[Letter of Seyss-Inquart to Himmler]
At Vienna, 19 August 1939
Reichsf uehrer !
At Munich I delivered to you a copy of the communication which I had addressed to Gauleiter Buerckel and in which, in a friendly and sincere manner, I had attempted to explain to him my viewpoint on the situation at Vienna. I have now received a reply from Buerckel, of which I am enclosing a copy. Upon receipt of this communication, which I beg you to read at once, I immediately sent the following reply to Buerckel: "Gauleiter! I confirm with thanks the receipt of your communication as of the 8th of this month. Now I at best know where I stand and have stood."
I request that you inform me who is supposed to have been that "very offensive immigrant at Prague" who reportedly received a letter from me this spring.
Heil Hitler
Signed
Seyss-Inquart
1Ö47
As an SS man I hereby inform you, Reichsfuehrer, of this communication of SS Gruppenfuehrer Gauleiter Buerckel. Buer-ckel is accusing me of anti-Reich and party feelings. The individual, actual assertions1 of his writing contradict this accusation, for, in regard to these details, there still remains, in any one, a mistake and misunderstanding as an excuse. However, when a man of Buerckel's political importance accuses me of having anti-Reichs and party convictions, such accusations must remain neither untested nor unanswered. In keeping with my report I therefore beg of you to take all necessary steps to clearly present the facts in the case and to ascertain the consequent responsibilities.
I am aware that every individual sentence written by Buerckel, is directed against me for a hostile purpose and signifies an attack. His writing therefore requires a minute and thorough examination. However, already at this time, I wish to take a stand against the most important accusation and have marked these points with consecutive numbers, which, already now, I shall enter into.
To 1. I do not know if a conversation, during which I gave Buerckel an explicit, confidential and personal explanation, took place 3 weeks before my writing. However, I do believe that at the time of the Fuehrer's visit on the 10th and 11th of June of this year, such an explanation was no longer issued on my part, for already then I was aware of the extreme suspicions which were directed against Buerckel, even if I did not yet share them. It is quite possible that I discussed matters of a relevant nature with Buerckel at the time, which, as Gauleiter of Vienna, he will also in the future have to take care of. At any rate, during the time in which I urged Buerckel to accept the position of Gauleiter; I also had the corresponding confidence in him. Without hesitation I must admit that in this case I have made a mistake.
To 2. The reference to Globocnik is an apparent shifting of the facts, of which Buerckel must be aware as he knows the state of affairs. I don't know Whether Globocnik in his speech at the time had especially declared war against those forces, which were coming to terms with the "Schwartben" [clerical party of Austria]. I only know that he spoke against saboteurs in the country even if they were in the highest positions. But it is completely wrong that I urged a change in the office of Regional Leader [Gauleiter], beginning at this moment. It is a known fact that I have tried in a friendly way to influence Globocnik to remove the misinterpretations which have arisen, but as I didn't succeed
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for a considerable time, I withdrew and didn't support and defend Globocnik. But I did not oppose him. It was Buerckel who first called me for a discussion with Globocnik, at which I for the first time expressed my former misgivings. But this happened at the moment when Buerckel himself had already brought up the question of the regional leadership. These are the facts. What Buerckel is attempting is a distortion of the facts in order to-imply a prejudice in my attitude for his further statements. For I state emphatically that while I requested Buerckel not to put aside factual considerations with references to separatism he met my representations with exactly, and one might say exclusively, this reproach. In his communication Buerckel refers several times to voices from thé other world. For instance an utterance by Klausner on 24 December 1938 at that time, according to my recollection, no Globocnik-crisis whatsoever existed yet, in any case I didn't know anything about it, and above all that speech by Globocnik hadn't been made which later caused my being held back and is assumed by Buerckel as the chronological point of origin of my altered attitude.
To 3. The speech of Buerckel at the "Gauappel" was no cause at all for me to assume any attitude. Its contents were known to me only through the newspapers and at that time he inveighed against everything as I was told by party members who were in the audience, especially against "Frau Blaschke" ["John Doe"], against the gripers, and against those who are waiting in the background for their opportunity. I cannot be considered as belonging to any of these three groups not even to the last one, because according to the situation at that time as I remember "the Gauappel" took place after the 1st of May of that year. I didn't expect anything in Vienna anymore.
