Draft memorandum on how to pursue German goals in Hungary, including the need to prevent a Hungarian alliance with Britain, access to resources and labor, and the benefit of an "evolutionary" political process over military intervention

Nazi Proposal for Absorption of Hung-ary
[Typewritten draft for a memorandum. It is undated, but one page is written on the back of an unfinished letter dated 11 March, 1944]
(Handwritten corrections made to the original typewritten script by Krallert, Weneck, Kaltenbrunner, Flotte and Urban, are given in brackets with their initials, viz., Kr., W., K., F., & U., the crossed out phrase being underlined [italics].) ,
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From the point of view of the Reich, an incorporation of the Hungarian area as a fundamental part of the old Habsburg sphere of power is in the long run inadmissible.
This aim can be achieved by force (by intervention—K.) or as the result of an evolutionary process.
In spite of the extraordinary geopolitical and economic importance of Hungary for the Reich, German foreign policy has made no serious attempt during recent years to gain an influence on developments in Hungary and to make use of this to attain the goal by means of evolutionary methods (apart, perhaps, from direct personal endeavors by the Fuehrer to win Horthy over to the dismissal of Kallay and the elimination of the Bethlen influence.—K.)
Those Hungarians who look back, in the field of foreign policy, to a centuries-old tradition as a great power, incline fundamentally towards a conspiratorial policy. The complete lack of German attempts at influence has inevitably trained them to follow that policy of playing off one power against another which has now attained an intolerable character as the "proofs" have clearly revealed. (Underlining by W.)
(+) Instead of recognizing therein the necessity of seeking, in the numerous positive forces, bases for a solution which will both secure the total utilization of Hungarian potentialities for the prosecution of the war at the moment, and create for the future the prerequisites for the final aim striven for an attempt at a military solution by force now threatens. This will by no means lead (underlining by U.) to the complete fulfillment of the military and economic demands of the Reich in this area, and will, on the contrary, obstruct forever the road to an evolutionary development ((+) the whole paragraph is crossed out and the following substituted : I fear that the road to a future evolutionary development might be blocked by immediate military operations, without achieving for the present the seizure of the military and economic potentialities.—K.).
On the Hungarian side there stands against all this the fear of
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falling a victim to Bolshevism on the defeat of Germany, which is taken for granted. It is believed that the only way to exercise this danger is by an early adherence to the Anglo-American side. To this is added the deep dislike of the leading upper class towards us as the bearers of a social revolution which will, in the long run, make impossible the continuation of the feudal system of life in Hungary the beneficiary of which is this very upper class.
The consideration that a possible English intervention would have to be met in good time was one of the main reasons for the origination of the plan for a solution by force. (Indecipherablfe alterations have been made by K. and the whole paragraph has been struck out.)
Against this, I consider—for reasons arising from the geographical situation alone, the probability of an attempt at an invasion to be very slight. (Firstly, because of the geographical situation and then because an undertaking so unpredictable does not tempt the English who are not minded to take risks.—K.) I believe, on the other hand, that the approach of Bolshevism will in itself soon make even those of the upper class forces which are inimical to us, ready to negotiate, out of despair of the possibility of English aid and out of fear of the even greater Bolshevist danger.
The vitally essential demands of the Reich in this area are now as follows:
(1) Complete exhaustion of all economic and especially agricultural resources in order to safeguard the basis of Germany's and Europe's food supply, in view of the loss of the Ukrainian areas.
(2) Employment of all reserves of manpower for carrying on the war and
(3) Complete relaxation of tension, in order to set free the Rumanian troops also, for use on the Eastern front.
The military action will create the following state of affairs, especially in the event of participation by the Rumanians and Slovaks:
(1) A united defense front, such as has never been seen before —from the Communists to the Arrow and Cross party (Pfeil-kreuzler).
(2) The impossibility of forming any government; at the most some mercenary persons would be found.
(3) Horthy's immediate resignation.
(4) Military, political, and economic chaos.
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The country—one center of resistance, partisan activity on the greatest possible scale.
(5) And this point carries particularly great weight when the present German military situation is taken into consideration— numerous German divisions will be tied down for an unlimited period.
The desired aims will therefore not be attained. The carrying out of the military action at the time of the cultivation of the land in the spring, in itself decisively damages the prospects for the harvest. Ownership of large estates and the activity of Jewish middlemen, neither of which can be eliminated at short notice, will further lessen results. The partisan activity that can be expected for certain, finally destroys any hope of an increase in productivity.
The Hungarians have for centuries had experience in the organization of national resistance. Even the efforts of the old monarchy, which went on for twenty years, from 1848 to 1867, making use of all means of power, resulted in total failure. On the contrary, they decisively contribute to the creation and intensification of Hungarian national chauvinism. A recruitment of the Hungarian reserves of manpower for the German war effort is out of the question under these circumstances. On the other hand, continuous partisan warfare will ensue in the area occupied by us. As a result of the clash of the two opponents, warfare on a large scale would ensue in Transylvania and would presumably last a long time.
