Comparison of document PS 798 (prosecution's text of Hitler's speech on war aims and strategy, 22 August 1939) with Raeder's version of the same speech (Raeder 27)

Prosecution comparison of documents 798-PS and Raeder 27
Document 798-PS
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A. 1 II have called you together to give a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.
Raeder Document Book II, No. 27
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1 1 Purpose of speech to give the Fuehrer's
opinion on the political situation, to present his ideas so as to strengthen confidence in his decision because his decision to act was irrevocable.
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5 After this we will idiscuss military
details.
6 It was clear to me that a conflict
with Poland had to come sooner or later.
7 I had already made this decision in
Spring but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East.
9 But the sequence cannot be fixed.
9 One cannot close ones eyes even before a'threatening situation.
10 I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West.
12 But this plan, which was agreeable
to me, could not be executed since essential points have changed.
13 It became clear to me that Poland
would attack us in case of a conflict with the West.
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No.
1 15 Although this conflict with Poland was unwelcome and it was necessary.
1 4 As late as last Spring his intention still
was to postpone the solution of the Polish question, to put it on ice, so to speak, in order to settle first the conflict in the West, unavoidable in his opinion.
1 7 However, a politician cannot commit himself as to the sequence of events. One must be elastic.
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1 8 The basis for his original intentions had
changed.
1 9 For that matter, he had never believed
that the Poles would have observed the Non Agression Pact when Germany would have been tied down somewhere else.
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J. 1 15 Poland wants access to the sea. The
further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel Region.
K. 1 16 And it became clear to me that in
the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerated as reasons for this reflection.
L. 1 19 (1) First of all two personal constitutions.
M. 1 20 My own personality and that of
Mussolini.
N. 1 21 Essentially depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence, therefore, is a factor of great value.
O. 1 25 But I can be eliminated at any time
by a criminal or an idiot.
1 12 This is shown by the map.
1 15 It was necessary and the political situation
was at present more favorable than perhaps in a few years' time for the following reasons.
1 18 (1) Personal reasons on our side.
1 19 (a) His own person as acid in the life of
the German people.
2 1 (b) A similar case can be made for Mussolini.
1 19 His own person as acid in the life of the
German people. He had unified the German people; has confidence and authority over the German people such as no successor could enjoy it greater.
1 22 Any day he could be the victim of an enemy
or an insane or could die a natural death.
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P. 1 27 The second personal factor is the
Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him Italy's loyalty to the Alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce' is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
Q. 1 32 The third factor favorable for us is
France. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain but this depends upon Franco's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.
R. 1 37 On the other side a negative picture,
as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or in France.
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2 1 (6) A similar case can be made for Mussolini. Not the pact with Italy are decisive but personalities. Mussolini is decisive for adherance to the Pact. The Court was against everything it considered adventurous, would like it best to be satisfied with what they got. Mussolini was a man "without nerves". Proof was the Abyssinia conflict.
2 8 The personality of France was also of consequence. The Fuehrer never expected more than friendly neutrality from Spain. She continued to be under the political influence of several parties. Only Franco was the guarantee of uniformity and a certain continuity in politics.
146 18 (2) On the other side, the opponents picture was negative, luckily for us there are no personalities.
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S. 1 39 For us it is easy to make a decision.
We have nothing to lose and can only gain. Our economic situation is such because of our. restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years.
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T. 1 41 Goering can confirm this.
U. 1 42 We have no other choice. We must
act. Our opponents risk much and gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. Nb personalities, no masters, no men of action.
V. 1 46 Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us. In the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world. The English Empire did not emerge from the last war
146 15 It is hard to make a decision which must
lead to bloodshed. It is difficult but comparatively easy for us because we have only one choice. Get it over with or lose out. We might be able to stand the present condition economically and by exercising all our strength for about 10 to 15 years, not longer.
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146 20 Therefore we are forced to come to a decision. Such decisions are much more difficult for our adversary. He would gain nothing. His stake is much greater, enormously great. The personalities on opponents side are, however, without exception below the average of what is expected from a statesman, they are no men of action.
147 1 There are a number of tension spheres for
England. In the Mediterranean the strained relation with Italy, in Asia with Japan, in the Near East England has alarmed the Mohammedans. When the expression "Pyrrhic" victory ever applied to a nation, it was the victory of 1918 to England. On the Seven Seas
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strengthened. From amaritime point of view nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland ; the South African Union became more independent; concessions had to be made to India.
W. 1 52 England is in great danger.
X. 1 52 Unhealthy industries.
Y. 1 53 A British statesman can look in the
future only with concern.
Z. 1 54 France's position also deteriorated,
particularly in the Mediterranean.
AA. 1 56 Further favorable factors for us are
these: Since Albania there is no equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation. Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been
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she lost her predominance and shares it with America. Her Empire was shaken, Ireland became independent, the Union of South Africa aspires to the same, the appetite for it is growing in India.