The opinion was general that Buerckel meant Frauenfeld and his hangers-on by the third group. In any case Muehlmann could not have asked if Buerckel meant the governor [Statthalter], for I believe, as already mentioned, that at the time of the "Gauappell" the question of the governorship [Statthalterei] was already eliminated.
To 4. If the price-lowering activity of Buerckel actually had the significance of which he speaks, then I must double my reproach that his kind of propaganda is false. I have above all objected to the nature of his propaganda in Vienna and quoted the lowering of prices only as an example. An impression on the population through the lowering of prices was not noticeable at any rate. When in the course of this disagreement Buerckel
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attributed it to me that I had put skilled workers and former Marxists on the same level and thus contradicted myself, it is wrong and an exact perusal of my letter shows that I have spoken of two separate connections and meant different persons. The conclusions of Buerckel in regard to these statements give me the impression of pettifogging.
To 5. What Buerckel tries to present here is a "reversal" I say that openly. It is possible that there are no "Pfaelzer" in the official administrations, but that the Reich Commissioner's office rules everything, especially in Vienna, is known to every child on the street. At any rate these people do everything, and there is no level of authority into which they do not try to talk themselves and do talk themselves and they always call upon the authority of the Reich Commissioner. The directing authority in Vienna, whether region [Gau] or city, is the office of the Reich Commissioner. Buerckel now makes one of his usual subtle reproaches to the effect that I had taken too little interest in my administration and could only travel around in the Reich thanks to his people, apparently as he hints, to make propaganda for myself. My activity as a speaker is of no concern to Buerckel. Where I appeared I had the best of success, in any case more success than I could notice in connection with Buerckel's speeches. I also believe that my activity was very desired by the party offices concerned, e.g. the regional leader Gauleiter, and was approved by the Fuehrer to whom I sent reports now and then. I used the given situation to make the fellow Germans in the old Reich understand the concept of the Reich and the creation of the Reich through the Fuehrer. I have always not only avoided making my own person conspicuous in this connection but also, if this happened from a third party, I fought against it and pointed first of all to the Fuehrer and then to the old fighters. But this is of no concern to Buerckel. But the concealed reproach that I and therefore also my office had not functioned is flatly a mockery. If we—and here I think primarily of my very efficient collaborators such as Fischboeck, Plattner, Wimmer, Waechter, etc.—had not been after the things with such eagerness, the unsystematic and sudden decisions of the Reich Commissioner and the senseless interfering activities of his men would have resulted in administrative anarchy. But I ask where Buerckel was, especially since he is to fill the very responsible position of regional leader [Gauleiter] of Vienna. I believe that since that time, or the year 1939 on the whole, he has hardly spent 2/5 of his time in Vienna. I do not wish in this connection to argue against his
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technical suitability for the position of regional leader [Gauleiter] of Vienna, but already the technical supposition is lacking if he does not relinquish all his other tasks and is only regional leader [Gauleiter] of Vienna. If he is not willing to give his whole being to the most difficult regional leader [Gauleiter] post in the Reich, he is basically unfit to carry out this duty here. Thus it follows that he is mostly not here and the Reich Commissariat is administered by his, as a whole mediocre, people who remained strangers here. At the risk of being considered a horror-propagandist again, I mention that in the "Ostmark" and especially in Vienna, malicious jokes circulate which speak of a new branch of the Armed Forces, namely The "Position Hunters-Regiment of the Pfalz."
To 6. From where Buerckel has the intelligence that I am for conservation I don't know. I refer to my last letter and the quoted letter to Bormann where I just pointed to the danger of involuntary conservation and demanded the solution of Austrianism [Oesterreichertum] but not its strengthening through Buerckel— methods.
