16 November 1932
Reichs Chancellor von Papen.
Dear Reichs Chancellor,
After a full consideration of your request dated 13 November for a conference on the situation and the decisions required, 1 have to give the following reply:
In spite of misgivings, I share your opinion that as leader of a large party one should not refuse to "enter into negotiations on the situation and the decisions required with that German politician who at present bears the full responsibility." However, the nation expects more from such a conference than a theoretical approach to the difficulties and problems which occupy them at present. Besides I have so often in my writing and speeches explained my attitude concerning this, that you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, must be aware of same. Small as appear to be the advantages of such a general discussion, as large may be damaging consequences derived therefrom, because millions of our fellow countrymen expect positive results from negotiations if they take place at the present moment and if they become generally known. And quite rightly so! Discussions of the position by themselves won't help anybody. Therefore I consider negotiations at this very moment only advisable if their negative outcome is not established from the onset. I am therefore obliged, dear Reichs Chancellor, to name four conditions under which such an exchange of ideas might take place.
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Item 1. I am unable to attend a verbal discussion but would ask that, if ideas are to be exchanged, this should be done in writing. The experience of the verbal discussions which have taken place so far and in the presence of witnesses, proves that the recollecting powers of the two parties do not yield in identical reproduction of the text and context of the negotiations. You yourself, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, state right in the beginning of your letter, that you had at one time been assured of the support by the national-socialist party of the Presidential cabinet to enable you to carry out your instruction "to effect the strongest possible concentration of all nationalist elements." The facts are that I stated in the presence of Hauptmann Goering, when I was informed that the cabinet was to be reshuffled after the elections, that I would not insist on this, provided the government would fulfill its nationalist duties. I instantly refused a request made to me about the same time to issue in writing a declaration of support, and stressed that this was quite out of the question. One could not possibly ask me to give a blank cheque to men, who were partly personally and in any event politically unknown to me. The economic and political measures taken by this cabinet during its first six weeks in office, have justified this reserved attitude of mine.
Your contention, Reichs Chancellor, that I had demanded total powers, whilst in fact I only asked for the leadership, prove how far verbal discussions may lead to erroneous conceptions. You yourself were to be a member of the new cabinet in your capacity as foreign secretary, General Schleicher, enjoying the special confidence of the Reichs President, was to be minister in charge of the Reichswehr and, agent from the Home Office and two, or at the very most three, ministries of no political significance, all positions were to be staffed by personnel who were either already in office or were to be agreed upon in negotiations between the parties concerned. You, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, have interpreted our demands, which at that time were more than modest, in such an erroneous light, that, wise through experience, I am no longer willing to deviate from the only safe method, that is, to deal with such questions in Writing, all the more, since I am obviously powerless against so-called official communiques. You, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, are not only able to submit your interpretation to the German people through the officially inspired broadcasting system, but you can also force it on to the readers of my own party newspapers by means of the publications regulation [Anflageverfahren], I have no defense 1 against such methods. If therefore, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, you
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intend to enter into a discussion, under observance of the other three conditions, 1 would ask you to let me know your attitude and/or your questions in writing when 1 shall similarly let you have my written replies.
Item 2. There is no point in starting discussions, unless you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, let me know in advance, how far you do in fact feel and regard yourself as fully responsible in your capacity as the leading German politician. Under no circumstances am I prepared to expose myself again to the methods used on 13 August. For in my opinion it is inadmissible for the "German politician bearing the full responsibility," to share out his responsibility at a given moment when responsible action is required. I refer here to a passage of your letter in which you now speak of reasons leading to the decision of 13 August, reasons which continued to apply, though at the same time you remark that you yourself do not come into this discussion at all! Mr. Reichs Chancellor, once and for all I should like to state: Just as I regard myself as basically responsible for the political decisions of the national-socialist party, as long as I am the leader of that party, so are you responsible for the political decisions of the Reichs government, as long as you are Reichs Chancellor. For that reason I asked you on 13 August to take the responsibility for the breaking-off of our negotiations yourself, instead of setting it on the Reichs President. I told you that since, as you assured me, our demands could not be met owing to reasons connected with the Reichs President. I had obviously to refuse to call on him in the circumstances. I told you that, as long as a Reichs Chancellor bore the political responsibility, it was his duty to cover his sovereign, he a king or a president. When you asked me what ideas I had on this subject, I suggested you should issue an official communique to the effect that negotiations concerning the Reichs Government reshuffle had taken place between you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, and me in my capacity as leader of the national-socialist movement; these negotiations had been unsuccessful and had therefore been broken off. For since I had previously been a presidential candidate, it seemed to me inadvisable toward the millions of my adherents to let the Reichs President appear as being in any way connected with my being turned down, which was now to be expected. You were the politician bearing full responsibility for the Reich, and in my opinion it was up to you especially in this case, to shoulder the responsibility, except if your conscience would have prevented you, in which case it would have been your duty to resign. Unfortunately you could not be prevailed upon to shoulder the due pro-
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portion of your responsibility; I carried mine all right. Your chancellery, however, succeeded by means of a subterfuge, against my wishes and in spite of the declaration which you had made, to involve me in a discussion with the Reichs President. The outcome, which to you was a foregone conclusion, may have relieved you of the responsibility in your own eyes; it did not destroy me, but it dragged the Reichs President, at the age of 85 years, into a common squabble and settled him with a heavy responsibility. I do not wish to see a repetition of this game. 7 am therefore only prepared to enter into a correspondence on the situation in Germany and the alleviation of our difficulties, if you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, are first prepared to admit unambiguously your full responsibility for the future.