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147 13 Because of the armament all countries have
created their own industries. It has become difficult for England to find markets. The old order is disturbed.
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147 17 France too is in a bad state, above all because of the decrease of her conscription classes.
147 19 Facts favorable for us are furthermore the
occupation of Albania, which, in the hands of Italy, neutralizes Yugoslavia. But this too is weaker than the Serbia of 1914, as the Croates are causing a splitting of the country, Rumania is weaker than before, and Hungary and Bulgaria are arming and marching at her border. Turkey has lost her only great man, At-taturk, the men now in power are little
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ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men. All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two or three years.
2 No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
4 The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically but militarily it was questionable since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible not by general settlement but by solving individual tasks.
minds or are under the influence of the sterling. Taking everything in consideration, there are a number of favorable circumstances which might not exist any more in three years from now.
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148 4 The psychological side has also to be considered. The last three great events regarding the "Ostmark" (Austria), Sudeten Land and Czecho Slovakia are doubtless an excellent political accomplishment. It would, however, be extremely dangerous for a nation, and especially for her armed forces, to regard to the matter solely as an instrument of bluffing for political purposes without the intention of using them in earnest. From the viewpoint of a later, large and final settlement in the West which believed unavoidable, it appears advisable from a military point of view to test the armed forces in a single task. The question arises now: Is there any likelihood that this task can be carried out isolated and without bringing about other catastrophes?
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8 The relation to Poland has become unbearable.
8 My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people.
9 My propositions to Poland (Danzig
and Corridor) were disturbed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone toward us. State of tension intolerable in the long run.
11 The initiative cannot be allowed to
pass to others. This moment is more favorable than in two or three years.
12 An attempt on my life or Mussolini's
could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand beside one another with cocked rifle.
14 A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable ges-Page Line
148 18 It is obvious that the political situation of
Poland, such as it exists today, is unbearable in the long run.
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148 19 Therefore the proposal of the Fuehrer
about the cession of Danzig and the creation of a connecting line through the " corridor. This attempt for a settlement was disturbed by England, which worked herself in a frenzy and incited Poland to impertinent note and military measures. The relation between Germany and Poland must be tolerable or an unbearable tension will be created.
149 1 In that way, however, the initiative is no
longer in our hands. From this point of view also it would be better to act now rather than later.
No.
149 5 Bad compromises must be refused and the
demand for "nice gestures" that language of Versailles, which already can be
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tures. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not ' interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.
JJ. 2 21 Reference to previous risks.
I would have been stoned if I had not been right.
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heard again. We, in particular, must watch our prestige, as it is very important for us. The likelihood of an intervention of the Western Powers in a conflict is, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, not great. The carrying out of his plans would certainly be a daring enterprise. It would be a grave mistake to assume that politicians received any directives from God. Nobody expects this from a general but one hopes for it for a politician. This however, does just as little apply to a politician as to a general, both have to find their decisions in their own heart. The alternative for us is to act or to be destroyed in the long run.
149 19 He, the Fuehrer, could say that he had, up
to now, been right in his judgment of the situation in crises.
150 4 He had stubbornly, upheld his opinion
against everybody and he had proved to be right. There was also great risk involved in the case of the Eastmark (Austria), Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia and he had come through the crisis.
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LL. 2 22 The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before I got a warning through France.
MM. 2 24 I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.
NN. 2 26 Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.
00. 2 27 The following special reasons
strengthen me in my idea. England and France are obligated.
PP. 2 28 Neither is in a position for it.
QQ. 2 28 There is no actual rearmament in England. * * *
RR. 2 29 Just propaganda.
SS. 2 29 » It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote
to Englishmen after the solution
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149- 25 He reminded of the occupation of the Rhineland.
150 1 M. Poncet had seen him eight days before
the re-occupation and had informed him that a march into the Rhineland would mean war to France.
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150 11 There was also a great risk involved in the
present situation which could be mastered only through iron determination.
150 14 The Fuehrer does not believe in an intervention of the Western Powers for the following reasons. The two countries, England and France had, it is true, given a guarantee to Poland.***
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150 18 In judging the situation in the two countries it must be said that England had an excellent propaganda.
150 20 The attitude of Germans, including ones in prominent positions, had given considerable support to this English propaganda
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of the Czech question: the Fuehrer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon.
32 This, explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament.
34 But how is British rearmament in
actual fact. The construction program of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled.
35 Only mobilization of the reserve
fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers.
36 Considerable strengthening of the
Navy, not before 1941 or 1942. Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of three divisions to the Continent.
in Autumn 1938. They had said before and during the crisis: "England will intercede in favor of Czechoslovakia even with her armed forces". When this did not come off they said: "We admit we were wrong; the Fuehrer was right. He won because he had the better nerves and stuck it out."
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151 7 How is the present military situation in
England. The Naval shipbuilding program has only partly been carried out.
No.
151 9 Its effect is not to be expected before 1941
or 1942. The land troops had not been noticeably increased. The possible strength on the Continent had been estimated at three divisions.