The lack of understanding that he shows toward my work, knowingly or unknowingly, is documentation of his inability to fulfill this political task. I may point out that it was I who stood most energetically for liquidation at the moment when I realized the eventual dangers in the existence of a "Landesregierung" (state government)—see my letter to Bormann of the past year —also I have liquidated myself in the conference on the mountain, when the Fuehrer signed the Ostmark-low, and perhaps even accepted a certain alienation from the Fuehrer when I declared my intention of retiring from further activity in the Ostmark. In this connection I wish to emphatically state the following : If today the position of political Catholicism in the Ostmark is liquidated to a much greater extent than in the old Reich, it is by no means due to the Reich Commissioner, but to the energetic action of my specialist Plattner, who has, in agreement with Dr. Krueger, who was called in by me against the attempted restraints of other offices, forced through all measures demanded even today as desirable utopia in the old Reich, under my direction, knowledge and signature. At that time Buerckel wanted to sign his Austrian concordat against the details of which I raised objections, when I heard about them, insofar as it appeared to me that too great rights with reference to the building up of a new clerical generation appeared to be granted.
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The charge, that I am keeping bad company when I quote the language of the Viennese, leaves me cool, for I am keeping company with the oldest and most deserving party associates—those who performed for the Ostmark a quite different share of work from that performed by Buerckel. You, yourself, Reichsfuehrer, will in the meantime already have confirmed this. It is significant that the State Police (Stapo) declares that it can take strict measures against the complainers ("bleaters"), because, actually, the strongest expressions of discontent come from party circles themselves.
To 7. Here too a voice from the other-world. I want to ask Globus, however, what was actually wrong there. I don't want to speak about my own belief in regard to this matter; I should, however, like sometime when you, Reichsfuehrer, have the time, to make my standpoint completely clear to you. It will not offer you anything new and surprising. To be sure I am, however, fully conscious of the colossal political significance of confessional religions; yes, I believe that here lies the decisive question for the future, when the movement will no. longer be borne by the Fuehrer directly and no longer filled with the passion of the struggle. In this sense I have surely said repeatedly that the conflict National Socialism-Catholicism is the most difficult that there is. If I have ever ventured a personal side in this connection, I have never done so in the sense that my political course should come into question in any way. But certainly however from the human side. That is to be understood thus: Even in the opposing camp there are decent and valuable men because they also are men of German blood. Especially with these one must come to an understanding humanly, never politically, because there I follow unconditionally the directives of the Fuehrer in "Mein Kampf", that the political opponent must be fought under all conditions, and that in this fight, his good qualities must not be recognized publicly. However if one has to fulfill one's task in the border territories of one's own political area as we have to in Austria, one comes into personal contact and relationship with the political opponent, and discovers this and that person with character value. Then it does not leave one humanly indifferent, if in the decision one takes an attitude as a matter of course by which these people feel themselves abashed, because they have moved in their own ideas, which one has not contradicted for political reasons. Who never has felt this human conflict in such a situation, is either no politician or an unscrupulous demagogue. This has nothing at all to do with the political attitude, there one coldly goes one's way.
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As far as the activists in the Catholic action are concerned, I establish emphatically, that I never signed a declaration for entry into the Catholic action, I even repeatedly refused invitations to give such a signature. Thus if Catholics have taken no other stand than I, and are persecuted for it, then this presents an open blunder by the party. I can claim for myself, based on the established facts, that I was more of and did more as a National Socialist than it appeared.
To 8. I do not know what the question is here. I already have demanded an explanation from Buerckel. The final sentence already contains one of the usual, hidden threats with which Buerckel works; it is an impertinence that he speaks of an act of mercy in this connection.
To 9. To present all the events of 11 March of this year and of the preceding days is beyond the realm of this letter. I shall take a stand with regard to all these things, especially with respect to the different descriptions and claims, which also appeared abroad, although these do not worry me in the least. I only want to say in detail: I will talk to Globocnik and Rainer about a memorandum by Globocnik. I have heard, that such a thing exists, however I believe that it has the tendency to emphasize especially the activity of Globocnik and Rainer, because the two did not consider themselves sufficiently honored in the distribution of jobs after the change in March 1938. I have absolutely nothing against it, when the meaning of the activity of these two men is especially pushed into the foreground. It can only be a statement by Buerckel, that I was hardly to be found in the critical hours. I myself went out into the fresh air for a little while for about half or three-quarter hours after the presentation of an ultimatum to Miklas at about 1600 or 1615 hours, which, I believe, was limited until 1730 or 1745 in the afternoon. I confess that the hours which had just passed, had affected me somewhat, and I was to regain the usual calm in the fresh air, furthermore, 1 wanted to observe the situation in the street and in addition, wanted to make a call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery [Bundeskanzleramt], but from a place where at least there was not the certainty, but only the possibility of wire tapping. It was clear to me that I was not needed before 1730, because I knew that the people of the System [Systemleute] would not decide one second earlier than when they have to. The talks with Buerckel, supposedly held under extreme pressure, are disproved by the records of the Field Marshal. In any case, I have refrained from going to the telephone after every sentence of our discussions,
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to prevent the impression, because of foreign political reasons, that we National Socialists in Austria act only on orders from Berlin and not according to our own decision. I have threatened with resignation, and namely toward Miklas, once with resigning as Security Minister, when he did not want to appoint me chancellor at a moment when the actual power already has gone over into our hands, and once as presently appointed chancellor, when he did not want to appoint the cabinet proposed by me.
