his office and then made his well-known farewell speech on the radio, which he delivered at the microphone in the ante-room. That was between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening. This was preceded by discussions between Dr. Schuschnigg and Minister Seyss-Inquart. I do not know whether Dr. Schuschnigg also had discussions with the President.
The President: Are you informed about the proceedings in the Office of the Chancellor after Dr. Schuschnigg's farewell speech?
The Witness Dr. Troll: After the Chancellor's farewell speech I still stayed on at the office until about 2 a.m. I can no longer remember whether at that time I saw the defendant. At that time the Government was being formed. I only saw the members of newly formed Cabinet again when they came out of the cham-
536
3697—PS
bers of the President. I do not remember seeing Dr. Neumayer among the members of the Government, or seeing him at all at that time in the Chancellor's Office. I had nothing to do with the swearing-in of the new Government. I was busy at the Cabinet Council Meeting on Sunday, 13.III.1938. This took place at about 10 a.m. I do not know if it took place during the afternoon, but it may have done. From my experience of the Cabinet Council I definitely felt that I no longer wanted to have anything to do with it. I was presiding, [Presidialist] in the Chancellor's Office. I was a ministerial Councillor. I held the office of recorder. On 13.III.1938 this new Government held the first Cabinet meeting. I took the view that I no longer belonged to this Government. I just felt it. For me my activity also ended with the farewell speech of the Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg. In this connection it is true that I was still a Government official. Because I felt that way, however, I declined to act further as recorder at this meeting on 13.3.1938. I had the feeling that my place was no longer there, that another person belonged there. I also asked that someone else be entrusted with this position, but received instructions from Secretary of State Wimmer that I still had to act as recorder and, therefore, complied with these instructions.*
The President: What happened at this meeting?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I did not know what was the object of the Cabinet Meeting as it was an unprepared Cabinet Meeting. I did not at that time have to make any preparations. I then went into the Cabinet Council hall. The Government was assembled and I can still remember that the proceedings were rushed through. I hardly had the chance and the time to sit down. I had to take the minutes standing up. Seyss-Inquart said a few words at the beginning of the meeting which I can no longer remember. The whole matter must have lasted ten minutes at most. Seyss-Inquart read out the Anschluss Law, that Austria is a country of the German Reich and so on. To this no objection was raised. There was absolutely no debate at all. I have forgotten all that Seyss-Inquart said.
The President: I put it to you that the accused in his statement said the following: "The Cabinet Meeting was very short, the Anschluss Law has been accepted without objection, Seyss-Inquart first stated that as a result of the resignation of the Austrian President Miklas, the functions of President were transferred to him, and secondly Seyss-Inquart stated that he had a meeting at Linz on Saturday, the 12.3.1938, with Adolf Hitler,
744400—47—36
537
3697—PS
who ordered him, 'now, to-day, immediately' to pass the Anschluss Law which he was now reading-."
The Witness Dr. Troll states in this connection : I believe that must be right. I do not know whether the word "order" was used.
The President: Did Seyss-Inquart say that the functions of Austrian President had been transferred to him?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I do not exactly know but I consider it likely. Then the Anschluss Law was accepted without objection. The agenda was thereupon finished. After this meeting of the Cabinet Council all the members went away.
The President: What was the next step necessary? Was the law made public?
The Witness Dr. Troll : I gave the Anschluss Law documentary authentication and the law was then entered into the law gazette of the province [Land] of Austria, of that time, by the constitution service [Verfassungsdienst].
The President: Are you not aware that two men went to the residence of the former President for the purpose of getting the signature for this law?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I don't know, I have not heard anything about it. '
The President: You also cannot tell us at what time this meeting of the Cabinet Council took place on 13.3.1938?
The Witness Dr. Troll: No. This meeting could even have taken place in the afternoon.
The President: You made the acquaintance of the accused at the commencement of his period of office as Minister in November 1936. You perhaps also learned, and in your capacity as recorder, for what reason or in what capacity the defendant was appointed Finance Minister in Dr. Schuschnigg's Cabinet?
The Witness Dr. Troll : The retirement of the Finance Minister Dr. Draxler took place at that time. I do not know why Dr. Neumayer was then appointed as Finance Minister in the Schuschnigg Cabinet. I do not know whether political reasons were decisive here or purely technical reasons. It was certainly said that the accused supported the nationalist cause or had some such background.
The President: At the meetings of the Cabinet Council in November 1936 until the end, did the defendant in any way take up a party attitude or did he see things strictly from the point of view of his department?
The Witness Dr. Troll : I cannot recall any instance when the
538
3697—PS
defendant would have been prosecuted for his political views during the meetings of the Cabinet Council.
The President: Do you also.know anything about this ultimatum which was handed over on 11.B.1988 in the office of the Chancellor?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I heard rumors of it.