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XX. 2 39 A little has been done for the Air
Force but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment .England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced.
YY. 2 42 Fire directors are lacking.
ZZ. 2 43 England is still vulnerable from the air.
a. 2 43 This can change in two or three years.
b. 2 44 At the moment the English Air Force has only 130,000 men.
c. 2 44 France 72,000 men; Poland 15,000 men.
d. 2 45 England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.
e. 2 47 The following is characteristic for
England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament.
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151 12 In the air a certain success can be noted
which, however, is still in its beginning. The modern antiaircraft gun had been introduced last year, there are 150 to 200 guns available in the country, the monthly deliveries amount to 15 to 20. Even with us and our better industry, an increase of this production would require 9 to 12 months. For instance to increase the production from 70 to 90, how much more so in England?
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151 20 She was also vulnerable from the air.
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151 20 The Air Force itself had in England about
130,000 men.
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151 23 Political and military complications in the
world are therefore not welcome for England as she had to defend many positions.
151 26 What England thinks of Poland is shown by the negotiations for a loan. England had declined Poland's request for 8 mil-
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England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million points in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.
f. 2 53 France lacks men (decline of the birthrate). Little has been done for. rearmament.
g. 2 54 The artillery is antiquated.
h. 2 54 France did not want to enter in this adventure.
i. 2 55 The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:
(1) Blockade: It will not be effective.
lion points gold Sterling, although she had recently invested half a billion in China. When Poland then requested arms they have mentioned ridiculous figures of obsolete material, in other words declined any serious assistance with the reason that they need their gold and arms themselves. Only such credit for goods had been granted which do not mean any serious help. The situation of England was certainly precarious. "It therefore seems impossible to me that any responsible British statesman would take the risk of a war for England in this situation."
152 10 France cannot afford a long bloody war,
her conscription classes are too small, her material not sufficient.
No.
152 11 France was forced into . this situation
against her will.
152 14 Which are now the possibilities for an intervention of the Western Powers?
(1) The blockade which however has not the significance any more as before.
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j. 2 56
k. 2 58
Because of our anarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east. (2) Attack from the west from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.
1. 2 59 Another possibility is the violation
of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means.
m. 2 61 England and France will not violate
the neutrality of these countries.
Actually England cannot help Poland.
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No.
152 18 Here one had to consider what it would
mean for the French soldier who had been brought up with the idea to defend the Maginot line, to come out of this defense line and attack the German West-wall to lose perhaps a quarter of a mil-* lion men without any definite guarantee
of success. Because the German nation who had heroically defended shellholes before would certainly hold the present Westwall.
152 26 The Western Powers might perhaps try to
advance against Germany through neutral territory, and here the Fuehrer began to review the neutrals. All of them had the honest desire to remain neutral : the Nordic states unconditionally.
158 7 It would, however, be impossible for England and France to violate the neutrality of this country against her will.
153 10 Perhaps the declarations of neutrality by
these countries were given at the instigation of England in order to give England a reason for her drawing back at
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o. 2 64 There remains an attack on Italy.
A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need, 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it cannot be done.
p. 3 1 It is nonsense to say that England
wants to wage a long war.
q. 3 3
r. 3 6
s. 3 6
We will hold our position in the West until- we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious Of our great production. It is much bigger than 1914-1918.
The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy.
After the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.
the outbreak of a conflict between Germany and Poland. She would then say: ***we regret that we are unable to help. No.
153 17 Now many say: "England is prepared for
a long war". The Fuehrer believes this opinion to be wrong.
No.
154 5 Among the Western powers there was hope
for the cooperation of Russia.
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I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer.
Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland.
And Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten.
Litvinov's replacement was decisive.
I brought about the change toward Russia gradually.
y. 3 13 In connection with the commercial
treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a nonaggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contact with Stalin is established.
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154 8 But only a blind optimist could believe that
Stalin would be so crazy as not to see through England's intentions.
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154 16 Stalin furthermore has to be afraid just as
much of a victorious army as of a beaten one.
154 17 The dismissal of Litvinov as Foreign Minister affected the Fuehrer like a gun shot.
154 19 A careful change in the political attitude
took place, beginning with the fact that the Fuehrer treated the Russian ambassador at a reception just as politely as the other diplomats.
154 23 Further discussions in the economic sphere resulted which led to a commercial agreement. Finally a proposition came from the Russians:
(1) For a nonaggression pact.
(2) For an intervention between
Russia and Japan.
(3) For a solution of the questions of
the Baltic provinces.
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aa. 3 17 The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty.
bb. 3 18 Now Poland is in the position in
which I wanted her.
cc. 3 20 We need not be afraid of a blockade.
The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc: It is a big arm which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation. The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations. Today's publication of the nonaggression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous. Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.
155 4
155 7
The nonaggression pact was to be signed on 23 August.
Now we have the possibility to strike at the heart of Poland, the military road, to the best of our knowledge, is free.
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