10. I never sent a congratulatory message to Dollfuss. It is known to you, that there was in Austria at the time of the black and red coalition a secret society, which was anything but secret, with the name of "German Community" [Deutsche Gemeinschaft]. Those national and Catholic forces who at that time at least were anti-marxist and anti-semitic in their attitude, met here. Lawyer Dr. Doelter, my Chancellery Chief, was one of the founders and leaders of this society, and through him I also was brought into it. Dollfuss was also active there; he was in my age group, and he was extraordinarily active anti-semitically. It is a result of the activity of this society that the black and red coalition came to naught and that the Marxists never came into the government again. Then, when National Socialism gained a foothold, this society fell apart and was dissolved. The spokesman for the Catholics was Hofrat Bick of the National Library. It was our practice to make the Catholic faction as insecure as possible. Therefore we kept up our connection with these people. When the first attempt on Dollfuss' life had failed, at a time when there was already the most vehement political fighting, but before the series of constitutional violations and in particular the terrorist activities against National Socialist had started, I wrote to Hofrat Bick, gave by way of introduction, expression to my satisfaction at the failure, and continued with a recollection of the time when we worked together. I thereby reminded, Hofrat Bick and, as I know, Dollfuss also of the fact, that they themselves were once antisemitic. This was the purpose of my letter.
11. I do not know, whether this is an inaccuracy or an intentional distortion is involved here. It concerns a letter from Schuschnigg to the Chief of Police in Innsbruck. He defended himself there against the charge that he trusted me. This letter is moreover available. He did not describe me as his reliable man, but consoled the admonisher with the thought, that he had put me under the surveillance of Skubl, his most reliable man. Buerckel, in all his eagerness, should be careful with his propa-
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ganda, when it's a matter of such serious charges, should not act as if Schuschnigg had made this remark after the goal had been reached, that is after 11 March. From the standpoint of SS and party comradeship I consider it very regrettable, that Buerckel draws cogent conclusions on the basis of suspicions or at least cherishes suspicions, which contain such insulting accusations against me.
12. I dispense entirely with Buerckel's concern for me. It goes without sayihg that the Fuehrer would never have let himself be guided in his political decisions by considerations for my person. It is just as correct, that he never believed the suspicions, which Buerckel presents here on the sly. On 17 Nov., 1938 I had a discussion with the Fuehrer lasting more than two hours, and on this occasion set forth my standpoint in detail. As to the further contents of this discussion, I can testify only then, when the Fuehrer permits me to do so. I left this discussion a very upright man with the unspeakable happy feeling of being permitted to be a tool of the Fuehrer. Perhaps it will be of assistance in appraising my attitude, if I can prove in this connection, that I was able to report my discussion with the Fuehrer, in as far as the actual political situation was concerned, to Schuschnigg word for word and that Schuschnigg took cognizance of it. The attitude of the Fuehrer, in whose realm of light I stood, was thus so clear and unequivocal.