Item 3. I would ask you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, to inform me to what purpose an inclusion of the national-socialist movement is desired. If you intend to get me and the nationalsocialist movement to subscribe to the political and economic program, on which, as you state in your letter, the Reichs government has embarked, any correspondence in this matter would be irrelevant, nay superfluous. I am willing and unable to give an opinion on what the government regards as the program of its own violation, since, in spite of the closest consideration, I have never quite understood that program. However, if it is a question of continuing those internal, foreign and economic-political measures which are being carried out at present, I shall have to refuse any support on the part of the national-socialist movement, since I consider these measures partly as inadequate, partly as insufficiently planned, partly as completely useless, even as dangerous. I know that you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, have a different opinion, but I consider that the practical activities of your Government have already been proven to be at least unsuccessful.
Item 4. You say in your letter that as a result of 6 November "a new opportunity for the concentration of all national elements" had arisen. I must confess that I am quite unable to understand the purport of this remark. I am of the opinion that that possibility has obviously only deteriorated through the dissolution of the diet in September, because the result is on the One hand an immeasurable strengthening of Communism and on the other a revival of the small splinter parties, which are without the slightest practical political value. The formation of a politically practicable block within the German people is thereby, from a party point of view, only imaginable by the inclusion of the Nationalists [Deutschnationale] and German people's party
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(DVP), because I have to decline a prior suggestion, which you seem to have in your mind, to include the Socialist party (SPD). As you know yourself, the leader of the Nationalist party [Deutschnationale] has, prior to the elections, most unambiguously branded any cooperation with the R.C. center party [Zentrum] as treason and a crime against the nation. I do not believe that all of a sudden Geheimrat Hugenberg would prove himself so lacking in character that he would do after the elections what he had so strongly condemned before the elections. Your endeavors, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, appear to me vague and thereby as much a waste of time as they are useless, as long as you are unable to inform me that Mr. Hugenberg has changed his mind after all.
These four points, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, I regard as my conditions for an exchange of ideas and/or correspondence. Approval or disapproval depends on you.
In conclusion I should like to assure you, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, that I am nursing no bitterness on account of the elections. During the 13 years of my struggle for Germany I had to suffer so much persecution and so many personal attacks, that I have learned in time to place the big task which I serve above my own miserable self. What embitters me is merely, to have to observe how, under your somewhat unfortunate statecraft, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, day after day some of the national wealth, in the creation of which, within the framework of German history, I participated to the best of my ability, is being squandered. This wastage of the hope, faith and trust of the nation in a German future is what fills me with sorrow and pain but at the same time confirms me in my unswerving resolution, to insist on my demands, which in my opinion can alone overcome our danger.
Yours faithfully (etc.)
(sgd) Adolf Hitler.
P.S. Since I understand that General von Schleicher has been informed of the contents of your letter, Mr. Reichs Chancellor, I take the liberty of forwarding on my part a copy of this reply.
Letter from von Papen to Hitler asking him to participate in the formation of a nationalist government, and Hitler's reply stating conditions for a negotiation
Authors
Franz Papen, von (Vice-Chancellor; ambassador)
Franz von Papen
German general staff officer, politician, diplomat, nobleman and Chancellor of Germany (1879–1969)
- Born: 1879-10-29 (Werl)
- Died: 1969-05-02 (Sasbach)
- Country of citizenship: German Reich; Germany
- Occupation: diplomat; military personnel; politician
- Member of political party: Centre Party (until: 1932-01-01); Nazi Party
- Member of: Union-Klub
- Participant in: Hostages Trial (date: 1947-10-03; role: affiant)
- Significant person: Wilhelm List (role: acquaintance)
Adolf Hitler (Fuehrer, Reich Chancellor, Supeme Commander of Wehrmacht)
Adolf Hitler
Austrian nationalized German politician, leader of the National Socialist party and dictator of Germany (1889-1945)
- Born: 1889-01-01 1889-04-20 (Braunau am Inn) (country: Austria-Hungary; located in the administrative territorial entity: Archduchy of Austria above the Enns; statement is subject of: Adolf-Hitler-Geburtshaus)
- Died: 1945-04-30 (Berlin Führerbunker) (country: Nazi Germany; located in the administrative territorial entity: Berlin; statement is subject of: death of Adolf Hitler)
- Country of citizenship: Cisleithania (period: 1889-04-20 through 1918-11-11); First Republic of Austria (period: 1919-01-01 through 1925-04-30); Nazi Germany (end cause: death of Adolf Hitler; period: 1933-01-30 through 1945-04-30); Republic of German-Austria (period: 1918-01-01 through 1919-01-01)
- Occupation: painter (statement is subject of: paintings by Adolf Hitler); political writer; politician (reason for preferred rank: generally used form); soldier
- Member of political party: German Workers' Party (period: 1919-09-12 through 1921-07-11); Nazi Party (series ordinal: 556)
- Member of: Nazi Party
- Participant in: Aktion T4; Beer Hall Putsch; The Holocaust; ethnic cleansing
- Significant person: Albert Speer; Benito Mussolini; Eva Braun; Joseph Stalin
Date: 13 November 1932
Literal Title: Letter from von Papen to Hitler, dated 13 November 1932.
Defendant: Franz Papen, von
Total Pages: 4
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: D-634
Citations: IMT (page 3248), IMT (page 3250)
HLSL Item No.: 453497
Notes:Von Papen to Hitler, 13 November; Hitler to von Papen, 16 November 1932.