Berlin, 31st May, 1934 [Pencil note]
Habicht is coming today. . . .L 6/6 The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6.
From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June.
NOTE
The Austrian laivyer Baron Waechter visited me today in order to bring me greetings from the members of our Embassy as he remarked at the beginning, and to introduce himself to me in person as the leader of the department dealing with Austrian affairs. Herr v. Waechter of fresh, youthful appearance, gives the impression of an energetic personality steadily pursuing his
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aims. His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite.
Herr v. Waechter drew up for me too a 'picture of the situation in Austria which was in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts tv ere multiplying. Irrespective of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr v. Waechter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus, the great terrorist action as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up was by no means committed by Marxists, but by the Austrian SA, and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or in its preparations. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater. One main seat of unrest and therefore a particular source of danger for sudden outbursts of mob passions was and still remained Carin-thia, the country where the mismanagement and want under the Dollfuss regime were most felt and where National Socialism was, therefore, most successful. Herr v. Waechter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, and namely by means of centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in Austria itself and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today. Baron Waechter himself had, on the contrary, so far been unable during his present visit to put forward his views and suggestions, which were at the same time those of the authoritative party leaders in Austria. For a while peace and order reigned within the party in Austria, when after the February events the Reich Chancellor prohibited any propaganda activities and issued an order for a truce to be observed along the whole line. This was naturally obeyed by. all departments. But everyone supposed that a solution was being prepared and that,
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by his basic orders, the Fuehrer desired to create the necessary peaceful and favorable atmosphere for forthcoming negotiations. But when nothing followed in the meantime, and on the other hand the counter measures of the Austrian administration grew more and more brutal and incisive from day to day, the radical elements moved afresh and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons, but was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as the true political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which was as unobtrusive as possible. They were now working on this principle. In the course of the discussions, this idea, which goes on secretly smouldering, was met with again and again. A change must soon be made and a uniform leadership * * * [illegible]
otherwise Herr v. Waechter concluded his impressive description, any day a disaster might occur which would have the worst consequences from the point of view of foreign policy, not for Austria alone, but above all for Germany.
During the conversation, the visitor was called to the telephone on urgent business. Herr v. Waechter received a telephone warning from Munich not to return to Vienna, because he would be faced with arrest on the frontier already. An impressive illustration of what he has just told me about the intensification of Austrian police measures.
To my question as to what he intended to do now, Herr v. Waechter shrugged his shoulders and confined himself to remarking that he would first have to discuss it with his party friends.
I told Herr v. Waechter that in view of the importance of his report and the dangers which arose from it, I would make a suitable report to the Reich Minister and to the State Secretary. Herr v. Waechter asked me to do so.
[sgd] Koepke
Memorandum on Baron Waechter's report on the political situation in Austria, including terrorism committed by members of the Austrian SA, the need for centralized direction from Germany, the Austrian government's countermeasures
Authors
Gerhard Koepke (Dr., chief of political division, German Foreign Office)
Gerhard Koepke
- Additional details not yet available.
Date: 31 May 1934
Literal Title: Note.
Defendant: Constantin Neurath, von
Total Pages: 2
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: D-868
Citation: IMT (page 12343)
HLSL Item No.: 453655
Notes:In the transcript, the exhibit number is mis-stated as UK 155; 515 is correct. Von Waechtner was apparently part of or associated with the German embassy in Austria. Koepke stated that he would report the discussion to von Neurath, and a marginal note indicates that Hitler was also informed.