To 13. When Buerckel speaks of purely personal, political welfare-wishes [Versorgungswuensche] in reference to me, I can say merely, that the rogue thinks as he is. And that is the case. Everything that Buerckel does here in Vienna is also at least influenced by his political ambitions. The situation would be much easier, if we today knew of a new political task for Buerckel, which would not force him to descend from the level of a Minister again to the level of a Gauleiter or Reichsstatthalter, once the position of Reich Commissioner [RSchskommissariat] has expired. As it is the impression arises, that he seeks to hold at least the two functions of Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter in the two hubs of the Reich, in the West and in the East, to be sure in accordance with his absolute ambition to serve the Fuehrer, the party and the Reich. I for my own person can point out only, that I appeared before the Fuehrer after the execution of the annexation law [Anschlussgesetz] on 13 March, reported to the Fuehrer the execution of his order, and requested at the same time to be permitted to return to the ranks and to my private profession. The Fuehrer refused this at once and informed me* that he was
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thinking of appointing me Reichsstatthalter. I believe that in other ways as well nothing can be found, which would point to special political ambitions on my part. Perhaps there may even exist a certain deficiency on my part in this respect. In any case, however, I had no cause to think about any special provision [Konservierung] in my favor since, aside from the fact that something like that is not in my nature, the Fuehrer wrote me already in April 1938, that he would appoint me Reichsminister effective the 1st of May, 1989. -To 14. Here Buerckel raises against me in clear words the accusation that I am an enemy of the party.
To 15. I know that a group or a labor-association [Arbeitsgemeinschaft] of the Catholic National Socialists was to be created. That is a plan which goes back to the year 1934, at which time I had not yet developed any special, political activity. Thus I do not know, what Buerckel refers to.
16. As far as my membership in the party is concerned I state that I was never asked to join the party, but had asked Dr. Kier in December 1931 to clarify my relationship with the party, since I regarded the party as the basis for the solution of the Austrian problem. Moreover I had written this to Dr. Neubacher already in 1929 in order to bring his hopes which he had placed in the Austrian-German Volksbund to the correct proportions thereupon. I paid my membership fees [Beitraege] and as I believe directly to the region [Gau] Vienna. These contributions also took place after the period of suppression. Later on I had direct contact with the Ortsgruppe in Dörnbach. My wife paid these fees, but the "blockwart" was never in doubt, considering that this amount—40 shillings per month—was a difficult accomplishment for my wife and myself and I was in every respect treated as a party member. Furthermore, since 1932 I had also been a member of the Styrian home guard [Heimatschutz] Kammerhofer. In this organization, I worked for and contributed considerably towards the amalgamation of the Styrian home guard with the party whereupon, Habicht then announced that the members of the Styrian home guard will become party members. In every way, therefore, I felt as a party member, and considered myself a party member this as stated as far back as December 1931.
It is nonsense that I had intended the dissolution of Austria for a rather long time. First of all I never kept a certain time in mind at all when that would happen, because I did not know that Austria was to be dissolved. The proposal.in question, by Buerckel toward -this end was tunned down in Graz by the Fuehrer in my
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presence. The fact that Austria was to be dissolved I learned from the decree published by the Reich Commissariat and that was all there was to it as far as I was concerned. That the amalgamation or, as I prefer to say, dissolving beyond the (merely) administrative problems will consume more time is perfectly clear to me, and I can cite an utterance of the Fuehrer who told me that it took 40 years to make Bavaria a part of the Reich and in the case of Austria it would Still take longer.
Note to page 17. In this connection I am charged with having made plans for an Austrian Ministry secretly apd maliciously against the intentions of the Fuehrer. In hardly any other sense is Buerckel's charge understandable. The facts in this case are very simple. .
On 8 November 1938 various political leaders were asked to have supper with the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer called me to his side. We happened to discuss the situation in the Ostmark. I told him that according to his orders we were then about to divide the various authorities [Kompetenzen] of the Austrian State government, partly to the district governments [Gaue] partly to the central agencies, but certain affairs common to all district governments would remain, (1) because the actual incorporation would not be concluded quickly, (2) because property laws for Ostmark will remain at variance with the Reich's law for some time to come. These matters need supervision. Referring apparently to his letter to me the Fuehrer thought that I was here to serve as an expert for the Ostmark. As a matter of fact he repeated this again in March of that year during Buerckel's presence which did not at all please the latter. I sketched a plan according to which, an Ostmark specialist should be appointed in every central agency with the task of the special supervision of Ostmark questions and I in my function as Reich's minister would supervise these specialists. "Yes that's what I have in mind" answered the Fuehrer. On the basis of this conversation I started. Buerckel did not like that and interfered in his own peculiar way and told me that as Reich's commissioner he had obtained directives from the Fuehrer that such a solution was out of the question. I know nothing of the working out of a plan and sending it to a Berlin central agency. I turn to Pg. Stuckart for a clarification of this among other matters.