The Prosecuting Attorney: The defendant has stated in his defense that Seyss-Inquart declared at the opening of the meeting of the Cabinet Council on 13.3.1988 that the Anschluss Law must be passed otherwise he would bring war on Austria. Can you recall any such words by Seyss-Inquart?
The Witness Dr. Troll: I recall that some kind of statements were made by the Chancellor Seyss-Inquart at the time, but I do not know any details.
The Defence Counsel: submits to the witness his statements before the Examining Judge.
The Witness Dr. Troll states in this connection: My statements before the Examining Judge in File No. 22 are correct. I still stand by these statements.
The Witness Otto Huber: Personal particulars in S 107, no relation to the defendant,—after having been warned to tell the truth, and duly sworn, states:
The President: When did you get to know the defendant?
The Witness Huber: At the opening of the Vienna Fair which took place twice a year. I got to know him then in his capacity as Financial Advisor to the Vienna municipality. I was then in the company of the President. Later I got to know him in November 1936 as Finance Minister in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
The President: Was anything at all known about him personally, in what direction his views tended and so on?
The Witness Huber: It was known that the defendant was a nationalist. He was looked upon as a special Minister. The reasons for his appointment as Finance Minister are not known to me.
The President: Could you briefly describe to us the events of
11.3.1938 at the office of the Chancellor, as far as you can remember them?
The Witness Huber: Up to the afternoon the President had not heard anything from the "Right". At that time no ultimatum had yet been presented. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon I drove home with President Miklas. At that time we still did not know anything about the events. At about 3.30 p.m. we returned to the Chancellor's office. The Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg then announced to the President that he was going to resign. A long
539
3697—PS
discussion then took place between President Miklas and Chancellor Schuschnigg at which I was not present. Then the ultimatum was presented—I have forgotten who by. There appeared I believe two youngish men from Salzburg, one of them must have been Dr. Reiner; he said he had spoken to Goering on the telephone about the ultimatum and that Goering had told him that the ultimatum must be kept, nothing would happen to Austria if the ultimatum were kept. These people wanted to speak to President Miklas; I did not let them, but referred them to Minister Glaise-Horstenau.
The President: Why did you refer these people to Minister Glaise-Horstenau ?
The Witness Huber: The National Socialists were then going in and out of the Chancellor's office, and it was already evident that they were representatives of the opposition. Then Secretary of State Dr. Kepler handed over the ultimatum. I was not present, however, at the handing over of this ultimatum. President Miklas rejected the ultimatum. Discussion was then entered into as to whether a different Chancellor and not Seyss-Inquart could be installed in the Government. They had Dr. Ender in mind for this purpose. Dr. Ender, however, declined. Then there appeared Lieutenant General Muff. President Miklas told him, too, of the rejection of the ultimatum. In this connection I remarked that Lieutenant General Muff had spoken very strongly to Dr. Guido Schmidt who was present and had blamed him for being largely responsible in the whole matter. Upon this Guido Schmidt left.
At 12 noon Secretaries were changed.
The President: Secretary:
[illegible Trumler e.h.
signature]
The above copy is a true extract from an Austrian court document in the proceedings against the defendant Dr. Rudolf Neumayer, containing the testimony of the witness Wilhelm Miklas.
[stamp]
People's Court Vienna Vienna VIII (64) Landesgrichtsstr.il.
Section V g 1 11.11. 1946.
[Stamp]
Prezzi. [?]
People's Court Vienna in the building of the "Landes"
Penal Court.
540
Testimony by Wilhelm Miklas in the trial of Rudolf Neumayer (in Austria), on Austrian politics and the German takeover in February-March 1938, including Seyss-Inquart's role
Authors
Wilhelm Miklas (president of Austria (1928-38))
Wilhelm Miklas
Austrian politician; President (1928-1938)
- Born: 1872-10-15 (Krems an der Donau)
- Died: 1956-03-20 (Vienna)
- Country of citizenship: Austria; Cisleithania
- Occupation: politician
- Member of political party: Christian Social Party
- Member of: Katholische Österreichische Studentenverbindung Austria-Wien
- Position held: Member of Abgeordnetenhaus; Member of the Landtag of Lower Austria; member of the National Council of Austria (parliamentary term: 1st National Council of Austria, 2nd National Council of Austria, 3rd National Council of Austria)
- Educated at: University of Vienna; convent Gymnasium in Seitenstetten
Date: 30 January 1936
Literal Title: Third day of Trial - 30 January 1946.
Defendants: Franz Papen, von, Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Total Pages: 34
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: PS-3697
Citation: IMT (page 11540)
HLSL Item No.: 453296
Notes:This document was entered as US exhibit 884. Testimony was also given by Wolfgang Troll (pages 24-31) and Otto Huber (pages 31-33).
Document Summary
PS-3697: Court proceedings, testimony of the witness Wilhelm Miklas in the case against the accused Dr. Rudolf Neumayer re happenings of February 1938