Even assuming the more advantageous case of a final Rumanian victory, the losses the Rumanians would have suffered and the necessity of suppressing northern Transylvania would make the employment of Rumanian troops in the East impossible for some months at least, if not permanently. We would, therefore, not see our present hopes fulfilled, would probably close the road to a later appeasement and final solution and would also evoke far-reaching reactions in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. The zones of unrest created behind our enemies, with an operational intention, would be closed to form a belt reaching from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, if a mutinous Hungary and a Transylvania in a state of war were added to them. Simultaneously, we thereby cut those supply routes, the safe functioning of which is vitally necessary to the southern wing of the Eastern front. If the Soviet intention of cutting, one after another, the supply routes that run parallel to and outside the Carpathians until the last railway line is cut, succeeds, then the supply lines through the Carpathian basin will alone be the basis for further resistance.
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But, also, those supply lines into the Balkans which are today the only safe ones and which would be vitally necessary in view of the 'possibility of a war against Turkey or a (of a—K.) landing in the Balkans (there—K.) would be endangered.
" Almost equally important are presumably the political effects abroad. The German attitude on the Transylvanian question, once again executing a volte face, would entail such a loss of prestige even in friendly foreign countries that no one could have faith in (doubts would arise as to—K.) our ability and our will for a New Order in Europe. The effects must be disastrous (will be oppressive^-K.) even in friendly nations such as Bulgaria, where it would be feared that a possible German agreement with the Serbs or Greeks might one day result again in the loss of Macedonia or Thrace. Thus we would drive the Bulgarians too into the arms of the Anglo-Americans in the endeavor (who will endeavor—K.) to make it possible to retain (to obtain a guarantee from them for (Sewoff)—K.) the territories they have gained, by changing sides in time. .
The effects to be expected in Finland, the Baltic States, etc., would be quite similar.
I am therefore convinced that the intended military coercive measures (intervention—K.) will not only not (will not necessarily—K.) attain any of the (the—K.) aims set, will create new and unforeseeable difficulties (situations that are difficult to get a bird's eye view of—K.) in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. A successful attempt at a new order on an evolutionary basis on the other hand (however—K.), would mean:
(1) An internally consolidated Hungary, friendly to Germany,
(2) Horthy's remaining in his position as a "historical" personality, who would continue to guarantee the functioning of the national institutions.
(3) The Honved and the security units would remain entirely in step and would thus be at the disposal of the Reich's military requirements.
(4) The total economic draining of the Hungarian area is fully guaranteed.
(5) The elimination of all arguments on Rumania's part that
she needs troops in Transylvania, makes these troops available for the East, and can postpone the present Transylvanian problem to a later date by clever promises.
(6) Therefore, not' only will Hungarian and Rumanian troops be gained, but numerous German divisions will be spared.
(7) A distribution of German troops throughout Hungary,
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which might become necessary for the purpose of security and against a British invasion, can be carried out unhindered, by means of troops in training, in the same way as has been done in Rumania. .
These far reaching results can be attained by comparatively simple means.
The point of departure would have to be a personal message from the Fuehrer to Horthy who, as is known, is (has been—K.) always most strongly (strongly—K.) impressed by the personality of the Fuehrer. The go-between for this message could be a diplomat such as von Papen who is not only known as an honest broker, but who enjoys moreover the personal confidence of Horthy. This message would have to refer to the debit balance of the government (Kallay's—K.) which had been hostile to Germany and express the thought that the full employment of Hungary's potentialities for Germany's and Europe's aims could alone assure Hungary's future existence. The condition and the guarantee for the carrying out of these demands would have to be created by a complete change of regime (in any case with German occupation—K.). Following on this, the Regent will legalize a neiv government on the broadest (a broad—Kr.) basis from the right xoing of the Government throughout the Party for Hungarian Renewal and the Hungarian National Socialist Party to the Arrow and Cross Party (Underlining by V.)
The Putsch-like carrying out of this change of government must be organized in such a manner that the entire public remains unaware of the actual connections, as a result of the authoritative decision of the Regent and that antagonistic forces do not get a chance to act. The putting into effect of this plan is guaranteed by the existence of plenty of suitable personalities ivith whom we have close connections through my collaborators (underlining by W).
(x) The most important of these men, who could take up leading posts in a new government, are:
Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal of the Reserve Ratz, a respected general who enjoys the confidence of the entire right wing opposition, and who seems certain to be acceptable to the Regent as Prime Minister.
Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Ruszkay, a highly qualified soldier of pure German descent, who enjoys the very highest respect of the officer class, and who, on taking over the Honved Ministry, would be a certain guarantee that Hungary's military forces would stand unconditionally at the side of the Reich.
The former Prime Minister Imredy, a man of great qualities as
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an economic leader and financial expert, who meets with very great approval, particularly among the Hungarian intelligentsia.
Major General of the Reserve Baky (deputy—Kr), one of the organizers of the Hungarian gendarmerie, who are generally and quite rightly looked upon as being the surest instrument for peace and order, and who have, at the same time, always been entirely sympathetic to Germany.
A number of popular party leaders of the right wing, as well as acknowledged experts, would also immediately be at our disposal (passage from (x) sidelined by F.).
(-|—[-) Conclusion.
I dare say that such an attempt could, through my collaboration, bring about a government consisting of the above-named people within 3 days. The military undertaking (transports to the Eastern front) will make its own contribution towards this. The Trojan method remains assured, but so does our good reputation as well.
The discussions taken down on the 13.3 did not even become a "D.-day."
It rests with the (?) and the "proofs"! (-(—|-K.).