Note to Page 18 It is certainly as much a gross exaggeration of the value of Muehlmann as it is likewise an underrating of myself if Buerckel is of the opinion that the removal of Muehlmann were the coup de grace to my intentions. Buerckel, ever so often, jabs the air and fights shadows. It is my impression
that the extraordinary initiative, energy etc. displayed by Buerckel in these questions already transgresses the borderline of a clinical complex of hallucinations.
Note to Page 19 Far be it from me to call the men who work under Buerckel today in the function of Kreisleiters or Gauleiters ambitious fellow party members [Parteigenossen]. On the contrary, they are those disciplined fellow party members Who accept Buerckel because the latter was appointed by the Fuehrer. It was especially on behalf of these fellow party members that I intervened and adjured Buerckel with all possible emphasis that he should not carry on a policy against the party. I believe, Reichsfuehrer, that in the meantime you will have gained sufficient insight into the Viennese situation in order to ascertain that my fears are justified, Buerckel should not count off all the possible months spent in jail. I know that much better because I had experiences with the people in the struggle which had brought me to the very gates of prison, in any case I was suspect to investigations and arrest by the police. Buerckel, however, should recognize for once how many Gauamtsleiter he has already removed permanently or temporarily, or for example how many fellow party members he had detained or arrested, even if only temporarily. 6
To 20. I do not know if I am quite capable of pushing others ahead. One of my main properties which I feel as a drawback is my modesty almost to the extent of bashfulness. I just don't push my way forward, however, I have the misfortune to very often recognize the course of affairs correctly in advance, and when things then happen that way those concerned believe that I had arranged the course of events myself. Anyway I try to defend myself against this Cassandra's fate, but Buerckel can be as-aured, that in moments where decision really counts I can be very energetic and that I also am right in the foreground of events just as I used to be at the front. Only it takes a little longer before I warm up, because I have a perhaps wrong but great understanding of human weaknesses. Therefore I let people who are energetic step ahead, as for instance Buerckel during the past year. I believe I could have caused difficulties for this Reich Kom-missari'at with its' unsystematic conduct of business affairs so that it could have become questionable" if Buerckel would have, achieved the political position in Austria which he holds today, or at least believes to hold. But just in this connection I take the liberty, Reichsfuehrer, to refer to our conversation in Munich. Apparently Buerckel thinks, that I want to appoint Neubacher as Gauleiter today. Neubacher is one of my closest friends. But
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what I had to say about Neubacher as Gauleiter I have told you as well as Buerckel. Concerning Frauenfeld, we also discussed this possibility in Munich, I also mentioned Jury. I have brought forth everything, which speaks for or against the solution, the decision rests with the Fuehrer.
21. In this connection it seems to me as if Buerckel would again use a voice from the beyond and would in this case misuse it. Buerckel acts as if Hammerschmid had turned against me and my method. If Buerckel wants to claim that, it will be a lie. Hammerschmid stood so close to me that he would never have expressed criticism about me, least of all to Buerckel. The situation is quite simple. I threatened to interfere with my political efforts in Slovakia, approved by the Fuehrer, between two authorities, namely the Field Marshal and Ribbentrop. I may in this connection refer to my detailed presentation of these conditions which I submitted to you during spring of this year after the solution of the Slovak question. Now I didn't play any politics as does Buerckel in such cases, rather I said to myself that the Fuehrer had delegated both of these jurisidictions, the Four Year Plan to the Field Marshal, the Office of Foreign Affairs to Ribbentrop. Therefore I have to supply both with reports to which they are entitled, that means the General Field Marshal in particular with reports of economy, Ribbentrop with reports of foreign affairs. I must call the summarizing explanations of Buerckel in this paragraph just gossip. I.don't understand them. I do not know what I should have advised the Field Marshal about or what I did advise him. I did not do anything nor did I attempt anything; rather, I merely commissioned Hammerschmid to extend information necessary to them, in the above-mentioned manner, to the Field Marshal as well as to Ribbentrop. In this connection I may recall my great worries, which I have expressed regarding the above-mentioned representation of the Slovak affair, namely that in the Third Reich there exists such a lack of willingness for cooperative work. But if one does such cooperative work, he exposes himself to the danger of being suspected by Buerckel.
In this connection the affair Keppler-Field Marshal appears to me in a new light. I am convinced that Buerckel gave the Field Marshal the inflated report only in order to show the Field Marshal how attentive and anxious he, Buerckel, was, while I stood at least within the light of indifference.
22. "But you cannot do one thing, replace National Socialism with cleverness". With that Buerckel is insulting my party honor, but also my honor as an SS man.
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to 23. I have never attempted to force any man upon Buerckel. I recommended Muehlmann if he had a careful hand in treating people. However he wanted a man from me, namely Dr. Ham-merschmid, but the latter didn't want to be with him. I do not make any attempt to introduce my "garnishings" anywhere. I consider it bad anyway, if one introduces "garnishings" anywhere in the Third Reich, because thereby one only plants the seed for future fights of giants [Diadochen],
I never talk myself out of difficulties; even if I am not energetic in all circumstances, I still act sensibly. In any event I am also harmless. And sometimes I am surprised that people with unfriendly feelings see something in my actions which one cannot attribute to the action under quiet and unbiased consideration. But then the reproach falls back on the one who, because of his own ill will, wants to brand the harmless act of another as a misdemeanor. I will not be drawn into the discussion of an even better National Socialism, since all of us stand in the immediate experience of the Fuehrer. If Buerckel does that he claims that he would be able to decide what National Socialism is, and not the Fuehrer. However I believe that I may say one thing: the political artist Buerckel cannot be reached by me, which I confess without envy. However the National Socialist Buerckel can still learn something, as experience in this case teaches.
Reichsfuehrer, I have presented to you this letter by Buerckel and my first opinion, because according to my view you as Reichsfuehrer SS have the special task, of supervising the protection of the Reich and the party, and because you in your national functions have been charged with the maintenance of state political security.
My first impulse was to lay the writing of Buerckel before the Fuehrer and I believe now as before that the last declaration on this matter should be spoken by the Fuehrer. But the Fuehrer is so occupied with foreign political questions today that I do not wish to come to him at this moment, even though this affair has a meaning for me, as has no other matter touching me personally. I turn to you accordingly and beg you for the strictest investigation of these things and fixing of the responsibilities which must be borne here.
Hail to the Fuehrer!
Letter to Himmler, on his political conflict with Josef Buerckel, his happiness in being a useful "tool" for Hitler, connections with the Austrian Nazis since 1931, and his request that Himmler investigate the situation
Authors
Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Nazi official, Austria, Poland, Netherlands)
Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Austrian Nazi politician, and Nazi ruler of occupied Netherlands, convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death (1892-1946)
- Born: 1892-07-22 (Stonařov)
- Died: 1946-10-16 (Nuremberg)
- Country of citizenship: Austria; Austria-Hungary; Nazi Germany
- Occupation: jurist; lawyer; politician
- Member of political party: Fatherland Front; Nazi Party
- Member of: Schutzstaffel
- Position held: Federal Chancellor of Austria (period: 1938-03-11 through 1938-03-13; replaced by: Anschluss; replaces: Kurt Schuschnigg); Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs (period: 1945-04-30 through 1945-05-02; replaced by: Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk; replaces: Joachim von Ribbentrop); Reichskommissar; member of the Reichstag of Nazi Germany
- Employer: Austrian Federal Government; Reichskommissariat Niederlande
Date: 19 August 1939
Defendant: Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Total Pages: 12
Language of Text: English
Source of Text: Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.)
Evidence Code: PS-3271
Citation: IMT (page 2822)
HLSL Item No.: 453253
Notes:For a follow-up letter by Seyss-Inquart, 4 November 1939, see document PS 3398.
Document Summary
PS-3271: Unsigned carbon copy of letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler; long, detailed justification of himself as against accusations of buerckel
PS-3271: Seyss-inquart’s letter to Himmler, 19 August 1939: antisemitic attitude and political activity of the so-called "German community", to which dollfuss and Seyss-inquart belonged; his relations with dollfuss and others; his conference with Hitler, 17 february 1938; his party membership; his attitude to the dissolution of the state of Austria; his quarrel with the Vienna Gauleiter Burckel